U NITED S TATES A IR F ORCE
C OURT OF C RIMINAL APPEALS
In re Vincent L. WILLIAMS ) Misc. Dkt. No. 2022-11
Petitioner )
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) ORDER
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) Panel 1
Petitioner seeks extraordinary relief in the nature of a writ of error coram
nobis. He asks us to set aside the punitive discharge from his 2007 court-mar-
tial under the theories that his confrontation rights were violated and he did
not receive the benefit of his pretrial agreement. Petitioner has raised varia-
tions of these same claims both on direct appeal and through habeas corpus
petitions.
I. BACKGROUND
In 2007, Petitioner was convicted by a general court-martial, consistent
with his pleas and pursuant to a pretrial agreement, of carnal knowledge and
indecent acts with his stepdaughter in violation of Articles 120 and 134, Uni-
form Code of Military Justice (UCMJ),
10 U.S.C. §§ 920, 934.1 Petitioner had
been charged with raping his stepdaughter, but the Government—under the
terms of the pretrial agreement—did not proceed on that greater charge, leav-
ing Petitioner convicted of the lesser included offense of carnal knowledge. He
was sentenced by a panel of members to a dishonorable discharge, 18 years
and 4 months of confinement, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and reduc-
tion to the grade of E-1. In accordance with the pretrial agreement, the con-
vening authority reduced Petitioner’s confinement to 15 years, but otherwise
approved the adjudged sentence.
Among other provisions in the pretrial agreement, Petitioner agreed to en-
ter into a stipulation of expected testimony with respect to the victim, his step-
daughter. In general, the stipulation described severe and repeated abuse she
1 See generally United States v. Williams, No. ACM 36996,
2009 CCA LEXIS 256 (A.F.
Ct. Crim. App. 15 Jul. 2009) (unpub. op.) (discussing Petitioner’s charges and his court-
martial).
In re Williams, Misc. Dkt. No. 2022-11
suffered at Petitioner’s hands and highlighted her initial attempts to resist Pe-
titioner’s advances. During sentencing, trial counsel argued the nonconsensual
aspect of Petitioner’s offenses, while trial defense counsel told the members
that Petitioner had not been convicted of raping his stepdaughter and should
not be sentenced as if he had.2
In his direct appeal of his case, Petitioner argued, inter alia, that trial coun-
sel’s argument amounted to plain error because the pretrial agreement prohib-
ited the Government from proceeding on the rape charge. We rejected this
claim as being without merit. United States v. Williams, No. ACM 36996,
2009
CCA LEXIS 256, at *28–29 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 15 Jul. 2009) (unpub. op.). The
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) subsequently
denied review. United States v. Williams,
69 M.J. 190 (C.A.A.F. 2010). Peti-
tioner’s dishonorable discharge was then ordered to be executed on 19 July
2010, rendering his case final under Article 76, UCMJ,
10 U.S.C. § 876. See
United States v. Williams, Misc. Dkt. No. 2011-05,
2011 CCA LEXIS 893, at *3
(A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 26 Oct. 2011) (order).
In 2011, we responded to a petition for extraordinary relief in the nature of
a writ of habeas corpus in which Petitioner raised various issues with respect
to the stipulation and the Government’s use of it during presentencing pro-
ceedings.
Id. at *1. Concluding Petitioner had presented “nothing more than a
rehash of claims [he had] already raised unsuccessfully on direct judicial re-
view,” we denied relief.
Id. at *4–5. In 2015, Petitioner sought a second writ of
habeas corpus, which we denied for lack of jurisdiction. Williams v. United
States, Misc. Dkt. No. 2015-01,
2016 CCA LEXIS 216, at *2–3 (A.F. Ct. Crim.
App. 4 Apr. 2016) (unpub. op.).
Petitioner now returns to this court seeking extraordinary relief in the na-
ture of a writ of error coram nobis. He asserts the stipulation of expected tes-
timony never should have been admitted at his court-martial, under the theory
it violated his confrontation rights under the Sixth Amendment.3 Relatedly,
Petitioner asserts he did not receive the benefit of his pretrial agreement inas-
much as trial counsel argued the victim did not consent to Petitioner’s acts,
despite the fact the Government was not going forward with the greater offense
of rape.
2 Under the versions of Article 120, UCMJ,
10 U.S.C. § 920, in effect at the time of
Petitioner’s offenses, rape required proof of both force and lack of consent. Carnal
knowledge, however, involved sexual intercourse with a person under the age of 16,
irrespective of consent.
