A.N.M. v. R.C.W. (Appeal from Marshall Juvenile Court: CS-17-900134.02). ( 2023 )

REL: December 1, 2023
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024
_________________________
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_________________________
A.N.M.
v.
R.C.W.
Appeal from Marshall Juvenile Court
(CS-17-900134.02)
MOORE, Judge.
A.N.M. ("the mother") appeals from a judgment entered by the
Marshall Juvenile Court ("the juvenile court") that, among other things,
denied her request for a modification of custody of her children, J.A.W.
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and L.A.W. ("the children"), and for a modification of her child-support
obligation to R.C.W. ("the father"). We dismiss the appeal.
Procedural History
The record indicates that the juvenile court entered a judgment on
December 15, 2017, that, among other things, awarded the parties joint
legal custody of the children; awarded the father sole physical custody of
the children, subject to the mother's visitation, which included visitation
via telephone; and directed the mother to pay child support to the father
in the amount of $200 per month. On December 10, 2021, the mother
filed in the juvenile court a petition requesting, among other things, a
modification of custody and of child support and a finding of contempt
against the father.
On March 16, 2022, the mother filed a motion for a default
judgment against the father; attached to her motion was the mother's
affidavit in support of her requests for an award of sole legal and sole
physical custody of the children, an award of visitation to the father of
one hour every other Saturday, and an award of child support to the
mother. The juvenile court entered an order on March 22, 2022, that
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states, in its entirety: "Motion for default judgment filed by [the mother]
is hereby granted."
On March 25, 2022, the father's retained counsel filed a notice of
appearance, and, on that same date, the father filed a motion to set aside
the default judgment. The juvenile court entered an order on March 25,
2022, setting the father's motion for a hearing on April 27, 2022. On April
4, 2022, the juvenile court entered a default judgment based on the
mother's affidavit testimony, awarding the mother sole physical custody
of the children, awarding the father "standard visitation," terminating
the mother's child-support obligation to the father, directing the father
to pay child support to the mother in the amount of $200 per month, and
denying all remaining requested relief. Following the scheduled hearing
on the father's motion to set aside the default judgment, the juvenile
court entered an order on April 27, 2022, purporting to grant the father's
motion and to set aside its April 4, 2022, judgment. On that same date,
the juvenile court entered an "amended order," which stated, in its
entirety: "[p]ursuant to Rule 60(a)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] the court sets aside
the final order dated April 4, 2022, as being entered via clerical error."
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The father proceeded to file an answer and a counterpetition, in
which he requested an award of attorney's fees and any additional relief
deemed proper by the court. Following a trial on the merits, the juvenile
court entered a judgment on April 6, 2023, purporting to maintain the
custody arrangement outlined in the December 15, 2017, judgment, but
modifying the mother's telephonic visitation with the children, directing
the mother to pay a portion of the father's attorney's fees, and denying
all remaining requested relief. The mother filed a postjudgment motion
on April 7, 2023, which the juvenile court purported to grant, in part, on
April 19, 2023. The mother filed a notice of appeal to this court on May
2, 2023.
Analysis
Although neither party has raised the issue of this court's
jurisdiction to consider the mother's appeal, we do so ex mero motu. In
K.M.G. v. B.A., 73 So. 3d 708, 710-11 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011), this court
stated, in pertinent part:
"On questions of subject-matter jurisdiction, this court
is not limited by the parties' arguments or by the legal
conclusions of the lower court. Rather, ' "jurisdictional matters
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are of such magnitude that we take notice of them at any time
and do so even ex mero motu." ' Singleton v. Graham, 716 So.
2d 224, 225 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998) (quoting Wallace v. Tee Jays
Mfg. Co., 689 So. 2d 210, 211 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997), quoting in
turn Nunn v. Baker, 518 So. 2d 711, 712 (Ala. 1987)).
' " '[S]ubject-matter jurisdiction may not be waived; a court's
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time
by any party and may even be raised by a court ex mero
motu.' " ' M.B.L. v. G.G.L., 1 So. 3d 1048, 1050 (Ala. Civ. App.
2008) (quoting S.B.U. v. D.G.B., 913 So. 2d 452, 455 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2005), quoting in turn C.J.L. v. M.W.B., 868 So. 2d 451,
453 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003)). '[W]e are obligated to dismiss an
appeal if, for any reason, [subject-matter] jurisdiction does not
exist.' Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Human Res., 999 So. 2d 891,
895 (Ala. 2008)."
In the underlying action, on March 22, 2022, the juvenile court
entered an order granting the mother's motion for a default judgment.
On March 25, 2022, the father filed a motion to set aside what he
described as a default judgment, pursuant to Rule 55(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.,
which provides:
"In its discretion, the court may set aside an entry of default
at any time before judgment. The court may on its own motion
set aside a judgment by default within thirty (30) days after
the entry of the judgment. The court may also set aside a
judgment by default on the motion of a party filed not later
than thirty (30) days after the entry of the judgment."
