Constitutionality of the Matthew Shepard Hate Crimes Prevention Act ( 2009 )


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  •      CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE M A T T H E W SHEPARD H A T E CRIMES
    PREVENTION ACT
    The two new criminal prohibitions created in the Matthew Shepard Hate Crimes Prevention Act
    would be constitutional.
    June 16,2009
    MEMORANDUM OPINION FOR THE ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
    OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS
    You have asked for our views on the constitutionality of a pending bill, S. 909, the
    Matthew Shepard Hate Crimes Prevention Act. In particular, you have asked us to review
    section 7(a) of S. 909, which would amend title 18 of the United States Code to create a new
    section 249, which would establish two criminal prohibitions called "hate crime acts."
    First, proposed section 249(a)(1) would prohibit willfully causing bodily injury to any
    person, or attempting to cause bodily injury to any person through the use of fire, a firearm, a
    dangerous weapon, or an explosive or incendiary device, "because of the actual or perceived
    race, color, religion, or national origin of any person." This provision is similar to an existing
    federal law, 18 U.S.C. § 245 (2006), the principal difference being that the new section
    249(a)(1), unlike section 245, would not require the prosecutor to prove that the victim was or
    had been "participating in or enjoying any benefit, service, privilege, program, facility or activity
    provided or administered by any State or subdivision thereof."
    Second, proposed section 249(a)(2) would prohibit willfully causing bodily injury to any
    person, or attempting to cause bodily injury to any person through the use of fire, a firearm, a
    dangerous weapon, or an explosive or incendiary device, "because of the actual or perceived
    religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity or disability of any person,"
    section 249(a)(2)(A), but only if the conduct occurs in at least one of a series of defined
    "circumstances" that have a specified connection with or effect upon interstate or foreign
    commerce, see section 249(a)(2)(B). This new provision would prohibit certain forms of
    discriminatory violence—namely, violence committed because of a person's actual or perceived
    gender, sexual orientation, gender identity or disability—that are not addressed by the existing
    section 245 of title 18.
    S. 909 is, in these respects, nearly identical to a bill this Office reviewed in 2000. 2 In our
    analysis of that proposed legislation, which your Office transmitted to Congress, we concluded
    that the bill would be constitutional. See Letter for Senator Edward Kennedy from Robert
    Raben, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs, United States Department of
    1
    A new proposed section 249(a)(3) would make the same conduct unlawful if done within the special
    maritime or territorial jurisdiction of the United States a provision that does not raise any serious questions with
    respect to Congress's authority. See United Stales v. Sharpnack. 
    355 U.S. 286
    . 288 (1958).
    2
    The principal material difference is that section 249(a)(2) of S. 909 encompasses violence on the basis
    of a person's real or perceived gender identity, something that the 2000 legislation did not address.
    Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 33
    Justice (June 13, 2000) (attached); see also S. Rep. No. 107-147, at 15-23 (2002) ("Senate
    Report") (reprinting the OLA Letter containing the 2000 OLC analysis as an explanation of the
    constitutional basis for such legislation). In 2007, however, the Office of Management and
    Budget indicated to the 110th Congress that one provision of such legislation would raise
    constitutional concerns, see Statement of Administration Policy on H.R. 1592 (May 3, 2007),
    as did the Attorney General, see Letter for the Hon. Carl Levin, Chairman, Senate Committee
    on Armed Services, from Michael B. Mukasey, Attorney General, at 6 (Nov. 13, 2007)
    (regarding section 1023 of H.R.1585).
    We have carefully reviewed the relevant legal materials and now conclude, as we did
    in 2000, that the legislation is constitutional. The Attorney General concurs in this view.
    Section 249(a)(1)
    As we explained in 2000, see Senate Report at 16-18, we believe Congress has authority
    under section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment to punish racially motivated violence as part of a
    reasonable legislative effort to extinguish the relics, badges and incidents of slavery. Congress
    may rationally determine, as it would do in S. 909, that "eliminating racially motivated violence
    is an important means of eliminating, to the extent possible, the badges, incidents, and relics of
    slavery and involuntary servitude," and that " s l a v e r y and involuntary servitude were enforced
    . . . through widespread public and private violence directed at persons because of their race."
    S. 909 § 2(7); see also H.R. 1585, 110th Cong., § 1023(b)(7) (2007) (same). 3
    Like the current 18 U.S.C. § 245, proposed section 249(a)(1) of title 18 would not be
    limited by its terms to violence involving racial discrimination: It would criminalize violence
    committed "because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, or national origin of any
    person." S. 909 explains (§ 2(8)) that "in order to eliminate, to the extent possible, the badges,
    incidents, and relics of slavery, it is necessary to prohibit assaults on the basis of real or
    perceived religions or national origins, at least to the extent such religions or national origins
    were regarded as races at the time of the adoption of the 13th, 14th, and 15th amendments."
    As we have previously concluded, under existing case law the proscription of violence
    motivated by "religion" and "national origin" would constitute a valid exercise of Congress's
    Thirteenth Amendment authority insofar as "the violence is directed at members of those
    religions or national origins that would have been considered races at the time of the adoption of
    the Thirteenth Amendment." Senate Report at 17-18; see also Saint Francis College v. Al-
    Khazraji, 
    481 U.S. 604
    , 610-613 (1987) (holding that the prohibition of race discrimination in 42
    U.S.C. § 1981, a Reconstruction-era statute that was enacted pursuant to, and contemporaneously
    with, the Thirteenth Amendment, extends to discrimination against Arabs, as Congress intended
    to protect "identifiable classes of persons who are subjected to intentional discrimination solely
    Given our conclusion that Congress possesses authority to enact this provision under the Thirteenth
    Amendment, we do not address whether Congress might also possess sufficient authority under the Commerce
    Clause and/or the Fourteenth Amendment. See United Slates v. Nelson, 
    277 F.3d 164
    , 174-75 & n.10 (2d Cir.
