Ex parte Triad of Alabama, LLC, d/b/a Flowers Hospital PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS (In re: Voncille Askew and Don Askew v. Triad of Alabama, LLC, d/b/a Flowers Hospital) (Houston Circuit Court: CV-22-900177) ( 2024 )

Rel: January 26, 2024
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts,
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other
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SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024
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Ex parte Triad of Alabama, LLC, d/b/a Flowers Hospital
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Voncille Askew and Don Askew
v.
Triad of Alabama, LLC, d/b/a Flowers Hospital)
(Houston Circuit Court: CV-22-900177)
SELLERS, Justice.
Triad of Alabama, LLC, d/b/a Flowers Hospital, the defendant
below in a pending personal-injury action, petitions this Court for a writ
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of mandamus directing the Houston Circuit Court to vacate its order
granting a motion filed by the plaintiffs, Voncille Askew and Don Askew,
striking Triad's affirmative defense under what the parties refer to as the
Alabama COVID-19 Immunity Act ("the ACIA"),
Ala. Code 1975, § 6-5-790 et seq. For the reasons set forth below, we
grant the petition and issue the writ.
Factual Background
Around August 16, 2021, Triad began providing
monoclonal-antibody-infusion therapy at Flowers Hospital to patients
infected with Coronavirus, which is commonly referred to as COVID-19.
See, e.g., § 6-5-791(a)(4), Ala. Code 1975. According to Triad, it directed
those patients to enter the hospital through a preexisting entrance
designated as "Infusion entry" to help isolate those patients infected with
COVID-19 from the hospital's general population. According to the
Askews, that entrance had been created as part of a 2014 construction
project and had been frequently used since its creation as an entrance
and an exit for both hospital patients and employees. Furthermore,
according to the Askews, neither the entrance nor the small, concrete
ramp leading up to it had been modified since their creation.
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Around September 21, 2021, Voncille Askew was diagnosed with
COVID-19, and her physician scheduled her for
monoclonal-antibody-infusion therapy at the hospital on the following
day. At approximately 12:30 p.m. on September 22, 2021, Voncille
proceeded through the "Infusion entry" for her appointment. After
undergoing therapy for approximately two hours, Voncille was
discharged and instructed to leave through the same "Infusion entry."
According to the Askews, as Voncille exited, her foot caught the edge of
the concrete ramp, causing her to fall and sustain serious injuries.
Procedural History
On May 10, 2022, the Askews sued Triad, alleging claims of
negligence, negligence per se, wantonness, and loss of consortium. In its
answers to both the complaint and the second amended complaint, Triad
raised the affirmative defense of civil immunity under the ACIA. On
February 16, 2023, the Askews moved to strike Triad's affirmative
defense, averring that the immunity provisions of the ACIA had no
applicability to their claims. Specifically, the Askews asserted that
because their "claims ar[o]se from the hospital's negligence in
maintaining a safe premises and [its] failure to comply with key safety
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codes," such claims were not "health emergency claims" for which Triad,
even as a covered entity under the ACIA, could be accorded immunity
under § 6-5-792(a), Ala. Code 1975. Moreover, the Askews contended
that, because "[n]o health care services or treatment were being
performed on or provided to [Voncille] at the time of her fall," Triad was
not entitled to immunity under § 6-5-794(a), Ala. Code 1975.
On March 7, 2023, Triad responded to the Askews' motion to strike,
arguing that, pursuant to the plain text of §§ 6-5-792 and 6-5-794, it was
entitled to immunity under both provisions. Nevertheless, on April 20,
2023, the trial court entered an order granting the Askews' motion to
strike without having conducted a hearing and without explaining its
rationale for granting the motion. Consequently, Triad petitioned this
Court for a writ of mandamus. After ordering answers and briefs, we held
oral argument on November 1, 2023.
Standard of Review
The standard for granting mandamus relief is well established:
"The writ of mandamus is an extraordinary legal
remedy. Therefore, this Court will not grant mandamus relief
unless the petitioner shows: (1) a clear legal right to the order
sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the trial court to perform,
accompanied by its refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another
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adequate remedy; and (4) the properly invoked jurisdiction of
the Court."
Ex parte Davis, 930 So. 2d 497, 499 (Ala. 2005) (citations omitted).
