Whether a Commissioned Military Officer May Retain His Commission If He Accepts a Presidential Appointment as Administrator of General Services or a Presidential Designation as Acting Administrator ( 1979 )
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April 10, 1979 79-23 MEMORANDUM FOR THE GENERAL COUNSEL, GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION Military Officer—Appointments to Civil Office— Administrator of General Services—Effect on Military Office—
10 U.S.C. § 973;
40 U.S.C. § 751(c) This responds to your letter o f March 27, 1979, inquiring: first, whether a commissioned military officer can retain his commission if he accepts a Presidential designation as Acting A dm inistrator o f General Services; and second, whether the officer can retain his commission if subsequently ap pointed as Adm inistrator. In our opinion, both questions must be answered in the negative; indeed, we believe that he may not be designated as Acting Adm inistrator. Section 973(b) o f Title 10 U.S. Code, provides: (b) Except as otherwise provided by law, no officer on the active list o f the Regular Army, Regular Navy, Regular Air Force, Regular Marine Corps, or Regular Coast G uard may hold a civil office by election or appointm ent, whether under the United States, a Territory or possession, or a State. The acceptance of such a civil office or the exercise o f its functions by such an of ficer terminates his military appointm ent. (We assume that the officer in question is on the active list.) The accept ance o f a civilian office or the exercise o f its functions by such an officer thus terminates his military appointm ent unless otherwise provided by law. With respect to your first question, the legal mem orandum o f law o f your office takes the position that such an exception is found in § 101(c) o f the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act o f 1949, 40 U .S.C . § 751(c). It provides in substance that, in the event o f a vacancy in the Office o f the A dm inistrator o f General Services, the Deputy A d m inistrator shall be Acting Adm inistrator o f General Services unless the President shall designate “ another officer o f the G overnm ent.” 148 Although you have not raised the issue, a threshold question is whether a commissioned military officer on the active list is “ another officer o f the Governm ent” within the meaning o f § 101(c). Your m em orandum points to the close relationship between § 101(c) and the provisions o f the Va cancy Act, 5 U .S.C . §§ 3345-3349, in particular
5 U.S.C. § 3347. That sec tion authorizes the President to fill a vacancy in an executive or military department on a temporary basis by directing an officer in an Executive or military departm ent, appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent o f the Senate, to perform the duties o f the office during the vacancy.' While it is true that the Vacancy Act itself is not applicable to the General Services Adm inistration,2 the interpretation given o f the phrase in § 3347 “ officer in an executive or military departm ent” has a significant bearing on the meaning o f “ officer o f the G overnm ent” in § 101(c). Attorney General Wickersham ruled in 1909 that not every commis sioned military officer is “ an officer in a departm ent” eligible to be designated by the President under R.S. § 179, the predecessor o f
5 U.S.C. § 3347. 28 Op. A .G . 95. He concluded that the only military officers eligi ble for designation under R.S. § 179 are those who hold statutory offices in a departm ent, such as the chiefs o f its several bureaus, whose appoint ments are provided for by law (pp. 97-98). Again, in 1919 Attorney General Palmer ruled that while the War Department is an executive departm ent, the Army is not a part o f the W ar Departm ent, so that an of ficer in the Army is not by virtue of that fact alone an officer in the Department o f the Army. 31 Op. A .G . 471. This distinction between the military departm ents and the military services was also recognized by the Comptroller o f the Treasury and the Comptroller General. 19 Comp. Dec. 834 (1913);
17 Comp. Gen. 1066(1938). We realize, o f course, that
5 U.S.C. § 3347uses the term “ officer in an Executive or military departm ent,” while the corresponding language of § 101(c) reads “ another officer o f the G overnm ent.” Both statutes, however, deal with the same subject m atter—the tem porary filling of vacancies in the executive branch. Hence, they are in pari materia and should be interpreted in a manner consistent with one another. United States v. Jefferson Electric C o.,
291 U.S. 386, 396 (1934); Hynes v. Grimes Packing Co.,
