Applicability of Post-Employment Restrictions on Dealing With Government to Former Employees of the Government Printing Office ( 1985 )


Menu:
  •            Applicability of Post-Employment Restrictions
    on Dealing with Government to Former Employees
    of the Government Printing Office
    The Governm ent Printing Office (GPO) is neither a part o f the Executive Branch nor an
    independent agency o f the United States for purposes of restrictions on post-employm ent
    activities o f certain government officers and employees set forth in 
    18 U.S.C. § 207
    . Rather,
    GPO is a unit of the Legislative Branch. Accordingly, officers and employees of GPO are not
    subject to the post-employment restrictions of 
    18 U.S.C. § 207
    .
    Special employees of the GPO are also excluded from coverage o f the post-employment restric­
    tions, although special employees o f the Executive Branch would be covered. Because
    restrictions o f § 207 do not apply to regular officers and employees o f the Legislative Branch,
    it is extremely doubtful that Congress intended them to apply to special employees o f that
    branch.
    February 26, 1985
    M   em orandum         O p in io n   for th e    In s p e c t o r G e n e r a l ,
    G   overnm ent       P r in t in g O f f ic e
    This responds to your request for our opinion whether 
    18 U.S.C. § 207
    ,
    which restricts the post-employment activities of government officers and
    employees within its coverage, applies to former employees of the Government
    Printing Office (GPO).1 Specifically, you asked us to consider whether the
    GPO is an “independent agency of the United States” for purposes of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 207
     and 208.2 In an informal letter to the General Counsel of GPO, the
    Office of Government Ethics (OGE) addressed this same question in 1982.
    OGE concluded that § 207 does not apply to former GPO employees because
    the GPO is a part of the Legislative Branch and the Legislative Branch is not
    subject to § 207. After reviewing the legislative history and the laws governing
    the GPO, we conclude that GPO is not an “independent agency of the United
    States” for purposes of §§ 207 and 208. Therefore, for the reasons discussed below,
    we agree with OGE that 
    18 U.S.C. § 207
     does not apply to employees of the GPO.
    1 Section 207 is the crim inal conflict o f interest statute governing post-em ploym ent activities of govern­
    m ent em ployees. In broad terms, it prohibits form er em ployees from undertaking representational activities
    before federal agencies, on behalf o f som eone other than the governm ent, w ith respect to m atters in w hich the
    form er em ployee participated personally and substantially w hile in governm ent service (a lifetim e ban) or
    that fell under the em ployee’s official responsibility in the last year o f governm ent service (a tw o-year ban).
    For certain senior-level em ployees, § 207 also establishes a o ne-year ban on representational activities before
    the em ployee’s form er agency o r certain com ponents o f that agency. Section 207 is supplem ented by
    extensive regulations issued by the O ffice o f Governm ent Ethics. See 5 C.F.R. Part 737.
    2 
    18 U.S.C. § 209
     also applies to officers and employees o f an “independent agency of the United S tates.”
    55
    By its terms, § 207 applies to any person who has been “an officer or
    employee of the executive branch of the United States Government, of any
    independent agency o f the United States, or o f the District of Columbia.” In
    contrast, other conflict o f interest provisions expressly apply to officers and
    employees in the Executive, Legislative and Judicial Branches. See, e.g., 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 203
    , 205. W e are not aware of any discussion in the legislative
    history o f the revision o f the conflict of interest laws in 1962 or the amend­
    ments made to § 207 by the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 9 5 -
    521, 
    92 Stat. 1864
    , regarding the specific application of § 207 or the other
    conflict o f interest laws to the GPO.3 However, the legislative history of Title V
    o f the Ethics in Government Act indicates unequivocally that Congress in­
    tended § 207 to restrict the post-employment activities o f officers and employ­
    ees o f the Executive Branch (as well as the District of Columbia and the
    independent agencies), see S. Rep. No. 170, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 31,47, 151
    (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4216, 4247, 4263, 4367; H.R. Conf.
    Rep. No. 1756,95th Cong., 2d Sess. 73 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
    4381,4389, but not the post-employment activities of employees o f the Legis­
    lative or Judicial Branches, see S. Rep. No. 170 at 151, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
    4367 (“Officers and employees o f the Legislative and Judicial Branch of the
    Government are not covered by this Tide.”).
