United States v. Denny ( 2017 )


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  •               U NITED S TATES AIR F ORCE
    C OURT OF C RIMINAL APPEALS
    ________________________
    No. ACM 39089
    ________________________
    UNITED STATES
    Appellee
    v.
    Hunter J. DENNY
    Airman Basic (E-1), U.S. Air Force, Appellant
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States Air Force Trial Judiciary
    Decided 21 September 2017
    ________________________
    Military Judge: Marvin W. Tubbs II.
    Approved sentence: Dishonorable discharge and confinement for 1 year.
    Sentence adjudged 10 February 2016 by GCM convened at Sheppard Air
    Force Base, Texas.
    For Appellant: Captain Patricia Encarnación Miranda, USAF.
    For Appellee: Major Mary Ellen Payne, USAF; Gerald R. Bruce, Esquire.
    Before DREW, MAYBERRY, and BENNETT, Appellate Military Judges.
    ________________________
    This is an unpublished opinion and, as such, does not serve as
    precedent under AFCCA Rule of Practice and Procedure 18.4.
    ________________________
    PER CURIAM:
    The approved findings and sentence are correct in law and fact, and no er-
    ror materially prejudicial to Appellant’s substantial rights occurred. Articles
    United States v. Denny, No. ACM 39089
    59(a) and 66(c), Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 859(a), 866(c).
    Accordingly, the approved findings and sentence are AFFIRMED. *
    FOR THE COURT
    KURT J. BRUBAKER
    Clerk of the Court
    *   Though not raised by Appellant, we note that 2016 was a leap year, February
    2016 had 29 days, and the convening authority failed to take action within 120 days.
    Rather, action was taken in 121 days. Therefore, we apply a rebuttable presumption
    of unreasonable post-trial delay which triggers an analysis of the four factors from
    Barker v. Wingo, 
    407 U.S. 514
    , 530 (1972). See United States v. Moreno, 
    63 M.J. 129
    ,
    142–43 (C.A.A.F. 2006). Based on our de novo review and after applying the four
    Barker v. Wingo factors, we find no prejudice, and any post-trial delay in this case
    harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, while Article 66(c) empowers appellate
    courts to grant sentence relief for excessive post-trial delay without the showing of
    actual prejudice, we conclude that sentence relief under Article 66(c) is unwarranted.
    See Tardif, 
    57 M.J. 219
    , 224 (C.A.A.F. 2002); see also United States v. Harvey, 
    64 M.J. 13
    , 24 (C.A.A.F. 2006).
    2
    

Document Info

Docket Number: ACM 39089

Filed Date: 9/21/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021