Marianne N. v. dcs/o.N./i.T./a.G. ( 2017 )


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  •                                 IN THE
    SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA
    MARIANNE N.,
    Appellant,
    v.
    DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, O.N., I.T., A.G.,
    Appellees.
    No. CV-16-0259-PR
    Filed September 25, 2017
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Coconino County
    The Honorable Margaret A. McCullough, Judge
    No. JD2009-0008
    AFFIRMED
    Opinion of the Court of Appeals, Division One
    
    240 Ariz. 470
    (App. 2016)
    VACATED IN PART
    COUNSEL:
    Chad Joshua Winger (argued), Harris & Winger, P.C., Flagstaff; Attorneys
    for Marianne N.
    Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General, Dominic E. Draye, Solicitor
    General, Nicholas Chapman-Hushek (argued), JoAnn Falgout, Assistant
    Attorney Generals, Phoenix, Attorneys for Department of Child Safety
    MARIANNE N. V. DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, O.N., I.T., A.G.
    Opinion of the Court
    JUSTICE TIMMER authored the opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF
    JUSTICE BALES, VICE CHIEF JUSTICE PELANDER, and JUSTICE
    BRUTINEL joined. JUDGE PETER J. ECKERSTROM, ∗ joined by JUSTICES
    BOLICK and GOULD, dissented.
    JUSTICE TIMMER, opinion of the Court:
    ¶1            When termination of parental rights proceedings are initiated
    by motion in a pending dependency action, A.R.S. § 8-863(C) authorizes the
    juvenile court to find that a parent waived legal rights and admitted the
    motion’s allegations if the parent “does not appear at the hearing.” The
    court may then terminate that parent’s relationship with the child. Rule
    64(C), Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct., authorizes the court to proceed in the same
    manner if a parent fails without good cause to appear at “the initial hearing,
    pretrial conference, status conference or termination adjudication hearing.”
    ¶2           We here hold that applying Rule 64(C) in pretrial proceedings
    does not conflict with § 8-863(C) in violation of the separation of powers
    required by the Arizona Constitution, article 3.
    BACKGROUND
    ¶3            The Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) took custody of
    Marianne N.’s three children in February 2015 and placed them in foster
    care. In June, after a hearing at which Marianne testified, the juvenile court
    found the children dependent as to her on the ground of neglect. (The court
    also found the children dependent as to their respective fathers. The
    fathers’ parental rights are not at issue here.) The court found that
    Marianne had continuing substance abuse issues and had exposed the
    children to inappropriate caregivers and safety risks. The court ordered
    DCS to continue providing family reunification services.
    ¶4          Marianne’s participation in services was sporadic, and the
    children remained in foster care. At a permanency hearing held on
    ∗
    Justice John R. Lopez IV recused himself. Pursuant to article 6,
    section 3 of the Arizona Constitution, the Honorable Peter J. Eckerstrom,
    Judge of the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two, was designated to sit
    in this matter.
    2
    MARIANNE N. V. DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, O.N., I.T., A.G.
    Opinion of the Court
    November 30, the court changed the case plan to severance and adoption
    and directed DCS to file a motion to terminate Marianne’s parental rights.
    DCS did so on the grounds of neglect, chronic abuse of dangerous drugs,
    and the length of time the children had been in an out-of-home placement.
    See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2), (3), (8).
    ¶5            The court held an initial termination hearing on December 18,
    which Marianne attended. The court scheduled a mediation and pretrial
    hearing for January 20, 2016, and set the termination adjudication hearing
    for February 24. The court provided Marianne a written notice (“the Form
    3”) informing her, in relevant part, as follows:
    You are required to attend all termination hearings. If you
    cannot attend a court hearing, you must prove to the Court
    that you had good cause for not attending. If you fail to attend
    the Initial Termination Hearing, Termination Pre-trial
    Conference, or Termination Adjudication Hearing without
    good cause, the Court may determine that you have waived
    your legal rights, and admitted the allegations in the
    motion/petition for termination. The hearings may go
    forward in your absence, and the Court may terminate your
    parental rights to your child based on the record and evidence
    presented.
