Executive Power With Regard to the Libyan Situation ( 1981 )


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  •       Executive Power with Regard to the Libyan Situation
    [The following memorandum reviews the significant statutory authorities available to the
    President and other executive officials in dealing with a foreign policy crisis.]
    December 23, 1981
    MEMORANDUM OPINION FOR T H E ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    T H E DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL, AND THE ASSOCIATE
    ATTORNEY G EN ERA L
    To assist you in deliberations regarding Libya, we are providing a
    general memorandum concerning statutes likely to be significant.
    A. The International Emergency Economic Powers Act
    The President has wide-ranging power to regulate property and
    transactions in which a foreign country has an interest under the Inter­
    national Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 
    50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706
     (Supp. Ill 1979), enacted in 1977. IEEPA was used
    during the Iran hostage crisis: (1) to block Iranian government property
    in this country; (2) to limit exports and imports to Iran; (3) to restrict
    transactions with any foreign person or entity relating to travel to Iran;
    and (4) to make the required transfers of funds in connection with the
    agreement ending the hostage crisis. Dames & Moore v. Reagan, 
    453 U.S. 654
     (1981); e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,170, 
    44 Fed. Reg. 65,729
    (1979); Exec. Order No. 12,205, 
    45 Fed. Reg. 24,099
     (1980); Exec.
    Order No. 12,211, 
    45 Fed. Reg. 26,685
     (1980). It continues to be used
    today to implement various financial aspects of the settlement with
    Iran.
    The IEEPA provides broad powers to the President in the event of
    any:
    unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in
    whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the
    national security, foreign policy, or economy of the
    United States, if the President declares a national emer­
    gency with respect to such threat.
    
    50 U.S.C. § 1701
    . If such an emergency is declared, the President may:
    432
    under such regulations as he may prescribe, by means of
    instructions, licenses, or otherwise—
    (A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit—
    (i) any transactions in foreign exchange,
    (ii) transfers of credit or payments between, by,
    through, or to any banking institution, to the extent that
    such transfers or payments involve any interest of any
    foreign country or a national thereof,
    (iii) the importing or exporting of currency or securities; and
    (B) investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, pre­
    vent or prohibit, .any acquisition, holding, withholding, use,
    transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation
    of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege
    with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which
    any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest;
    by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to
    the jurisdiction of the United States.
    
    50 U.S.C. § 1702
    (a)(1).:Under these provisions, once the President
    declares a national emergency, he may control all foreign assets subject to
    the jurisdiction of the United States, regulate or prohibit movements of
    foreign or domestic currency or credit in and out of the country, and
    prohibit all transactions involving any property in which the foreign
    country or any national thereof has an interest.
    If a decision is made to invoke IEEPA, certain steps must be taken
    immediately under that Act and the National Emergencies Act, 
    50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1651
    . The latter Act confers no separate authority, but
    imposes procedural requirements.
    (1) Consultation with Congress: The President, “in every possible in­
    stance,” shall consult with Congress before exercising authorities under
    the IEEPA. 
    50 U.S.C. § 1703
    (a). There is no formal procedure for this.
    It has usually been done with only a small group of congressional
    leaders.
    (2) Declaration o f a national emergency: A proclamation of national
    emergency is necessary to use the powers available under IEEPA. 
    50 U.S.C. § 1701
    . The President is authorized to declare an emergency
    pursuant to the National Emergencies Act. 
    50 U.S.C. § 1621
    . For pur­
    poses of IEEPA, such an emergency may be declared with respect to
    any unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign
    policy, or economy of the United States which has its source outside
    this country. 
    50 U.S.C. § 1701
    . This language was left broad to provide
    necessary discretion. H.R. Rep. No. 459, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10
    (1977).
    433
    A presidential declaration of emergency under IEEPA can be short
    and to the point. In the Iran crisis, the President stated: “I find that the
    situation in Iran constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the
    national security, foreign policy and economy of the United States and
    hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat.” Exec.
    Order No. 12,170, supra, 
    44 Fed. Reg. 65,729
    . The courts will not
    review a determination so peculiarly within the province of the Presi­
    dent. See 42 Op. A tt’y Gen. at 370.
    Under the Act, Congress is authorized to terminate a declared emer­
    gency through adoption of a concurrent resolution. 