Moreover, this Court has recognized that "[a] trial court's disallowance of
a party's affirmative defense is reviewable by a petition for a writ of
mandamus." Ex parte Buffalo Rock Co., 941 So. 2d 273, 277 (Ala. 2006)
(citing Ex parte Neely Truck Line, Inc., 588 So. 2d 484 (Ala. Civ. App.
1991)).
When a motion to strike an affirmative defense seeks "a dispositive
ruling on the basis of evidence outside the pleadings, we construe it as a
motion seeking the entry of a partial summary judgment."1 Ex parte
Teal, 336 So. 3d 165, 167 n.3 (Ala. 2021) (citing Rule 56(a), Ala. R. Civ.
P.). Because the order striking Triad's affirmative defense amounted to a
partial summary judgment and because no genuine issues of material
fact are in dispute, the standard of review is as follows:
" 'An order granting or denying a summary judgment is
reviewed de novo, applying the same standard as the trial
court applied. American Gen. Life & Accident Ins. Co. v.
Underwood, 886 So. 2d 807, 811 (Ala. 2004). In addition,
"[t]his court reviews de novo a trial court's interpretation of a
statute, because only a question of law is presented." Scott
1Included in support of the Askews' motion to strike were excerpts
from a deposition of Triad's COO, Matthew Blevins.
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Bridge Co. v. Wright, 883 So. 2d 1221, 1223 (Ala. 2003).
Where, as here, the facts of a case are essentially undisputed,
this Court must determine whether the trial court misapplied
the law to the undisputed facts, applying a de novo standard
of review. Carter v. City of Haleyville, 669 So. 2d 812, 815
(Ala. 1995). Here, in reviewing the ... summary judgment
when the facts are undisputed, we review de novo the trial
court's interpretation of statutory language and our previous
caselaw on a controlling question of law.' "
McKinney v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 33 So. 3d 1203, 1206 (Ala.
2009) (quoting Continental Nat'l Indem. Co. v. Fields, 926 So. 2d 1033,
1034-35 (Ala. 2005)).
Discussion
I. Lack of Another Adequate Remedy
Triad contends that, "[b]ecause one of the purposes of immunity is
to spare a defendant from the demands associated with defending a
drawn-out lawsuit, a defendant wrongfully denied immunity protection
has no adequate remedy on appeal if the case is erroneously permitted to
go to trial." Petition at 25. This is so, Triad avers, even though it would
not be entitled to immunity as to the wantonness claim against it, and
thus would still have to litigate that claim, see § 6-5-792(b) and § 6-5-
794(a), noting that this Court has previously granted mandamus relief to
a defendant, determining that that defendant was entitled to State-agent
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immunity as to the claims against her even though the case would
proceed on the claims against the other defendants. See Ex parte Mestas,
371 So. 3d 220, 221-22 (Ala. 2022).
Although we agree with Triad that it lacks another adequate
remedy, we do not agree with its rationale. A review of our precedents
reveals considerable tension between the immunity exception in our
mandamus jurisprudence, see, e.g., Ex parte Purvis, 689 So. 2d 794, 795
(Ala. 1996), and the broader concept that mandamus relief is appropriate
to permit a disallowed affirmative defense only when that affirmative
defense, if successful, would be determinative of the entire action against
a particular defendant, see, e.g., Ex parte Tahsin Indus. Corp., U.S.A., 4
So. 3d 1121, 1123-24 (Ala. 2008).
A. The Immunity Exception in Our Mandamus Jurisprudence
This Court has long held that "the general rule is that denial of a
summary-judgment motion is not immediately reviewable by an
appellate court." Ex parte Wood, 852 So. 2d 705, 708 (Ala. 2002). There
exists an important exception, however: The "denial of a motion for a
summary judgment grounded on a claim of immunity is immediately
reviewable by a petition for a writ of mandamus." Id. (citing Ex parte
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Purvis, 689 So. 2d at 795) (emphasis added). Although this Court initially
created this exception to apply to claims of sovereign (or State) immunity,
see Ex parte Purvis, 689 So. 2d at 795, we have since expanded the
applicability of the exception to claims of State-agent immunity, see, e.g.,
Ex parte Rizk, 791 So. 2d 911, 912 (Ala. 2000), qualified immunity, see,
e.g., Ex parte Sawyer, 876 So. 2d 433, 439 (Ala. 2003), municipal
substantive immunity, see, e.g., Ex parte City of Muscle Shoals, [Ms. SC-
2022-0524, Mar. 31, 2023] __ So. 3d __, __ (Ala. 2023), and statutory
immunity, see, e.g., Ex parte Dixon Mills Volunteer Fire Dep't, 181 So.