    See Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 65(D)(3) (requiring court at the initial hearing to notify
    a parent of the substance of Form 3). The Form 3 also stated that a
    mediation would take place on January 20, 2016, at 1:00 p.m. followed by a
    pretrial conference at 1:45 p.m. Marianne signed the form. The court
    likewise verbally warned Marianne twice that if she failed to attend future
    proceedings, it could proceed without her and find that she waived her
    rights and admitted DCS’s allegations. Marianne did not respond to the
    court’s warnings. Before concluding the hearing, the court found that
    Marianne had been “advised of the consequences of failure to attend future
    hearings.”
    ¶6            Marianne did not appear at the scheduled mediation and
    pretrial hearing on January 20. Her attorney made “several attempts to
    contact her” by telephone without success. The court found that Marianne
    3
    MARIANNE N. V. DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, O.N., I.T., A.G.
    Opinion of the Court
    had notice of the hearing date and time, as shown by the Form 3, and had
    been warned about the consequences for non-attendance.
    ¶7           The court found that Marianne failed to appear without good
    cause and proceeded to conduct a termination hearing pursuant to Rule
    64(C), which authorizes the court to proceed to a final termination hearing
    when a parent fails to appear without good cause at a pretrial conference.
    The court also found that Marianne had been served with the motion for
    termination of parental rights. DCS elicited testimony from a caseworker,
    and Marianne’s attorney cross-examined her.
    ¶8            Thirty minutes after the hearing started, Marianne called the
    court asking to appear telephonically. She conferred separately with her
    attorney, who then related Marianne’s explanation that the Form 3 listed a
    different date for the hearing. The court disbelieved Marianne because the
    Form 3 in the court’s file listed the correct hearing date. The court therefore
    refused to permit Marianne to appear telephonically but indicated it would
    reconsider the decision if Marianne’s copy of the Form 3, which may have
    been filled out separately from the original, bore an incorrect hearing date.
    (She never submitted her copy for inspection.
    ¶9             At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found that DCS
    had proven all three statutory grounds for termination by clear and
    convincing evidence and that termination was in the children’s best
    interests. The court therefore terminated Marianne’s parental rights. (The
    court also terminated parental rights of one of the fathers who did not
    attend the hearing. It confirmed the termination adjudication hearing date
    for the other two fathers who attended the hearing.).
    ¶10           Marianne appealed. Marianne N. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 
    240 Ariz. 470
    (App. 2016). She argued for the first time that Rule 64(C) conflicts
    with A.R.S. § 8-863(C), which addresses the consequences for a parent’s
    failure to appear at a hearing, and thus violates separation-of-powers
    principles. 
    Id. at 472–73
    ¶ 8. The court of appeals disagreed. It did not
    address whether the rule and statute conflicted but instead concluded that
    Rule 64(C) is a procedural rule and therefore was promulgated in a
    constitutional exercise of this Court’s authority. 
    Id. at 474
    ¶ 14.
    4
    MARIANNE N. V. DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, O.N., I.T., A.G.
    Opinion of the Court
    ¶11          We granted review to decide the constitutionality of Rule
    64(C), a recurring issue of statewide importance. We have jurisdiction
    pursuant to article 6, section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S.
    § 12-120.24.
    DISCUSSION
    I.
    A.
    ¶12            We here decide only whether Rule 64(C) violates separation-
    of-powers principles—the sole issue presented by Marianne—a
    constitutional issue that we review de novo. See State v. Nordstrom, 
    230 Ariz. 110
    , 115 ¶ 17 (2012). Before this Court, Marianne has not argued that the
    juvenile court abused its discretion under Rule 64(C) by proceeding to a
    termination hearing without her participation. Nor has she argued that
    applying Rule 64(C) denied her due process or interfered with her liberty
    interest in parenting her children.
    B.
