Vaska v. State ( 2006 )

CARPENETI, Justice,

dissenting in part.

I agree with the analysis contained in Part III.B. of today’s Opinion, which holds that the state failed to establish a foundation for admitting T.E.’s prior statements under Evidence Rule 801(d)(1)(A). But I do not join the Opinion in this regard, because I do not believe it is necessary to reach this issue in this case. The trial court’s decision can and should be affirmed on the grounds on which the trial court admitted the evidence, identification of a person under Evidence Rule 801(d)(1)(C).¹ This is the thesis of Part II of Justice Matthews’s dissent, with which I agree. For this reason, I join in Part II of the dissent.

A review of the trial record convinces me that Judge Funk correctly admitted the disputed evidence on the basis of Evidence Rule 801(d)(1)(C). That is a sufficient basis for affirmance. Accordingly, I would affirm Yas-ka’s conviction on the ground that the superi- or court correctly admitted the disputed evidence.

1 . Indeed, we have repeatedly held that we can affirm on any basis supported by the record, even if not relied on by the trial court. See, e.g., Atcherian v. State, Dep't of Revenue, Child Support Enforcement Div., 14 P.3d 970, 974 n. 8 (Alaska 2000) (“We may affirm a superior court’s decision on any ground that appears in the record.”). See also Sopko v. Dowell Schlumberger, Inc., 21 P.3d 1265, 1269 (Alaska 2001) ("[W]e can affirm a grant of summary judgment on alternative grounds, including grounds not advanced by the lower court or the parties. Moreover, we will consider any matter appearing in the record, even if not passed upon by the lower court, in defense of the judgment.”). When the trial court specifies a basis for its decision with which we agree, the case for affirmance is even stronger.