Legal and Ethical Aspects of Temporary Exchange of Duties by Assistant United States Attorneys and Assistant Federal Public Defenders ( 1977 )


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  •                                                                               May 17, 1977
    77-27        MEMORANDUM OPINION FOR THE
    DIRECTOR OF THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE
    FOR UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS
    Interchange of Counsel Project—Assistant United
    States Attorneys and Assistant Public Defenders
    This is in response to your memorandum requesting our opinion on
    the legal and ethical aspects of having one or more Assistant United
    States Attorneys and Assistant Federal Public Defenders temporarily
    exchange duties. We understand that the purpose of the proposed
    exchange is to give the participating attorneys a greater understanding
    of and sympathy for counsel who appear against them, by allowing
    prosecutors to defend a number of criminal cases and vice versa. While
    several types of exchange programs have been conducted, all of the
    proposed programs necessarily contemplate that the participating attor­
    neys will return to their form er duties.
    It should be noted at the outset that the attorneys employed by a
    Federal Public Defender Office are officers of the judicial branch of the
    Government. They are paid by the Administrative Office of the United
    States Courts from the appropriation for the judiciary, and they are
    ultimately responsible to the Judicial Council of the circuit in which
    they perform their duties. The Department o f Justice has no control
    over them .1 Assistant U.S. Attorneys, on the other hand, are employees
    of the Departm ent of Justice.
    'S e e 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(h)(2)(A), (j). T h e Federal P ublic D efender Office shares the
    task o f defending indigents accused o f Federal crim es w ith the private bar o f the district
    in w hich it operates. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (a), (b).
    T h e statute provides an alternative to the F ederal Public D efender Office if the district
    c o u rt and the C ircuit Judicial C ouncil prefer th e Com m unity D efender O rganization. The
    C om m unity D efender O rganization is a private, nonprofit organization funded by a block
    g ran t o f judicial funds. See 18 U .S.C . § 3006A(h)(2)(B). W hile the statute requires the
    C om m unity D efender O rganization to report its activities and financial position to the
    Judicial C onference o f the United States, it does not ap p ear to prohibit the organization
    from receiving funds from other sources. E m ployees of a Com m unity D efender O rganiza­
    tion are not Federal employees.
    110
    A p p l ic a b il it y o f t h e C o n f l ic t o f I n t e r e s t L a w s a n d t h e D e p a r t ­
    m e n t ’s S t a n d a r d s o f C o n d u c t
    Section 205 of Title 18, U.S. Code, provides, in pertinent part, as
    follows:
    Whoever, being an officer or employee of the United States in the
    executive . . . or judicial branch o f the Government . . . otherwise
    than in the proper discharge of his official duties—
    *            *           *           *            *           *           *
    (2)      acts as agent or attorney for anyone before any department,
    agency, court-martial, officer, or any civil, military, or naval com­
    mission in connection with any proceeding . . . controversy,
    charge, accusation, arrest, or other particular matter in which the
    United States is a party or has a direct and substantial interest . . .
    is guilty of a felony.2 The statute expressly allows representation “in the
    proper discharge of . . . official duties.” The House committee that
    drafted the statute stated that its purpose was to protect the “clear
    public interest in preventing Government employees from allying them­
    selves actively with private parties in the multitude of matters and
    proceedings in which . . . the Government has a direct and substantial
    interest.” [Emphasis added.]3 In the light of this intent, this Office has
    regarded § 205 as prohibiting Federal attorneys from serving as volun­
    teer or appointed criminal defense counsel in United States and District
    of Columbia courts. But this limitation does not apply to a Federal
    Public Defender Office, whose statutory function is to defend Federal
    criminal cases.
    The proposed exchange program therefore differs significantly from
    other proposals that we have considered. Instead of acting as private
    individuals or affiliates of a nongovernmental organization, participating
    Assistant U.S. Attorneys would be assigned by this Department to the
    Public Defender Office, another Federal Government agency, and
    would perform the official duties of that organization under its supervi­
    sion. Those duties would include the defense of Federal criminal pros­
    ecutions. Thus, we see no problem as far as § 205 is concerned.4
    It should also be noted that 
    18 U.S.C. § 203
    (a) and 28 CFR 45.735-
    6(a)(3) prohibit Department attorneys from soliciting or receiving any
    compensation other than “as provided by law for the proper discharge
    of official duties” in connection with litigation against the Government.
    The Department’s Standards of Conduct, 
    28 CFR § 45.735-9
    (e), permit
    Department attorneys to provide uncompensated legal assistance to
    indigents in off-duty time, but in that connection they forbid “represen­
    2 T he D epartm ent’s Standards o f C onduct, 28 C F R § 45.735-6(a)(2), duplicate the
    statute.
    3 H.R. Rep. 748, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 9.
    4 T his conclusion does not apply to the assignm ent o f D epartm ent o f Justice attorneys
    to a private legal services organization, such as a C om m unity D efender O rganization.
    Ill
    tation or assistance in any criminal matter or proceeding, whether
    Federal, State or local.” For the reason stated above, we are of the
    opinion that these provisions do not restrict participation in an ex­
    change program with a Federal Public Defender office.