    ¶13             Before turning to the merits, we consider DCS’s argument
    that Marianne waived her challenge by failing to raise it to the juvenile
    court. Although generally we refuse to address an argument raised for the
    first time on appeal, that principle is jurisprudential, not jurisdictional. See
    City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 
    209 Ariz. 544
    , 552 ¶ 33 n.9 (2005).
    In light of the statewide significance of the issue here, and because the court
    of appeals decided it, we address the merits of Marianne’s challenge. Cf. 
    id. (noting that
    “good reason exists” to decide an issue not raised to the
    superior court when the issue has statewide importance and the court of
    appeals addressed it).
    II.
    A.
    ¶14           The Arizona Constitution divides governmental powers
    among the legislative, the executive, and the judicial departments, “and no
    one of such departments shall exercise the powers properly belonging to
    either of the others.” Ariz. Const. art. 3. Although this Court has the
    5
    MARIANNE N. V. DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, O.N., I.T., A.G.
    Opinion of the Court
    exclusive power to govern procedural matters in Arizona courts, Ariz.
    Const. art. 6, § 5(5), it cannot enlarge or diminish substantive rights created
    by statute. Daou v. Harris, 
    139 Ariz. 353
    , 357–58 (1984).
    ¶15           Parental-termination proceedings are initiated by motion,
    when dependency proceedings are ongoing, and otherwise by petition. See
    A.R.S. §§ 8-533(A) (petition), -862(D) (motion). Section 8-863, which applies
    when termination proceedings are initiated by motion in a dependency
    proceeding, as here, provides:
    A. At least ten days before the initial hearing on the
    termination of parental rights pursuant to this article, the
    party who is responsible for filing a motion pursuant to
    § 8-862, subsection D shall serve the motion on all parties as
    prescribed in rule 5(c) of the Arizona rules of civil procedure
    ....
    B. The court may terminate the parental rights of a parent if
    the court finds by clear and convincing evidence one or more
    of the grounds prescribed in § 8-533.
    C. If a parent does not appear at the hearing, the court, after
    determining that the parent has been served as provided in
    subsection A of this section, may find that the parent has
    waived the parent’s legal rights and is deemed to have
    admitted the allegations of the petition by the failure to
    appear. The court may terminate the parent-child relationship
    as to a parent who does not appear based on the record and
    evidence presented as provided in rules prescribed by the
    supreme court.
    ¶16          Rule 64(C) provides notice procedures in termination
    hearings, whether initiated by motion or petition:
    C. Notice of Hearing. A notice of hearing shall accompany
    the motion or petition for termination of parental rights and
    shall advise the parent . . . of the location, date and time of the
    initial termination hearing. In addition to the information
    required by law, the notice of hearing shall advise the parent
    6
    MARIANNE N. V. DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, O.N., I.T., A.G.
    Opinion of the Court
    . . . that failure to appear at the initial hearing, pretrial
    conference, status conference or termination adjudication
    hearing, without good cause, may result in a finding that the
    parent . . . has waived legal rights, and is deemed to have
    admitted the allegations in the motion or petition for
    termination. The notice shall advise the parent . . . that the
    hearings may go forward in the absence of the parent . . . and
    may result in the termination of parental rights based upon
    the record and evidence presented.
    This rule implicitly authorizes the juvenile court to terminate parental
    rights by default if a parent fails to appear without good cause at any one
    of four types of court proceedings. See Adrian E. v. Ariz. Dept. of Econ. Sec.,
    
    215 Ariz. 96
    , 100 ¶ 12 (App. 2007) (noting that reading Rule 64(C) as a
    notice-only provision would render it meaningless in motion-initiated
    termination actions). Marianne does not contest that Rule 64(C) applies
    here if this Court had the authority to promulgate it. (It is therefore
    unnecessary to respond to the dissent’s recasting of Rule 64(C) as “an over-
    inclusive, omnibus notice” that purposefully warns parents about
    consequences the juvenile court is not authorized to impose. See infra ¶¶
    57–59).