    2002).
    2
    Constitutionality of the Matthew Shepard Hate Crimes Prevention Act
    because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics"); Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 
    481 U.S. 615
    , 617-18 (1987) (holding that Jews can state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1982, another
    antidiscrimination statute enacted pursuant to, and contemporaneously with, the Thirteenth
    Amendment, because Jews "were among the peoples [at the time the statutes were adopted]
    considered to be distinct races"); Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1,17 (1906) ("Slavery or
    involuntary servitude of the Chinese, of the Italian, of the Anglo-Saxon, are as much within its
    compass as slavery or involuntary servitude of the African."); United States v. Nelson, 
    277 F.3d 164
    , 176-78 (2d Cir. 2002) (concluding that 18 U.S.C. § 245 could be applied constitutionally to
    protect Jews against crimes based on their religion, because Jews were considered a "race" when
    the Thirteenth Amendment was adopted). While it is true that the institution of slavery in the
    United States, the abolition of which was the primary impetus for the Thirteenth Amendment,
    primarily involved the subjugation of African Americans, it is well-established by Supreme
    Court precedent that Congress's authority to abolish the badges and incidents of slavery extends
    "to legislation in regard to 'every race and individual.'" McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp.
    Co., 
    427 U.S. 273
    , 288 n.18 (1976) (quoting 
    Hodges, 203 U.S. at 16-17
    ).4
    Although "there is strong precedent to support the conclusion that the Thirteenth
    Amendment extends its protections to religions directly, and thus to members of the Jewish
    religion, without the detour through historically changing conceptions of race,'" 
    id. at 179,
    it remains an open question whether and to what extent the Thirteenth Amendment empowers
    Congress to address forms of discrimination short of slavery and involuntary servitude with
    respect to religions and national origins that were not considered "races" in 1865. Accordingly,
    to the extent violence is directed at victims on the basis of a religion or national origin that was
    not regarded as a "race" at the time the Thirteenth Amendment was ratified, prosecutors may
    choose to bring actions under the Commerce Clause provision of S. 909, i.e., proposed 18 U.S.C.
    § 249(a)(2), if they can prove the elements of such an offense. See Senate Report at 15.
    Proposed section 249(a)(1) differs from the current 18 U.S.C. § 245 in that it would not
    require the government to prove that the defendant committed the violence because the victim
    was or had been "participating in or enjoying any benefit, service, privilege, program, facility or
    activity provided or administered by any State or subdivision thereof."5 The outer limits of the
    4
    In McDonald, for example, the Supreme Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1981, a Reconstruction-era statute
    that was enacted pursuant to, and contemporaneously with, the Thirteenth Amendment, prohibits racial
    discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts against all persons, including whites. 
    See 427 U.S. at 286-96
    .
    3
    Section 245(b)(2) makes it a crime, "whether or not acting under color of law, by force or threat of force
    willfully [to] injure[], intimidate or interfere with, or attempt to injure, intimidate or interfere with . . . any
    person because of his race, color, religion or national origin and because he is or has been—
    (A) enrolling in or attending any public school or public college;
    (B) participating in or enjoying any benefit, service, privilege, program, facility or activity provided or
    administered by any State or subdivision thereof;
    (C) applying for or enjoying employment, or any perquisite thereof, by any private employer or any agency
    of any State or subdivision thereof, or joining or using the services or advantages of any labor organization,
    hiring hall, or employment agency;
    3
    Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 33
    expansive list of specified activities in section 245 have not been conclusively defined, but courts
    have concluded that the section protects, inter alia, drinking beer in a public park {see United
    States v. Allen, 
    341 F.3d 870
    (9th Cir. 2003)), and walking on a city street {see Nelson).
    Although it is not clear that Congress included the activities element of section 245 in order to
    justify an exercise of its Thirteenth Amendment enforcement powers, 6 the courts have held that
    section 245 is proper Thirteenth Amendment legislation. See, e.g., Nelson; Allen.
    The Supreme Court's decisions in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 
    392 U.S. 409
    (1968),
    and Griffin v. Breckenridge, 
    403 U.S. 88
    (1971), support the further judgment that the Thirteenth
    Amendment does not require such a federal-activities element. In Jones, the Court upheld
    section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (now 42 U.S.C. § 1982) as a valid exercise of
    Congress's Thirteenth Amendment enforcement authority. The statute in Jones was limited to
    discriminatory interferences with the rights to make contracts and buy or sell property, but the
    Court did not rest its approval on that limitation. Instead, the Court wrote, " s u r e l y Congress
    has the power under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally to determine what are the badges
    and the incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate that determination into effective
    
    legislation." 392 U.S. at 440
    . Similarly, in Griffin, the Court held that the Thirteenth
    Amendment supported application of the Ku Klux Klan Act (now 42 U.S.C. § 1985) to a case
    of racially motivated violence intended to deprive the victims of what the Court called "the basic
    rights that the law secures to all free 
    men," 403 U.S. at 105
    —which in that case, according to the
    complaint, included the "right to be secure in their person" and "their rights to travel the public
    highways without restraint," 
    id. at 91-92.
    The Court again endorsed the broad Jones
    formulation, which contains no interference-with-protected-activities limitation: "Congress has
    the power under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally to determine what are the badges and the
    incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate that determination into effective legislation."
    
    Id. at 105.
    To be sure, "there exist indubitable connections . . . between post Civil War efforts
    to return freed slaves to a subjugated status and private violence directed at interfering with and
    discouraging the freed slaves' exercise of civil rights in public places." 
