U NITED S TATES AIR F ORCE
C OURT OF C RIMINAL APPEALS
________________________
No. ACM 39903
________________________
UNITED STATES
Appellee
v.
Jesus MARTINEZ
Airman First Class (E-3), U.S. Air Force, Appellant
________________________
Appeal from the United States Air Force Trial Judiciary
Decided 21 May 2021
________________________
Military Judge: Christopher M. Schumann.
Sentence: Sentence adjudged on 30 August 2019 by GCM convened at
Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington. Sentence entered by military
judge on 18 October 2019: Dishonorable discharge, confinement for 6
years, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and reduction to E-1.
For Appellant: Major Jenna M. Arroyo, USAF; Major Rodrigo M. Caruço,
USAF; Allison R. Weber, Esquire.
For Appellee: Lieutenant Colonel Matthew J. Neil, USAF; Major Alex B.
Coberly, USAF; Major Brian E. Flanagan, USAF; Major John P. Patera,
USAF; Mary Ellen Payne, Esquire.
Before J. JOHNSON, KEY, and ANNEXSTAD, Appellate Military
Judges.
Judge KEY delivered the opinion of the court, in which Chief Judge J.
JOHNSON joined. Judge ANNEXSTAD filed a separate dissenting opin-
ion.
________________________
This is an unpublished opinion and, as such, does not serve as
precedent under AFCCA Rule of Practice and Procedure 30.4.
________________________
United States v. Martinez, No. ACM 39903
KEY, Judge:
A general court-martial composed of officer and enlisted members convicted
Appellant, contrary to his pleas, of one specification of sexual assault and one
specification of attempted sexual assault in violation of Articles 120 and 80,
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ),
10 U.S.C. §§ 920, 880. 1,2 The speci-
fications pertained to offenses Appellant committed in 2018. The members sen-
tenced Appellant to a dishonorable discharge, confinement for six years, forfei-
ture of all pay and allowances, and reduction to the grade of E-1.
On appeal, Appellant raises eleven assignments of error, the eighth of
which we reach here: whether the convening authority erred by not taking ac-
tion on Appellant’s sentence as required by Executive Order 13,825, § 6(b),
83
Fed. Reg. 9889, 9890 (
8 Mar. 2018), and Article 60, UCMJ,
10 U.S.C. § 860.
Appellant proposes this court remand his case to the Chief Trial Judge, Air
Force Trial Judiciary, to resolve this matter.
We agree with Appellant. As a result, we conclude remand to the Chief
Trial Judge, Air Force Trial Judiciary, is appropriate, and we do not reach his
other ten assignments of error. Considering our resolution of Appellant’s
eighth assignment of error, we will defer addressing the remainder of his as-
signments of error until the record is returned to this court for completion of
our review under Article 66(d), UCMJ,
10 U.S.C. § 866(d) (Manual for Courts-
Martial, United States (2019 ed.) (2019 MCM)).
I. BACKGROUND
The specifications in this case were referred on 12 April 2019, and Appel-
lant was tried by members in August 2019. Afterwards, Appellant’s trial de-
fense counsel submitted a petition for clemency on 9 September 2019 in which
he identified a number of alleged legal errors occurring during Appellant’s
court-martial and asked the convening authority to disapprove Appellant’s ad-
judged reduction in grade. On 23 September 2019, the convening authority’s
staff judge advocate completed a written recommendation to the convening au-
thority noting, inter alia, that he found the alleged legal errors to be without
merit and that he recommended the convening authority “take no action on the
findings or sentence in this case.” Appellant did not submit additional matters
in response.
1 Unless otherwise noted, references to the UCMJ and the Rules for Courts-Martial
(R.C.M.) are to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2016 ed.).
2 Appellant was acquitted of one specification of abusive sexual contact in violation of
Article 120, UCMJ,
10 U.S.C. § 920.
2
United States v. Martinez, No. ACM 39903
On 11 October 2019, the convening authority signed a Decision on Action
memorandum. In the memorandum, the convening authority stated: “I take no
action on the findings in this case.” He further wrote, “I take no action on the
sentence in this case.” The Decision on Action memorandum also directed Ap-
pellant to “take leave pending completion of appellate review” upon release
from confinement. The memorandum contained no further indication as to
whether any element of Appellant’s sentence was approved, disapproved, com-
muted, or suspended. On 18 October 2019, the military judge signed the entry
of judgment, setting out the adjudged sentence. He included the Decision on
Action memorandum as an attachment.
II. DISCUSSION
Proper completion of post-trial processing is a question of law this court
reviews de novo. United States v. Sheffield,
60 M.J. 591, 593 (A.F. Ct. Crim.
App. 2004) (citation omitted). Interpretation of a statute and a Rule for Courts-
Martial (R.C.M.) are also questions of law we review de novo. United States v.
Hunter,
65 M.J. 399, 401 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (citation omitted); United States v.
Martinelli,
62 M.J. 52, 56 (C.A.A.F. 2005) (citation omitted).
Executive Order 13,825, § 6(b), requires that the version of Article 60,
UCMJ,
in effect on the date of the earliest offense of which the accused
was found guilty, shall apply to the convening authority . . . to
the extent that Article 60: (1) requires action by the convening
authority on the sentence; . . . or (5) authorizes the convening
authority to approve, disapprove, commute, or suspend a sen-
tence in whole or in part.
