Ex parte Stanford Pritchett. , 167 So. 3d 321 ( 2014 )

REL: 10/31/2014
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SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2014-2015
____________________
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____________________
Ex parte Stanford Pritchett
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re: Stanford Pritchett
v.
State of Alabama)
(Marengo Circuit Court, CC-7-112;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-13-0438)
STUART, Justice.
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WRIT DENIED. NO OPINION.
Bolin, Parker, Shaw, Wise, and Bryan, JJ., concur.
Moore, C.J., dissents.
Main, J., recuses himself.*
*Justice Main was a member of the Court of Criminal
Appeals when that court considered an earlier appeal in this
case.
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MOORE, Chief Justice (dissenting).
The trial court in this case denied Stanford Pritchett's
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Because, in my view, the
Court of Criminal Appeals' unpublished memorandum affirming
the trial court's judgment, Pritchett v. State (No. CR-13-
0438, June 6, 2014), ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2014)
(table), conflicts with the Alabama Rules of Criminal
Procedure and with our precedent on the requirements for a
guilty-plea colloquy, I respectfully dissent from the denial
of Pritchett's petition for a writ of certiorari.
Facts
Pritchett was charged with murder made capital because it
was committed by shooting into a vehicle; he pleaded guilty to
a lesser-included charge of murder and agreed to a negotiated
sentence of 23 years. During his plea hearing the trial judge
did not mention or review the explanation-of-rights form with
Pritchett or ask if he understood the rights he was waiving by
pleading guilty (except for the right to appeal). The trial
judge also did not review with Pritchett the maximum sentence
or minimum sentence for the crime to which he was pleading
guilty. The "Request for Guilty Plea" form Pritchett submitted
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listed the sentencing range for the offense of murder as being
from 10 to 99 years' imprisonment or life imprisonment. In
fact, the range was 20 to 99 years' imprisonment because of an
applicable firearm enhancement. § 13A-5-6(a)(4), Ala. Code
1975.
Acting pro se, Pritchett moved to withdraw his guilty
plea. The trial court denied his motion. The Court of Criminal
Appeals affirmed its denial by an unpublished memorandum.
Pritchett v. State (No. CR-09-1050, Dec. 3, 2010), 92 So. 3d
816 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010) (table). This Court reversed the
Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment on the ground that
Pritchett was not represented by counsel in the proceedings on
his motion for withdrawal of the plea. Ex parte Pritchett, 117
So. 3d 356 (Ala. 2012). On remand, the trial court held a
hearing during which Pritchett's counsel raised the issue of
the court's failure to discuss with Pritchett the
minimum/maximum sentencing range. The trial court again denied
Pritchett's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The Court of
Criminal Appeals again affirmed, by unpublished memorandum,
and Pritchett petitioned this Court for certiorari review.
Discussion
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Explaining its most recent affirmance of the denial of
Pritchett's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the Court of
Criminal Appeals stated in its unpublished memorandum:
"Pritchett filed in the circuit court a request to enter a
guilty plea, which he and his attorneys signed, that clearly
states the sentencing range for murder. Further, Pritchett
pleaded guilty pursuant to a negotiated agreement and received
the sentence upon which he agreed." Neither of these reasons
is persuasive.
"What is at stake for an accused facing death or
imprisonment demands the utmost solicitude of which courts are
capable in canvassing the matter with the accused to make sure
he has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of
its consequence." Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243-44
(1969). Drawing on Boykin, this Court has held that "a
defendant, prior to pleading guilty, must be advised on the
record of the maximum and minimum potential punishment for his
crime." Carter v. State, 291 Ala. 83, 85, 277 So. 2d 896, 898
(1973) (emphasis added). Although at one time the Court of
Criminal Appeals noted that the submission of "a written
explanation of rights signed by appellant was more than
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adequate to satisfy the requirements of Boykin," Ireland v.
State, 47 Ala. App. 65, 66, 250 So. 2d 602, 603 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1971), "a signed Ireland form is, alone, insufficient to
establish the voluntariness of a plea." Waddle v. State, 784
So. 2d 367, 370 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000).
Effective January 1, 1991, the Alabama Supreme Court
adopted the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 14.4 of
those Rules reads as follows, in pertinent part:
"In all other cases [i.e., cases other than minor-
misdemeanor cases], except where the defendant is a
corporation or an association, the court shall not
accept a plea of guilty without first addressing the
defendant personally in the presence of counsel in
open court for the purposes of:
"(1) Ascertaining that the defendant has a full
understanding of what a plea of guilty means and its
consequences, by informing the defendant of and
determining that the defendant understands:
"(i) The nature of the charge and the
material elements of the offense to which
the plea is offered;
"(ii) The mandatory minimum penalty,
if any, and the maximum possible penalty
provided by law, including any enhanced
sentencing provisions ...."
Rule 14.4(a), Ala. R. Crim. P. (emphasis added).
"The court may comply with the requirements of Rule
14.4(a) by determining from a personal colloquy with
the defendant that the defendant has read, or has
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had read to the defendant, and understands each item
contained in Form C-44B, CR-51, CR-52, or Form
C-44A, as the case may be."
