Ex parte City of Anniston, Daniel Price, and Dustin Handling PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS (In re: Kimberly D. Ervin, as the personal representative of the Estate of Candi Jean Ward v. City of Anniston, Daniel Price, and Dustin Handling) (Calhoun Circuit Court: CV-16-900205). ( 2024 )

Rel: August 30, 2024
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
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SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2024
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SC-2023-0873
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Ex parte City of Anniston, Daniel Price, and Dustin Handling
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Kimberly D. Ervin, as the personal representative of the
Estate of Candi Jean Ward, deceased
v.
City of Anniston, Daniel Price, and Dustin Handling)
(Calhoun Circuit Court: CV-16-900205)
STEWART, Justice.
SC-2023-0873
PETITION DENIED. NO OPINION.
Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Bryan, and Mitchell, JJ., concur.
Sellers, J., dissents, with opinion, which Mendheim, J., joins.
Wise and Cook, JJ., recuse themselves.
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SELLERS, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the Court's decision to deny the petition
for a writ of mandamus in this matter. In my view, the petitioners have
demonstrated that the trial court erred in concluding that there is
sufficient evidence indicating that the police-officer defendants in this
case acted willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond their
authority, or under a mistaken interpretation of the law such that they
were precluded from relying on peace-officer immunity.
In September 2015, several drivers passing through Anniston on
Highway 202 called 911 emergency services and reported that they had
seen a person in dark clothing, later identified as Candi Jean Ward, lying
on the shoulder of the highway. Police officers Daniel Price and Dustin
Handling, who were employed by the City of Anniston ("the City"), as well
as emergency-medical-services ("EMS") workers, arrived at Ward' s
location. The EMS workers informed the officers that they had found on
the ground nearby a bottle of pills, later identified as Diazepam, and that
they also believed that Ward was intoxicated. Ward admitted to the
officers that she had been drinking and that she had taken one of the
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pills, although a toxicology report later showed that Ward had little
alcohol and Diazepam in her system.
The EMS workers also informed the officers that Ward was
suffering from road rash and that Ward had told them that she "fell out
of the truck" that was being driven by her "live-in partner," Shaneyfelt
Troy Robinson. Ward suggested to the officers that Robinson had been
"hitting" Ward at the time. It appears that the officers had previously
responded to a disturbance involving Ward and Robinson at a local
business approximately 15 minutes earlier.
When the officers asked Ward if she wanted medical treatment, she
refused treatment. Instead, she told the officers that her nearest relative
was her aunt, who lived in Talladega, and that her aunt could come and
pick her up. Ward, however, did not have a telephone and did not know
her aunt's phone number. Ward explained to the officers that she did,
however, know Robinson's phone number, that Robinson knew her aunt's
phone number, and that the officers could call Robinson to retrieve her
aunt's phone number. Instead, the officers recommended that Ward walk
to Dee Ford's, a nearby bar, to find someone that she knew or to use the
bar's phone to call Robinson and, in turn, her aunt. Price testified that
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he also suggested to Ward that he could call her a cab, but it is disputed
as to whether that conversation occurred. Price and Handling made no
attempt to call Robinson or to have their police dispatcher call Robinson.
Handling told Ward that he could arrest her for possession of a
controlled substance or for public intoxication but that he did not want to
do so because he had "something he need[ed] to do first thing in the
morning." He also told her that he did not want to have to spend the
night at the hospital with Ward if she was arrested for public
intoxication. After additional attempts to persuade Ward to walk to Dee
Ford's failed, the officers allowed Ward to leave the scene and walk
toward Talladega along Highway 202. They warned Ward to stay to the
right of the asphalt, and they told her that, if they caught her on the
asphalt, they would take her to jail. Shortly thereafter, 911 emergency
services received a call from a driver on Highway 202 reporting that he
had fatally struck a woman who was in the middle of the road wearing
dark clothes and who was later identified as Ward. Following an internal
investigation of the incident by the Anniston Police Department, the
officers resigned their employment.
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Kimberly D. Ervin, as the personal representative of Ward' s estate,
sued the City and the officers in the Calhoun Circuit Court, asserting
that the officers had acted negligently, wantonly, maliciously, or in bad
faith and had caused Ward' s death. The City and the officers moved for
a summary judgment, asserting peace-officer immunity pursuant to § 6-
5-338, Ala. Code 1975. The trial court denied that motion, and this
petition followed.