    50 U.S.C. § 1706
    (b)
    (Supp. Ill 1979). It is our position that a concurrent resolution, because
    it would not be subject to the President’s veto, would be constitution­
    ally insufficient to terminate a declared emergency.
    (3) Designation o f Act: The National Emergencies Act declares that in
    the same proclamation or by contemporaneous or subsequent executive
    orders, the President must designate the particular emergency statute he
    wishes to invoke, e.g., IEEPA. The 1979 Iranian blocking order and
    emergency declaration appeared in the same document. Exec. Order
    No. 12,170, supra, 
    44 Fed. Reg. 65,729
    .
    (4) Delegation: Since IEEPA vests powers directly in the President,
    an executive order should delegate power to an appropriate official. 
    3 U.S.C. § 301
    . This could be the Secretary of the Treasury, who already
    administers similar programs. The President could declare a sanction in
    general terms and delegate to an appropriate official the powers to
    administer the sanction and enforce the Act. This was done with the
    1979 Iranian blocking order; doing so would avoid any enforcement
    gap between the issuance o f the proclamation and implementation of
    the regulations by Treasury.
    (5) Publication and transmittal to Congress: The National Emergencies
    Act requires that the emergency proclamation be immediately transmit­
    ted to Congress and published in the Federal Register. 
    50 U.S.C. § 1621
    .
    (6) Report to Congress: Following the issuance of the order, the
    President shall “immediately” transmit a report to the Congress specify­
    ing:
    (1) the circumstances which necessitate such exercise of
    authority;
    (2) why the President believes those circumstances con­
    stitute an unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its
    source in whole or substantial part outside the United
    States, to the national security, foreign policy, or econ­
    omy of the United States;
    (3) the authorities to be exercised and the actions to be
    taken in the exercise of those authorities to deal with
    those circumstances;
    434
    (4) why the President believes such actions are neces­
    sary to deal with those circumstances; and
    (5) any foreign countries with respect to which such
    actions are to be taken and why such actions are to be
    taken with respect to those countries.
    
    50 U.S.C. § 1703
    (b).
    The legislative history indicates that this requirement was not to
    impede use of emergency power. The House report notes:
    Nothing in this section should be construed as requiring
    submission of a report as a precondition of taking action
    where circumstances require prompt action prior to or
    simultaneously with submission of a report.
    H.R. Rep. No. 459, supra, at 16.
    The Department of State is currently drafting appropriate report
    language which, once approved by concerned agencies, can be incorpo­
    rated immediately into final documents.
    IEEPA provides for prison sentences of up to 10 years and fines up
    to $50,000. Officers, directors, and agents of corporations are specifi­
    cally covered by this provision if they knowingly participate in viola­
    tions. Civil fines of up to $10,000 may also be imposed.
    B. The Trading With the Enemy Act
    The Trading with the Enemy Act, as amended in 1977, is available
    only during a war. 50 U.S.C. App. § 5(b) (Supp. Ill 1979). The key
    language of IEEPA quoted above (describing the powers available to
    the President) was based on the Trading with the Enemy Act, which
    retains comparable provisions. In addition, broader powers are available
    under the Trading with the Enemy Act, including the authority to vest
    enemy property (a process by which the government seizes and takes
    title to it) and to control wholly domestic transactions. 50 U.S.C. App.
    § 5(b).
    C. Passport Restrictions
    The Passport Act, as amended in 1978, deals with the power of the
    Secretary of State to restrict the use of passports. It provides:
    Unless authorized by law, a passport may not be desig­
    nated as restricted for travel to or for use in any country
    other than a country with which the United States is at
    war, where armed hostilities are in progress, or where
    there is imminent danger to the public health or the physi­
    cal safety of United States travellers.
    22 U.S.C. § 211a (Supp. Ill 1979).
    435
    The amendment followed a Supreme Court decision holding that the
    President had authority to refuse to validate passports for travel to
    Cuba. Zem el v. Rusk, 
    381 U.S. 1
     (1965). The Senate committee that
    added the amendment said that it intended to make “the freedom-of-
    travel principle . . . a matter of law.” S. Rep. No. 842, 95th Cong., 2d
    Sess. 14 (1978). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has recently con­
    firmed that the President has broad power over the issuance and revo­
    cation of passports. Haig v. Agee, 
    453 U.S. 280
     (1981).
    The President’s power has been delegated to the Secretary of State
    pursuant to Executive Order No. 11,295, 
    31 Fed. Reg. 10,603
     (1966).
