Application of 18 U.S.C. § 1913 to "Grass Roots" Lobbying by Union Representatives ( 2005 )


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  •             Application of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1913
     to “Grass Roots”
    Lobbying by Union Representatives
    Under 
    18 U.S.C. § 1913
    , federal employees who are union representatives may not use official time to
    engage in “grass roots” lobbying in which, on behalf of their unions, they ask members of the public
    to communicate with government officials in support of, or opposition to, legislation or other
    measures.
    November 23, 2005
    MEMORANDUM OPINION FOR THE GENERAL COUNSEL
    DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
    Your office has asked whether federal employees who are union representatives
    may use their official time to engage in “grass roots” lobbying in which, on behalf
    of their unions, they ask members of the public to communicate with government
    officials in support of, or opposition to, legislation or other measures. 1 We
    conclude that federal employees are barred from doing so by 
    18 U.S.C. § 1913
    . As
    discussed below, whether any particular activity would violate section 1913 will
    depend on the specific facts.
    Central to our analysis is the distinction between direct and “grass roots” lobby-
    ing. This distinction has been extensively applied in decisions of our Office and
    the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) dealing with lobbying by
    government officials. For example, we have stated that 
    18 U.S.C. § 1913
     “does not
    apply to direct communications between Department of Justice officials and
    Members of Congress and their staffs . . . in support of Administration or Depart-
    ment positions,” but that the statute “may prohibit substantial ‘grass roots’
    lobbying campaigns . . . designed to encourage members of the public to pressure
    Members of Congress to support Administration or Department legislative or
    appropriations proposals.” Constraints Imposed by 
    18 U.S.C. § 1913
     on Lobbying
    Efforts, 
    13 Op. O.L.C. 300
    , 301 (1989) (“1989 Opinion”). The essence of a “grass
    roots” campaign is the use of “telegrams, letters, and other private forms of
    communication expressly asking recipients to contact Members of Congress.”
    Office of Legal Counsel, Guidelines on 
    18 U.S.C. § 1913
     at 2 (Apr. 14, 1995)
    (“1995 Guidelines”) (attachment to Memorandum for the Heads of All Executive
    Departments and Agencies, from the Attorney General, Re: Anti-Lobbying Act
    Guidelines (Apr. 18, 1995)). Similarly, GAO has noted that appropriations riders
    imposing restrictions similar to those in section 1913 “apply primarily to indirect
    or grass-roots lobbying, and not to direct contact with or appeals to Members of
    Congress,” Lobbying Activity in Support of China Permanent Normal Trade
    1
    See Letter for Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal
    Counsel, from Jane Dana, Acting General Counsel, Department of Commerce (June 20, 2005)
    (“Commerce Letter”).
    179
    Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 29
    Relations, B-285,298, 
    2000 WL 675585
    , at *3 (Comp. Gen.) (citations omitted),
    and that “grass roots” lobbying involves “a clear appeal by the agency to the
    public to contact congressional members in support of the agency’s position,”
    Social Security Administration—Grassroots Lobbying Allegation, B-304,715,
    
    2005 WL 991729
    , at *1 (Comp. Gen.). 2 As explained below, this same distinction
    is critical to identifying the limits of permissible lobbying by union representatives
    while they are on official time.
    I.
    Section 1913 of title 18 currently provides:
    No part of the money appropriated by any enactment of Congress
    shall, in the absence of express authorization by Congress, be used
    directly or indirectly to pay for any personal service, advertisement,
    telegram, telephone, letter, printed or written matter, or other device,
    intended or designed to influence in any manner a Member of Con-
    gress, a jurisdiction, or an official of any government, to favor,
    adopt, or oppose, by vote or otherwise, any legislation, law, ratifica-
    tion, policy or appropriation, whether before or after the introduction
    of any bill, measure, or resolution proposing such legislation, law,
    ratification, policy or appropriation; but this shall not prevent offi-
    cers or employees of the United States or of its departments or agen-
    cies from communicating to any such Member or official, at his re-
    quest, or to Congress or such official, through the proper official
    channels, requests for any legislation, law, ratification, policy or ap-
    propriations which they deem necessary for the efficient conduct of
    the public business, or from making any communication whose pro-
    hibition by this section might, in the opinion of the Attorney Gen-
    eral, violate the Constitution or interfere with the conduct of foreign
    policy, counter-intelligence, intelligence, or national security activi-
    ties. Violations of this section shall constitute violations of section
    1352(a) of title 31.