    Ethical Implications
    The contemplated exchange program does, however, raise ethical
    problems. The participating attorney is in a situation where his loyalties
    may be divided between a temporary and a permanent employer. When
    a tem porary and permanent employer represent conflicting legal inter­
    ests, the American Bar Association (ABA) Code of Professional Re­
    sponsibility severely limits the attorney’s freedom of action. Here the
    interest of the Assistant U.S. Attorneys is to prosecute and to establish
    case precedent conducive to effective prosecution; the interest of the
    Public Defender is to defend and to develop case law favorable to
    defendants. There is a certain inherent conflict in the two roles.
    The disciplinary rules implementing Canon 5 of the Code of Profes­
    sional Responsibility embody the ancient maxim that a person cannot
    serve tw o masters. Of particular significance is DR 5 - 105(A), which
    provides as follows:
    A lawyer shall decline proffered employment if the exercise of his
    independent professional judgm ent in behalf of a client will be or is
    likely to be adversely affected by the acceptance of the proffered
    employment, or if it would be likely to involve him in representing
    differing interests, except to the extent permitted under DR 5-
    105(C).
    The rule applies not only to open conflicts but also to “subliminal or
    concealed” influences on the attorney’s loyalty. Goodson v. Payton, 
    351 F. 2d 905
    , 909 (4th Cir. 1965); ABA Formal Opinion 30. For that
    reason it is considered unethical for an active prosecutor to represent
    criminal defendants in his o r her own or another jurisdiction. See ABA
    Formal Opinions 30, 34, 118, 142. Similarly, it is considered unethical
    for an attorney or his associates 5 to attack the result of his professional
    efforts on behalf of a former private or governmental employer. ABA
    Formal Opinions 33, 64, 71. Finally, the rule would prohibit an attor­
    ney who is temporarily absent from his employer, with arrangements
    5 D R 5 - 105(D) provides:
    I f a law y er is required to decline em ploym ent or to w ithdraw from em ploym ent
    un d er a D isciplinary Rule, n o partner, or associate, o r any o th er law yer affiliated
    w ith him o r his firm, may a cc ep t o r continue em ploym ent.
    W hile this rule clearly applies to colleagues w ith w hom the law yer shares a com m on
    financial interest, it also serves to prevent even the possible appearance o f conflicting
    loyalties o r disclosure o f confidences w ithin a g roup o f law yers w ho practice together.
    See A B A Form al O pinions 16, 33, 49, 296, 306; Inform al Opinion 1235.
    112
    made for his return, from representing interests adverse to those of the
    permanent employer. ABA Formal Opinion 192.®
    In a recent opinion,7 the ABA considered the propriety of a military
    legal office providing both prosecution and defense counsel in the same
    court-martial. It was willing to approve the arrangement only if indi­
    vidual attorneys were assigned, as far as practicable, exclusively to
    prosecution or defense work. It stated that “performance of adverse
    roles in succeeding cases within the same jurisdiction, even though the
    cases themselves may be entirely unrelated, will involve lawyers in
    potentially awkward situations.” The opinion continued:
    Depending on whether a lawyer is cast in a defense or prosecutor­
    ial role, he may be required to frame and advocate interpretations
    of established rules of law or procedure that are, or seem to be,
    poles apart. He may be required to criticize police actions in one
    case, then turn about to defend the same or similar actions in a
    subsequent case where the facts may be, or seem to be, the same.
    He will deal frequently with the same investigative or police per­
    sonnel; he may appear before the same [judges]. In the course of
    this, the temptations may be great to mute the force of advocacy,
    or adjust the handling o f cases in subtle ways.
    The opinion also noted that an appearance of impropriety would be
    created, in violation of Canon 9, when the same attorney represented
    the prosecution and the defense in succeeding cases.
    It is certainly open to argument that any temporary exchange of
    attorneys between a U.S. Attorney’s Office and a Federal Public De­
    fender’s Office would create conflicting loyalties in violation of Canon
    5 and D R 5 - 105(A). The interests of the respective offices serving in
    the same district are plainly adverse. Even if the participants in an
    exchange program were sent to other districts, they would still be
    involved in creating precedent adverse to the interests served by their
    permanent employers. The possibility that they would maintain a con­
    scious or subliminal loyalty to the permanent employer is enhanced by
    the fact that both the Department of Justice and the Federal Public
    Defender Offices have considerable discretion in the pay and promotion
    of their attorneys.8 It would be difficult to avoid the appearance that a
    * In Form al Opinion 192, the question was w hether a law yer tem porarily em ployed full
    tim e by the governm ent could remain a m em ber o f his form er law firm if he received no
    com pensation from it. T h e opinion concluded that he could remain a m em ber o f the firm
    only “so long as the firm refrains from representing interests adverse to the em ployer.”
    7 A B A Inform al Opinion 1235 (A ugust 24, 1972). Accord: Goodson v. Payton, supra, at 908.
    908.
    8 See 18 U.S.C. § 3306A(h)(2)(A); 
    28 U.S.C. § 548
    ; 28 C F R § 0.15(b)(3)(ii).