    Nelson, 277 F.3d at 190
    .
    But there are also such "indubitable connections" "between slavery and private violence directed
    (D) serving, or attending upon any court of any State in connection with possible service, as a grand or petit
    juror;
    (E) traveling in or using any facility of interstate commerce, or using any vehicle, terminal, or facility of
    any common carrier by motor, rail, water, or air;
    (F) enjoying the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any inn, hotel,
    motel, or other establishment which provides lodging to transient guests, or of any restaurant, cafeteria,
    lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain, or other facility which serves the public and which is principally
    engaged in selling food or beverages for consumption on the premises, or of any gasoline station, or of any
    motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium, or any other place of exhibition or
    entertainment which serves the public, or of any other establishment which serves the public and
    (i) which is located within the premises of any of the aforesaid establishments or within the
    premises of which is physically located any of the aforesaid establishments, and
    (ii) which holds itself out as serving patrons of such establishments."
    See 
    Nelson, 277 F.3d at 191
    n.26 (explaining that Congress included the "participating in or enjoying
    civil rights" requirement in section 245 for purposes of providing a basis for the provision under the Fourteenth
    Amendment and possibly also the Fifteenth Amendment).
    4
    Constitutionality of the Matthew Shepard Hate Crimes Prevention Act
    against despised and enslaved groups" more generally. 
    Id. In light
    of these precedents, and
    consistent with our conclusion in 2000, see Senate Report at 16-17, we think it would be rational
    at the very least for Congress to find that " s l a v e r y and involuntary servitude were enforced . . .
    through widespread public and private violence directed at persons because of their race" and
    that "eliminating racially motivated violence is an important means of eliminating, to the extent
    possible, the badges, incidents, and relics of slavery and involuntary servitude," S. 909 § 2(7),
    regardless of whether the perpetrator in a particular case is attempting to deprive the victim of
    the use of the activities covered by the current section 245.
    We therefore conclude, as we did in 2000, that the prohibition of discriminatory violence
    in section 249(a)(1) would be a permissible exercise of Congress's broad authority to enforce the
    Thirteenth Amendment.
    Section 249(a)(2)
    Proposed section 249(a)(2) of S. 909 would be a proper exercise of Congress's authority
    under the Commerce Clause, U.S. Const, art. 1, § 8, cl. 3, because it would require the
    Government to allege and prove beyond a reasonable doubt in each case that there is an explicit
    and discrete connection between the proscribed conduct and interstate or foreign commerce.
    In particular, it would require that the offense have occurred "in any circumstance described
    in [proposed 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2)(B)]." Those enumerated circumstances are that:
    (i) the conduct described in subparagraph (A) occurs during the course of, or as the result
    of, the travel of the defendant or the victim—(I) across a State line or national border; or
    (II) using a channel, facility, or instrumentality of foreign commerce;
    (ii) the defendant uses a channel, facility, or instrumentality of interstate or foreign
    commerce in connection with the conduct described in subparagraph (A);
    (iii) in connection with the conduct described in subparagraph (A), the defendant
    employs a firearm, dangerous weapon, explosive or incendiary device, or other weapon
    that has traveled in interstate or foreign commerce; or
    (iv) the conduct described in subparagraph (A)—(I) interferes with commercial or other
    economic activity in which the victim is engaged at the time of the conduct; or (II)
    otherwise affects interstate commerce.
    7
    As the Second Circuit noted in Nelson, the Supreme Court has limited the scope of Congress's
    enforcement authority under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in a series of recent cases. 
    See 277 F.3d at 185
    n.20. But as that court also noted, these precedents do not address the Thirteenth Amendment, which contemplates
    an inquiry that the Supreme Court has referred to as the "inherently legislative task of defining involuntary
    servitude." 
    Id. (quoting United
    States v. Kozminski, 
    487 U.S. 931
    , 951 (1988)). The court of appeals in Nelson
    further explained that "the task of defining 'badges and incidents' of servitude is by necessity even more inherently
    legislative." 
    Id. Finally, we
    note that the Thirteenth Amendment, unlike the Fourteenth Amendment, contains no
    state-action requirement, a distinction of relevance in determining Congress's authority to regulate private, racially
    motivated violence. See Senate Report at 18.
    5
    Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 33
    As we explained in 2000, see Senate Report at 18-23, requiring proof of at least one of these
    "jurisdictional" elements would "ensure, through case-by-case-inquiry, that the [offense] in
    question affects interstate commerce." United States v. Lopez, 
    514 U.S. 549
    , 561 (1995).
    Nothing in the law since 2000 calls this analysis into question.
    For these reasons we adhere to our 2000 conclusion that the new criminal offenses
    created in S. 909 would be wholly constitutional.
    /s/
    MARTIN S. LEDERMAN
    Deputy Assistant Attorney General
    8
    See, e.g., United States v. Dorsey, 
    418 F.3d 1038
    , 1045-46 (9th Cir. 2005) (upholding 18 U.S.C.
    § 922(q)(2)(A), which makes it a crime "knowingly to possess a firearm that has moved in or that otherwise affects
    interstate or foreign commerce at a place the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school
    zone"); United States v. Capozzi, 
    347 F.3d 327
    , 335-36 (1st Cir. 2003) (upholding the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C.
    § 1951 (a), which makes it a federal crime to commit or attempt to commit extortion that "in any way or degree,
    obstructs, delays or affects [interstate] commerce").