    On December 9, 1981, Acting Secretary of State Clark restricted the
    use of United States passports for travel in Libya by placing a notice to
    that effect in the Federal Register. 
    46 Fed. Reg. 60,712
     (1981). The
    notice said that the action was required by the unsettled state of
    relations with Libya, and the increased threat of hostile acts against
    Americans. It noted that the American Embassy in Libya remains
    closed and that the U.S. government is not in a position to provide
    diplomatic protection or consular assistance to Americans in Libya.
    Therefore there was an imminent danger to the physical safety of
    Americans travelling to or present in Libya.
    In April, 1980, shortly before the rescue mission to Iran, President
    Carter authorized the restriction of the use of passports for travel to
    Iran. Exec. Order No. 12,211, supra, 
    45 Fed. Reg. 26,685
     (1980). This
    restriction was lifted at the time of the hostage release agreement in
    January, 1981. The order did not prove to be successful in deterring
    some Americans from traveling to Iran. On May 31, 1980, while the
    hostages were being held and the travel restriction was in effect, former
    Attorney General Ramsey Clark led a group of ten U.S. citizens to Iran
    to participate in an international conference. The Attorney General
    decided earlier this year not to litigate the question of whether this
    group had violated various federal laws.
    The Passport Act itself provides no penalty for its violation. It is a
    crime “to use any passport in violation of the conditions or restrictions
    therein contained . . . . ” 
    18 U.S.C. § 1544
    . It is, however, difficult to
    enforce this law. It appears that, in order to have a successful prosecu­
    tion, the government must prove that a U.S. passport that was geo­
    graphically restricted was used to enter the country to which travel
    was restricted. Persons traveling to geographically restricted areas gen­
    erally work out arrangements with the country of destination to admit
    them without presentation o f the passport; if the passport is not used,
    no violation occurs. Even if the passport is used, evidence on this point
    is not likely to be available to prosecutors in the United States. State
    Department regulations do not list violation of area restrictions as a
    basis for revoking or denying a passport. 
    22 C.F.R. §§ 51.70
    —.71 (1981).
    It appears that the regulations could be amended so that violation of an
    436
    area restriction would be a ground for revocation. The problems of
    proof described for the criminal law would, however, apply here as
    well.
    D. Export Administration Act
    The Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. App. §§2401-
    2413 (Supp. Ill 1979), contains three separate grants of power to the
    President to prohibit or curtail the export of goods and technology
    subject to the jurisdiction of the United States: national security con­
    trols, foreign policy controls, and short supply controls. 50 U.S.C. App.
    §§ 2404, 2405, 2406.
    The provision likely to be most pertinent relates to foreign policy
    controls.1 On October 23, 1981, foreign policy controls were imposed
    on exports of aircraft and aircraft parts to Libya. 
    46 Fed. Reg. 53,023
    (1981) (to be codified at 
    15 C.F.R. §§ 376
    , 385, 399). Previously, off-
    highway tractors were restricted for sale to Libya under this section. 
    15 C.F.R. § 385.4
    (e) (1981).
    This Act was not employed against Iran, but was recently used to
    restrict exports to the Soviet Union in 1980 following the invasion of
    Afghanistan. 
    45 Fed. Reg. 1883
     (1980) (to be codified at 
    15 C.F.R. §§ 376
    , 386, 399) (Restriction on the Export of Agricultural Commod­
    ities and Products to the U.S.S.R.); 
    45 Fed. Reg. 21,612
     (1980) (to be
    codified at 
    15 C.F.R. §§ 371
    , 379, 385, 399) (Controls on Goods and
    Technology for Moscow Olympics).
    The President may prohibit exports “to the extent necessary to fur­
    ther significantly the foreign policy of the United States or to fulfill its
    declared international obligations.” 50 U.S.C. App. § 2405(a)(1). One of
    the expressly permitted purposes of foreign policy controls is discourag­
    ing the provision of aid or sanctuary to international terrorists. 50
    U.S.C. App. § 2402(8).
    The President’s authority to impose foreign policy controls has been
    delegated to the Secretary of Commerce. Exec. Order No. 12,214, 
    45 Fed. Reg. 29,783
     (1980). It must be exercised, however, in consultation
    with the Secretary of State. 50 U.S.C. App. § 2405(a) (Supp. Ill 1979).