337 U.S. 86, 116 (1949). We cannot impute to C on gress the intent that a commissioned military officer on active duty cannot serve in an acting capacity in any o f the executive or military departm ents, 1 We also assume that the officer in question has been appointed by the President with the advice and consent o f the Senate. Pursuant to 5 U .S.C . § 3348 such a direction cannot endure for more than 30 days beginning with the date when the vacancy occurred. It should be noted that § 101(c) does not contain a time limitation. 2 The General Services Adm inistration is not one o f the executive or military departm ents enumerated in 5 U .S.C . §§ 101, 102, but an independent establishment as defined in
5 U.S.C. § 104. Moreover, we believe that the special provisions o f § 101(c) supersede the general pro visions o f the Vacancy Act. 149 but is nevertheless qualified to serve as an Acting Adm inistrator of General Services. We therefore conclude that the phrase “ officer o f the Governm ent” in § 101(c) must be given the same meaning as “ officer in an Executive or military departm ent” used in 5 U .S.C . § 3347. It follows that a commissioned military officer can be designated Acting Administrator o f General Services only if he holds a statutory position in a military departm ent. As far as we know, the military officer here involved does not hold such a position. But even if § 101(c) were to be construed to the effect that a military of ficer is an officer o f the Government within the meaning o f that provision, it would not constitute a provision to the contrary within the meaning of 10 U .S.C . § 973(b). That section embodies an im portant policy designed to maintain civilian control o f the Government. In Riddle v. Warner, 522 F. (2d) 882, 884 (1st Cir. 1975) the court, while commenting on the history of the legislation from which 10 U .S.C . § 973(b) is derived, pointed out: A comment by the chairman o f the reporting committee, however, shows that a principal concern o f the bill’s proponents was to assure civilian preeminence in government, i.e., to prevent the military establishment from insinuating itself into the civil branch o f government and thereby growing “ param ount” to it. See Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. App. 150 (1870).3 T hat policy cannot be overcome implicitly by a broad and vague statutory authority to designate an Acting A dm inistrator in the absence o f express language stating that such designation is to be effective not withstanding the m andate o f 10 U .S.C . § 973(b). W here Congress wishes to permit a military officer to occupy a civilian position on an acting basis without forfeiting his commission, it has done so explicitly. See
10 U.S.C. §§ 3017(b), 5036(c), 8017(b). We therefore are compelled to conclude that even if § 101(c) were to be construed to authorize the President to designate a military officer to be Acting Adm inistrator o f General Serv ices, his acceptance o f that office4 or the exercise o f its functions would result in the term ination o f the officer’s military appointm ent. We therefore conclude that a military officer who does not occupy a statutory office in a military departm ent is not eligible for designation as Acting A dm inistrator o f General Services and that, in any event, accept ance o f that office or the exercise o f its functions would result in the ter mination o f his military commission. ‘ For the legislative history o f that bill, see also C o n g r e s s i o n a l G l o b e 41st C ong., 2d Sess., pp. 3394-3404. 4 The position o f an acting officer may not comply with the formal requirements o f tenure, duration, emolum ents, and duties postulated as the elements o f an “ office” in United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. (6 W all.) 385, 393 (1868). The A ttorneys General, however, have ruled that if the prohibitions o f the predecessor statute 10 U .S.C . § 973(b) “ are to have any substantial operatio n ,” the term “ officer” must be given a nontechnical interpretation and that the policy o f the statute points to a very broad interpretation o f the term “ civil officer.” 15 O p. A .G . 551, 553 (1876); 18 O p. A .G . 11, 12 (1884); 35 O p. A .G . 187, 189 (1927). 150 Your second question asks whether a military officer could be ap pointed Adm inistrator o f General Services without forfeiting his commis sion. Your request and the mem orandum o f law attached to it do not con tain any authority in support o f that proposition. We are also not aware o f any pertinent exceptions to the prohibition o f
10 U.S.C. § 973(b). I there fore am constrained to answer the question in the negative. John M. Harm on Assistant A ttorney General Office o f Legal Counsel 151
Document Info
Filed Date: 4/10/1979
Precedential Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 1/29/2017