3d 325, 327, 331 (Ala. 2015) (granting in part a mandamus petition based
on a claim of immunity under the Volunteer Service Act); Ex parte Tenax
Corp., 228 So. 3d 387, 390-91 (Ala. 2017) (granting a mandamus petition
premised on a claim of immunity under the exclusive-remedy provisions
of the Workers' Compensation Act); Ex parte City of Muscle Shoals, 257
So. 3d 850, 852, 854 (Ala. 2018) (granting a mandamus petition based on
a claim of municipal immunity under § 11-47-190, Ala. Code 1975).
Notably, we have reviewed by mandamus petition an order denying
a motion for a summary judgment premised on an immunity defense even
though that immunity defense, if successful, would not have resolved the
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action in its entirety against the petitioner. For example, in Ex parte
Kelley, 296 So. 3d 822, 826 (Ala. 2019), the petitioners sought mandamus
relief from orders denying their motions for a summary judgment
predicated on claims of parental immunity. This Court granted their
petitions on the basis of parental immunity insofar as the "wrongful-
death claims against [them] [we]re based on allegations of negligence,"
notwithstanding the fact that the wrongful-death claims against them
founded on allegations of wantonness would remain to be litigated. Id. at
834. Thus far, however, we have granted mandamus relief in this manner
only in the context of orders denying a motion for a summary judgment.
When petitioners have requested mandamus relief from a trial court's
order merely disallowing their affirmative defenses, however, we have
employed a different approach.
B. Mandamus Relief for the Disallowance of Affirmative
Defenses
As mentioned previously, this Court has acknowledged that "[a]
trial court's disallowance of a party's affirmative defense is reviewable by
a petition for a writ of mandamus." Ex parte Buffalo Rock Co., 941 So. 2d
at 277. Thus, we permit mandamus review when a trial court either
refuses a defendant's request to amend his or her pleadings to assert an
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affirmative defense, see, e.g., Ex parte Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 858 So.
2d 950, 952 (Ala. 2003), or -- as relevant here -- when a trial court grants
a plaintiff's motion to strike a defendant's affirmative defense, see, e.g.,
Ex parte Gadsden Country Club, 14 So. 3d 830, 832 (Ala. 2009).
Although, in the context of a trial court's disallowing a party's affirmative
defense, we have typically required that that affirmative defense, if
successful, be determinative of the entire action against a particular
defendant in order to support granting mandamus relief, see, e.g., Ex
parte TruckMax, Inc. [Ms. SC-2022-0957, Feb. 17, 2023] __ So. 3d __, __
(Ala. 2023), the importance of addressing questions of immunity does not
change depending on the context of how those questions are presented.
Thus, we conclude that Triad has no other adequate remedy at law and
is entitled to mandamus review.
II. Clear Legal Right
There are two immunity provisions relevant here: § 6-5-792(a) and
§ 6-5-794(a). Triad states that it is insulated from liability under both
sections of the ACIA; the Askews believe that neither section is applicable
to Triad.
A. Immunity Under § 6-5-792
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The ACIA provides, in relevant part, that "a covered entity[2] shall
not be liable for any damages, injury, or death suffered by any person or
entity as a result of, or in connection with, a health emergency claim that
results from any act or omission of the covered entity." § 6-5-792(a). The
ACIA further defines a "health emergency claim" as follows:
"Any claim that arises from or is related to Coronavirus. All
such claims, no matter how denominated, shall be considered
a health emergency claim for purposes of [the ACIA]. The
term includes, but is not limited to, any cause of action that is
related in any manner to either or both of the following:
"a. The actual, alleged, or feared exposure to
or contraction of Coronavirus from the premises of
a covered entity or otherwise related to or arising
from its operations, products, or services provided
on or off-premises.
"b. The covered entity's efforts to prevent or
delay the spread of Coronavirus, including, but not
limited to, any of the following:
2A covered entity includes, among other things, "[a] health care
provider." § 6-5-791(a)(5)b., Ala. Code 1975. Included within the ACIA's
definition of "health care provider" is "[a]ny health care provider as that
term is defined in ... Section 6-5-481(1)-(8)[, Ala. Code
1975]." § 6-5-791(a)(11)a. Thus, a health-care provider encompasses
"[s]uch institutions as are defined in Section 22-21-21[, Ala. Code 1975,]
as hospitals." § 6-5-481(7). The reference to § 22-21-21 in § 6-5-481(7)
appears to be a typographical error; it further appears that the correct
reference should be to § 22-21-20(1), Ala. Code 1975. Section 22-21-20(1)
defines hospitals as "[g]eneral and specialized hospitals." Therefore, and
as both parties agree, Triad, which operates Flowers Hospital, is a
covered entity for purposes of the ACIA.