    ¶17           Marianne argues that Rule 64(C) diminished the substantive
    rights conferred by A.R.S. § 8-863(C) by authorizing the juvenile court to
    find that she waived legal rights and admitted the motion’s allegations by
    failing to appear at the pretrial conference, rather than the scheduled
    termination adjudication hearing, and then terminating her rights based on
    the record and evidence presented. DCS counters that Rule 64(C) does not
    conflict with § 8-863(C) and, even if it does, the court of appeals correctly
    found that the rule is procedural and thus properly promulgated by this
    Court.
    ¶18           We need not decide whether § 8-863(C) and Rule 64(C) are
    procedural or substantive because we agree with DCS that they can be
    harmonized. See State v. Hansen, 
    215 Ariz. 287
    , 289 ¶ 7 (2007) (“Rules and
    statutes should be harmonized wherever possible and read in conjunction
    with each other.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
    7
    MARIANNE N. V. DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, O.N., I.T., A.G.
    Opinion of the Court
    B.
    ¶19            We begin by addressing the meaning of § 8-863(C). Marianne
    asserts that “the hearing” in § 8-863(C) refers solely to a final termination
    adjudication hearing and therefore grants parents the substantive right to
    appear and participate in that hearing regardless of any failure to attend
    prior hearings or proceedings. She argues that Rule 64(C) diminishes that
    right when applied to pre-termination adjudication hearing proceedings.
    ¶20            The identity of “the hearing” in § 8-863(C) is unclear. It most
    likely refers to the “initial hearing,” as that is the only hearing mentioned
    in the statute. A.R.S. § 8-863(A). And the juvenile court can find a waiver
    of legal rights based on non-appearance at “the hearing” only if the parent
    was served with the motion for termination, which sets forth the date and
    time for the initial hearing, not the termination adjudication hearing. 
    Id. §§ 8-862(D)(2),
    -863(C). But the statute also sets forth the standard for
    terminating parental rights, making it plausible that “the hearing” means
    the termination adjudication hearing. See 
    id. § 8-863(B).
    ¶21            We need not resolve this ambiguity. Even assuming
    Marianne is correct that “the hearing” in § 8-863(C) refers to the termination
    adjudication hearing, Rule 64(C) does not diminish any substantive rights
    arguably conferred by that statute. Nothing in § 8-863(C) restricts “the
    hearing” to a previously scheduled termination adjudication hearing or
    requires that notice be given in advance of the hearing. Cf. Farris v.
    Advantage Capital Corp., 
    217 Ariz. 1
    , 2 ¶ 5 (2007) (declaring that statutory
    text is the best indicator of legislative intent). Other than directing when
    the motion for termination must be served on a parent, § 8-863 leaves it to
    this Court to provide the procedural framework for making the termination
    decision. Cf. 
    Daou, 139 Ariz. at 357-58
    (“The power to govern procedural
    matters for all courts, however, is vested exclusively with this court.”);
    Kenneth T. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 
    212 Ariz. 150
    , 152 ¶ 10 (App. 2006)
    (approving termination of parental rights by summary judgment,
    reasoning that “whether the case is resolved by default, a motion to dismiss,
    motion for summary judgment, or by trial, is a question of procedure.”).
    ¶22          The procedural framework created by this Court includes
    Rule 64(C), which authorizes the juvenile court to “go forward” with a
    termination adjudication hearing at the time scheduled for a pretrial
    8
    MARIANNE N. V. DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, O.N., I.T., A.G.
    Opinion of the Court
    proceeding if the parent fails to attend without good cause. Section 8-
    863(C) does not curtail the juvenile court’s authority to convert a scheduled
    pretrial conference into a termination adjudication hearing, as Marianne
    was repeatedly warned could occur in the event of her non-attendance.
    (Indeed, the statutes governing motion-initiated termination proceedings
    do not mention pretrial conferences.) When the juvenile court “go[es]
    forward” with the adjudication termination hearing in the parent’s absence,
    it can proceed as contemplated by § 8-863(C) by determining that the parent
    was served with the motion to terminate parental rights. It may then find
    that a parent has waived her legal rights by failing to appear at the
    termination adjudication hearing and then terminate the parent-child
    relationship based on the record and evidence presented. A.R.S. § 8-863(C).