    
    18 U.S.C. § 1913
     (Supp. IV 2005). Funds “appropriated by . . . enactment[s] of
    Congress” within the meaning of section 1913 include funds used to pay the
    salaries of representatives of federal employees’ unions insofar as they devote
    official time to their representational activities. See 
    5 U.S.C. § 7131
    (d) (2000).
    This expenditure of appropriated funds raises a question under 
    18 U.S.C. § 1913
    ,
    2
    We note that “the Comptroller General, as the agent of Congress, cannot issue interpretations of
    the law that are binding on the executive branch,” Comptroller General’s Authority to Relieve
    Disbursing and Certifying Officials from Liability, 
    15 Op. O.L.C. 80
    , 82 (1991), and here we do not
    endorse the holding of any particular opinion of the Comptroller General or the Government
    Accountability Office.
    180
    Application of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1913
     to “Grass Roots” Lobbying
    to the extent that such funds are thus “used directly or indirectly to pay for any
    personal service, advertisement, telegram, telephone, letter, printed or written
    matter, or other device, intended or designed to influence in any manner a member
    of Congress, a jurisdiction, or an official of any government, to favor, adopt, or
    oppose, by vote or otherwise, any legislation, law, ratification, policy or appropria-
    tion.”
    By its terms, section 1913 applies only “in the absence of express authorization
    by Congress,” and Congress has elsewhere given express authorization for union
    representatives to use official time for direct lobbying on representational issues.
    Under 
    5 U.S.C. § 7102
    (1) (2000), each federal employee has the right
    to act for a labor organization in the capacity of a representative and
    the right, in that capacity, to present the views of the labor organiza-
    tion to heads of agencies and other officials of the executive branch
    of the Government, the Congress, or other appropriate authorities.
    Section 7131(d) of title 5 states that
    [e]xcept as provided in the preceding subsections of this section
    [prohibiting the use of official time for activities relating to the inter-
    nal business of a labor organization] . . . in connection with any other
    matter covered by this chapter [which includes section 7102], any
    employee in an appropriate unit represented by an exclusive repre-
    sentative, shall be granted official time in any amount the agency and
    the exclusive representative involved agree to be reasonable, neces-
    sary, and in the public interest.
    We previously concluded that sections 7102 and 7131(d) together give “express
    authorization” under 
    18 U.S.C. § 1913
     for union representatives “to lobby
    members of Congress on representational issues.” Memorandum for Charlotte
    Hardnett, Acting General Counsel, Social Security Administration, from Daniel L.
    Koffsky, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re:
    Applicability of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1913
     to the Provision of Official Time to Employee
    Union Representatives to Lobby Congress on Representational Issues at 1, 3 (Mar.
    23, 2001) (“2001 Opinion”). The Federal Labor Relations Authority (“FLRA”) has
    reached the same conclusion about the application of section 1913. United States
    Department of the Army Corps of Engineers, Memphis District, Memphis,
    Tennessee and National Federation of Federal Employees Local 259, 
    52 F.L.R.A. 920
     (1997) (“Army Corps of Engineers”). 3 The First Circuit, moreover, has
    3
    See also Soc. Sec. Admin., Balt., Md. & Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., 
    54 F.L.R.A. 600
     (1998); Ass’n
    of Civilian Technicians, Old Hickory Chapter, & U.S. Dep’t of Defense, N.C. Nat’l Guard Bureau,
    Raleigh, N.C., 
    55 F.L.R.A. 811
     (1999); Ass’n of Civilian Technicians, Razorback Chapter 117, & U.S.