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"1. Testing.
"2. Monitoring, collecting,
reporting, tracking, tracing, disclosing,
or investigating exposures or other
information.
"3. Using or supplying
precautionary equipment or supplies
such as personal protective
equipment."
§ 6-5-791(a)(13), Ala. Code 1975.
The parties disagree as to the meaning and scope of the above
language. Triad argues that because Voncille was at the hospital to be
treated for COVID-19, the Askews' negligence claims "arise[] from or
[are] related to Coronavirus," and resulted from Triad's actions, and,
thus, that those claims were health emergency claims for which it cannot
be liable. The Askews view this section much more narrowly. They
contend that health emergency claims are only those that either relate to
exposure to or contraction of COVID-19 or arise from a covered entity's
efforts to prevent or delay the spread of the virus. Furthermore, they
opine that any other reading of this section would render §§ 6-5-792(a)
and 6-5-794(a) redundant.
1. The Scope of § 6-5-792(a)
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Incorporating the definition of "health emergency claim" into the
language of § 6-5-792(a) results in the following unambiguous text: "[A]
covered entity shall not be liable for any damages, injury, or death
suffered by any person or entity as a result of, or in connection with, [any
claim that arises from or is related to Coronavirus] that results from any
act or omission of the covered entity." Both sides agree that Triad was
providing monoclonal-antibody-infusion therapy to COVID-19 patients.
Both sides further agree that Triad directed those patients seeking that
treatment to enter and exit through an entrance designated "Infusion
entry." Accordingly, both sides agree that Triad directed Voncille, in
order to receive that treatment, to enter and exit through the "Infusion
entry." Finally, both sides agree that Voncille fell and sustained injuries
after exiting through the "Infusion entry." Factually, then, Voncille
suffered an injury in connection with her seeking treatment for
COVID-19 when Triad directed her to enter and exit through a specific
entrance devoted exclusively for patients seeking
monoclonal-antibody-infusion therapy for COVID-19.
The Askews believe that we cannot reach this conclusion for two
reasons. First, they assert that this conclusion relies on too broad an
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interpretation of the language "[a]ny claim that arises from or is related
to Coronavirus." § 6-5-791(a)(13). Instead, they aver that the only claims
for which a covered entity may be immune are those claims -- or causes
of actions that bear resemblance to those claims -- that are expressly
listed under the ACIA's definition of "health emergency claim."
Therefore, because, according to the Askews, their negligence claims bear
"striking dissimilarity to" the types of claims described in
§ 6-5-791(a)(13)a.-b., Triad cannot be immune as to those claims. Askews'
brief at 7. What the Askews are asking us to do, in so many words, is
apply the rule of ejusdem generis to the statute. Under that rule, "where
general words or phrases follow or precede a specific list of classes of
persons or things, the general word or phrase is interpreted to be of the
same nature or class as those named in the specific list." Ex parte
Mitchell, 989 So. 2d 1083, 1091 (Ala. 2008) (citing Ex parte McLeod, 718
So. 2d 682 (Ala. 1997)). However, that rule applies only "if the provision
in question does not express a contrary intent." Cintech Indus. Coatings,
Inc. v. Bennett Indus., Inc., 85 F.3d 1198, 1202 (6th Cir. 1996). As noted
earlier, the language preceding the specific examples contained in § 6-5-
791(a)(13)a.-b. states that a health emergency claim "includes, but is not
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limited to," those listed examples. § 6-5-791(a)(13). "Numerous courts
have found that the use of the words 'includ[es], but [is] not limited to,'
as appear in this clause, reflect such a contrary intent." Cintech Indus.
Coatings, 85 F.3d at 1202. Therefore, we reject the Askews' invitation to
use the rule of ejusdem generis to narrow our interpretation of the ACIA,
and we recognize the sweeping breadth of the language in 6-5-791(a)(13)
as expressing the intent of the legislature to grant immunity for "[a]ny
claim that arises from or is related to Coronavirus." The statute imposes
no limitations on the chain of causation or on the relation between a claim
and Coronavirus outside of those limitations inherent to the words
"arises from" or "is related to."