    The rule and statute work harmoniously.
    ¶23           The legislative history for § 8-863(C) supports our view.
    Subsection (C) was added to § 8-863 in 1999 as part of a comprehensive
    packet of new laws affecting child safety and welfare. In part, the
    legislature sought to “resolve[] the problem posed by” Don L. v. Arizona
    Department of Economic Security, 
    193 Ariz. 556
    (App. 1998), “which held that
    the juvenile court lacked authority to sever parental rights by default in the
    absence of a court rule or statute granting that authority.” Ariz. State Senate
    Fact Sheet for S.B. 1109, 44th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Apr. 30, 1999).
    ¶24            The situation in Don L. is analogous to the one here and
    illuminates the legislature’s intent. The child there was adjudicated
    dependent, and DCS’s predecessor eventually petitioned to terminate the
    father’s parental rights. Don 
    L., 193 Ariz. at 557-58
    ¶ 2. (The law was
    amended after the events there to permit the termination of parental rights
    to be initiated by motion in a pending dependency action rather than by
    petition. See A.R.S. § 8-862(D), Historical and Statutory Notes; 1998 Ariz.
    Leg. Serv. Ch. 276 (H.B. 2645)). At the initial termination hearing, as here,
    the court admonished the father to attend all future hearings and warned
    that his failure to attend could result in the entry of a default judgment. Don
    L., 193 Ariz. At 557-58 ¶ 2. The father subsequently failed to appear at a
    status hearing, so the court found he had admitted the petition allegations
    and conducted a termination adjudication hearing. 
    Id. at 558
    ¶¶ 2-3. After
    hearing testimony and admitting evidence proving the petition allegations,
    the court terminated the father’s parental rights. 
    Id. ¶ 3.
    The court of
    appeals reversed because nothing “allow[ed] the juvenile court to sever
    9
    MARIANNE N. V. DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, O.N., I.T., A.G.
    Opinion of the Court
    parental rights by ‘default’ solely because the parent fails to attend a status
    hearing.” 
    Id. ¶ 6.
    ¶25           The legislature’s goal of “resolv[ing] the problem posed by“
    Don L. is only achieved by interpreting § 8-863(C) as permitting the juvenile
    court to conduct a termination adjudication hearing at a time scheduled for
    a pretrial conference when a parent fails to appear without good cause. If
    we viewed the provision as narrowly as Marianne, the problem presented
    in Don L. would remain unresolved.
    ¶26           Our view is also supported by considering that Marianne’s
    interpretation would result in treating motion-initiated termination
    proceedings differently from petition-initiated proceedings. We find no
    basis for doing so.
    ¶27            When the legislature enacted § 8-863(C), it also enacted
    provisions requiring the juvenile court in petition-initiated proceedings to
    conduct an initial hearing, a pretrial conference or status conference, and a
    termination adjudication hearing. See A.R.S. § 8-535(A)-(B), (E); S.B. 1109,
    44th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 1999). It simultaneously provided that if a
    parent fails to appear at any of these proceedings, the court may find that
    the parent waived his or her legal rights and admitted the petition’s
    allegations and then terminate the parent’s rights based on the record and
    evidence presented. See A.R.S. §§ 8-535(D), -537(C).
    ¶28           Under Marianne’s view, adopted by the dissent, the court
    could find that a parent who does not attend a pretrial conference waived
    legal rights and admitted termination allegations and then terminate that
    parent’s rights after receiving sufficient evidence in petition-initiated
    proceedings but not in motion-initiated proceedings. But the legislature
    enacted the motion-initiated termination process in pending dependency
    cases “so that children can be adopted more readily and at an earlier age.”
