Ammons Properties, LLC v. Andrew William Spraggins ( 2023 )

Rel: May 19, 2023
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts,
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SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023
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Ammons Properties, LLC
v.
Andrew William Spraggins
Appeal from Madison Circuit Court
(CV-20-901102)
MITCHELL, Justice.
Andrew William Spraggins's driveway crossed a neighboring tract
of land owned by Ammons Properties, LLC ("Ammons"). After a dispute
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arose between Spraggins and Ammons, Spraggins filed a complaint
asking the Madison Circuit Court to enter a judgment declaring that he
had an easement for the portion of his driveway that crossed Ammons's
property. Ammons filed a counterclaim alleging that Spraggins was
liable for several tortious acts. Following a bench trial, the circuit court
ruled that Spraggins had an easement across Ammons's property and
denied Ammons's counterclaims. Ammons appealed. We affirm the
judgment.
Facts and Procedural History
In 1991, Billy R. Webster ("Billy") acquired 7.51 acres of land ("the
Webster property") on the west side of Bell Factory Road, a public road
in Madison County. The Webster property consisted of three contiguous
tracts: a southern tract, a middle tract, and a northern tract. Four years
later, Billy died.
In the ensuing years, Billy's estate distributed the tracts to various
members of the Webster family. Charles B. Webster ("Charles") acquired
the middle tract in 2009. He took out a loan secured by a mortgage on
the property that same year. Two years later, Charles's sons acquired
the southern and northern tracts.
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In 2017, Charles defaulted on the loan for the middle tract, and the
tract was sold to Spraggins at a foreclosure sale. Before purchasing the
middle tract, Spraggins inspected and obtained a survey of the entire
Webster property. The survey included a note stating: "These three
tracts all belonged to [Billy] Webster and the driveways served multiple
houses. [The middle tract] uses the drive that crosses [the northern
tract]." The driveway across the northern tract was paved; the southern
tract contained a gravel driveway that also accessed the house that sat
on the middle tract.
Two years after the foreclosure sale, Ammons purchased the
southern and northern tracts from members of the Webster family. The
sole member of Ammons, Scott Ammons ("Scott"), testified that, soon
after purchasing the land, he began clearing the southern tract for
development and placed a chain across the gravel driveway located on
the southern tract. He had the property surveyed and began
construction.
In August 2020, Spraggins filed a complaint in the Madison Circuit
Court asking the court to "establish and declare the right-of-way
easements over and across the property of the Defendant, Ammons
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Properties, LLC, … as being, alternatively, an easement of necessity or
an easement by implication, having existed and then utilized by parties
occupying the property of the Plaintiff." Ammons counterclaimed for
damages based on theories of trespass, private nuisance, and outrage.
After a bench trial, the circuit court entered a judgment holding that
Spraggins had "an easement for ingress and egress over and across the
property belonging to [Ammons] described as and referred to during trial
as Tract 2, being the northern most property and currently containing an
asphalt driveway." The circuit court denied "[a]ll claims not specifically
addressed" in the judgment, including Ammons's counterclaims.
Ammons filed a "Motion for Reconsideration, and to Alter, Amend, or
Vacate" the judgment, which was deemed denied because the circuit
court did not rule on it within 90 days. See Rules 59(e) and 59.1, Ala. R.
Civ. P. Ammons appealed.
Standard of Review
" ' "When a judge in a nonjury case hears oral testimony, a judgment
based on findings of fact based on that testimony will be presumed correct
and will not be disturbed on appeal except for a plain and palpable
error." ' " Kennedy v. Boles Invs., Inc., 53 So. 3d 60, 67-68 (Ala. 2010)
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(citations omitted). But " 'that presumption [of correctness] has no
application when the trial court is shown to have improperly applied the
law to the facts.' " Id. at 68 (citation omitted).