3 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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In re Williams, Misc. Dkt. No. 2022-11
II. LAW
The All Writs Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), grants this court authority to issue
extraordinary writs. Loving v. United States,
62 M.J. 235, 246 (C.A.A.F. 2005)
(citing Clinton v. Goldsmith,
526 U.S. 529, 534 (1999)). As explained by the
United States Supreme Court, “[t]he writ of coram nobis is an ancient common-
law remedy designed ‘to correct errors of fact.’” United States v. Denedo,
556
U.S. 904, 910 (2009) (quoting United States v. Morgan,
346 U.S. 502, 507
(1954)). Appellate military courts have jurisdiction over petitions for coram
nobis relief “to consider allegations that an earlier judgment of conviction was
flawed in a fundamental respect.”
Id. at 917. The writ of error coram nobis is
an extraordinary writ and an extraordinary remedy.
Id. (citation omitted). As
the Supreme Court has explained: “Continuation of litigation after final judg-
ment and exhaustion or waiver of any statutory right of review should be al-
lowed through this extraordinary remedy only under circumstances compelling
such action to achieve justice.” Morgan, 346 U.S. at 511.4
In order to be entitled to a writ of error coram nobis, the CAAF has held
that a petitioner must meet the following threshold requirements:
(1) the alleged error is of the most fundamental character; (2) no
remedy other than coram nobis is available to rectify the conse-
quences of the error; (3) valid reasons exist for not seeking relief
earlier; (4) the new information presented in the petition could
not have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable dil-
igence prior to the original judgment; (5) the writ does not seek
to reevaluate previously considered evidence or legal issues; and
(6) the sentence has been served, but the consequences of the
erroneous conviction persist.
4 One initial question is whether we have coram nobis jurisdiction at all over a case
which is final. The CAAF recently held that once a case is final under Article 76,
UCMJ,
10 U.S.C. § 876, that court has no jurisdiction to hear a petitioner’s plea for
coram nobis relief. See United States v. Gray,
77 M.J. 5, 6 (C.A.A.F. 2017) (per curiam).
This conclusion, however, is difficult to square with the United States Supreme Court’s
holding in Denedo, 556 U.S. at 914–15, that the military appellate courts had coram
nobis jurisdiction over the petition before the Court. As was the case in Gray, the peti-
tioner’s case in Denedo had been final for some time before coram nobis relief was
sought. See Denedo v. United States,
66 M.J. 114, 136–37 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (Ryan, J.,
dissenting). At least one of our sister service Courts of Criminal Appeals has limited
the Gray holding to the facts of that capital case in which an execution date had been
set. See In re Trujillo, No. 9100502,
2021 CCA LEXIS 374, at *4 n.6 (N.M. Ct. Crim.
App. 28 Jul. 2021) (per curiam) (unpub. op.). We do the same and conclude we have
jurisdiction over the petition at issue here.
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In re Williams, Misc. Dkt. No. 2022-11
Denedo v. United States,
66 M.J. 114, 126 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (citations omitted),
aff’d and remanded,
556 U.S. 904 (2009). Only once a petitioner meets those
threshold requirements would we consider the substantive issues being raised.
III. DISCUSSION
At a minimum, Petitioner has failed to meet the first, third, fourth, and
fifth Denedo requirements, articulated by the CAAF, for his alleged errors. Pe-
titioner has repeatedly assailed the stipulation of expected testimony, yet it
was Petitioner who explicitly agreed to enter into that stipulation in exchange
for a 15-year limit on his potential confinement and to preclude the Govern-
ment from proceeding to trial on the greater offense of rape. Petitioner was
within his rights to waive his confrontation rights with respect to this stipula-
tion. See, e.g., United States v. Harcrow,
66 M.J. 154, 157 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (ex-
plaining that confrontation rights may be waived in support of a sound trial
strategy). Regardless of the question of waiver, however, this matter has been
known to Petitioner since his court-martial, and his post-trial claims regarding
the stipulation evince little more than him second-guessing the wisdom of
agreeing to the stipulation in the first place.
Petitioner has presented his base contentions both during his direct appeal
and in petitions for extraordinary relief—namely, that the stipulation of ex-
pected testimony alleged nonconsensual conduct and trial counsel made use of
that fact during the Government’s sentencing argument. Although Petitioner’s
legal theories have shifted over the years, he has failed to show a valid reason
for not advancing those theories earlier; that he possesses any new infor-
mation; or that he is seeking evaluation of new evidence or legal issues. More-
over, he has not demonstrated how any error was fundamental in the face of
the fact that Petitioner himself paved the way for the stipulation’s use at his
court-martial.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude Petitioner has not carried his burden
to demonstrate that his case warrants extraordinary relief in the form of a writ
of error coram nobis.
Accordingly, it is by the court on this 16th day of November, 2022,
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In re Williams, Misc. Dkt. No. 2022-11
ORDERED:
The Petition for Extraordinary Relief in the Nature of a Writ of Error Co-
ram Nobis is DENIED.
FOR THE COURT
CAROL K. JOYCE
Clerk of the Court
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