See 2018 Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 83
Fed. Reg. at 9890. The version of Article 60, UCMJ, in effect when Appellant’s
offenses first occurred stated “[a]ction on the sentence of a court-martial shall
be taken by the convening authority or by another person authorized to act
under this section.”
10 U.S.C. § 860(c)(2)(A) (emphasis added); see also United
States v. Perez,
66 M.J. 164, 165 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (per curiam) (“[T]he convening
authority is required to take action on the sentence . . . .”). Article 60(c)(2)(B),
UCMJ, further stated: “Except as [otherwise] provided . . . the convening au-
thority . . . may approve, disapprove, commute, or suspend the sentence of the
court-martial in whole or in part.”
10 U.S.C. § 860(c)(2)(B). The convening au-
thority’s action is required to be “clear and unambiguous.” United States v.
Politte,
63 M.J. 24, 26 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (citation omitted).
This court addressed a similar situation in its en banc decision in United
States v. Aumont, No. ACM 39673,
2020 CCA LEXIS 416 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App.
3
United States v. Martinez, No. ACM 39903
20 Nov. 2020) (en banc) (unpub. op.), rev. granted, ___ M.J. ___, No. 21-0126,
2021 CAAF LEXIS 389 (C.A.A.F.
4 Mar. 2021). In Aumont, the convening au-
thority signed a memorandum stating that he took “no action” on the findings
or sentence in a case involving offenses occurring prior to 1 January 2019.
Id.
at *19. Aumont resulted in four separate opinions, reflecting four distinct po-
sitions among the judges on this court as to whether the convening authority’s
statement that he took no action was erroneous and, if so, whether remand for
correction was required.
Id. (passim). A majority of the judges in Aumont—six
of the ten judges—concluded the convening authority erred; four of those six
judges, including the majority of the panel in the instant case, found the error
required remand for corrective action without testing for prejudice,
id. at *89
(J. Johnson, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
We recognize that other panels of this court have applied different reason-
ing in cases decided before and after Aumont. See, e.g., United States v. Crus-
pero, No. ACM S32595,
2020 CCA LEXIS 427 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 24 Nov.
2020) (unpub. op.); United States v. Barrick, No. ACM S32579,
2020 CCA
LEXIS 346 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 30 Sep. 2020) (unpub. op.); United States v.
Finco, No. ACM S32603,
2020 CCA LEXIS 246 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 27 Jul.
2020) (unpub. op.); cf. United States v. Coffman,
79 M.J. 820, 824 (A. Ct. Crim.
App. 2020) (wherein our sister-service court found the convening authority’s
failure to take action was harmless error). Nevertheless, we continue to adhere
to the view that—in situations where the convening authority fails to take ac-
tion on the sentence as required by Executive Order 13,825 and the pre-1 Jan-
uary 2019 version of Article 60, UCMJ—the convening authority has erred.
In cases involving a conviction for an offense committed prior to 1 January
2019, the convening authority is required to explicitly state whether the sen-
tence is approved. R.C.M. 1107(f)(4)(A) (implementing the version of Article 60,
UCMJ, applicable to Appellant’s case). “If only part of the sentence is approved,
the action shall state which parts are approved.”
Id. In this case, the convening
authority explicitly stated he did not take action on the sentence. He implicitly
referenced the adjudged punitive discharge by mentioning appellate leave, but
he did not mention the confinement, reduction in grade, or forfeitures. The
convening authority’s action was incomplete and ambiguous, and therefore de-
ficient. See Politte, 63 M.J. at 26. The convening authority’s failure to take ac-
tion on the entire sentence fails to satisfy the requirement of the applicable
Article 60, UCMJ. See United States v. Lopez, No. ACM S32597,
2020 CCA
LEXIS 439, at *11 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 8 Dec. 2020) (unpub. op.).
Our superior court has mandated that when a Court of Criminal Appeals
identifies an ambiguity in an action, it must return the case to the convening
authority. Politte, 63 M.J. at 25–26 (applying the earlier versions of Articles 60
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United States v. Martinez, No. ACM 39903
and 66, UCMJ,
10 U.S.C. §§ 860, 866 (2000), reasoning which we find applica-
ble here). In requiring the deficient action to be returned to the convening au-
thority, our superior court did not evaluate the deficiency for prejudice; the
deficiency in the action ipso facto required its return. Id.; see also United States
v. Scott,
49 M.J. 160, 160 (C.A.A.F. 1998). For the reasons set forth in the dis-
senting opinion in Aumont, we remand the record to the Chief Trial Judge, Air
Force Trial Judiciary, to resolve the error. Unpub. op. at *89 (J. Johnson, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); see Article 66(f)(3), UCMJ,
10 U.S.C.
§ 866(f)(3) (2019 MCM).
III. CONCLUSION
The record is REMANDED to the Chief Trial Judge, Air Force Trial Judi-
ciary, to resolve a substantial issue with the convening authority’s decision
memorandum, as the action taken on Appellant’s adjudged sentence was am-
biguous and incomplete.