    1 National security controls may be imposed in order to restrict the export of goods and technology
    which would make “a significant contribution to the military potential o f any other country,” which
    would prove detrimental to the United States, 50 U.S.C. App. § 2402(2)(B), and which pertain to
    “militarily critical goods and technologies,” 50 U.S.C. App. § 2404(d)(1). The Secretary cannot require
    a validated license unless (A) the export is restricted under a multilateral agreement; (B) with respect
    to the export, other nations do not possess capabilities comparable to those of the United States; or (C)
    the United States is seeking agreement of other suppliers to apply comparable controls 50 U.S.C.
    App. § 2404(e)(2). If the President determines that goods or technology are available from foreign
    sources so that a specific licensing requirement would be ineffective, he may still impose controls if he
    finds that “the absence o f export controls    . would prove detrimental to the national security of the
    United States ” 50 U.S.C. App. § 2404(f)(1).
    Short supply controls are used “ to restrict the export of goods where necessary to protect the
    domestic economy from the excessive drain of scarce materials and to reduce the senous inflationary
    impact of foreign demand ” 50 U.S.C. App. § 2402(2)(C)
    437
    Certain criteria must be considered when imposing or expanding such
    controls. They include:
    (1) The probability that they will achieve their purpose;
    (2) Compatibility with foreign policy including the
    effort to counter terrorism;
    (3) The reaction o f other countries;
    (4) The impact on the ability of the United States to
    compete economically including the effect on existing
    contracts;
    (5) Ability to enforce the controls effectively; and
    (6) The foreign policy consequences of not imposing
    controls.
    50 U.S.C. App. § 2405(b).
    The Secretary of Commerce must, in addition, take the following
    steps:
    (a) Consult with afTected industries concerning items (1)
    and (4), supra;
    (b) Determine that reasonable efforts have been made
    to achieve the purposes of the controls through negotia­
    tions or other alternative means;
    (c) Consult “in every possible instance” with the Con­
    gress;
    (d) Notify Congress of the action taken; and
    (e) Submit a report on items (1) through (6), supra, and
    on alternative means attempted or the reason for imposing
    the control without attempting alternative means. The
    report must also indicate how such controls will signifi­
    cantly further the foreign policy of the United States or
    will further its international obligations.
    (0 Take all feasible steps to initiate and conclude nego­
    tiations with appropriate foreign governments to control
    exports by them of comparable goods or technology.
    50 U.S.C. App. § 2405(c), (d), (e).
    Criminal violators of restrictions issued for foreign policy purposes
    can be punished by a fine of five times the value of the export or
    $100,000, whichever is greater, and imprisoned for up to 10 years.
    Officers of corporations are not specifically covered by the penalty
    provision but under general principles of law can be prosecuted as
    violators. 
    18 U.S.C. §2
    . Wood v. United States, 
    204 Fed. 55
     (4th Cir.
    1913), cert, denied, 
    229 U.S. 617
    . In addition, civil fines of up to $10,000
    may be imposed by the Commerce Department. Administrative sanc­
    tions are also available including revocation of the authority to export
    goods or technology. 50 U.S.C. App. § 2410(b), (c).
    438
    E. The War Powers Resolution
    The War Powers Resolution, 
    50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548
    , deals with the
    procedures which must be followed in the use of our armed forces. It
    includes requirements to consult with and report to Congress.
    1.    Consultation. The consultation requirement focuses on use of
    troops in hostile situations:
    The President in every possible instance shall consult
    with Congress before introducing United States Armed
    Forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent
    involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the cir­
    cumstances, and after every such introduction shall con­
    sult regularly with the Congress until United States*
    Armed Forces are no longer engaged in hostilities or have
    been removed from such situations.
    
    50 U.S.C. § 1542
    .
    On its face, consultation is required with “Congress.” This language
    replaced an earlier version which merely required consultation with the
    leadership and appropriate committees of Congress. H.R. Conf. Rep.
    No. 547, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1973); H.R. Rep. No. 287, 93rd Cong.,
    1st Sess. 6 (1973). Nevertheless, as a practical matter consultation with
    any more than a select group of congressional leaders has never been
    attempted.
    In requiring consultation in “every possible instance,” Congress
    meant to be firm yet flexible. H.R. Rep. No. 287, supra, at 6. The
    House report noted:
    The use of the word “every” reflects the committee’s
    belief that such consultation prior to the commitment of
    armed forces should be inclusive. In other words, it
    should apply in extraordinary and emergency circum­
    stances—even when it is not possible to get formal con­
    gressional approval in the form of a declaration of war or
    other specific authorization.