Analysis
Ammons raises what he says are three grounds for reversal: (1) the
circuit court did not have jurisdiction to grant an easement to Spraggins,
and, if it did, Ammons was owed compensation for the easement; (2) the
evidence at trial did not support an easement in favor of Spraggins; and
(3) the circuit court erred by declining to award damages to Ammons on
its counterclaims against Spraggins. Because Ammons does not
demonstrate reversible error on any of these grounds, we affirm.
A. The Circuit Court Had Jurisdiction and Ammons Is Not Due
Compensation
Ammons first argues that the judgment of the Madison Circuit
Court is void because Spraggins did not initiate the action in the Madison
Probate Court. Ammons notes that a landowner seeking to condemn a
right-of-way over neighboring land must apply "to the probate court of
the county in which the lands over which such right-of-way is desired." §
18-3-3, Ala. Code 1975. Because § 18-3-3 does not give the circuit court
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jurisdiction to condemn a right-of-way over neighboring property,
Ammons argues, the circuit court's order is void.
Ammons is correct that, in the absence of an existing right-of-way
to a public road, the owner of a landlocked tract may petition the county
probate court to condemn a right-of-way across a neighboring tract.
§ 18-3-1 and § 18-3-3. But that is not the only way a landowner without
access to a public road can obtain it. Relevant here, an easement by
necessity may be implied when the owner of two tracts of land, one of
which requires the use of an existing right-of-way over the other, conveys
the tract that benefits from the right-of-way. See Burrow v. Miller, 340
So. 2d 779, 780 (Ala. 1976) (explaining that an easement can arise even
when a conveyance is "not an express conveyance of the easement in
question but the deed to the property to be served by the claimed
easement" because a landowner who conveys property " 'also conveys
whatever is necessary to its beneficial use' " (citation omitted)).
In his complaint, Spraggins asked the circuit court to "establish and
declare the right-of-way easements over and across the property of the
Defendant," either as "an easement by necessity or an easement by
implication, having existed and then utilized by parties occupying the
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property of the Plaintiff." Because Spraggins sought legal recognition of
an existing easement and not the condemnation of a new right-of-way, §
18-3-3 did not restrict jurisdiction over the action to the probate court.
Accordingly, Ammons has not shown that the circuit court's judgment is
void for want of jurisdiction.
In the alternative, Ammons argues that "[t]he trial court was
additionally in error for awarding such an easement without due
compensation to Ammons." Ammons's brief at 27. Ammons notes that a
person seeking to condemn a " 'right-of-way must pay the owner of the
land across which the right-of-way is taken "the value of the land taken
and compensation for damages to the land." ' " Id. at 24 (quoting Ally
Windsor Howell, Tilley's Alabama Equity § 17:4 (5th ed. 2012)). But, as
explained above, Spraggins asked the circuit court to declare an existing
easement, not to condemn Ammons's property. Therefore, Ammons was
not owed compensation.
B. Ammons Has Not Shown that Declaring an Easement Was
Erroneous
Ammons next argues that there was insufficient evidence for the
circuit court to declare the existence of an easement. An easement is a
nonpossessory interest in land that can be created in several ways,
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including by (1) deed, (2) prescription, (3) adverse use for a statutory
period, (4) express conveyance, (5) reservation or exception, (6)
implication, (7) necessity, (8) contract, or (9) reference to boundaries or
maps. Cleek v. Povia, 515 So. 2d 1246, 1247 (Ala. 1987). In his
complaint, Spraggins asked the circuit court to declare an easement by
necessity or by implication. The circuit court issued a judgment declaring
an easement in favor of Spraggins, but it did not specify which type of
easement -- by necessity or by implication -- Spraggins had. Because
Ammons fails to show that the circuit court's judgment implicitly
declaring an easement by necessity was plainly and palpably wrong, we
can affirm on that basis. We address each of Ammons's evidentiary
arguments below.