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However, when the father filed his March 25, 2022, motion to set aside
the default judgment, the juvenile court had not yet entered a default
judgment; instead, the trial court had only granted the mother's motion
to enter a default judgment. The trial court did not actually enter a
default judgment until April 4, 2022. Upon the entry of the default
judgment on April 4, 2022, which conclusively decided each of the issues
that had been raised in the mother's petition and in the father's
counterpetition, the father's March 25, 2022, motion to set aside the
default judgment quickened. See Richardson v. Integrity Bible Church,
Inc., 897 So. 2d 345, 347 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004) (explaining that a
postjudgment motion filed pursuant to Rule 55(c), Ala. R. Civ. P., to set
aside a default judgment quickens on the day that the final judgment is
entered).
A postjudgment motion filed pursuant to Rule 55 cannot remain
pending in a juvenile court for more than 14 days, after which, unless the
time for ruling has been extended in accordance with the Alabama Rules
of Juvenile Procedure, the motion is automatically denied. See Rule 59.1,
Ala. R. Civ. P.; Rule 1(B), Ala. R. Juv. P.; and Ex parte R.S.C., 853 So. 2d
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228, 234 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002). In the absence of an order extending the
time for ruling on the motion, the father's Rule 55(c) motion was denied
by operation of law on April 18, 2022. On April 27, 2022, the juvenile
court entered an order purporting to grant the father's motion, but that
order was a nullity. See S.D.C. v. N.L., 864 So. 2d 1089, 1091 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2002) (providing that any action upon a postjudgment motion that
has been denied by operation of law is a nullity). The juvenile court's
jurisdiction to set aside the judgment on its own motion also expired on
April 18, 2022. See D.F.C. v. T.D., 142 So. 3d 1159, 1160 (Ala. Civ. App.
2013) ("[A] juvenile court may, on its own motion, vacate or amend its
judgment within 14 days of the entry of a final judgment ...."). Thus,
because the juvenile court's April 27, 2022, order was entered more than
14 days after the father filed his Rule 55(c) motion, the juvenile court no
longer had jurisdiction to vacate the judgment at that time.
The juvenile court also entered on April 27, 2022, an order
purporting to set aside the April 4, 2022, judgment "as being entered via
clerical error," pursuant to Rule 60(a), Ala. R. Civ. P. Rule 60(a) provides,
in pertinent part:
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"Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or other parts of the
record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission
may be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative
or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as
the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal or
thereafter, such mistakes may be so corrected by the trial
court. Whenever necessary a transcript of the record as
corrected may be certified to the appellate court in response
to a writ of certiorari or like writ."
In interpreting Rule 60(a), this court has stated that "[t]he right to amend
a judgment to correct a clerical error does not authorize the court to
render a different judgment." Hurst v. Hurst, 582 So. 2d 1144, 1145 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1991). In Pierce v. American General Finance, Inc., 991 So. 2d
212 (Ala. 2008), our supreme court held that the Montgomery Circuit
Court could not use Rule 60(a) to vacate a final judgment dismissing a
case because "any error in the entry of the judgment dismissing the case
was not the kind of mistake 'associated with mistakes in transcription,
alteration, or omission of any papers and documents' that can be
corrected pursuant to Rule 60(a)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.]." 991 So. 2d at 217.
Our supreme court concluded that, because the circuit court had entered
a judgment dismissing the case and that judgment had never been set
aside, the circuit court was without jurisdiction to hold a trial and to
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enter a second judgment, and, as a result, the ensuing judgment was void.
Id. at 217.
In the present case, like in Pierce, a final judgment was entered on
April 4, 2022. Although the juvenile court purported to enter an order
setting that judgment aside pursuant to Rule 60(a), the supreme court
has confirmed, as illustrated by its holding in Pierce, that Rule 60(a)
cannot be used in the manner employed by the juvenile court.
Accordingly, that order was also a nullity. See City of Huntsville v.
COLSA Corp., 71 So. 3d 637, 642 (Ala. 2011) ("[W]hen a trial court
purports to exercise jurisdiction where it has none, every order and
judgment entered pursuant thereto is void ab initio."); and Ex parte Britt,
212 So. 3d 963, 966 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016) (concluding that an order
granting a Rule 60(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion that was entered outside of
the trial court's authority to correct clerical errors "can have no effect").
Like in Pierce, although the juvenile court proceeded to conduct a trial
on the merits and purported to enter a final judgment thereafter, it had
lost jurisdiction to do so and the April 6, 2023, judgment is void.
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Conclusion
The juvenile court lost jurisdiction to act following the denial by
operation of law of the father's Rule 55(c) motion on April 18, 2022;
therefore, each of the juvenile court's orders entered after that date are
void and are due to be vacated. Because the juvenile court's April 6, 2023,
judgment is also void, the appeal is dismissed.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
Thompson, P.J., and Edwards, Hanson, and Fridy, JJ., concur.
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