    6
    USDOJ Seal
    U.S. Department of Justice
    Office of Legislative Affairs
    Office of the Assistant Attorney Genera!                      Washington. D.C. 20530
    June 13,2000
    The Honorable Edward Kennedy
    United States Senate
    Washington, D.C. 20510
    Dear Senator Kennedy:
    This letter responds to your request for our views on the constitutionality of a proposed
    legislative amendment entitled the "Local Law Enforcement Enhancement Act of 2000." Section
    7(a) of the bill would amend title 18 of the United States Code to create a new § 249, which
    would establish two criminal prohibitions called "hate crime acts." First, proposed § 249(a)(1)
    would prohibit willfully causing bodily injury to any person, or attempting to cause bodily injury
    to any person through the use of fire, a firearm, or an explosive or incendiary device, "because of
    the actual or perceived race, color, religion, or national origin of any person." Second, proposed
    § 249(a)(2) would prohibit willfully causing bodily injury to any person, or attempting to cause
    bodily injury to any person through the use of fire, a firearm, or an explosive or incendiary
    device, "because of the actual or perceived religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, or
    disability of any person," § 249(a)(2)(A), but only if the conduct occurs in at least one of a series
    of defined "circumstances" that have an explicit connection with or effect on interstate or foreign
    commerce, § 249(a)(2)(B).
    In light of United States v. Morrison, 
    120 S. Ct. 1740
    (2000), and other recent Supreme
    Court decisions, defendants might challenge the constitutionality of their convictions under § 249
    on the ground that Congress lacks power to enact the proposed statute. We believe, for the
    reasons set forth below, that the statute would be constitutional under governing Supreme Court
    precedents.1 We consider in turn the two proposed new crimes that would be created in § 249.
    Because you have asked specifically about the effect of Morrison on the constitutionality of the
    proposed bill, this letter addresses constitutional questions relating only to Congress's power to enact the proposed
    bill.
    1.      Proposed 13 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1)
    Congress may prohibit the first category of hate crime acts that would be proscribed —
    actual or attempted violence directed at persons "because of the[ir] actual or perceived race,
    color, religion, or national origin," § 249(a)(1) — pursuant to its power to enforce the Thirteenth
    Amendment to the United States Constitution.2 Section 1 of that amendment provides, in
    relevant part, "[neither slavery nor involuntary servitude .. . shall exist within the United
    States." Section 2 provides, "Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
    legislation."
    Under the Thirteenth Amendment, Congress has the authority not only to prevent the
    "actual imposition of slavery or involuntary servitude," but to ensure that none of the "badges
    and incidents" of slavery or involuntary servitude exists in the United States. Griffin v.
    Breckinridge, 
    403 U.S. 88
    , 105 (1971): see Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.. 
    392 U.S. 409
    , 440-43
    (1968) (discussing Congress's power to eliminate the "badges," "incidents," and "relic[s]" of
    slavery). '"Congress has the power under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally to determine
    what are the badges and incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate that determination into
    effective legislation."' 
    Griffin, 403 U.S. at 105
    (quoting 
    Jones, 392 U.S. at 440
    ); see also Civil
    Rights Cases, 
    109 U.S. 3
    , 21 (1883) ("Congress has a right to enact all necessary and proper laws
    for the obliteration and prevention of slavery, with all its badges and incidents"). In so
    legislating, Congress may impose liability not only for state action, but for "varieties of private
    conduct," as well. 
    Griffin, 403 U.S. at 105
    .
    Section 2(10) of the bill's findings provides, in relevant part, that "eliminating racially
    motivated violence is an important means of eliminating, to the extent possible, the badges,
    incidents, and relics of slavery and involuntary servitude," and that "[s]lavery and involuntary
    servitude were enforced .. . through widespread public and private violence directed at persons
    because of their race." So long as Congress may rationally reach such determinations — and we
    believe Congress plainly could3 — the prohibition of racially motivated violence would be a
    permissible exercise of Congress's broad authority to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment.
    That the bill would prohibit violence against not only African Americans but also persons
    of other races does not alter our conclusion. While it is true that the institution of slavery in the
    United States, the abolition of which was the primary impetus for the Thirteenth Amendment,
    primarily involved the subjugation of African Americans, it is well-established by Supreme
    Court precedent that Congress's authority to abolish the badges and incidents of slavery extends
    "to legislation in regard to 'every race and individual.'" McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp.
    Co.. 
    427 U.S. 273
    ,288 n.18 (1976) (quoting Hodges v. United States. 203 U.S. 1,16-17 (1906),
    Given our conclusion that Congress possesses authority to enact this provision under the Thirteenth
    Amendment, we do not address whether Congress might also possess authority under the Commerce Clause and the
    Fourteenth Amendment.
    3
    See, e.g.. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union. 
    491 U.S. 164
    , 183 (1989); 
    Jones, 392 U.S. at 441
    n.78;
    Hodges v. United States. 203 U.S. 1,34-35 (1906) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
    and citing Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.. 
    392 U.S. 409
    , 441 n.78 (1968)). In McDonald, for
    example, the Supreme Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1981, a Reconstruction-era statute that was
    enacted pursuant to, and contemporaneously with, the Thirteenth Amendment, prohibits racial
    discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts against all persons, including whites.
    See 
    McDonald, 427 U.S. at 286-96
    .
    The question whether Congress may prohibit violence against persons because of their
    actual or perceived religion or national origin is more complex, but there is a substantial basis to
    conclude that the Thirteenth Amendment grants Congress that authority, at a minimum, with
    respect to some religions and national origins. In Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji. 