1. The Driveway
Ammons first argues that Spraggins could not have an easement by
necessity because "Spraggins had the ability to construct his own
driveway on [the middle tract], but chose not to do so." Ammons's brief
at 32. In making this argument, Ammons contends that, because it built
a driveway over land on the southern tract that was virtually identical to
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an adjacent portion of the middle tract, Spraggins had no real need for a
right-of-way over Ammons's property.
When a landowner conveys a tract of land, an easement by
necessity arises on the adjacent tract when (1) the conveyor owned both
tracts immediately before the conveyance and (2) a right-of-way over the
adjacent tract is the sole practical means of ingress and egress for the
tract conveyed. See Burrow, 340 So. 2d at 780. Consequently, as
Ammons notes, "[i]f there are other reasonably practical ways of ingress
and egress over complainant's property, then no easement over the
defendants' lots may be implied. That it might be more convenient or
less expensive does not serve to raise the implication of such quasi
easement." Crawford v. Tucker, 258 Ala. 658, 661, 64 So. 2d 411, 413-14
(1952).
At trial, Spraggins's expert testified that, based on his assessment
of two areas of the middle tract, Spraggins could not safely construct a
driveway to Bell Factory Road. But, as Ammons points out, Spraggins's
expert did not assess the portion of the middle tract adjacent to Ammons's
driveway on the southern tract. Nor, Ammons notes, did Spraggins
present evidence of the cost of a driveway. Accordingly, Ammons reasons
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that Spraggins failed to show that he could not reasonably construct his
own driveway for ingress and egress over the middle tract.
But Spraggins's expert, after viewing a video of Scott driving his
vehicle on the driveway Ammons had built, also testified that Ammons's
driveway was unsafely steep. Therefore, the circuit court could have
reasoned that a similar driveway over the adjacent part of the middle
tract would likewise be unsafe. For that reason, it was not plainly and
palpably wrong for the circuit court to accept the expert's testimony that
there was no safe way for Spraggins to build a driveway over the middle
tract.
2. The Effect of the Prior Foreclosure on the Middle Tract
Ammons next argues that any easement benefiting the middle tract
was extinguished when the middle tract was foreclosed on in 2017.
Ammons points out that Charles mortgaged the middle tract in 2009.
Ammons also maintains that, assuming there was an easement by
necessity, such easement could have arisen only when Charles's sons
acquired the southern and northern tracts in 2011. Because Charles
mortgaged the middle tract two years before Ammons says any easement
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could have arisen, Ammons contends that the 2017 foreclosure
necessarily extinguished the easement.
Ammons supports this argument by citing Alabama Historical
Commission v. City of Birmingham, 769 So. 2d 317, 320 (Ala. Civ. App.
2000). In that case, an easement encumbered a tract of land that had
previously been mortgaged. Id. The Court of Civil Appeals held that
foreclosure of the mortgage extinguished the easement because the
easement was established after the tract had been mortgaged. Id.Indeed, "the general rule is that the foreclosure of a mortgage terminates
an easement that is recorded after the mortgage, subject only to the
junior easement holder's right to redeem under § 6-5-248, Ala. Code
1975." Id.
But an easement encumbers the servient, not the dominant,
tenement. See Oates v. Town of Headland, 154 Ala. 503, 505, 45 So. 910,
911 (1908) (" 'An easement is an interest in land … conferring a right
upon the owner thereof to some profit, benefit, dominion, or lawful use
out of or from the estate of another.' " (citation omitted)). Accordingly, for
a foreclosure to extinguish an easement, the foreclosed property must be
the servient tenement. Here, the easement consisted of a right-of-way
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over the northern tract, which was thus the servient tenement.
Therefore, foreclosure of the mortgage on the middle tract did not
extinguish the easement.