    Mara M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 
    201 Ariz. 503
    , 505-06 ¶ 16 (App. 2002). It
    is unfathomable that the legislature would intend that the court could
    accelerate proceedings in petition-initiated proceedings but not in motion-
    initiated ones. This is particularly true as dependent children have already
    endured a period of uncertainty before initiation of termination
    proceedings. Interpreting § 8-863(C) as we do results in parallel
    10
    MARIANNE N. V. DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, O.N., I.T., A.G.
    Opinion of the Court
    acceleration procedures regardless of how the termination proceedings
    were initiated.
    ¶29             The dissent speculates that the legislature singled out
    petition-initiated proceedings for different treatment because judges know
    less about the alleged termination grounds there than in motion-initiated
    proceedings, which have a dependency track record. The theory is that a
    parent’s non-appearance at a pretrial conference in petition-initiated
    proceedings therefore justifies acceleration to a final termination hearing to
    avoid      the    risk    of    obstructing    and    delaying       a   child’s
    permanency. See infra ¶¶ 45-47. In short, the less the judge knows about a
    case the more justified proceeding to a final termination hearing if a parent
    fails to appear at a pretrial conference. That conjecture is illogical. Whether
    the case is initiated by petition or motion, when a parent fails without good
    cause to attend a pretrial conference, proceeding to termination provides a
    strong incentive for attendance and prevents delay in the resolution of the
    child’s status, a goal—unlike the dissent’s speculative rationale—that is
    supported by the legislative history.
    ¶30           Marianne argues that by omitting references to a pretrial
    conference and status conference in § 8-863(C), the legislature evidenced its
    intent to create different procedures for petition-initiated and motion-
    initiated termination proceedings. But no reason existed for the legislature
    to refer to these proceedings in § 8-863(C) because, unlike with petition-
    initiated proceedings, no pretrial conferences are required in motion-
    initiated proceedings. (The dependency action preceding motion-initiated
    proceedings already requires the court to hold a settlement conference or
    pretrial conference or order mediation.) The legislature only required the
    court in motion-initiated proceedings to hold an initial hearing and a
    termination adjudication hearing. A.R.S. § 8-862(D)(2).
    ¶31           In sum, we agree with the court of appeals’ holding but for a
    different reason. Rule 64(C) does not enlarge or diminish any substantive
    rights granted by § 8-863(C). The rule and statute work in harmony, and
    there is no separation-of-powers violation.
    11
    MARIANNE N. V. DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, O.N., I.T., A.G.
    Opinion of the Court
    CONCLUSION
    ¶32           We vacate ¶¶ 7 – 14 of the court of appeals’ opinion and affirm
    the juvenile court’s termination of Marianne’s parental rights.
    JUDGE ECKERSTROM, joined by JUSTICES BOLICK AND GOULD,
    dissenting:
    ¶33           The majority holds today that Marianne N., a mother who
    appeared at all fourteen hearings in her dependency case, and attempted to
    appear telephonically at the pretrial conference regarding DCS’s motion to
    terminate her parental rights, was properly “defaulted” under Arizona law.
    Because I cannot agree that A.R.S. § 8-863(C) can be read to authorize such
    a result and because Rule 64(C), Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct., is most plausibly
    understood as a notice provision designed to facilitate that statute, I
    respectfully dissent.
    ¶34            The United States Supreme Court long ago observed that a
    parent’s right to “care, custody, management and companionship of [his
    or] her minor children” is “far more precious” than any property interest,
    May v. Anderson, 
    345 U.S. 528
    , 533, (1953), and has determined that right is
    fundamental. Stanley v. Illinois, 
    40 U.S. 645
    , 651 (1972). Accordingly, both
    the United States Supreme Court and Arizona courts have repeatedly held
    that the state may not interfere with the relationship between parents and
    their children without providing due process of law. Carolina H. v. Ariz.
    Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 
    232 Ariz. 569
    , 571 ¶ 6 (App. 2013) (listing cases).
