Shana Lane Ellison v. Donald Elbert Stokes ( 2023 )


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  • Rel: April 21, 2023
    Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
    Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter
    Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that
    corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.
    ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
    OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023
    _________________________
    CL-2022-0845
    _________________________
    Shana Lane Ellison
    v.
    Donald Elbert Stokes
    Appeal from Chilton Circuit Court
    (DR-22-42)
    THOMPSON, Presiding Judge.
    Shana Lane Ellison appeals from a judgment entered by the
    Chilton Circuit Court ("the trial court") dismissing her complaint. For
    the reasons set forth herein, we reverse the judgment.
    CL-2022-0845
    On April 22, 2022, Ellison filed a complaint for a divorce from
    Donald Elbert Stokes, alleging in pertinent part:
    "1. That [Stokes] is over the age of nineteen (19) years
    … That [Ellison] is over the age of nineteen (19) years ….
    "2. That [Ellison and Stokes] were lawfully common law
    married to each other on or about, to-wit: January 10, 2009,
    in Clanton, Chilton County, Alabama, after which time they
    lived together as husband and wife, until their date of
    separation on March 1, 2022, in Chilton County, Alabama.
    "….
    "4. That the parties have held themselves out as
    husband and wife for over 13 years;
    "5. That [Stokes] has given [Ellison] several cards that
    read 'to my wife';
    "6. [That Stokes has] introduced [Ellison] as his wife
    when meeting new people;
    "7. That the parties have taken several family pictures
    together;
    "8. That [Ellison has] considered herself his legal wife;
    "9. That [Stokes] has committed adultery with another
    woman ….
    "….
    "12. That the parties owned real estate together ….
    "13. … [T]hat the parties owned certain personal
    property .…
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    CL-2022-0845
    "14. … [T]hat the parties … have accumulated a
    number of outstanding debts."
    On April 27, 2022, Stokes filed a motion to dismiss, pursuant to
    Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., arguing that Ellison's complaint should be
    dismissed because, he said, she had failed to state a claim upon which
    relief could be granted. Specifically, Stokes argued that the facts alleged
    in the complaint did not adequately demonstrate that he and Ellison had
    entered into a common-law marriage.
    On May 5, 2022, the trial court conducted a hearing to address
    Stokes's motion to dismiss.1 That same day, the trial court entered an
    order granting Stokes's motion to dismiss.
    On June 3, 2022, Ellison filed a postjudgment motion that asked
    the trial court to reconsider its order dismissing her complaint. That
    same day the trial court entered an order denying Ellison's
    postjudgment motion. On July 14, 2022, Ellison timely filed her notice
    of appeal.
    1A transcript of the hearing on Stokes's motion to dismiss is not
    included in the record.
    3
    CL-2022-0845
    A motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ.
    P., tests the sufficiency of a complaint to determine if a plaintiff has
    stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. Burch v. Birdsong, 
    181 So. 3d 343
    , 351 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015). The dismissal of a complaint,
    pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), "is with prejudice to [a] plaintiff's right to file
    another action against that defendant." Ex parte Harrington, 
    289 So. 3d 1232
    , 1237 n.7 (Ala. 2019).
    " '[T]he standard of review of a dismissal of a complaint
    pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] is whether the
    plaintiff has stated a claim whereby relief can be granted
    under any provable set of facts and under any cognizable
    theory of law.' Henderson v. Early, 
    555 So. 2d 130
    , 131 (Ala.
    1989).
    " ' "Where a [motion to dismiss] has been
    granted and [we are] called upon to review the
    dismissal of the complaint, we must examine the
    allegations contained therein and construe them
    so as to resolve all doubts concerning the
    sufficiency of the complaint in favor of the
    plaintiff. In so doing, [we do] not consider
    whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail,
    only whether he has stated a claim under which
    he may possibly prevail." '
    "Armstrong v. Brown Serv. Funeral Home W. Chapel, 
    700 So. 2d 1379
    , 1381 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997)(quoting Fontenot v.
    Bramlett, 
    470 So. 2d 669
    , 671 (Ala. 1985))(citations omitted);
    see also State ex rel. Solaiman v. Aviki, 
    694 So. 2d 19
    , 20
    (Ala. Civ. App. 1997)."
    4
    CL-2022-0845
    Berryman v. Berryman, 
    816 So. 2d 43
    , 45 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001).