    Dep’t of Defense, Nat’l Guard Bureau, Ark. Nat’l Guard, Camp Robinson, N. Little Rock, Ark., 
    56 F.L.R.A. 427
     (2000) (“Ark. Nat’l Guard”); cf. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Soc. Sec. Admin., &
    181
    Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 29
    strongly suggested the same view about application of the statute. In Granite State
    Chapter, Association of Civilian Technicians v. FLRA, 
    173 F.3d 25
     (1st Cir.
    1999), although the court held that an appropriations rider applicable to the
    Department of Defense barred any use of funds for lobbying, the court assumed
    that, absent the rider, union representatives could have lobbied Congress on
    official time. The court noted that the FLRA had found the use of funds for
    lobbying was consistent with section 1913 but was contrary to the rider. In
    affirming the FLRA’s decision, the court wrote that the rider “repealed the
    Union’s right to lobby Congress on official time as otherwise guaranteed by 
    5 U.S.C. § 7102
    .” 
    Id. at 28
    . See also Ass’n of Civilian Technicians, Silver Barons
    Chapter v. FLRA, 
    200 F.3d 590
    , 592 (9th Cir. 2000) (the rider “repeal[s] sections
    7131 and 7102 . . . as they are read to allow [Department of Defense] employees to
    use official time to lobby Congress”); Ass’n of Civilian Technicians, Tony
    Kempenich Mem’l Chapter 21 v. FLRA, 
    269 F.3d 1119
    , 1122 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
    (agreeing with the First Circuit’s decision but not referring to sections 7102 and
    7131, except in reciting what the FLRA had decided).
    These decisions—whether of this Office, the FLRA, or the courts—concern
    only direct lobbying. You have requested that we clarify the application of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1913
     in the context of “grass roots” lobbying by union representatives.
    See Commerce Letter at 1. 4
    II.
    In our 2001 Opinion finding that the federal labor laws create an “express
    authorization” under 
    18 U.S.C. § 1913
     for direct lobbying, we did not decide
    whether the prohibition in section 1913 is necessarily limited to lobbying by
    agency officials acting on behalf of their agencies’ positions. There, because we
    concluded that there was “express authorization” for the lobbying at issue, we did
    not “need [to] decide whether the lobbying activities engaged in by such repre-
    sentatives are exempt from the prohibition of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1913
     on any other
    ground.” 
    Id.
     at 4 n.3. Here, we must first resolve the question whether the
    Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., Local 3231, 
    11 F.L.R.A. 7
    , 8 (1983) (in a case of direct lobbying, the FLRA
    finds that no violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1913
     has been shown). In some other cases, without considering
    
    18 U.S.C. § 1913
    , the FLRA has upheld union rights to engage in direct lobbying under some
    circumstances. See, e.g., Overseas Fed’n of Teachers, & Dep’t of Def. Dependent Schs., Mediterranean
    Region, 
    21 F.L.R.A. 757
     (1986); Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Emps. Local 122 & U.S. Dep’t of Veterans
    Affairs, Reg’l Office, Atlanta, Ga., 
    47 F.L.R.A. 1118
     (1993).
    4
    The FLRA declined our invitation to present its views on the question here. The Office of Person-
    nel Management expressed the view that “section 7102 as written does not presently contemplate the
    use of official time for lobbying that does not meet the direct lobbying standard as stated in Section
    7102” and that “any request by a union representative for official time to engage in grass roots lobbying
    would not be authorized under section 7131 and therefore would be in contravention of the Anti-
    Lobbying Act, section 1913.” Letter for Steven G. Bradbury, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office
    of Legal Counsel, from Mark A. Robbins, General Counsel, Office of Personnel Management, Re:
    Anti-Lobbying Act at 2 (Aug. 22, 2005).
    182
    Application of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1913
     to “Grass Roots” Lobbying
    prohibition in section 1913 extends beyond agency officials’ lobbying on behalf of
    their agencies. We conclude that section 1913 reaches the use of appropriations for
    “grass roots” lobbying even if not on behalf of an agency’s position. We further
    conclude that Congress has not expressly authorized an exception for such
    lobbying by union representatives.