    M oreover, this Office previously has interpreted the post-employment pro­
    hibitions in § 207 to apply solely to officers and employees in the Executive
    Branch. See Memorandum to Honorable William E. Casselman II, Legal
    Counsel to the Vice President, from Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Assistant Attorney
    General, Office o f Legal Counsel (June 13,1974) (
    18 U.S.C. §§ 207-209
     apply
    solely to employees in the Executive Branch); Letter to Charles E. Blake from
    Leon Ulman, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel
    (Apr. 8, 1974) (§ 207 applies only to Executive Branch officers and employees
    and does not restrict post-employment activities of former legislative employ­
    ees); cf. “Conflict o f Interest — 
    18 U.S.C. § 207
     — Applicability to the
    General Accounting Office,” 
    3 Op. O.L.C. 433
     (1979) (§ 207 applies to Gen­
    eral Accounting Office because o f the unique statutory definitions regarding
    the GAO). Accordingly, we examine whether the GPO is an independent
    agency or part o f the Legislative Branch for purposes of § 207.
    The GPO was created in 1860, J. Res. of June 23, 1860, 
    12 Stat. 117
    , after
    extensive debate over the relative merits of a contract system of public printing
    versus the establishment of a GPO. At that time, the government employed a
    tariff system, or fixed price schedule. The contract system had been tried in the
    past but had been rejected because it was fraught with partisan abuses, particu-
    3 The introductory phrase in § 207(a) (as am ended by T itle V o f the Ethics in Governm ent Act), which
    describ es the form er o fficers and employees to whom § 207 applies, is identical to the introductory phrase in
    § 207 as first enacted in 1962. The House rep o rt on the 1962 law describes § 207(a) (and §§ 208 and 209) as
    applying to o fficers and em ployees o f the “executive branch’* o r an “independent agency,” w ithout further
    elaboration. S e e , e.g .t H .R. R ep. No. 748, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 11, 12, 13, 2 3 ,2 4 (1961). The Senate report
    describes §§ 2 0 7 ,2 0 8 and 209 as applying to present and fo rm er governm ent em ployees only in very general
    term s. See S. R ep. N o. 2213, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962), reprinted in 1962 U .S.C.C.A.N. 3852.
    56
    larly with regard to the printing for the executive departments. Congress saw
    the ability to have its own materials printed more expeditiously and less
    expensively as a primary advantage of a Government Printing Office. See
    generally H.R. Rep. No. 249, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. (1860); Cong. Globe, 36th
    Cong., 1st Sess. 2478, 2482-87,2489, 2500-05, 2507, 2511-13 (1860) (House
    debate); id. at 3057-62 (1860) (Senate debate).
    Courts have described the GPO as a “legislative unit performing a support
    function for Congress.” Lewis v. Sawyer, 
    698 F.2d 1261
    , 1262 n.2 (D.C. Cir.
    1983) (Wald, J., concurring). Its “prime function is to support Congress by
    publishing for distribution legislative journals, bills, resolutions, laws, reports,
    and numerous other documents; this type of ‘informative’ activity, ‘operating
    merely in aid of congressional authority to legislate,’ fits a ‘category of
    powers’ that the Supreme Court considered within Congress’ dominion.” 
    Id. at 1262
     (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 
    424 U.S. 1
    , 137-43 (1976) (per curiam)); see
    also Thompson v. Sawyer, 
    678 F.2d 257
    , 264 (D.C. Cir. 1982); H entoff v.
    Ichord, 
    318 F. Supp. 1175
    , 1180 n.3 (D.D.C. 1970); United States v. Allison,
    
    91 U.S. 303
    , 307 (1875). The Comptroller General has also recognized that, as
    a general matter, the GPO is within the Legislative Branch of government. 
    36 Comp. Gen. 163
    , 165 (1956); 
    29 Comp. Gen. 388
    , 390 (1950).
    The Congressional Joint Committee on Printing (JCP) retains supervisory
    control over a host of GPO’s functions. See, e.g., 
    44 U.S.C. § 103
     (power to
    remedy neglect, delay, duplication, and waste); 
    id.
     § 305 (approval of GPO
    employees’ pay);4 id. § 309 (revolving fund available for expenses authorized
    in writing by the JCP); id. § 312 (requisitioning of materials and machinery
    with approval of the JCP); id. § 313 (examining board consisting of GPO
    personnel and a person designated by the JCP); id. § 502 (approval of contract
    work); id. § 505 (regulation of sale of duplicate plates); id. §§ 509-517 (ap­
    proval of paper contracts); id. § 1914 (approval o f measures taken by the Public
    Printer to implement the depository library program); see also Lewis v. Sawyer,
    
    698 F.2d at 1263
    . This relationship to Congress appears to preclude a conclu­
    sion, either in fact or as a constitutional matter, see INS v. Chadha, 
    462 U.S. 919
     (1983), that the GPO is not an arm o f Congress.
    The appointment of the Public Printer by the President with the advice and
    consent of the Senate, see 
    44 U.S.C. § 301
    , is not inconsistent with a conclu­
    sion that the GPO is a Legislative Branch unit. The President’s appointment
    power under Article II of the Constitution is not limited to the Executive
    Branch. For example, the President appoints federal judges and also a number
    of legislative officers, such as the Comptroller General, the Librarian of Con­
    gress, and the Architect of the Capitol.