    "Furthermore, ' "[i]t is a well-established principle of law in
    this state that a complaint, like all other pleadings, should
    be liberally construed, Rule 8(f), Ala. R. Civ. P., and that a
    dismissal for failure to state a claim is properly granted only
    when it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove
    no set of facts entitling him to relief." ' Seals v. City of
    Columbia, 
    575 So. 2d 1061
    , 1063 (Ala.1991)(quoting
    Fontenot[ v. Bramlett], 470 So. 2d [669,] 671 [(Ala. 1985)]);
    see also Winn-Dixie Montgomery, Inc. v. Henderson, 
    371 So. 2d 899
     (Ala. 1979); and Fraternal Order of Police,
    Strawberry Lodge No. 40 v. Entrekin, 
    294 Ala. 201
    , 211, 
    314 So. 2d 663
    , 672 (1975)(noting that pleadings are required to
    give notice and are not required to precisely plead every fact
    necessary to entitle the pleader to a judgment)."
    Burch, 
    181 So. 3d at 352
    .
    Ellison contends that the trial court erred by dismissing her
    complaint because, she says, her complaint sufficiently pleaded facts to
    give Stokes notice that she was seeking a divorce from their common-
    law marriage.
    "Rule 8(a)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] provides:
    " '(a) Claims for Relief. A pleading which sets
    forth a claim for relief, whether an original claim,
    counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim,
    shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the
    claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,
    and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief the
    pleader seeks. Relief in the alternative or of
    several different types may be demanded.'
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    CL-2022-0845
    " '[T]he purpose of notice pleading is to provide
    defendants adequate notice of the claims against them.' Ex
    parte International Ref. & Mfg. Co., 
    972 So. 2d 784
    , 789 (Ala.
    2007). See also Rule 8, Ala. R. Civ. P., Committee Comments
    on 1973 Adoption ('Under [Rule 8] the prime purpose of
    pleadings is to give notice.'). …
    " '[Rule 8(a)] is complied with if the claim for relief
    gives to the opponent fair notice of the pleader's
    claim and the grounds upon which it rests. Carter
    v. Calhoun County Board of Education, 
    345 So. 2d 1351
     (Ala. 1977). The discovery process bears the
    burden of filling in the factual details. 5 C. Wright
    & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §
    1215, p. 110 (1969). A fair reading and study of
    the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure lead to the
    determination that pleading technicalities are now
    largely avoided and that the pleading of legal
    conclusions is not prohibited, as long as the
    requisite fair notice is provided thereby to the
    opponent.'
    "Mitchell v. Mitchell, 
    506 So. 2d 1009
    , 1010 (Ala. Civ. App.
    1987). Furthermore, 'pleadings are to be liberally construed
    in favor of the pleader.' Adkison v. 
    Thompson, 650
     So. 2d 859,
    862 (Ala. 1994). See also Rule 8, Ala. R. Civ. P., Committee
    Comments on 1973 Adoption ('Rule 8(f), [Ala. R. Civ. P.,] ...
    provides that the pleadings are to be construed liberally in
    favor of the pleader.').
    " '[T]he dismissal of a complaint is not proper if the
    pleading contains "even a generalized statement of
    facts which will support a claim for relief under
    [Rule] 8, [Ala. R. Civ. P.]" (Dunson v. Friedlander
    Realty, 
    369 So. 2d 792
    , 796 (Ala. 1979)), because
    "[t]he purpose of the Alabama Rules of Civil
    Procedure is to effect justice upon the merits of the
    claim and to renounce the technicality of
    6
    CL-2022-0845
    procedure." Crawford v. Crawford, 
    349 So. 2d 65
    ,
    66 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977).'
    "Simpson v. Jones, 
    460 So. 2d 1282
    , 1285 (Ala.1984)."
    McKelvin v. Smith, 
    85 So. 3d 386
    , 388-89 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010).
    Accordingly, for her complaint to be sufficient and overcome a
    Rule 12(b)(6), motion to dismiss, Ellison's complaint had to set forth
    facts that if proven true adequately demonstrated that she and Stokes
    had entered into a common-law marriage.
    Section 30-1-20, Ala. Code 1975, provides that on or after January
    1, 2017, common-law marriage is no longer legal in this state but that
    a valid common-law marriage entered into before January 1, 2017, shall
    continue to be valid.