    A.
    A statement in an FLRA opinion suggests an argument for why the prohibition
    in section 1913 might not apply to “grass roots” lobbying by union representatives.
    In Army Corps of Engineers, the FLRA wrote that
    when Congress enacted 
    18 U.S.C. § 1913
    , it intended to protect its
    members from indirect lobbying by agency officials. There is no ev-
    idence or assertion that the Union representatives in this case were
    lobbying indirectly on behalf of agency officials.
    52 F.L.R.A. at 930 (citation omitted). Although the FLRA did not so hold, its
    statement that section 1913 was aimed at “agency officials” suggests a possible
    argument that 
    18 U.S.C. § 1913
     would not apply at all to lobbying by union
    representatives on behalf of their unions, but only to lobbying on behalf of a
    federal agency.
    We do not believe that section 1913 is limited to lobbying by agency officials
    as such. The prohibitory portion of section 1913—“[n]o part of the money
    appropriated by any enactment of Congress shall, in the absence of express
    authorization by Congress, be used directly or indirectly” for prohibited purpos-
    es—is not limited to the communication of agency positions. Rather, its language
    on its face applies to the use of appropriated funds for any communications
    designed to influence members of Congress or other officials with respect to any
    legislation, law, ratification, policy, or appropriation. As noted, relevant appropria-
    tions include funds used to pay the salaries of federal employees who are repre-
    sentatives of federal employees’ unions, insofar as those employees devote official
    time to their representational activities. Moreover, amendments to section 1913
    enacted in 2002 removed language that had limited the penalties under that section
    to “an officer or employee of the United States or of any department or agency
    thereof,” Pub. L. No. 107-273, div. A, § 205(b), 
    116 Stat. 1778
     (2002), and thus
    undermined any argument that only lobbying by persons acting for an agency in an
    official capacity would be covered.
    The only portion of section 1913 that refers to “officers or employees of the
    United States or of its departments or agencies” who are communicating an
    agency position is not the prohibition but the exception to the prohibition. There is
    no reason to read that clause as implying that the prohibition itself is limited to
    such communications; rather, it is naturally read to do just what it says it does: to
    create an exception for communications whose prohibition this Office has long
    183
    Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 29
    believed would raise constitutional concerns. See, e.g., 1989 Opinion, 13 Op.
    O.L.C. at 305–06.
    Furthermore, although the language of section 1913 has been read narrowly to
    avoid constitutional concerns that would arise from its application to government
    officials, no such concerns would justify a narrowing construction of the language
    so as not to apply it to “grass roots” lobbying by federal employees who are union
    representatives. A broad interpretation of the law, as applied to those speaking for
    the Executive Branch, could “interfere with the President’s constitutionally
    mandated role in the legislative process,” “infringe upon his constitutional
    obligation to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,’” and “weaken the
    constitutional framework established in Article II, which in general imposes on the
    President the duty to communicate with the American people.” 1989 Opinion, 13
    Op. O.L.C. at 305. These separation of powers concerns do not apply to lobbying
    on behalf of unions. See Office of the Adjutant Gen., N.H. Nat’l Guard, Concord,
    N.H. & Granite State Chapter, Ass’n of Civilian Technicians, 
    54 F.L.R.A. 301
    ,
    312 (1998), aff’d, Granite State Chapter, 
    173 F.3d 25
    . Nor does such lobbying
    raise First Amendment issues that might call for a narrowing construction, because
    nothing in 
    18 U.S.C. § 1913
     affects what private persons may say while on their
    own time. See Tony Kempenich Mem’l Chapter 21, 
    269 F.3d at 1122
     (addressing
    First Amendment argument under an appropriations rider). Accordingly, we find
    no reason to give 
    18 U.S.C. § 1913
    , in this context, an interpretation that is
    narrower than its words would otherwise indicate. 5
    B.
    We therefore turn to the question whether the federal laws, which give “express
    authorization” for direct lobbying of Congress by federal employees who are
    union representatives, also offer “express authorization” for “grass roots” lobbying
    by such employees. We believe that they do not provide such authorization.