In deciding whether a police officer is entitled to immunity under §
6-5-338, courts consider the factors set out in Ex parte Cranman, 792 So.
2d 392 (Ala. 2000) (plurality opinion), as modified in Hollis v. City of
Brighton, 950 So. 2d 300 (Ala. 2006). The officers in this case are entitled
to immunity if the basis of their alleged liability consists of actions they
took in exercising judgment in the enforcement of the criminal laws of
the State. Id. It is undisputed that the officers were enforcing those laws
when they took the actions that allegedly led to Ward's death. There are,
however, some exceptions to peace-officer immunity that Ward claims
apply here. Specifically, she asserts that the officers acted willfully,
maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond their authority, or under
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a mistaken interpretation of the law. See Cranman, 792 So. 2d at 405;
Hollis, 950 So. 2d at 307.
In specifically asserting that the officers acted beyond their
authority, Ervin claims that they breached duties set out in detailed
"rules or regulations" such as those embodied by a "checklist." See
Giambrone v. Douglas, 874 So. 2d 1046, 1053 (Ala. 2003). However, for
a particular rule or regulation to serve as the basis for an exception to
State-agent or peace-officer immunity, it must be so specific that it
removes any discretion that a State agent or peace officer otherwise
would have and puts the agent or officer on notice that certain behavior
is prohibited. Odom v. Helms, 314 So. 3d 220, 229 (Ala. 2020). The
administrative order upon which Ervin relies in the present case provides
broadly that Anniston police officers should "provide a safety net" for
"victims" of domestic violence. Examples of safety nets recognized in the
administrative order include "mak[ing] telephone calls or physical
contacts with persons" who can provide support to victims and providing
victims with "information" regarding people who can assist them. The
administrative order does not expressly direct officers to contact any
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specific persons, and it is noteworthy here that 911 emergency-services
personnel contacted EMS workers to assist Ward.
I agree with the officers' and the City's position that the
administrative order "is a general, broad policy 'instituted to ensure that
all personnel consider the fact that victims feel hopeless, vulnerable,
frightened and traumatized ….' " Petition at 15. There are a myriad of
potential situations involving victims of domestic violence that police
officers might be confronted with, and I do not consider a broad policy
regarding the provision of a "safety net" by, for example, contacting
unnamed persons who might assist a victim to be the sort of detailed
checklist that would remove the discretion that an officer must have in
dealing with each particular situation based on its own unique
circumstances. I also agree with the police officers and the City that the
initial determination of whether Ward was a "victim" in the first place
also required some degree of discretion on the officers' part. Cf. Howard
v. City of Atmore, 887 So. 2d 201, 207 (Ala. 2003) (concluding that a police
officer acting as a jailer had discretion to determine whether an inmate
was intoxicated, was an addict, or was a suicide risk with respect to
complying with a policy requiring regular frequent checks of such
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inmates); Walker v. City of Huntsville, 62 So. 3d 474, 498 (Ala. 2010)
(holding that police officers had discretion to determine whether a
prisoner was injured before or during an arrest with respect to complying
with a policy requiring the officers to take injured prisoners for medical
attention). A police officer's alleged negligence or wantonness is not
enough to establish that the officer violated a detailed mandatory
directive that removed the officer's discretion while engaging in police
activity. See Ex parte City of Montgomery, 272 So. 3d 155, 168 (Ala.
2018) ("[N]egligent or wanton conduct will not support the conclusion
that a police officer has acted beyond his or her authority when he or she
is exercising discretion in the discharge of his or her law-enforcement
duties.").
I also do not believe that there is substantial evidence indicating
that the police officers acted willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad
faith, or under a mistaken interpretation of the law. Again, negligence
or wantonness is not enough. Ex parte City of Montgomery, 272 So. 3d
at 168. The evidence does not indicate that the officers intended to injure
Ward or that they otherwise acted with ill intent or bad faith. To the
contrary, although the officers arguably acted negligently, the evidence
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establishes that the officers tried to help Ward, not harm her. That they
were unsuccessful does not subject them to liability.
Because, in my view, there is not substantial evidence showing the
existence of an exception to peace-officer immunity, I would grant the
petition and issue a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to dismiss
Ervin's claims against the police officers and Ervin's claims against the
City grounded on those officers' actions. See City of Crossville v. Haynes,
925 So. 2d 944, 954-55 (Ala. 2005) (indicating that, if a police officer is
entitled to immunity, then so is the city employing the officer).
Mendheim, J., concurs.
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