Doe v. Colligan , 1988 Alas. LEXIS 48 ( 1988 )

BURKE, Justice,

dissenting.

I dissent.

I think it is wrong for us to assume that punitive damages serve only to punish and deter the wrongdoer. For more than a decade, this court has recognized that punitive damages are assessed, partly, as an “example and warning to others.” Alaska Placer Co. v. Lee, 553 P.2d 54, 61 (Alaska 1976). Thus, we have said that punitive damages are “designed not only to punish the wrongdoer, but also to deter him and others like him, from similar wrongdoing in the future.” Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 47 (Alaska 1979) (emphasis added). Indeed, this probably is the primary purpose of such an award. See Gavica v. Hanson, 101 Idaho 58, 608 P.2d 861, 864 (1980) (while a form of punishment, the primary purpose behind an award of punitive damages is one of deterrence).

If the legislature intended not to allow a victim’s claim for punitive damages to survive the death of the tortfeasor, when it enacted AS 09.55.570, such intent is not apparent to me. Accordingly, I would reverse. I would hold that punitive damages are recoverable against the estate of the deceased tortfeasor, unless and until the legislature says otherwise. To date, it has not done so.