Our remand returns jurisdiction over the case to a detailed military judge
and dismisses this appellate proceeding consistent with Rule 29(b)(2) of the
Joint Rules for Appellate Procedure for Courts of Criminal Appeals. JT. CT.
CRIM. APP. R. 29(b)(2). A detailed military judge may:
(1) Correct the Statement of Trial Results; 3
(2) Return the record of trial to the convening authority or his successor to
take action on the sentence;
(3) Conduct one or more Article 66(f)(3), UCMJ (2019 MCM), proceedings
using the procedural rules for post-trial Article 39(a), UCMJ,
10 U.S.C.
§ 839, sessions; and/or
(4) Correct or modify the entry of judgment.
Thereafter, the record of trial will be returned to the court for completion
of appellate review under Article 66, UCMJ.
ANNEXSTAD, Judge (dissenting):
3 The Statement of Trial Results failed to include the command that convened the
court-martial as required by R.C.M. 1101(a)(3) (2019 MCM). Appellant has not claimed
prejudice, and we find none. See United States v. Moody-Neukom, No. ACM S32594,
2019 CCA LEXIS 521, at *2–3 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 16 Dec. 2019) (per curiam) (unpub.
op.).
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United States v. Martinez, No. ACM 39903
I respectfully disagree with my colleagues’ conclusion remanding this case
to the Chief Trial Judge, Air Force Trial Judiciary, because the convening au-
thority’s action was ambiguous and incomplete. Consistent with our court’s de-
cision in United States v. Barrick, No. ACM S32579,
2020 CCA LEXIS 346, at
*3 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 30 Sep. 2020) (unpub. op.), I would find the convening
authority’s decision to “take no action on the sentence” was the equivalent of
action. In coming to this conclusion, I note, as our court did in Barrick, that:
Air Force Instruction 51-201, Administration of Military Justice,
Section 13D (18 Jan. 2019), correctly advises convening author-
ities to grant relief as circumscribed by the applicable version of
Article 60, UCMJ[,
10 U.S.C. § 860]. Additionally, it advises
convening authorities to specify “no action” if not granting relief,
which would include effecting “action” under the applicable ver-
sion of Article 60, UCMJ.
Id. at *3–4.
I also recognize that we can use surrounding documentation to interpret an
otherwise unclear convening authority action, including looking outside the
four corners of the action’s language. See United States v. Politte,
63 M.J. 24,
26 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (citing United States v. Loft,
10 M.J. 262, 268 (C.M.A.
1981)).
In this case, the record demonstrates that Appellant submitted clemency
matters to the convening authority on 9 September 2019. In his matters, Ap-
pellant asked the convening authority to “disapprove reduction in grade to E-
1.” On 23 September 2019, the convening authority’s staff judge advocate com-
pleted a written recommendation to the convening authority recommending
that he “take no action on the findings or sentence in this case.” On 11 October
2019, the convening authority memorialized his decision to “take no action” on
the findings and sentence in his Decision on Action memorandum to the mili-
tary judge. Consistent with the advice from his staff judge advocate and Sec-
tion 13D of Air Force Instruction (AFI) 51-201, Administration of Military Jus-
tice, the convening authority expressed his decision to not grant relief as “no
action.” See AFI 51-201, ¶ 13.23 (18 Jan. 2019). Additionally, the convening
authority directed Appellant to “take leave” pending completion of appellate
review upon release from confinement—an action only necessary when a con-
vening authority cannot or chooses not to disturb an adjudged punitive dis-
charge. On 18 October 2019, the military judge signed the entry of judgment
(EoJ), reflecting the sentence as adjudged. The convening authority’s Decision
on Action memorandum was attached to the EoJ.
I would find that the convening authority’s decision met the legacy require-
ments of Article 60, UCMJ,
10 U.S.C. § 860 (Manual for Courts-Martial, United
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United States v. Martinez, No. ACM 39903
States (2016 ed.)), requiring the convening authority to effectuate the sentence.
I would also find the decision complied with the provisions of Rule for Courts-
Martial (R.C.M.) 1109 of the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2019
ed.) (2019 MCM), requiring convening authority action only when affecting the
sentence. In this case, the convening authority’s decision to provide no relief at
action was a “clear and unambiguous” determination to effectuate the ad-
judged sentence without modification. See Politte, 63 M.J. at 25−26 (footnote
omitted). The action was consistent with the legal advice he was provided and
there is no indication in the record that the military judge or the parties were
confused as to the convening authority’s decision to grant no relief. The sen-
tence memorialized in the EoJ was the same as the sentence adjudged at trial,
and neither party moved for correction of the Decision on Action memorandum
or the EoJ. See R.C.M. 1104(b)(2)(B), (C) (2019 MCM). For these reasons, I
would find no error in the convening authority’s action and would not delay
our review under Article 66(d), UCMJ,
10 U.S.C. § 866(d) (2019 MCM), by re-
manding the case to the Chief Trial Judge, Air Force Trial Judiciary.
FOR THE COURT
CAROL K. JOYCE
Clerk of the Court
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