United States v. Private E1 RONALD GRAY , 2012 CCA LEXIS 52 ( 2012 )


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  • UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
    Before
    JOHNSON, COOK, and BURTON
    Appellate Military Judges
    Private E1 RONALD GRAY
    United States Army, Petitioner
    v.
    Colonel ERIC BELCHER,
    Commandant, United States Disciplinary Barracks
    and
    THE UNITED STATES, Respondents
    ARMY MISC 20110093 1
    For Petitioner: Colonel Mark Tellitocci, JA; Captain Stephen J. Rueter, JA;
    Timothy P. Kane, Esq.; Shawn Nolan, Esq.; Billy H. Nolas, Esq. (on brief).
    For Respondents: Colonel Michael E. Mulligan, JA; Major Amber J. Williams, JA;
    Major Adam S. Kazin, JA (on brief).
    26 January 2012
    -------------------------------------------------------------
    OPINION OF THE COURT AND ACTION
    ON PETITION FOR EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF
    IN THE NATURE OF A WRIT OF CORAM NOBIS
    --------------------------------------------------------------
    JOHNSON, Senior Judge:
    This is a petition for extraordinary relief in the nature of a writ of coram
    nobis based on several alleged errors discovered after petitioner’s court-martial and
    appellate proceedings. We hold that petitioner cannot meet the threshold criteria for
    coram nobis review. Petitioner has other remedies available to him as a matter of
    law, but not within the military justice system.
    I
    In 1988, petitioner was tried by a general court-martial composed of officer
    and enlisted members. Contrary to his pleas, petitioner was convicted of the
    premeditated murder of Ms. KAR and Private LLV, as well as the attempted murder
    of Private MALN, in violation of Articles 118, and 80, Uniform Code of Military
    Justice, 
    10 U.S.C. §§ 918
    , and 880 (1982) [hereinafter UCMJ, 1982]. Petitioner
    was also convicted of rape (3 specifications), robbery (2 specifications), and sodomy
    1
    The docket number for petitioner’s direct appeal is ACMR 8800807.
    GRAY—ARMY MISC 20110093
    (2 specifications) with respect to the above victims, as well as burglary and larceny
    of another person, in violation of Articles 120, 122, 125, 129, and 121, UCMJ, 1982,
    respectively. The convening authority approved his sentence to death, a
    dishonorable discharge, total forfeitures and reduction to E1.
    The petitioner’s conviction and sentence were affirmed by both the Army
    Court of Military Review, which is this court’s predecessor, and the United States
    Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. United States v. Gray, 
    37 M.J. 730
    (A.C.M.R. 1992); United States v. Gray, 
    51 M.J. 1
     (C.A.A.F. 1999), aff’g 
    37 M.J. 751
     (A.C.M.R. 1993), cert. denied, 
    532 U.S. 919
     (2001). On 28 July 2008, the
    President of the United States approved petitioner’s sentence to death and ordered it
    executed. The Secretary of the Army scheduled petitioner’s execution for 10
    December 2008; however, before it could be carried out, the United States District
    Court for the District of Kansas granted a stay of execution in anticipation of
    petitioner filing a petition for extraordinary relief in the nature of a writ of habeas
    corpus. Thereafter, petitioner filed a writ of habeas corpus, which is still pending
    before that court.
    On 11 February 2011, petitioner filed with this court the instant petition for
    extraordinary relief in the nature of a writ of coram nobis. We then ordered the
    government to show cause why the writ should not issue, and it filed an answer brief
    on 14 March 2011. Petitioner filed a reply brief on 13 June 2011. Petitioner is
    currently in confinement at the United States Disciplinary Barracks, Fort
    Leavenworth, Kansas.
    II
    In this case, there is a final judgment as to the legality of the proceedings
    under Article 71(c)(1), UCMJ, and the case is final under Article 76, UCMJ. See
    Loving v. United States (Loving I), 
    62 M.J. 235
    , 244 (C.A.A.F. 2005). Therefore,
    this court is without jurisdiction to entertain collateral review under a writ of habeas
    corpus. Loving v. United States (Loving II), 
    64 M.J. 132
    , 135 (C.A.A.F. 2006)
    (quoting Loving I, 62 M.J. at 236). 2 See H.R. Rep. No. 81-491, at 35 (1949)
    (“Subject only to a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Federal court, [Article 76]
    provides for the finality of court-martial proceedings and judgments”). Although a
    case is final pursuant to Article 76, UCMJ, a service court may nonetheless entertain
    a writ of coram nobis “in aid of” its jurisdiction. Denedo II, 556 U.S. at ___, 129 S.
    Ct. at 2223–24; Denedo I, 66 M.J. at 120–21, 125; 
    28 U.S.C. § 1651
    (a) (2010).
    2
    Although the reasoning in Denedo v. United States (Denedo I), 
    66 M.J. 114
    (C.A.A.F. 2008), and United States v. Denedo (Denedo II), 
    556 U.S. 904
    , 
    129 S. Ct. 2213
     (2009), could be construed to reach all forms of collateral review, their mutual
    holding is much more limited. Those cases extended collateral review beyond
    Article 76 only for writs of coram nobis.
    2
    GRAY—ARMY MISC 20110093
    In the military justice system, a petitioner must satisfy several, stringent
    threshold requirements in order to obtain coram nobis relief:
    (1) the alleged error is of the most fundamental character; (2) no
    remedy other than coram nobis is available to rectify the consequences
    of the error; (3) valid reasons exist for not seeking relief earlier; (4) the
    new information presented in the petition could not have been
    discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence prior to the
    original judgment; (5) the writ does not seek to reevaluate previously
    considered evidence or legal issues; and (6) the sentence has been
    served, but the consequences of the erroneous conviction persist.
    Denedo I, 66 M.J. at 126 (citing United States v. Morgan, 
    346 U.S. 502
    , 512–13
    (1954), and Loving I, 62 M.J. at 252–53). Here, petitioner cannot traverse these
    threshold requirements because there is, as a matter of law, a remedy other than
    coram nobis available to him. 3 Although in our view petitioner’s right to habeas
    corpus in the military justice system has ended, this is not so for Article III courts.
    In fact, petitioner has filed a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court and the
    government does not dispute the jurisdictional basis for doing so. The merits of
    petitioner’s claims are now for the federal district court, rather than this court, to
    decide.
    We are cognizant of the preference for military courts to hear issues
    potentially of first impression, 4 but we are also mindful of clear constraints imposed
    on this court by statute and our superior court.
    III
    The Petition for Extraordinary Relief in the Nature of a Writ of Error Coram
    Nobis is DENIED.
    3
    Where a petitioner is in custody, he or she can obtain relief through a writ of
    habeas corpus and, therefore, cannot establish that no remedy other than coram
    nobis is available. See Denedo I, 66 M.J. at 126 (noting that the petitioner in that
    case did not have habeas corpus available to him because he was not in custody).
    4
    See generally Denedo I, 66 M.J. at 121–122 (stating that “courts within the military
    justice system should have an opportunity to consider challenges to court-martial
    proceedings prior to review by courts outside the military justice system”).
    3
    GRAY—ARMY MISC 20110093
    Judges COOK and BURTON concur.
    FORTHE
    FOR  THECOURT:
    COURT:
    MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR.
    MALCOLM     H. SQUIRES, JR.
    Clerk of Court
    Clerk of Court
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: ARMY MISC 20110093

Citation Numbers: 70 M.J. 646, 2012 CCA LEXIS 52

Judges: Burton, Cook, Johnson

Filed Date: 1/26/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024