    113
    public defender, who is on temporary assignment from a prosecutor’s
    office that controls his immediate professional future, might be deliber­
    ately or unconsciously devoting less than his best efforts to the defense
    of his clients. The same would, o f course, be true of a public defender
    assigned to the Department.9
    The exception to DR 5 - 105(A) contained in D R 5 -105(C)10 would
    not appear to apply here. Assuming that “multiple clients” within the
    meaning of the rule include successive clients with differing interests,
    the exception applies only when it is “obvious” that the lawyer can
    adequately represent the interest of each client and all clients have
    given their fully informed consent. Given the conflict between the
    interests represented by U.S. Attorneys and the Federal Public Defend­
    ers and the control they have over the pay and promotion of their
    subordinates, it is by no means obvious that an attorney temporarily
    attached to the one would not retain some permanent loyalty to the
    other. M oreover, the need to obtain the informed consent of a defend­
    ant whenever an Assistant U.S. Attorney is assigned to him could limit
    considerably the number o f cases in which he could participate.
    Effective Assistance of Counsel
    Finally, the temporary assignment of an Assistant U.S. Attorney as
    defense counsel would also present a problem with respect to a defend­
    ant’s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. It is
    well settled that effective assistance has not been provided “if counsel,
    unknown to the accused, and without his knowledgeable assent, is in a
    duplictous position where his full talents—as a vigorous advocate
    having the single aim of acquittal by all fair and honorable means—are
    hobbled or fettered, or restrained by commitments to others.” 11 The
    Fourth Circuit, moreover, has held that the possibility of “subliminal or
    concealed” influences is so great that the assignment of a prosecutor as
    defense counsel without the consent of the accused is per se a denial of
    the right to counsel.12 It should also be noted that the Third Circuit, in
    • T h ere ap p ear to be no published ethics opinions o f the A B A o r o th er organizations
    c o ncerning the exchange program s that are being conducted in several States.
    10 D R 5-105(C ) provides:
    In the situations covered b y D R 5 - 105(A) . . . a law yer m ay represent m ultiple
    clients if it is obvious that h e can adequately represent the interest o f each and if
    each consents to the representation after full disclosure o f the possible effect o f such
    representation on the exercise o f his independent professional judgm ent on behalf o f
    each.
    11 Porter v. United States, 298 F . 2d 461, 463 (5th Cir. 1962). Accord: United States v.
    Jeffers, 
    520 F. 2d 1256
     (7th Cir. 1975); United States el rel Hart v. Davenport, 
    478 F. 2d 203
     (3d C ir. 1974); Goodson v. Payton, 
    351 F. 2d 905
     (4th Cir. 1965). See, generally. Glosser
    v. United States, 
    315 U.S. 60
    (1942).
    11 Goodson v. Payton, 
    351 F. 2d 905
    , 908-09 (4th Cir. 1965) supra. T he case arose from
    the V irginia p ractice, since discontinued, o f assigning the prosecuting a ttorney o f one
    rural co u n ty as defense counsel in other counties if no local attorney was available. Id. at
    906-07; see, also, Yates v. Payton, 
    378 F. 2d 57
     (4th Cir. 1967).
    T h e Sixth C ircuit has declined to adopt a per se rule. See, Dawson v. Cowan, 
    531 F. 2d 1374
    , 1376 (6th C ir. 1976); Harris v. Thomas, 
    311 F. 2d 560
    , 561 (6th Cir. 1965).
    114
    obiter dictum, has defined “normal competency” of counsel for Sixth
    Amendment purposes to include “such adherence to ethical standards
    with respect to avoiding conflicting interests as is generally expected
    from the bar.” 13
    It seems to us that on the basis of these cases an Assistant U.S.
    Attorney serving temporarily as a public defender could not constitu­
    tionally be assigned to a defendant without his informed consent. Re­
    gardless of the outcome of litigation on this point, the possibility im­
    pairs the usefulness of any assistant participating in an exchange pro­
    gram.
    In conclusion, it is our opinion that the statutes governing conflicts of
    interest and the Department’s Standards of Conduct do not as such
    prohibit the temporary assignment of Assistant U.S. Attorneys to
    Public Defender Organizations as defense counsel in criminal cases.
    However, under both the Code of Professional Responsiblity and case
    law concerning effective assistance of counsel, any assistant so assigned
    could not represent a defendant without obtaining his informed consent
    after complete disclosure of his apparent conflicting interests. There is
    also precedent from one Federal circuit that would appear to make it a
    per se denial of effective assistance of counsel for an Assistant U.S.
    Attorney to be assigned to a defendant. In our opinion, the requirement
    of disclosure and consent and the risk of direct or collateral attack on
    convictions in which a participating Assistant U.S. Attorney was in­
    volved, may seriously impair the usefulness of any exchange program
    involving Assistant U.S. Attorneys.
    John M . H     arm on
    Acting Assistant Attorney General
    Office o f Legal Counsel
    13 United States ex rel. Hart Davenport. 478, F. 2d 203, 210 (3d Cir., 1974).
    115