2. Potential Overlap Between §§ 6-5-792(a) and
6-5-794(a)
Second, the Askews appear to contest a broad interpretation of
§ 6-5-791(a)(13) on the ground that such an interpretation would make
the immunity under § 6-5-792(a) so far reaching in the context of health-
care providers as to render immunity under § 6-5-794(a) superfluous.
Essentially, the Askews ask us to forgo a plain-language interpretation
of the ACIA and to instead rely on the rule against surplusage -- a canon
of statutory interpretation that "cautions against needlessly reading a
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statute in a way that renders ... certain [provisions] superfluous," Barton
v. United States Att'y Gen., 904 F.3d 1294, 1300 (11th Cir. 2018) -- to
narrow the scope of claims as to which a health-care provider is immune.
However, "the usual 'preference' for 'avoiding surplusage constructions is
not absolute' and ... 'applying the rule against surplusage is, absent other
indications, inappropriate' when it would make an otherwise
unambiguous statute ambiguous." Id. at 1301 (quoting Lamie v. United
States Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 536 (2004), citing in turn Chickasaw Nation v.
United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001)). Even assuming, for the sake of
argument, that our interpretation of §§ 6-5-791(a)(13) and 6-5-792(a)
renders § 6-5-794(a) superfluous, when "faced with a choice between a
plain-text reading that renders a [provision] superfluous and an
interpretation that gives every [provision] independent meaning but, in
the doing, muddies up the statute," we " 'should prefer the plain meaning
since that approach respects the words of [our legislature].' " Id. (quoting
Lamie, 540 U.S. at 536). Therefore, we also reject the Askews' invitation
to employ the rule against surplusage to narrow our interpretation of the
ACIA.
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Accordingly, the plain language of §§ 6-5-791(a)(13) and 6-5-792(a)
mandate Triad's entitlement to immunity as to the Askews' negligence
claims.
B. Immunity Under § 6-5-794(a)
Because we resolve this dispute under § 6-5-792(a), we pretermit
discussion of the question whether Triad is entitled to immunity under
§ 6-5-794(a).
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we grant Triad's mandamus petition and
issue the writ; the trial court is directed to vacate its order striking
Triad's affirmative defense under the ACIA.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Mendheim, J., concurs.
Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Wise, Bryan, and Stewart, JJ., concur in
the result.
Mitchell, J., concurs in the result, with opinion.
Cook, J., recuses himself.
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MITCHELL, Justice (concurring in the result).
Although Triad of Alabama, LLC, d/b/a Flowers Hospital is entitled
to mandamus relief, I disagree with material parts of the main opinion's
reasoning. In particular, I believe that the adequate-remedy element of
our mandamus test is satisfied on immunity grounds only, thus obviating
the need to analyze affirmative-defense grounds. And while I agree that
Triad has a clear legal right to immunity on Voncille and Don Askews'
negligence claims under what the parties refer to as the Alabama
COVID-19 Immunity Act ("the ACIA"), §§ 6-5-790 to -799, Ala. Code
1975, I believe we must acknowledge that the statutory phrase "arises
from or is related to" imposes meaningful limitations on what claims are
covered by immunity. § 6-5-791(a)(13), Ala. Code 1975. For these
reasons, I concur in the result only.
Adequate Remedy
Unlike the main opinion, I see no tension between our Court's
mandamus jurisprudence on immunity and the striking of affirmative
defenses. Our Court recognizes the denial of immunity as a standalone
reason for seeking mandamus relief, so the procedural posture in which
an immunity issue comes to us does not matter. See, e.g., Ex parte
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Purvis, 689 So. 2d 794, 795 (Ala. 1996) (granting mandamus review on
the denial of a motion to dismiss on immunity grounds); Ex parte Smith,
327 So. 3d 184, 187 (Ala. 2020) (granting mandamus review on the denial
of a summary-judgment motion on immunity grounds). That's because
"a defendant wrongfully denied immunity protection has no adequate
remedy if the case is erroneously permitted to go to trial," Ex parte
Kelley, 296 So. 3d 822, 826 (Ala. 2019); indeed, the whole point of
immunity is to "spare a defendant from … defending" against the claim
at issue. Id. And, as the main opinion recognizes, the solicitude our
Court gives to immunity is not limited to State or State-agent immunity;
it extends to all kinds of common-law and statutory immunity. See, e.g.,
id. (parental immunity); Ex parte Johnson, [Ms. SC-2023-0251, Dec. 15,
2023] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. 2023) (self-defense immunity); Ex parte Tenax
Corp., 228 So. 3d 387 (Ala. 2017) (Workers' Compensation Act immunity);
Ex parte Dixon Mills Volunteer Fire Dep't, 181 So. 3d 325 (Ala. 2015)
(Volunteer Service Act immunity).
