Royals v. State , 36 Ala. App. 11 ( 1951 )

On Rehearing.

■In his brief in support of this application for rehearing appellant’s learned counsel contends we erred in stating that the testimony as to the identity of the driver of the Royals car was sufficient for the jury to have reasonably inferred that the appellant was the driver of the '■ offending car. It is the view of appellant’s counsel, as we interpret his brief, that such, statement violates the 'basic legal principle that every accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable'doulbt.

■Our statement of which counsel complains does not, in our opinion, run contra to the above-mentioned basic legal principle.

The identity of the accused as the perpetrator of the offense is a part and'parcel of the corpus delicti of every offense.

As stated in Patterson v. State, 202 Ala. 65, 79 So. 459, 460; “It is not required that the corpus delicti be proved by direct or positive evidence; it may be shown by evidence from zvhich only a reasonable inference may be drawn by the jury that the offense has been committed. To its ascertainment, the proven facts and circumstances should be considered together, and if, upon the whole evidence, the jury are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt (a) that the crime has been committed, and (b) that the defendant is the guilty perpetrator, it is the duty of the jury to convict. Ryan v. State, 100 Ala. 94, 14 So. 868; Fowler v. State, 170 Ala. 65, 54 So. 115.” (Italics ours.)

To deny the propriety of sustaining convictions on legitimate or reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence would in effect annihilate the efficacy o.f .all circumstantial evidence. This has never been the law. Reasonable inferences from evidence, believed by the jury under the required rule, may well furnish a basis for proof beyond reasonable doubt. See Snead v. State, 251 Ala. 624, 38 So.2d 576.

Application denied.