    At the same time, through use of the word “possible” it
    recognizes that a situation may be so dire, e.g„ hostile
    missile attack underway, and require such instantaneous
    action that no prior consultation will be possible.
    Id.
    President Carter determined that consultation was not “possible”
    prior to the Iran rescue mission because of the great need for secrecy.
    He indicated, however, that if the mission had not been aborted in its
    439
    first phase, he planned to advise appropriate congressional leaders
    before the next phase, the actual rescue, took place.2
    Consultation is only required prior to the actual “introduction” of
    forces into hostilities. Thus, it is not required during planning or prepa­
    ration stages as long as forces have not been committed.
    A determination must also be made as to when hostilities exist that
    require consultation. President Ford took the position, for example, that
    no consultation was legally required at the Danang or Lebanon evacu­
    ations because hostilities were not involved. Franck, After the Fall: The
    N ew Procedural Framework fo r Congressional Control Over the War
    Power, 71 Am. I. Int’l L. 605, 615 (1977). The State and Defense
    Departments have said that “hostilities” mean a situation in which
    American forces are actively exchanging fire with opposing units and
    “imminent hostilities” mean a situation where there is a serious risk
    from hostile fire to the safety of U.S. forces. Neither term was thought
    to encompass irregular or infrequent violence which may occur in a
    particular area. War Powers: A Test o f Compliance, Relative to the
    Danang Sealift, the Evacuation o f Phnom Penh, the Evacuation o f Saigon,
    and the Mayaguez Incident, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Secu­
    rity and Scientific Affairs o f the House Comm, on Int'l Relations, 94th
    Cong., 1st Sess. 38-39, 85-86 (1975).
    2. Reporting requirements. The reporting requirements apply to situa­
    tions not only where hostilities are taking place or imminent (which
    requires consultation) but where armed forces are sent to a foreign
    country equipped for combat. 
    50 U.S.C. § 1543
    . The report must be
    filed within 48 hours. This has been interpreted as meaning 48 hours
    from the time that they are “introduced” into the situation triggering
    the requirement and not from the time that the decision to dispatch
    them is made. E.g., Franck, supra, at 615. The report must include:
    (1) The circumstances necessitating the introduction of
    United States Armed Forces;
    (2) The constitutional or legislative authority under
    which such introduction took place; and
    (3) The estimated scope and duration of the hostilities
    or involvement.
    Franck, supra, at 614-15.
    Reports filed in the past have been brief and to the point; they have not
    run more than one or two pages. The discussion of legal authority in the
    reports has been limited to a brief reference to the constitutional power of
    the President as Commander-in-Chief and Chief Executive. This Admin­
    2 Statement o f A cting Secretary o f State Christopher, May 8, 1980, to Senate Foreign Relations
    Comm., p. 5. A lthough the Acting Secretary’s statement was phrased in statutory terms, the consulta­
    tion requirement raises a constitutional question as to a possible limit on the President’s independent
    power. Testimony o f State Department Legal Adviser M onroe Leigh in War Powers: A Test o f
    Compliance, supra, at 100
    440
    istration took the position that the incident earlier this year where two
    Libyan planes were shot down over the Mediterranean did not implicate
    either the consultation or reporting provisions.
    The resolution includes in its statement of purpose and policy a list of
    situations in which the President is authorized to introduce the Armed
    Forces into hostilities or situations of imminent hostility. This may be
    done: (1) pursuant to a declaration of war; (2) under specific statutory
    authorization, or (3) in a national emergency created by an attack upon
    the United States, its territories or possesions or its armed forces. 
    50 U.S.C. § 1541
    (c). We do not believe, however, that the purpose and
    policy statement should be construed to constrain the exercise of the
    President’s constitutional power. The Resolution’s policy statement is
    not a comprehensive or binding formulation of the President’s powers
    as Commander-in-Chief. See H.R. Conf. Rep. 547, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess.
    8 (1973) (stating that subsequent sections of the Resolution are not
    dependent on the policy statement). The Resolution itself disclaims any
    intent to alter the constitutional power of the President. 
    50 U.S.C. § 1547
    (d)(1).
    Finally, the Resolution provides that Congress may, by concurrent
    resolution, force the withdrawal of our armed forces from abroad. 