    "To constitute a common-law marriage, there must be a
    present agreement or a mutual understanding to enter into
    the marriage relationship; the parties must be capable in law
    of making the marriage contract; and there must follow
    cohabitation as husband and wife and a public recognition of
    that relationship. Golden v. Golden, 
    360 So. 2d 994
     (Ala. Civ.
    App.), cert. denied, 
    360 So. 2d 996
     (Ala. 1978). No words of
    assent are required; present intention is inferred from
    cohabitation and public recognition. Skipworth v. Skipworth,
    
    360 So. 2d 975
     (Ala. 1978).
    " 'The marriage relationship may be shown in any
    way that can be known by others, such as living
    together as man and wife, referring to each other
    in the presence of others as being in that relation,
    7
    CL-2022-0845
    declaring the relation in various types of
    documents and transactions, sharing household
    duties and expenses, and generally engaging in "...
    all of the numerous aspects of day-to-day mutual
    existence of married persons." [Citations omitted.]'
    "Bishop v. Bishop, 
    57 Ala. App. 619
    , 
    330 So. 2d 443
     (1976).
    "Due to the serious nature of the marriage relationship,
    the courts will closely scrutinize claims of common-law
    marriage and require clear and convincing proof thereof. Piel
    v. Brown, 
    361 So. 2d 90
     (Ala. 1978)."
    Walton v. Walton, 
    409 So. 2d 858
    , 860-61 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982). See also
    Adams v. Boan, 
    559 So. 2d 1084
    , 1086 (Ala. 1990); Cochran v. Chapman,
    
    81 So. 3d 344
     (Ala. Civ. App. 2011); and Gray v. Bush, 
    835 So. 2d 192
    ,
    194 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001).
    Our consideration at this stage in the litigation is not whether
    Ellison will ultimately prevail, but, rather, whether she has stated a
    claim under which she may possibly prevail. See Johnson v. State, 
    797 So. 2d 1113
    , 1114 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001)(citing Patton v. Black, 
    646 So. 2d 8
     (Ala. 1994)). Thus, we need determine only if Ellison adequately
    pleaded facts that, if proven true, demonstrate that she and Stokes
    entered into a common-law marriage. In her complaint Ellison alleged
    that she and Stokes are over the age of 19 years old, that they entered
    into a common-law marriage on January 10, 2009, that they lived
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    CL-2022-0845
    together as husband and wife until March 1, 2022, that they have held
    themselves out as husband and wife for over 13 years, that Stokes
    recognized Ellison as his wife by giving her cards that read "to my wife"
    and by introducing her as his wife when they met new people, that
    Stokes had committed adultery with another woman, and that they
    jointly owned real and personal property. Considering the caselaw
    requiring us to construe a complaint liberally and in favor of Ellison, we
    cannot conclude that Ellison cannot prove a set of facts entitling her to
    relief.2 Further, Ellison sufficiently pleaded facts that gave Stokes fair
    notice that she was claiming that the parties had entered into a
    2We   reject Stokes's contention in his appellate brief that Ellison's
    complaint is fatally defective because she did not sufficiently allege that
    the parties had the capacity to enter into a common-law marriage. The
    complaint is sufficient under Rule 8(a) to put Ellison on notice even
    though there is no specific allegation that each party was 16 years or
    older when they entered into the common-law marriage; thus, dismissal
    is not proper for that reason. Cf. Knight v. Burns, Kirkley & Williams
    Constr. Co., 
    331 So. 2d 651
    , 654-55 (Ala. 1976)(holding that although
    complaint alleging negligence contained no specific allegation of duty
    owed, complaint was sufficiently pleaded under Rule 8(a), Ala. R. Civ.
    P.); and McKelvin v. Smith, 
    85 So. 3d 386
    , 389 (Ala. Civ. App.
    2010)(holding plaintiffs' adequately stated their claims against
    defendant under Rule 8(a), Ala. R. Civ. P.).
    9
    CL-2022-0845
    common-law marriage. Simpson v. Jones, 
    460 So. 2d 1282
    , 1285 (Ala.
    1984).
    Because Ellison's complaint clearly states a claim for relief, the
    judgment dismissing Ellison's complaint is reversed, and the cause is
    remanded for further proceedings.
    REVERSED AND REMANDED.
    Moore, Edwards, Hanson, and Fridy, JJ., concur.
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