    481 U.S. 604
    , 613 (1987), the Court held that the prohibition of discrimination in § 1981 extends to
    discrimination against Arabs, as Congress intended to protect "identifiable classes of persons
    who are subjected to intentional discrimination solely because of their ancestry or ethnic-
    characteristics." Similarly, the Court in Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 
    481 U.S. 615
    , 617-
    18 (1987), held that Jews can state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1982, another Reconstruction-era
    antidiscrimination statute enacted pursuant to, and contemporaneously with, the Thirteenth
    Amendment. In construing the reach of these two Reconstruction-era statutes, the Supreme
    Court found that Congress intended those statutes to extend to groups like "Arabs" and "Jews"
    because those groups "were among the peoples [at the time the statutes were adopted] considered
    to be distinct races." Id.; see also Saint Francis 
    College, 481 U.S. at 610-13
    . We thus believe
    that Congress would have authority under the Thirteenth Amendment to extend the prohibitions
    of proposed § 249(a)(1) to violence that is based on a victim's religion or national origin, at least
    to the extent the violence is directed at members of those religions or national origins that would
    have been considered races at the time of the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment.4
    None of the Court's recent federalism decisions casts doubt on Congress's powers under
    the Thirteenth Amendment to eliminate the badges and incidents of slavery. Both Boerne v.
    Flores. 
    521 U.S. 507
    (1997), and United States v. Morrison. 
    120 S. Ct. 1740
    (2000), involved
    legislation that was found to exceed Congress's powers under the Fourteenth Amendment. The
    Court in Morrison, for example, found that Congress lacked the power to enact the civil remedy
    of the Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA"), 42 U.S.C. § 13981, pursuant to the Fourteenth
    Amendment because that amendment's equal protection guarantee extends only to "state action,"
    and the private remedy there was not, in the Court's view, sufficiently directed at such "state
    
    action." 120 S. Ct. at 1756
    , 1758. The Thirteenth Amendment, however, plainly reaches private
    conduct as well as government conduct, and Congress thus is authorized to prohibit private
    action that constitutes a badge, incident or relic of slavery. See 
    Griffin. 403 U.S. at 105
    ; 
    Jones, 392 U.S. at 440
    -43. Enactment of the proposed § 249(a)(1) therefore would be within
    Congress's Thirteenth Amendment power.
    4
    In light of the Court's construction of §§ 1981 and 1982 in Shaare Tefila Congregation and St. Francis
    College, it would be consistent for the Court so to construe this legislation, especially with sufficient guidance from
    Congress.
    2.     Proposed 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2)
    Congress may prohibit the second category of hate crime acts that would be proscribed —
    certain instances of actual or attempted violence directed at persons "because of the[ir] actual or
    perceived religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, or disability," § 249(a)(1)(A) —
    pursuant to its power under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, art. I., § 8, cl. 3.
    The Court in Morrison emphasized that "even under our modern, expansive interpretation
    of the Commerce Clause, Congress' regulatory authority is not without effective bounds.'" 120 S.
    Ct. at 1748; see also United States v. Lopez, 
    514 U.S. 549
    , 557-61 (1995). Consistent with the
    Court's emphasis, the prohibitions of proposed § 249(a)(2) (in contrast to the provisions of
    proposed § 249(a)(1), discussed above), would not apply except where there is an explicit and
    discrete connection between the proscribed conduct and interstate or foreign commerce, a
    connection that the government would be required to allege and prove in each case.
    In Lopez, the Court considered Congress's power to enact a statute prohibiting the
    possession of firearms within 1000 feet of a school. Conviction for a violation of that statute
    required no proof of a jurisdictional nexus between the gun, or the gun possession, and interstate
    commerce. The statute included no findings from which the Court could find that the possession
    of guns near schools substantially affected interstate commerce and, in the Court's view, the
    possession of a gun was not an economic activity itself. Under these circumstances, the Court
    held that the statute exceeded Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce because the
    prohibited conduct could not be said to "substantially affect" interstate commerce. Proposed §
    249(a)(2), by contrast to the statute invalidated in Lopez, would require pleading and proof of a
    specific jurisdictional nexus to interstate commerce for each and every offense.
    In Morrison, the Court applied its holding in Lopez to find unconstitutional the civil
    remedy provided in VAWA, 42 U.S.C. § 13981. Like the prohibition of gun possession in the
    statute at issue in Lopez, the VAWA civil remedy required no pleading or proof of a connection
    between the specific conduct prohibited by the statute and interstate commerce. Although the
    VAWA statute was supported by extensive congressional findings of the relationship between
    violence against women and the national economy, the Court was troubled that accepting this as
    a basis for legislation under the Commerce Clause would permit Congress to regulate anything,
    thus obliterating the "distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local."
    
    Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1754
    (citing 
    Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568
    ). By contrast, the requirement in
    proposed § 249(a)(2) of proof in each case of a specific nexus between interstate commerce and
    the proscribed conduct would ensure that only conduct that falls within the Commerce power,
    and thus is "truly national," would be within the reach of that statutory provision.
    The Court in Morrison emphasized, as it did in 
    Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-62
    , that the statute
    the Court was invalidating did not include an "express jurisdictional 
    element," 120 S. Ct. at 1751
    , and compared this unfavorably to the criminal provision of VAWA, 18 U.S.C. §
    2261(a)(1), which does include such a jurisdictional nexus. See 
    id. at 1752
    n.5. The Court
    indicated that the presence of such a jurisdictional nexus would go far towards meeting its
    constitutional concerns:
    The second consideration that we found important in analyzing [the statute in
    Lopez was that the statute contained "no express jurisdictional element which
    might limit its reach to a discrete set of firearm possessions that additionally have
    an explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce." [514 U.S.] at 562.
    Such a jurisdictional element may establish that the enactment is in pursuance of
    Congress' regulation of interstate commerce.
    I d at 1750-51; see also 
    id. at 1751
    -52 ("Although Lopez makes clear that such a jurisdictional
    element would lend support to the argument that [the provision at issue in Morrison] is
    sufficiently tied to interstate commerce, Congress elected to cast [the provision's] remedy over a
    wider, and more purely intrastate, body of violent crime.").