3. Whether Spraggins Knew of an Easement
Ammons further contends that an easement by necessity could not
have arisen because "Spraggins knew an easement did not exist based on
his inspection and his survey." Ammons's brief at 29; cf. Crawford, 258
Ala. at 661, 64 So. 2d at 414 (holding that a landowner did not have an
easement over his neighbor's land when "[t]he driveway was open and
visible when complainant purchased his property; he knew his
conveyance did not grant any right of way or easement over the
remainder of the property, and accepted it without any reservation or
grant of an easement"). Ammons points to several pieces of evidence to
support its position.
First, Spraggins inspected the Webster property and had it
surveyed. Ammons contends that a note in the survey containing the
statement that "[t]hese three tracts all belonged to [Billy] Webster and
the driveways served multiple houses" put "Spraggins on notice that the
driveways existed for the sole owner of the [Webster property], not him."
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Ammons's brief at 31. But, after the excerpt quoted by Ammons, the
survey note continues: "[The middle tract] uses the drive that crosses [the
northern tract]." The full note, therefore, could reasonably indicate that
the driveway over the northern tract was for the benefit of the middle
tract regardless of who its owner was. Thus, the circuit court could
properly have found that the survey note supports the existence of an
easement for the benefit of the middle tract.
Second, Ammons argues that Spraggins was on notice that there
was no easement because, though he knew of the driveway over the
northern tract, he "never raised any questions about how he was going to
get to the property when he bought it." Id. But Ammons points to no
authority showing that the existence of an easement by necessity
depends on an inquiry by the purchaser of the dominant tenement.
Indeed, Spraggins's failure to ask this question could indicate that
Spraggins had no reason to doubt that an easement existed. Accordingly,
this fact does not establish a lack of knowledge on Spraggins's part.
Nor do the other pieces of evidence highlighted by Ammons, many
of which show only that Spraggins did not have an express easement.
For instance, Ammons points to (1) the lack of a "grant in the deed from
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the adjacent property of use of the driveway"; (2) testimony that the
owners of the northern tract never offered or issued Spraggins an
easement; (3) Spraggins's failure to offer to buy an easement; and (4)
testimony that Spraggins's use of the driveway crossing the northern
tract would have been without permission. Id. at 31-32. None of this
evidence indicates that the circuit court was plainly and palpably wrong
about the existence of an easement by necessity -- which is implied, not
express. Ammons thus does not prevail on this issue.
4. Landlocked Property
Ammons also disputes the circuit court's judgment on the ground
that "an owner who has a way of access through his own land cannot
impose a way of necessity across the lands of a neighbor unless his own
way is not reasonably adequate, or the use of it is prohibitively costly."
Ammons's brief at 24 (citing 1 Jesse P. Evans III, Alabama Property
Rights and Remedies § 40.12, at 795 (2d ed. 1999)). Ammons notes that
" 'a landlocked owner is not entitled to condemn a right-of-way across
adjoining land, if the landlocked landowner has an existing, reasonably
adequate means of access to his land, or if he could construct such an
access without prohibitive expense.' " Id. (quoting Tilly's Alabama Equity
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§ 17.4) (emphasis omitted). Because the middle tract abutted Bell
Factory Road, Ammons argues that the middle tract was not landlocked
and, thus, that Spraggins had reasonably adequate access to his
property.
But, in making this argument, Ammons again confuses an action to
declare an existing easement with an action to condemn a new right-of-
way. Spraggins sought neither to impose nor to condemn a new right-of-
way; yet Ammons relies on treatises addressing only those
circumstances. Because Ammons fails to demonstrate that an easement
by necessity can arise only when the dominant tenement is landlocked,
Ammons has not shown that the circuit court erred by holding that
Spraggins had that type of easement. Therefore, the circuit court's
judgment is not due to be reversed on this issue.
C. Ammons Did Not Prove Its Counterclaims
Ammons finally argues that the circuit court erred by denying its
counterclaims alleging trespass, private nuisance, and outrage. We
disagree.