    50 U.S.C. § 1544
    (c). This “legislative Veto” device is, in our view, uncon­
    stitutional. See Veto of the War Powers Resolution, 1973 Pub. Papers
    of Richard Nixon 893 (Oct. 24, 1973).
    F. Powers Relating to Libyan Nationals
    The Immigration and Nationality Act, 
    8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525
     (1976
    ed. and Supp. Ill 1979), provides the Executive with broad powers to
    restrict the entry of aliens into the United States and to deport them.
    The President may issue regulations governing the entry and depar­
    ture of aliens from the United States. It is unlawful
    for any alien to depart from or enter or attempt to depart
    from or enter the United States except under such reason­
    able rules, regulations, and orders, and subject to such
    limitations and exceptions as the President may pre­
    scribe . . . .
    
    8 U.S.C. § 1185
    (a)(Supp. Ill 1979). In addition, the President may
    suspend the entry of aliens by designated classes:
    Whenever the President finds that the entry of any
    aliens or of any class of aliens into the United States
    would be detrimental to the interests of the United States,
    he may by proclamation, and for such period as he shall
    deem necessary, suspend the entry of all aliens or any
    class of aliens as immigrant or nonimmigrants, or impose
    441
    on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be
    appropriate.
    
    8 U.S.C. § 1182
    (0-
    In the Iran crisis, the President delegated to the Secretary of State
    and the Attorney General the powers of the President under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1185
     to prescribe limitations respecting visas issued to Iranians. Exec.
    Order No. 12,172, 
    44 Fed. Reg. 67,947
     (1979), as amended by Exec.
    Order No. 12,206, 
    45 Fed. Reg. 24,101
     (1980). Under this order, the
    State Department issued regulations requiring all outstanding visas of
    Iranian nationals to be re-endorsed and for new visas to be issued only
    under strict standards. 
    22 C.F.R. §46.8
     (1981). Sections 1182 and 1185
    were the authority for Proclamation 4865, 
    46 Fed. Reg. 48,107
     (1981),
    and Executive Order No. 12,324, 
    46 Fed. Reg. 48,109
     (1981) concern­
    ing interdiction of aliens on the high seas.
    In addition, the Attorney General can issue regulations to carry out
    the immigration laws, 
    8 U.S.C. § 1103
    (a), and is charged with insuring
    that aliens who have not maintained their status under the law depart
    from the United States, 
    8 U.S.C. § 1184
    (a). These powers are delegated
    to the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization. 
    28 C.F.R. §0.105
     (1981). In 1979 the Immigration and Naturalization Service
    (INS) issued regulations requiring Iranian students to report to the INS
    and submit evidence that they had maintained eligibility as students
    under the immigration laws. 
    8 C.F.R. §214.5
     (1981). Subsequently, the
    INS provided for the accelerated departure of all Iranians who were
    judged deportable by limiting the amount of time permitted for depar­
    ture. 
    8 C.F.R. §242.5
     (1981). These INS regulations were upheld in
    subsequent litigation as a valid exercise of the Attorney General’s
    statutory power. The courts held that the regulations had a rational
    basis and did not therefore deprive Iranians of equal protection of the
    laws. Narenji v. Civiletti, 
    617 F.2d 745
     (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert, denied, 
    446 U.S. 957
     (1980); Malek-Marzban v. INS, 
    653 F.2d 113
     (4th Cir. 1981);
    cf. Yassini v. Crosland, 
    618 F.2d 1356
     (9th Cir. 1980).
    Apart from the statute below dealing with enemy aliens, there is no
    law which specifically provides the power to expel aliens who are in
    this country lawfully as permanent residents or nonimmigrants and who
    are not otherwise subject to deportation.
    The President has statutory authority to intern or expel enemy aliens.
    This power is available, however, only in time of war, invasion, or
    predatory incursion. 
    50 U.S.C. §21
    . The Supreme Court has held this
    provision constitutional. Ludecke v. Watkins, 
    335 U.S. 160
     (1948).
    For your information, we are attaching: (1) examples of orders which
    have been issued in the past; and (2) a listing of major opinions,
    including subject headings issued by this Office during the Iranian
    442
    crisis. The latter attachment demonstrates the broad range of actions
    which were considered during that crisis.
    T heodore   B. O l s o n
    Assistant Attorney General
    Office o f Legal Counsel
    443