United States v. Williams ( 2022 )


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  •               U NITED S TATES AIR F ORCE
    C OURT OF C RIMINAL APPEALS
    ________________________
    No. ACM 40028
    ________________________
    UNITED STATES
    Appellee
    v.
    Tarif R. WILLIAMS
    Captain (O-3), U.S. Air Force, Appellant
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States Air Force Trial Judiciary
    Decided 5 April 2022
    ________________________
    Military Judge: Christopher D. James.
    Sentence: Sentence adjudged 27 October 2020 by GCM convened at
    Keesler Air Force Base, Mississippi. Sentence entered by military judge
    on 13 November 2020: Dismissal and confinement for 13 months.
    For Appellant: Major Matthew L. Blyth, USAF.
    For Appellee: Lieutenant Colonel Amanda L.K. Linares, USAF; Lieuten-
    ant Colonel Matthew J. Neil, USAF; Mary Ellen Payne, Esquire.
    Before KEY, ANNEXSTAD, and MEGINLEY, Appellate Military
    Judges.
    Judge ANNEXSTAD delivered the opinion of the court, in which Senior
    Judge KEY and Judge MEGINLEY joined.
    ________________________
    This is an unpublished opinion and, as such, does not serve as
    precedent under AFCCA Rule of Practice and Procedure 30.4.
    ________________________
    ANNEXSTAD, Judge:
    A general court-martial composed of a military judge convicted Appellant,
    in accordance with his pleas and pursuant to a plea agreement (PA), of one
    specification each of conspiracy to distribute marijuana, wrongful introduction
    United States v. Williams, No. ACM 40028
    of marijuana onto a military installation, and wrongful use of marijuana on
    divers occasions in violation of Articles 81 and 112a, Uniform Code of Military
    Justice (UCMJ), 
    10 U.S.C. §§ 881
    , 912a.1,2
    The PA provided that the military judge must enter a sentence consisting
    of a dismissal. It also provided for a confinement range of between 0 and 24
    months for each of the conspiracy and wrongful introduction offenses, and a
    confinement range of between 0 and 6 months for the wrongful use offense.
    Lastly, the PA also provided that any periods of confinement were to be served
    concurrently. There were no other limitations on the sentence that could be
    imposed. After accepting Appellant’s pleas of guilty, the military judge sen-
    tenced Appellant to a dismissal and 13 months of confinement.3 Appellant sub-
    sequently requested the convening authority both defer and waive the auto-
    matic forfeitures in his case for the benefit of his son. On 10 November 2020,
    the convening authority signed a Decision on Action memorandum indicating
    she was taking no action on the findings and sentence and denying Appellant’s
    request for deferment and waiver of the automatic forfeitures “due to the egre-
    gious nature of the charges” of which Appellant was convicted.
    On appeal, Appellant raises two issues: (1) whether Appellant’s sentence is
    inappropriately severe; and (2) whether the convening authority abused her
    discretion by denying Appellant’s request to defer forfeitures.4 With respect to
    issue (2), we have carefully considered Appellant’s contention and find it does
    not require further discussion or warrant relief. See United States v. Matias,
    
    25 M.J. 356
    , 361 (C.M.A. 1987). With respect to the remaining issue, we find
    no error materially prejudicial to a substantial right of Appellant and affirm
    the findings and sentence.
    1 All references to the UCMJ are to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2019
    ed.).
    2 Pursuant to the plea agreement, the convening authority withdrew and dismissed
    (with prejudice upon completion of appellate review) one specification of attempted
    possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute in violation Article 80, UCMJ, 
    10 U.S.C. § 880
    .
    3 The military judge sentenced Appellant to 13 months’ confinement for the conspiracy
    specification, 13 months’ confinement for the wrongful introduction specification, and
    3 months’ confinement for the wrongful use specification, running concurrently. At the
    time of his sentence announcement, the military judge also recommended the conven-
    ing authority waive the automatic forfeitures for the benefit of Appellant’s son.