    While the Court in Morrison stated that Congress may not "regulate noneconomic,
    violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect on interstate commerce,"
    
    id. at 1754,
    the proposed regulation of violent conduct in § 249(a)(2) would not be based "solely
    on that conduct's aggregate effect on interstate commerce," but would instead be based on a
    specific and discrete connection between each instance of prohibited conduct and interstate or
    foreign commerce. Specifically, with respect to violence because of the actual or perceived
    religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation or disability of the victim, proposed §
    249(a)(2) would require the government to prove one or more specific jurisdictional commerce
    "elements" beyond a reasonable doubt. This additional jurisdictional requirement would reflect
    Congress's intent that § 249(a)(2) reach only a '"discrete set of [violent acts] that additionally
    have an explicit connection with or effect on interstate 
    commerce," 120 S. Ct. at 1751
    (quoting
    
    Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562
    ), and would fundamentally distinguish this statute from those that the
    Court invalidated in Lopez and in Morrison. 5 Absent such a jurisdictional element, there exists
    the risk that "a few random instances of interstate effects could be used to justify regulation of a
    multitude of intrastate transactions with no interstate effects." United States v. Harrington. 
    108 F.3d 1460
    , 1467 (D.C. Cir. 1997). By contrast, in the context of a statute with an interstate
    jurisdictional element (such as in proposed § 249(a)(2)(B)), "each case stands alone on its
    evidence that a concrete and specific effect does exist." Id.6
    5
    See also 
    Morrison. 120 S. Ct. at 1775
    (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("the Court reaffirms, as it should,
    Congress' well-established and frequently exercised power to enact laws that satisfy a commerce-related
    jurisdictional prerequisite — for example, that some item relevant to the federally regulated activity has at some
    time crossed a state line"). Of course, our reliance on the jurisdictional nexus in § 249(a)(2) is not intended to
    suggest that such a jurisdictional nexus is always necessary to sustain Commerce Clause legislation.
    That a jurisdictional element makes a material difference for constitutional purposes is demonstrated by
    the Lopez Court's citation to the jurisdictional element in the statute at issue in United States v. Bass. 
    404 U.S. 336
     (1971), as an example of a provision that "would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession
    in question affects interstate 
    commerce." 514 U.S. at 561
    . The Lopez Court wrote:
    For example, in United States v. Bass, 
    404 U.S. 336
    (1971), the Court
    interpreted former 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a), which made it a crime for a felon to
    "receive], posses[s], or transport] in commerce or affecting commerce ... any
    
    firearm." 404 U.S., at 337
    . The Court interpreted the possession component of
    § 1202(a) to require an additional nexus to interstate commerce both because the
    The jurisdictional elements in § 249(a)(2)(B) would ensure that each conviction under
    § 249(a)(2) would involve conduct that Congress has the power to regulate under the Commerce
    Clause. In Morrison, the Court reiterated its observation in Lopez that there are '"three broad
    categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its commerce 
    power.'" 120 S. Ct. at 1749
    (quoting 
    Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558
    ):
    "First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce.. . .
    Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of
    interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the
    threat may come only from intrastate activities. . . . Finally, Congress' commerce
    authority includes the power to regulate those activities having a substantial
    relation to interstate commerce,. . . i.e., those activities that substantially affect
    interstate commerce."
    I d (quoting 
    Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558
    -59).
    Proposed § 249(a)(2)(B)(i) would prohibit the violent conduct described in §
    249(a)(2)(A) where the government proves that the conduct "occurs in the course of, or as the
    result of, the travel of the defendant or the victim (a) across state lines or national borders, or (b)
    using a channel, facility, or instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce." A conviction
    based on such proof would be within Congress's powers to "regulate the use of the channels of
    interstate commerce," and to "regulate and protect. . . persons or things in interstate commerce."
    Proposed § 249(a)(2)(B)(ii) would prohibit the violent conduct described in § 249(a)(2)(A)
    where the government proves that the defendant "uses a channel, facility or instrumentality of
    interstate or foreign commerce in connection with the conduct" — such as by sending a bomb to
    the victim via common carrier — and would fall within the power of Congress to "regulate the
    use of the channels of interstate commerce" and "to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of
    interstate commerce." 7
    statute was ambiguous and because "unless Congress conveys its purpose
    clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state
    balance." Id, at 
    349. 514 U.S. at 561-62
    . In Bass itself, the Government argued that the statute in question should be construed not to
    require proof that the gun possession was in, or affected, interstate commerce. The Court responded that the
    Government's proposed "broad construction" would "render traditionally local criminal conduct a matter for
    federal enforcement and would also involve a substantial extension of federal police 
    resources." 404 U.S. at 350
    .
    The Court accordingly construed the statute to require "proof of some interstate commerce nexus in each case," so
    that the statute would not "dramatically intrude upon traditional state criminal jurisdiction," id, in the way it
    would if there were no requirement of proof in each case of the nexus to interstate commerce.