    Section 7102 of title 5 guarantees that union representatives may “present the
    views of the labor organization to heads of agencies and other officials of the
    executive branch of the Government, the Congress, or other appropriate authori-
    ties.” By its terms, this guarantee is confined to direct lobbying and does not
    mention the presentation of views to members of the public, let alone a request
    5
    In an analogous situation, an appropriations rider that deals with lobbying and is couched in
    general language not referring specifically to agencies or their officials—“[n]one of the funds made
    available by this Act shall be used in any way, directly or indirectly to influence congressional action
    on any legislation or appropriations matters pending before the Congress”—has been construed to
    reach expenditures for the salaries of union representatives engaged in lobbying. See Granite State
    Chapter, 
    173 F.3d at
    27–28 (quoting Pub. L. No. 104-61, § 8015, 
    109 Stat. 636
    , 654 (1996)). See also
    Headquarters, Nat’l Guard Bureau, Washington, D.C., Nev. Air Nat’l Guard, Reno, Nev., & Ass’n of
    Civilian Technicians, Silver Barons Chapter, Reno, Nev., 
    54 F.L.R.A. 316
     (1998), reaff’d, 
    54 F.L.R.A. 595
     (1998); Office of the Adjutant Gen., N.H. Nat’l Guard, Concord, N.H. & Granite State Chapter,
    Ass’n of Civilian Technicians, 
    54 F.L.R.A. 301
    , aff’d, Granite State Chapter, 
    173 F.3d 25
    .
    184
    Application of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1913
     to “Grass Roots” Lobbying
    that the public contact government officials. It therefore does not amount to the
    “express authorization” that would create an exception to 
    18 U.S.C. § 1913
     for
    “grass roots” lobbying. And, as noted, section 7131(d) of title 5 is derivative of
    section 7102.
    There is some precedent in this area for finding an “express” authorization even
    in the absence of clear words, but it does not apply here. See 1989 Opinion, 13 Op.
    O.L.C. at 303 (“We believe that Congress’ continued appropriation of funds for
    positions held by executive branch officials whose duties historically have
    included seeking support for the Administration’s legislative program constitutes
    ‘express authorization by Congress’ for the lobbying activities of these offi-
    cials . . . .”). 6 “Grass roots” lobbying is the core of the statutory prohibition. See
    1995 Guidelines at 2. The conduct now in question is within that core, and there
    are no constitutional considerations that would demand a flexible understanding of
    “express authorization” here. Cf. id. at 1 (in the context of communications by the
    Executive Branch, 
    18 U.S.C. § 1913
    , “[i]f applied according to its literal terms,”
    would raise concerns about separation of powers and “if so applied, might be
    unconstitutional”).
    There would seem to be two additional potential arguments against our reading
    of section 7102. We do not believe that either argument would be persuasive.
    First, the FLRA has stated that “[c]ommunicating with the public to encourage
    others to make common cause with the employees’ collective bargaining repre-
    sentative . . . is merely a logical extension of a Union’s Section 7102 rights and
    accordingly . . . such conduct is protected by the Statute.” Dep’t of the Air Force,
    3d Combat Support Group, Clark Air Base, Republic of the Philippines &
    Overseas Educ. Ass’n, Pacific Region, 
    29 F.L.R.A. 1044
    , 1062–63 (1987) (“Clark
    Air Base”) (conclusion of Administrative Law Judge, which the FLRA adopted)
    (emphasis added). 7 The FLRA has also indicated that in certain circumstances,
    section 7102 may protect “the right to publicize matters affecting unit employees’
    terms and conditions of employment.” Dep’t of the Air Force, Scott Air Force
    Base, Ill. & Nat’l Ass’n of Gov’t Emps. Local R7-23, SEIU, AFL-CIO, 
    34 F.L.R.A. 1129
    , 1135 (1990). But, to the extent that these statements might be read to find an
    express authorization for “grass roots” lobbying, they would go astray from the
    statutory text. We do not see how the federal labor laws, in guaranteeing a right
    6
    Even while finding express authorization in congressional appropriations for certain positions
    whose official duties included well-established lobbying activities, we “caution[ed] . . . against these
    officials engaging in ‘grass-roots’ campaigns of the type mentioned in the legislative history to section
    1913.” 1989 Opinion, 13 Op. O.L.C. at 303 n.5 (citation omitted).