Because we have recognized that immunity is a "well established"
and independent ground for mandamus review, we need not address the
circumstances in which the striking of an affirmative defense might also
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justify such review. Ex parte Gulf Health Hosps., Inc., 321 So. 3d 629,
632 (Ala. 2020). Therefore, in my view, immunity by itself is a sufficient
ground for mandamus review here.
Clear Legal Right
Whether Triad has a clear legal right to mandamus rests on the
ordinary meaning of the phrase "arises from or is related to" as found in
the ACIA. § 6-5-791(a)(13). If the Askews' claim "arises from or is related
to Coronavirus," id., then it is a "health emergency claim" and Triad
would be entitled to immunity. § 6-5-792(a), Ala. Code 1975. The
disagreement I have with the main opinion is that it does not indicate
whether there is any real limit to what claims may be covered by
immunity. As I see it -- and as our cases suggest -- the phrase "arises
from or is related to" incorporates substantive limitations; I believe we
must acknowledge those limitations here.
We have previously encountered phrases similar to "arises from or
is related to" in our contract-law jurisprudence. In the context of a jury-
trial-waiver provision, we have held that the terms " 'arising from' or
'arising under' cover[] only claims requiring a reference to the terms of
the contract." Ex parte AIG Baker Orange Beach Wharf, L.L.C., 49 So.
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3d 1198, 1203 (Ala. 2010). But adding the phrase "is related to" broadens
contracts to cover a wider range of circumstances. See Ex parte Cupps,
782 So. 2d 772, 776 (Ala. 2000); see also Beaver Constr. Co. v. Lakehouse,
L.L.C., 742 So. 2d 159, 165 (Ala. 1999) (noting that " 'relating-to'
language" is "relatively broad").
We have dealt with similar phrasing in arbitration clauses. In that
context, to rein in the far-reaching implications of those words, our Court
has held that " 'there must be some legal and logical nexus' between the
dispute and the arbitration provision." State v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 1
So. 3d 1, 9 (Ala. 2008) (quoting Kenworth of Dothan, Inc. v. Bruner-Wells
Trucking, Inc., 745 So. 2d 271, 275 (Ala. 1999)). In other words, the
phrase "arises from or is related to" incorporates a causal link, which a
reasonable reader would understand to track traditional notions of
foreseeability.
Applying these lessons from our cases interpreting contracts, I
believe that the phrase "arises from or is related to" in the ACIA carries
with it limitations that foreclose immunity for extremely remote or
attenuated claims. § 6-5-791(a)(13). That is, for a claim to qualify as a
"health emergency claim," it must have some reasonably apparent " 'legal
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and logical nexus ' " with Coronavirus. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 1 So. 3d at
9. Here, the Askews' claims have easily satisfied that test. As the main
opinion explains, Triad's decision to designate the relevant entrance for
use by Coronavirus patients to mitigate the spread of the illness directly
led to Voncille Askew's use of the entrance and her subsequent injury and
lawsuit. Thus, the Askews' claims have an obvious " 'legal and logical
nexus ' " with Coronavirus, id., and qualify as "health emergency claims."
§ 6-5-791(a)(13). Accordingly, Triad is entitled to immunity on the
Askews' negligence claims. § 6-5-792(a).
Interpreting the ACIA without an eye to those limitations is
dangerous. As Justice Scalia once noted, the phrase "relate to" is so broad
that applying it "according to its terms [is] a project doomed to failure,
since, as many a curbstone philosopher has observed, everything is
related to everything else." California Div. of Lab. Standards Enf't v.
Dillingham Constr. N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 335 (1997) (Scalia, J.,
concurring). Those limitations are especially important here. Almost
every claim made since March 2020 can be traced back to Coronavirus
given that the virus and the governmental response affected the entire
world for the better part of three years.
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***
For these reasons, I concur only in the result granting the petition
and issuing the writ of mandamus.
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