    In a 1979 opinion, this Office concluded that the General Accounting Office
    (GAO) is an “independent agency” within the meaning of 
    18 U.S.C. § 6
     and is
    therefore subject to § 207, even though it is generally considered to be part of
    the Legislative Branch. See 
    3 Op. O.L.C. 433
     (1979). This conclusion resulted
    4 Although G PO em ployees hold positions in the com petitive service, they are not covered by the civil
    service classification scheme. S ee 
    5 U.S.C. § 5102
    (c)(9); Thompson, 
    678 F.2d at 264
    .
    57
    from the unique statutory definitions regarding the GAO. The term “agency” as
    used in § 207 includes “any department, independent establishment, commis­
    sion, administration, authority, board or bureau of the United States or any
    corporation in which the United States has a proprietary interest, unless the
    context shows that such term was intended to be used in a more limited sense.
    
    18 U.S.C. § 6
     (emphasis added).5 Significantly, unlike the GPO, the GAO is
    specifically defined as an “independent establishment” for purposes of Title V
    o f the Ethics in Government Act. See 
    5 U.S.C. § 104
    .
    O ther language in our 1979 opinion concerning the GAO suggests that a
    determination that an entity is in the “Legislative” Branch is not dispositive of
    whether or not its officers and employees are subject to the conflict of interest
    provisions set forth at 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 207
    ,208 and 209. See 3 Op. O.L.C. at 435-
    36. W hen read in context, however, that language serves merely as a gloss on
    our conclusion that the GAO is an “independent agency” under § 207 by
    statutory definition, a conclusion we are unable to reach with respect to the
    GPO.6
    In your request, you note that the definition of “special Government em­
    ployee” in 
    18 U.S.C. § 202
    , for purposes of §§ 203, 205, 207, 208, and 209,
    includes officers and employees of the Legislative Branch. The legislative
    history of the conflict of interest laws reveals that Congress intended to create a
    category of special government employees for whom the restraints upon regu­
    lar government employees would be relaxed. This category would permit the
    government, primarily the Executive Branch, to bring in part-time or intermit­
    tent advisers and consultants with less difficulty. See H.R. Rep. No. 748, 87th
    Cong., 1st Sess. 4 -5 (1961); S. Rep. No. 2213, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962),
    reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3852, 3854—56, 3864 (views of Sen. John A.
    Carroll). The House bill did not make employees of the Legislative Branch
    eligible for classification as special government employees. See H.R. Rep. No.
    7 4 8 ,87th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1961). The Senate saw no reason for omitting
    them and amended the definition of special government employee accordingly.
    See S. Rep. No. 2213, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962), reprinted in 1962
    U.S.C.C.A.N. 3852, 3857.
    As you have pointed out, § 207 does apply to special government employ­
    ees. W e believe, however, that it would be inconsistent with the legislative
    purpose o f minimizing the obstacles faced by an agency requiring the part-time
    or temporary services of advisers and consultants to construe § 207(a) and (b)
    as applying to special government employees in the Legislative Branch, given
    that that section does not apply to regular Legislative Branch employees. We
    5 A lthough this expansive definition w o u ld appear to include all governm ental entities, the legislative
    history o f § 207 m akes clear that for purposes o f that section, the statutory definition o f “agency" does not
    include L egislative B ranch agencies such a s the GPO.
    6 The G overnm ent Printing Office Standards o f C onduct, w hich are not published in the Code o f Federal
    R e g u la tio n s, state (a t P art 6 ) that 18 U .S .C . §§ 2 0 7 -2 0 9 relate to the ethical conduct of GPO employees.
    G overnm ent Printing O ffice, Instruction 655.3 (Feb. 23, 1973). W e have not been asked and do not reach the
    question w hether those provisions of the G P O Standards o f C onduct are invalid in light o f our conclusion that
    §§ 2 0 7 -2 0 9 do not apply to the GPO.
    58
    doubt that Congress could have intended such an incongruous result. Rather,
    we construe the definition of “special Government employee” in 
    18 U.S.C. § 202
     as not changing the scope of coverage of any of the substantive sections.
    Therefore, we believe that those conflict of interest provisions that apply to
    special government employees apply only to those special government employ­
    ees in the branch or branches of government within the coverage of the particular
    substantive section. Compare 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 203
    ,205 with 
    id.
     §§ 207-209.
    For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that 
    18 U.S.C. § 207
     does not
    apply to officers and employees of the GPO, an entity within the Legislative
    Branch of government.
    R   alph   W . T arr
    Acting A ssistant Attorney General
    Office o f Legal Counsel
    59