    7
    Accord U.S. Marine Corps Base Camp Smedley D. Butler, Okinawa, Japan, & Overseas Educ.
    Ass’n, Pacific Region, 
    29 F.L.R.A. 1068
    , 1080 (1987) (“Camp Smedley T. Butler”) (same); Dep’t of the
    Air Force, 18th Combat Support Wing, Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, Japan, & Overseas Educ. Ass’n,
    Pacific Region, 
    29 F.L.R.A. 1085
    , 1097 (1987) (“Kadena Air Base”) (same). See generally Bureau of
    Prisons, Fed. Corr. Inst. (Danbury, Ct.) & Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., Council of Prison Locals C-33,
    Local 1661, AFL-CIO, 
    17 F.L.R.A. 696
    , 696–97 (1985) (“Bureau of Prisons”).
    185
    Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 29
    “to present the views of [a] labor organization to heads of agencies and other
    officials of the executive branch of the Government, the Congress, or other
    appropriate authorities” can reasonably be said to give an “express authorization”
    for urging the public to communicate with government officials.
    In its decision in Army Corps of Engineers, which concerned direct lobbying,
    the FLRA stated that, in enacting 
    18 U.S.C. § 1913
    , Congress “intended to protect
    its Members from indirect lobbying by agency officials” and that “there are
    significant questions whether the Union’s lobbying activities are within the
    definition of items that Congress prohibited in 
    18 U.S.C. § 1913
    .” 52 F.L.R.A. at
    930–31 (emphasis added). It went on to find that it was unnecessary to determine
    whether section 1913 would otherwise reach the lobbying by the union because 
    5 U.S.C. §§ 7102
     and 7131 gave “express authorization” to the direct lobbying
    activities at issue there. 52 F.L.R.A. at 930–31. This decision could be read to
    suggest that, whether union lobbying involves direct communications or indirect
    “grass roots” efforts, it is within the express authorization of the federal labor
    laws. 8 But the decision can as easily be read only to preserve the argument, similar
    to the one that we rejected above, that an appropriations rider applies only to
    agency officials acting in an official capacity on behalf of their agencies. See Ark.
    Nat’l Guard, 56 F.L.R.A. at 430 (relying on Army Corps of Engineers and
    apparently preserving the argument about application solely to agency officials).
    Moreover, the FLRA’s holding in the case was limited to direct lobbying: “[T]he
    Statute [enacting the federal labor laws] constitutes ‘an express authorization by
    Congress’ for using Federal funds to grant official time to employees to lobby
    Congress on representational matters.” Army Corps of Engineers, 52 F.L.R.A. at
    933 (emphasis added).
    Second, it might be argued that section 7102 authorizes “grass roots” lobbying
    on the ground that such lobbying may enable the public to serve as the conduit by
    which union representatives present their views to government officials. But any
    such argument would require a strained and unnatural reading of the phrase “to
    present the views of the labor organization to heads of agencies and other officials
    of the executive branch of the Government, the Congress, or other appropriate
    authorities.” In the communications that are intended to result from “grass roots”
    lobbying, members of the public, not the union representatives, would be making
    the presentation, and the views that government officials receive would be
    presented as the public’s views, rather than “the views of the labor organization.”
    The purpose of a “grass roots” campaign is to bring public pressure to bear on
    government officials, not to provide an indirect route for views that are attributed
    8
    But see Office of the Adjutant Gen., Ga. Dep’t of Def., Atlanta, Ga., & Ga. State Chapter Ass’n of
    Civilian Technicians, 
    54 F.L.R.A. 654
    , 666 n.9 (1988) (with regard to an appropriations rider, the
    FLRA found it “unnecessary to address the Respondent’s assertion that the activities for which official
    time was sought in this case are a form of ‘grass roots’ lobbying, as defined by the GAO, for which the
    use of appropriated funds is prohibited”); see also Ark. Nat’l Guard, 56 F.L.R.A. at 430 (reporting view
    of Chairman Wasserman).