    ¶35             As the majority points out, whether application of Rule 64(C)
    here deprived Marianne of her due process rights or interfered with her
    liberty interest in parenting her children is not before us. But as explained
    below, the text of § 8-863(C) strikes a careful balance between these
    important parental rights and a child’s need for permanency. In so doing,
    it does not authorize the forfeiture of a parent’s due process rights for
    failing to attend a pretrial conference. Nor should we read Rule 64(C) as
    anything other than what it purports to be—a notice provision designed to
    facilitate the legislature’s default scheme for terminations initiated by both
    motions and petitions.
    12
    MARIANNE N. V. DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, O.N., I.T., A.G.
    JUDGE ECKERSTROM, joined by JUSTICES BOLICK and GOULD,
    DISSENTING
    ¶36           In construing the rule and the statute, we must be cognizant
    that pretrial conferences in motion-initiated severance proceedings arise
    near the end of dependency proceedings. See A.R.S. §§ 8-841 to 8-847 (pre-
    termination dependency proceedings), 8-862. And, a parent’s failure to
    attend a pretrial conference risks no delay in the scheduled termination
    hearing or the child’s permanency. See A.R.S. §§ 8-862(D)(2), 8-864(2) (court
    under strict deadline to hold termination hearing). In apparent recognition
    of this, Arizona statute does not authorize the forfeiture of a parent’s due
    process rights for failure to attend a pretrial conference during the
    severance proceedings initiated by motion.
    ¶37           In enacting § 8-863, the legislature established important
    procedural protections for a parent facing termination arising out of
    dependency proceedings, including the right to notice of those proceedings
    and the benefit of an elevated standard of proof as to statutorily specified
    grounds for termination.        The legislature also identified the lone
    circumstance under which important due process rights may be deemed
    waived: the parent’s failure to appear at the termination hearing. A.R.S.
    § 8-863(C) (logically referring to the termination proceeding referred to in
    subsection A and described in subsection B).
    ¶38           Any statutory provision that establishes consequences for a
    person’s failure to appear for legal proceedings necessarily strikes a balance
    between competing interests. Here, the statute balances the parent’s
    entitlement to due process against the state’s substantial interest in securing
    permanency for dependent children. See Andrew R. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ.
    Sec., 
    223 Ariz. 453
    , 460 ¶ 24 (App. 2010) (observing strong public policy in
    favor of securing permanency for children). Indeed, the sequential
    provisions in § 8-863 demonstrate precisely such a tension. Subections (A)
    and (B) of § 8-863 set forth procedural rights benefitting the parent:
    respectively, the right to receive notice of the motion to terminate and the
    right to an enhanced burden of proof as to statutorily specified grounds for
    termination. By contrast, subsection (C) subordinates a parent’s procedural
    entitlements to the child’s interest in a permanent home—when the parent’s
    non-appearance at the termination hearing would otherwise delay that
    permanence.
    13
    MARIANNE N. V. DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, O.N., I.T., A.G.
    JUDGE ECKERSTROM, joined by JUSTICES BOLICK and GOULD,
    DISSENTING
    ¶39           Any expansion of the grounds for such a default would alter
    the balance expressed by the text of § 8-863. Therefore, to the extent
    Rule 64(C) is construed as intending to establish additional conditions for
    forfeiture or default beyond those enacted by our legislature, the rule
    cannot be harmonized with the statute. It would strike a different balance
    between competing interests.
    ¶40             The majority holds that the statute’s language does not
    expressly preclude default at a pretrial conference and therefore can be
    harmonized with its reading of Rule 64(C) as providing a supplementary
    forfeiture provision. Specifically, it maintains that “nothing in § 8-863(C)
    restricts ‘the hearing’ to a previously scheduled termination adjudication
    hearing . . . .” But, as the majority acknowledges, the legislature enacted
    § 8-863(C), establishing procedures for termination by motion, at the same
    time it enacted § 8-537(C), a parallel provision setting forth procedures for
    termination by petition. Unlike § 8-863(C), the latter specifies that a parent’s
    non-appearance at “the pretrial conference, status conference or
    termination adjudication hearing” can result in forfeiture of substantial
    procedural rights. A.R.S. § 8-537(C).