    4Both issues were personally raised by Appellant pursuant to United States v.
    Grostefon, 
    12 M.J. 431
     (C.M.A. 1982).
    2
    United States v. Williams, No. ACM 40028
    I. BACKGROUND
    Appellant joined the United States Air Force on 23 June 2012 and contin-
    uously served as a cyberspace operations officer. In November 2018, he volun-
    teered for a one-year deployment to Al Udeid Air Base (AUAB) in Qatar.
    Shortly, after his arrival in Qatar, he met and entered into a romantic rela-
    tionship with JS, a defense contractor, who worked on base. Between February
    and July 2019, Appellant smoked marijuana with JS on two occasions at her
    off-base apartment in Qatar. Through JS, Appellant met “Kev,” also known as
    “Trav,” and another individual, EJ, also known as “E.” During group discus-
    sions that followed, Appellant agreed to deliver marijuana to Kev and EJ in
    exchange for money. Specifically, the group devised a plan to ship marijuana
    to Appellant at AUAB, using a fake name to hide Appellant’s participation but
    including the actual mailing address for the Combined Air Operations Center
    (CAOC) on AUAB. Appellant would pick up the marijuana at the CAOC and
    deliver it to Kev off base in Qatar. Kev and EJ then planned to distribute the
    marijuana to others in Qatar.
    Between July and August 2019, Appellant received two packages at the
    CAOC, one containing marijuana and the other containing electronic ciga-
    rettes which are contraband in Qatar. In accordance with their plan, Appellant
    picked up the packages from the CAOC and delivered or attempted to deliver
    them to Kev. Appellant received approximately $1,366.00 for the first delivery.
    About a month later, military personnel picking up parcels at Doha Interna-
    tional Airport in Qatar for delivery to AUAB detected the scent of marijuana
    in a bag of packages. When the mail truck arrived on AUAB, the mail clerks
    removed the suspected bag first and brought it to their supervisor’s office. A
    short while later, security forces investigators responded to the mail facility
    with a drug detection dog. After the dog detected the smell of marijuana, in-
    vestigators opened the package and discovered that it contained over two
    pounds of marijuana. The investigators then created a decoy package, with a
    tracking device, which Appellant later picked up at the CAOC and took to his
    on-base dorm room. Shortly thereafter, investigators arrived at Appellant’s
    room where they found and seized the decoy package with Appellant’s consent.
    Following a rights advisement, Appellant admitted to his role in the con-
    spiracy to distribute marijuana and consented to a search of his cell phone.
    Investigators found text and WhatsApp5 messages between Appellant, JS, Kev,
    and EJ regarding the group’s illegal plans. Within 24 hours, Appellant was
    returned to duty at Keesler Air Force Base (AFB), Mississippi. Appellant con-
    5 WhatsApp is a social media messaging application.
    3
    United States v. Williams, No. ACM 40028
    sented to a urinalysis after arriving at Keeler AFB, and his urine tested posi-
    tive for tetrahydrocannabinol, the principal psychoactive ingredient in mariju-
    ana.
    II. DISCUSSION
    Appellant contends that his sentence is inappropriately severe given the
    nature of his convicted offenses. Specifically, Appellant contends that the mil-
    itary judge failed to consider Appellant’s “strong” rehabilitation potential. Ap-
    pellant also argues that the convening authority’s denial of his request to waive
    the automatic forfeitures for the benefit of his son makes his sentence inappro-
    priately severe. We disagree with Appellant’s contentions and find no relief
    warranted.
    A. Additional Background
    During sentencing, the military judge considered Appellant’s convicted
    misconduct and evidence presented by the Government, including testimony
    from Appellant’s deployed commander, Lieutenant Colonel (Lt Col) MP. Lt Col
    MP testified about the specific mission impacts caused by Appellant’s actions.