    7
    Such prohibitions are not uncommon in the federal criminal code. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(2) (1994)
    (prohibiting the transport in commerce of any firearm, explosive or incendiary device, knowing or having reason to
    know, or intending, that it will be used unlawfully in furtherance of a civil disorder); 18 U.S.C. § 875 (1994)
    (prohibiting the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of certain categories of threats and ransom
    demands); 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1998) (prohibiting the willful transportation in interstate or foreign
    commerce of a kidnaping victim); 18 U.S.C. § 1462 (1994 & Supp. II 1996) (prohibiting the transmission of
    Proposed § 249(a)(2)(B)(iii) would prohibit the violent conduct described in
    § 249(a)(2)(A) where the government proves that the defendant "employs a firearm, explosive or
    incendiary device, or other weapon that has traveled in interstate or foreign commerce in
    connection with the conduct."8 Such a provision addresses harms that are, in a constitutionally
    important sense, facilitated by the unencumbered movement of weapons across state and national
    borders, and is similar to several other federal statutes in which Congress has prohibited persons
    from using or possessing weapons and other articles that have at one time or another traveled in
    interstate or foreign commerce.9 The courts of appeals uniformly have upheld the
    constitutionality of such statutes.10 And, in Lopez itself, the Supreme Court cited to the
    jurisdictional element in the statute at issue in United States v. Bass, 
    404 U.S. 336
    (1971), as an
    example of a provision that "would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm
    possession in question affects interstate 
    commerce." 514 U.S. at 561
    . In 
    Bass, 404 U.S. at 350
    -
    obscene materials via common carrier); 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1994) (prohibiting travel in interstate or foreign
    commerce, or the use of "any facility in interstate or foreign commerce," with the intent to commit or facilitate
    certain unlawful activities).
    We understand that this subsection would sanction the conduct described in subparagraph (A) where, in
    connection with that conduct, the defendant employs a firearm, an explosive or incendiary device, or another
    weapon, that has traveled in interstate or foreign commerce.
    For example:
    • It is unlawful for convicted felons to receive any firearm or ammunition (18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1994 &
    Supp. 1999), or to receive or possess any explosive (18 U.S.C. § 842(i) (1994)), "which has been shipped
    or transported in interstate or foreign commerce."
    • A statute enacted as a response to Lopez makes it unlawful (with certain exceptions) for any individual
    knowingly to possess or discharge a firearm "that has moved in or that otherwise affects interstate or
    foreign commerce at a place that the individual knows . . . is a school zone." 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)-(3)
    (1994 & Supp. 1999).
    • It is unlawful, with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm, to engage in certain so-
    called "carjackings1' of motor vehicles that "ha[ve] been transported, shipped, or received in
    interstate or foreign commerce." 18 U.S.C.A. § 2119 (West 2000).
    • It is unlawful knowingly to possess matters containing any visual depiction that "involves the use of a
    minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct" that "has been mailed, or has been shipped or transported in
    interstate or foreign commerce, or which was produced using materials which have been mailed or so
    shipped or transported, by any means including by computer." 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (West Supp.
    2000).
    10
    See, e.g.. United States v. Folen, 
    84 F.3d 1103
    , 1104 (8th Cir. 1996) (§ 842(i)); Fraternal Order of
    Police v. United States, 
    173 F.3d 898
    , 907-08 & n.2 (D.C. Cir.), and cases cited therein (§ 922(g)), cert, denied. 
    120 S. Ct. 324
    (1999); Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis. 
    185 F.3d 693
    , 704-06 (7th Cir. 1999), and cases cited therein
    (same), cert, denied. 120 S. CL 934 (2000); United States v. Bostic, 
    168 F.3d 718
    , 723-24 (4th Cir.), cert, denied,
    
    527 U.S. 1029
    (1999) (same); United States v. Danks, 
    187 F.3d 643
    (8th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (table), 
    1999 WL 615445
    at * l-*2 (§ 922(q)), cert, denied, 120 S. Ct 823 (2000); United States v. Cobb. 
    144 F.3d 319
    , 320-22 (4th
    Cir. 1998), and cases cited therein (§ 2119); United States v. Bausch, 
    140 F.3d 739
    , 741 (8th Cir. 1998) (§
    2252(a)(4)(B)), cert, denied, 
    525 U.S. 1072
    (1999); United States v. Robinson, 
    137 F.3d 652
    , 655-56 (1st Cir.
    1998) (same).
    51, and in Scarborough v. United States, 
    431 U.S. 563
    (1977), the Court construed that statutory
    element to permit conviction upon proof that a felon had received or possessed a firearm that had
    at some time passed in interstate commerce.
    Proposed § 249(a)(2)(B)(iv)(I) would apply only where the government proves that the
    violent conduct "interferes with commercial or other economic activity in which the victim is
    engaged at the time of the conduct." This is one specific manner in which the violent conduct
    can affect interstate or foreign commerce.11 This jurisdictional element also is an exercise of
    Congress's power to regulate '"persons or things in interstate commerce.'" 
    Morrison. 120 S. Ct. at 1749
    (quoting 
    Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558
    ). As Justice Kennedy (joined by Justice O'Connor)
    wrote in 
    Lopez, 514 U.S. at 574
    , "Congress can regulate in the commercial sphere on the
    assumption that we have a single market and a unified purpose to build a stable national
    economy."12
    Finally, proposed § 249(a)(2)(B)(iv)(II) would prohibit the violent conduct described in
    § 249(a)(2)(A) where the government proves that the conduct "otherwise affects interstate or
    foreign commerce." Such "affects commerce" language has long been regarded as the
    appropriate means for Congress to invoke the full extent of its authority. See, e.g.. Jones v.
    United States. 
    120 S. Ct. 1904
    (2000), No. 99-5739, slip op. at 5 (May 22, 2000) ("the statutory
    term 'affecting . . . commerce,' . . . when unqualified, signal[s] Congress' intent to invoke its full
    authority under the Commerce Clause"); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 
    513 U.S. 265
    ,
    273 (1995) ("Th[e] phrase— 'affecting commerce' — normally signals Congress's intent to
    exercise its Commerce Clause powers to the full.").13 Of course, that this element goes to the
    11
    See, e.g.. United States v. Nguyen, 
    155 F.3d 1219
    , 1224-25 (10th Cir. 1998), cert, denied, 
    525 U.S. 1167
    (1999); see also, e.g., United States v. Thomas. 159 F.3d 296,297-98 (7th Cir. 1998), cert, denied, 527 U.S.