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1. Trespass
"[T]o be liable to another for trespass, the person must intentionally
enter upon land in the possession of another or the person must
intentionally cause some 'substance' or 'thing' to enter upon another's
land." Born v. Exxon Corp., 388 So. 2d 933, 934 (Ala. 1980). A plaintiff
may recover compensatory damages by showing harm " 'caused by any
act alone, activity carried on, or condition created by the trespasser,
irrespective of whether his conduct is such as would subject him to
liability were he not a trespasser.' " Rushing v. Hooper-McDonald, Inc.,
293 Ala. 56, 62, 300 So. 2d 94, 100 (1974) (citation omitted).
Ammons first argues that the circuit court should have awarded it
damages because "Spraggins admitted to breaking a chain so Spraggins
could drive through [the southern tract] to his house" and because
"Spraggins also admitted to pulling up construction survey stakes so that
he could freely cross [Ammons's] property as he pleased." Ammons's brief
at 36. Ammons states that the circuit court "heard testimony from [Scott]
that the home construction surveyors had to come to the property on
three (3) occasions." Id. Scott testified that the additional surveys cost
"about six hundred dollars."
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But, in its opening brief, Ammons never states which alleged act of
trespass -- breaking the chain or pulling up the stakes -- required the
survey to be repeated. Indeed, additional surveying could have been
required for a host of reasons that would not impose legal liability on
Spraggins -- for instance, survey errors or lost documentation. And the
sole evidence Ammons presented to support its claim for trespass
damages was Scott's testimony, which the judge as fact-finder need not
have credited. Cf. Tutor v. Sines, [Ms. 1210037, Feb. 17, 2023] ___ So. 3d
___, ___ (Ala. 2023) ("[T]he jury would have been justified in discounting
Tutor's testimony as self-serving."). Consequently, Ammons has not
shown that its alleged injury was caused by trespass.
Ammons also argues that the circuit court should have awarded
damages for trespass because "Spraggins admitted that his actions broke
the windshield of [Ammons's] 1989 Buick, which was a custom
windshield which cannot be replaced." Ammons's brief at 40. Although
Ammons acknowledges that proving trespass requires showing that the
defendant " 'intentionally entered' " another's property without the
owner's consent, he fails to point to any evidence showing that Spraggins
intentionally entered Ammons's property when he broke Scott's
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windshield. Id. at 35 (quoting 2 Alabama Pattern Jury Instructions --
Civil, Instruction 31A.00 (3d ed. 2019)). To the contrary, Spraggins gave
unrebutted testimony that he broke the windshield unintentionally
when, while he was "turning [his] long van in that driveway," the van
kicked up a loose rock that hit the windshield of Scott's vehicle, which
was parked on the northern tract. The circuit court could have
reasonably found that Spraggins's reference to "that driveway" was to the
asphalt driveway over which Spraggins had an easement because the
asphalt driveway crossed the northern tract. Therefore, Ammons has
failed to demonstrate reversible error on its counterclaim for trespass.
2. Private Nuisance and Outrage
Ammons faces a similar causation issue with its claims of private
nuisance and outrage. Ammons argues that several of Spraggins's
actions "constituted a nuisance" and were an "outrage," including (1)
"engag[ing] in confrontational acts" with Scott; (2) parking "numerous
vehicles on [the southern tract] to prevent [Scott] from accessing the
property"; and (3) "threaten[ing Scott] should he not be able to trespass
across [the northern tract] and use Ammons's asphalt driveway."
Ammons's brief at 38-39. Ammons asserts that these actions "caused
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considerable construction delays to Ammons," during which time the
price of lumber rose "from $4,000 to $28,000." Id. at 39-40. But Ammons
does not point to any evidence showing a causal link between the alleged
acts and the construction delays. Therefore, Ammons has failed to show
that the circuit court made a reversible error when it denied Ammons's
claims of private nuisance and outrage.
Conclusion
Because Ammons has not demonstrated that the circuit court erred
by granting Spraggins an easement or denying Ammons's counterclaims,
we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Bryan, and Mendheim, JJ., concur.
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