Rule 14.4(d), Ala. R. Crim. P.
The trial court, though it engaged in a colloquy with
Pritchett, did not discuss with him the maximum and minimum
penalties for the crime of murder, nor did it mention or
discuss the CR-51 (Ireland) form that is used in non-habitual-
offender felony cases.1 The "Request for Guilty Plea" form
introduced at the hearing on Pritchett's motion to withdraw
his guilty plea, and cited by the Court of Criminal Appeals,
is not one of the forms identified in Rule 14.4(d), Ala. R.
Crim. P., as acceptable for use in conjunction with a guilty-
plea colloquy. In any event, that form contained incorrect
information and thus misinformed Pritchett that he faced a
minimum sentence of 10 years if convicted, rather than a
minimum sentence of 20 years.
For a defendant's decision to plead guilty to be
intelligent and voluntary, the defendant must know the correct
1
The CR-51 form introduced into evidence at the hearing
on Pritchett's motion to withdraw his guilty plea was a blank
form with no particularized information written on it and no
signatures. According to the Court of Criminal Appeals, the
record of Pritchett's previous appeal contains an Ireland form
indicating that the minimum sentence for murder is 10 years.
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minimum sentence he or she will face by pleading guilty. "When
an accused who pleads guilty does so on the basis of
misinformation as to the range of punishment the guilty plea
is involuntary." Handley v. State, 686 So. 2d 540, 541 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1996). Furthermore, the trial judge did not
personally address Pritchett regarding either the "Request for
Guilty Plea" form or Form CR-51 as Rule 14.4(d) requires. The
Committee Comments to Rule 14.4 state:
"Section (d) is included to accommodate the
current Alabama practice of informing the defendant
of his rights through a form similar to that
approved in Ireland v. State, 47 Ala. App. 65, 250
So. 2d 602 (1971), and subsequent cases. The rule,
however, specifically retains the requirement that
the trial judge ... specifically question the
defendant concerning the information contained in
each item. Thus, in every case, the record should
affirmatively show a colloquy between the trial
judge and the defendant concerning all such matters.
... This rule requires such a colloquy and requires
that specific inquiry be made with regard to the
rights set out in Rule 14.4(a)(1) and (2)."
(Emphasis added.)
The Court of Criminal Appeals' holding in its unpublished
memorandum in this case that the "Request for Guilty Plea"
form, standing alone, satisfied the requirement that the plea
be voluntary was negated as long ago as 1973 in Carter. Rule
14.4, in effect since 1991, embodies the principle that
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without a colloquy to review a true Ireland form stating all
the rights the defendant is forgoing by pleading guilty, a
guilty plea is not voluntary. Furthermore, the unsupported
statement of the Court of Criminal Appeals that the trial
court did not have to inform Pritchett of the minimum and
maximum sentences because he had agreed to a negotiated plea
finds no recognition in the Alabama Rules of Criminal
Procedure or in prior cases. Surely the information that the
minimum sentence, if the defendant is found guilty, is 20
years, as opposed to 10 years, is necessary for a defendant to
make a knowing and intelligent decision either to plead guilty
or to go to trial.2
Recently the Court of Criminal Appeals recognized this
principle in a case Pritchett cites frequently in his petition
for certiorari review. See Williams v. State, [Ms. CR-13-0436,
May 2, 2014] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2014) (holding
2
The Court of Criminal Appeals also argued that Pritchett
did not object to the trial court's failure to inform him of
the firearm enhancement. This objection, however, is included
in Pritchett's objection to the failure to inform him of the
correct sentencing range. See Anderson v. State, 668 So. 2d
159, 159 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995) (equating a failure to inform
a defendant of a sentencing enhancement with a failure to
inform him of "the correct minimum and maximum possible
sentences he could receive").
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that a guilty plea was involuntary where the defendant was not
informed that a firearm enhancement would increase the minimum
sentence by 10 years). Because informing Pritchett of the
maximum and minimum possible sentences was "an absolute
constitutional prerequisite to acceptance of a guilty plea,"
Carter, 291 Ala. at 85, 277 So. 2d at 897, I believe
Pritchett's petition has merit. "The law in Alabama is clear
that the trial court's failure to correctly advise a defendant
of the minimum and maximum sentences before accepting his
guilty plea renders that guilty plea involuntary." White v.
State, 888 So. 2d 1288, 1290 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004). That the
sentence imposed (23 years) was within the legal range does
not control. "It does not matter that his sentence was legal.
'The accused's right to know the possible sentence he faces is
absolute.'" Bozeman v. State, 686 So. 2d 556, 559 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1996) (quoting Henry v. State, 639 So. 2d 583, 584 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1994)).
Conclusion
I would grant Pritchett's petition for a writ of
certiorari (1) to examine the apparent conflict between the
Court of Criminal Appeals' decision in this case and prior
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decisions and (2) to maintain uniformity in our cases applying
Rule 14.4.
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