    1023(1999).
    In this regard, it is worth noting that at least eight Justices in Morrison and in Lopez indicated that
    Congress can take a broad view as to what constitutes "commercial" or "economic" activity. See Morrison, 120 S.
    Ct. at 1750 (listing, as examples of "congressional Acts regulating intrastate economic activity," the statutes at issue
    in Wickard v. Filbum, 
    317 U.S. 111
    (1942) (restricting the intrastate growing of wheat on a farm for personal home
    consumption); and Perez v. United States. 
    402 U.S. 146
    (1971) (prohibiting intrastate loansharking)); id at 1750 n.4
    (describing the statute in Wickard as "regulat[ing] activity . . . of an apparent commercial character"); 
    id. at 1765
    (Souter, J., dissenting); see also 
    Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560-61
    ; id at 573 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id at 628-30
    (Breyer, J., dissenting).
    Such a jurisdictional element is found in many federal statutes, including criminal provisions that
    prohibit violent conduct or conduct that facilitates violence. See, e.g.:
    • 18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1) (1994) (prohibiting the teaching or demonstration of the use or making of
    firearms, explosives, or incendiary devices, or of techniques capable of causing injury or death, knowing or
    having reason to know or intending that the teaching or demonstration will be unlawfully employed in, or
    in furtherance of, a civil disorder "which may in any way or degree obstruct, delay, or adversely affect
    commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce");
    • 18 U.S.C.A. § 247(a)-(b) (West 2000) (prohibiting the intentional defacement, damaging or destruction
    of religious real property because of the religious character of that property, and the intentional obstruction
    extent of Congress's constitutional power does not mean that it is unlimited. Interpretation of the
    "affecting . . . commerce" provision would be addressed on a case-by-case basis, within the
    limits established by the Court's doctrine. There likely will be cases where there is some question
    whether a particular type or quantum of proof is adequate to show the "explicit" and "concrete"
    effect on interstate and foreign commerce that the element requires. See 
    Harrington, 108 F.3d at 1464
    , 1467 (citing 
    Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562
    , 567). But on its face this element is, by its nature,
    within Congress's Commerce Clause power.14
    by force or threat of force of any person in the enjoyment of that person's free exercise of religious beliefs,
    where "the offense is in or affects interstate or foreign commerce");
    • 18 U.S.C.A. § 2332a(a)(2) (West Supp. 2000) (prohibiting the use, without lawful authority, of a
    weapon of mass destruction, including any biological agent, toxin, or vector, where the results of such use
    "affect interstate or foreign commerce").
    14
    See United States v. Green, 350 U.S. 415,420-21 (1956) (upholding constitutionality of Hobbs Act, 18
    U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1994) —which prohibits robbery or extortion that "in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or
    affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce" — because "racketeering affecting
    interstate commerce [is] within federal legislative control"); see also United States v. Valenzeno, 
    123 F.3d 365
    , 367-
    68 (6th Cir. 1997) (affirming that Lopez did not affect constitutionality of Hobbs Act); United States v. Robinson.
    119 F.3d 1205,1212-14 (5th Cir. 1997) (same), cert, denied, 
    522 U.S. 1139
    (1998).
    In sum, because § 249(a)(2) would prohibit violent conduct in a "discrete set" of 
    cases, 120 S. Ct. at 1751
    (quoting 
    Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562
    ), where that conduct has an "explicit
    connection with or effect o n " interstate or foreign commerce, i d , it would satisfy the
    constitutional standards articulated in the Court's recent decisions. 1 5
    T h e Office of M a n a g e m e n t and Budget has advised that there is no objection from the
    standpoint of the Administration's program to the presentation of this letter.
    Sincerely,
    Robert Raben
    Assistant Attorney General
    Any argument that Morrison sub silentio implies that Congress lacks any power whatever under the
    Commerce Clause to regulate violent crime (or that Congress may do so only where each violation by itself
    "substantially affects" interstate or foreign commerce), is unwarranted. For reasons explained above, the presence
    of a jurisdictional element materially distinguishes a statute such as proposed § 249(a)(2) from the statutes at issue
    in Lopez and in Morrison. The Court in Morrison explained that such an element helps to ensure that the statute
    will reach only '"a discrete set'" of offenses, and will not extend to conduct that lacks an '"explicit connection with
    or effect on interstate 
    commerce.'" 120 S. Ct. at 1751
    (quoting 
    Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562
    ). What is more, the findings
    in sections 2(6)-(9) of the draft bill would, if adopted by Congress, reflect Congress's conclusion that the bill's
    proposed § 249(a)(2) is appropriate legislation under each of the three Commerce Clause "categories" identified in
    Lopez and in Morrison. Section 2(6) would find that the violence in question "substantially affects interstate
    commerce in many ways, including — (A) by impeding the movement of members of targeted groups and forcing
    such members to move across State lines to escape the incidence or risk of such violence; and (B) by preventing
    members of targeted groups from purchasing goods and services, obtaining or sustaining employment or
    participating in other commercial activity." Sections 2(7)-(9) would find that perpetrators "cross State lines to
    commit such violence," use the channels, facilities and instrumentalities of interstate commerce to commit such
    violence, and use articles that have traveled in interstate commerce to commit such crimes. While such findings
    might not in and of themselves be "sufficient" to justify Congress's assertion of its Commerce Clause authority, see
    
    Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1752
    , nevertheless they would provide important support for Congress's authority under the
    Commerce Clause to enact the draft hate-crimes bill's proposed § 249(a)(2), 
    see 120 S. Ct. at 1751
    (citing 
    Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563
    ).