    186
    Application of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1913
     to “Grass Roots” Lobbying
    to the union. Thus, when a union representative engages in “grass roots” lobbying
    of the sort that 
    18 U.S.C. § 1913
     may bar—an appeal to the public to communicate
    with government officials—the federal labor laws offer no protection. 9
    C.
    Whether any specific activity amounts to “grass roots” lobbying within the
    prohibition of section 1913 depends, of course, on the facts of the case, and we
    cannot determine such issues in the abstract. There may be uncertainty, for
    example, whether a particular communication urges recipients to communicate
    with government officials. We address here only your question whether the federal
    labor laws categorically exclude union representatives’ “grass roots” lobbying
    from the reach of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1913
    . We conclude that they do not.
    STEVEN G. BRADBURY
    Acting Assistant Attorney General
    Office of Legal Counsel
    9
    In Clark Air Base, Kadena Air Base, and Camp Smedley T. Butler, the FLRA held, outside the
    context of section 1913, that section 7102 protected union requests for members of the public to write
    to their Senators and Representatives. Camp Smedley T. Butler, 29 F.L.R.A. at 1076. The FLRA,
    however, did not consider the application of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1913
     to this “grass roots” lobbying. Indeed, at
    least the version of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1913
     in effect in 1986, when the events at issue in those cases took
    place, apparently would not have applied in any event to the lobbying there. At the time, 
    18 U.S.C. § 1913
     reached only activities “intended or designed to influence in any manner a Member of
    Congress, to favor or oppose, by vote or otherwise, any legislation or appropriation by Congress,” 
    18 U.S.C. § 1913
     (1982), but the communications to Congress at issue sought action with regard to how
    the Department of Defense was allocating cuts in spending, including those already mandated by the
    Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 
    99 Stat. 1037
     (1985), rather than action on any
    “legislation or appropriation by Congress.” See Camp Smedley T. Butler, 29 F.L.R.A. at 1073–74,
    1078. In our view, these decisions do not even implicitly suggest that section 7102 gives an “express
    authorization” for “grass roots” lobbying that 
    18 U.S.C. § 1913
     would otherwise forbid. Cf. Dep’t of
    the Air Force, Scott Air Force Base, Ill., and Nat’l Ass’n of Gov’t Emps., Local R7-23, SIEU, AFL-
    CIO, 
    34 F.L.R.A. 1129
     (1990) (agency lawfully refused, on grounds other than restrictions on lobby-
    ing, to allow union to place advertisement in base newspaper, urging readers to communicate with
    Congress on a non-legislative matter). In addition, in these decisions, the FLRA did not mention an
    earlier case in which it had stated that section 7102 did not apply where a letter drafted by a union “was
    intended to be adopted and sent by individual employees as a statement of their own individual views
    and not as their presentation to the Congress of the views of the Union.” U.S. Air Force, Lowry Air
    Force Base, Denver, Colo., & Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., AFL-CIO, Local 974, 
    16 F.L.R.A. 952
    , 964
    (1984). The FLRA declared that “[s]ection 7102 protects representatives of labor organizations in their
    presentation of the views of the labor organization to Congress,” 
    id.,
     and therefore did not cover the
    presentation of individual views that the union was trying to generate. The FLRA did find that
    communications by employees could be covered by 
    5 U.S.C. § 7211
     (1982), which forbids interference
    with the “[t]he right of employees, individually or collectively, to petition Congress or a Member of
    Congress.” A grant of official time under 
    5 U.S.C. § 7131
    (d), however, appears limited to matters
    “covered by . . . chapter [71 of title 5],” and section 7211 is in chapter 72. The guarantee of non-
    interference, therefore, does not convey a right to use official time.
    187