    In particular, Lt Col MP highlighted the gap in manning caused by Appellant’s
    redeployment and the one- to two-month delay for another military member to
    fill Appellant’s billet. Furthermore, he explained that certain unit initiatives
    were also not completed due to the personnel shortage caused by Appellant not
    completing the deployment. The Government also presented Appellant’s prior
    performance reports which were above average and unblemished.
    The military judge also considered evidence presented by Appellant. This
    included witness testimony from two field grade officers who opined that Ap-
    pellant was a good worker, supportive father, and that he had positive rehabil-
    itation potential. Appellant presented numerous positive character letters. Ad-
    ditionally, Appellant provided an unsworn statement in which he took respon-
    sibility for his actions, expressed remorse, and said he recognized that his ac-
    tions warranted a dismissal.
    B. Law
    “We review sentence appropriateness de novo.” United States v. Datavs, 
    70 M.J. 595
    , 604 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2011) (citing United States v. Baier, 
    60 M.J. 382
    , 383–84 (C.A.A.F. 2005)), aff’d, 
    71 M.J. 420
     (C.A.A.F. 2012). “We assess
    sentence appropriateness by considering the particular appellant, the nature
    and seriousness of the offense[s], the appellant’s record of service, and all mat-
    ters contained in the record of trial.” United States v. Anderson, 
    67 M.J. 703
    ,
    705 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2009) (per curiam) (citations omitted). While we have
    great discretion in determining whether a sentence is appropriate, we are not
    4
    United States v. Williams, No. ACM 40028
    authorized to engage in exercises of clemency. United States v. Nerad, 
    69 M.J. 138
    , 146 (C.A.A.F. 2010).
    C. Analysis
    We have conducted a thorough review of Appellant’s entire court-martial
    record, including his unsworn statement, officer performance reports, the tes-
    timony of the Defense’s sentencing witnesses, and all materials submitted by
    Appellant during sentencing and clemency. We conclude that the nature and
    seriousness of the offenses clearly support the approved sentence. Here, Appel-
    lant not only wrongfully used marijuana on two occasions while deployed, but
    also was a key player in an international drug trafficking scheme. He caused
    illegal drugs to be trafficked into a foreign country hosting United States mil-
    itary personnel and had those drugs shipped to a secure military operations
    facility. He then delivered the contraband to two individuals who planned to
    distribute the drugs. Additionally, his actions had direct negative impacts on
    his unit’s mission effectiveness.
    Finally, we note that the adjudged sentence was just over half of what Ap-
    pellant bargained for with the convening authority, and that Appellant has not
    cited any legal authority to support his contention that his sentence is inap-
    propriately severe. Appellant’s argument relies on matters previously consid-
    ered by both the military judge during sentencing, and the convening authority
    during clemency. “While these matters are appropriate considerations in clem-
    ency, they do not show that the [A]ppellant’s sentence is inappropriately se-
    vere.” United States v. Aguilar, 
    70 M.J. 563
    , 567 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2011).
    We find Appellant’s recitation of these prior arguments devoid of any rationale
    for inappropriateness as a matter of law, and another attempt at clemency,
    which is not an authorized function of this court. See Nerad, 69 M.J. at 146.
    Understanding we have a statutory responsibility to affirm only so much of the
    sentence that is correct and should be approved, Article 66(d), UCMJ, 
    10 U.S.C. § 866
    (d), we conclude that the sentence is not inappropriately severe
    and we affirm the sentence.
    III. CONCLUSION
    The findings and sentence as entered are correct in law and fact, and no
    error materially prejudicial to the substantial rights of Appellant occurred. Ar-
    ticles 59(a) and 66(d), UCMJ, 
    10 U.S.C. §§ 859
    (a), 866(d).
    5
    United States v. Williams, No. ACM 40028
    Accordingly, the findings and the sentence are AFFIRMED.
    FOR THE COURT
    CAROL K. JOYCE
    Clerk of the Court
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 40028

Filed Date: 4/5/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 5/29/2024