    ¶41           Thus, when the legislature intended to sanction non-
    appearance at pretrial conferences with instant acceleration of the
    termination proceedings, it conveyed that intent expressly. That it declined
    to do so in § 8-863(C)—in legislation enacted the same day as part of the
    same general scheme and as to parallel procedural events—demonstrates
    that the omission was intentional rather than accidental. See City of Flagstaff
    v. Mangum, 
    164 Ariz. 395
    , 398 (1990) (“Where the legislature uses a term
    within one statute and excludes it from another, the term usually will not
    be read into the provision from which it was excluded.”).
    ¶42           Based on its plain language, § 8-863(C) expressly allows
    default only if the parent fails to attend the severance hearing. By its very
    title, “Hearing to terminate parental rights; notice; grounds,” the statute as
    a whole pertains to the termination hearing. All three subsections define
    features of a termination hearing: they describe, respectively, how it is
    noticed, the evidentiary burdens therefor, and the circumstances under
    14
    MARIANNE N. V. DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, O.N., I.T., A.G.
    JUDGE ECKERSTROM, joined by JUSTICES BOLICK and GOULD,
    DISSENTING
    which a parent can forfeit procedural rights at the hearing.              A.R.S.
    § 8-863(A)-(C). 1
    ¶43             Furthermore, the language of subsection (C) cannot be
    harmonized with the suggestion that its default provisions would apply to
    non-appearance at multiple types of hearings: the statute sanctions a parent
    for non-appearance at “the hearing”—a semantically singular event. Thus,
    § 8-863(C) cannot be construed as providing such a default for failing to
    appear at a pretrial conference without adding words to the statute that the
    legislature chose not to include. See Calnimptewa v. Flagstaff Police Dep’t, 
    200 Ariz. 567
    , 570 ¶ 13, (App. 2001) (“[W]e are not authorized to supply words
    that would extend the scope of a statute beyond that intended by the
    legislature.”).
    ¶44           But why would the legislature establish different forfeiture
    standards for terminations by petition than for terminations by motion?
    Indeed, as the majority correctly observes, children involved in motion-
    initiated severance proceedings have already endured a longer period of
    uncertainty. Would not permanency be more urgent for them? Why, then,
    would the legislature be more tolerant of a parent’s failure to appear in
    motion-initiated proceedings than those initiated by petition?
    ¶45         The answers rest in the procedural differences between these
    two proceedings. In termination proceedings arising by motion, the
    lawyers and parties have already appeared in court, usually numerous
    times, to address the underlying dependency. That is precisely what
    1
    Arguably, § 8-863(C) can be read to authorize default for a parent’s
    non-appearance at the initial severance hearing. The phrase “the hearing”
    in subsection C could refer to either subsection B, which sets the evidentiary
    burden for the termination hearing, or subsection A, which refers to “the
    initial hearing on the termination of parental rights.” However, nothing in
    the text of the statute suggests that other types of hearings, such as a pretrial
    conferences, are included among events at which default could occur.
    Notably, non-appearance at either the initial severance hearing or the
    termination hearing would result in a potential delay of permanency if the
    Court lacked the power to proceed in the parent’s absence. This is not the
    case with non-appearance at status conferences or pretrial conferences.
    15
    MARIANNE N. V. DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, O.N., I.T., A.G.
    JUDGE ECKERSTROM, joined by JUSTICES BOLICK and GOULD,
    DISSENTING
    occurred in this case. For this reason, the grounds for severance are well
    known by the court and the parties. Frequently, the relevant factual issues
    have already been explored and litigated, albeit in the context of a
    dependency.
    ¶46            In contrast, petitions for termination initiate entirely new
    legal proceedings. Under such circumstances, planning hearings, such as
    pretrial conferences and status conferences, gain elevated importance. This
    is because courts must organize the gathering of evidence and coordination
    of schedules for new litigation. In that context, a parent’s failure to appear
    at such hearings has a greater potential to obstruct and delay the process
    for establishing the child’s permanency.
    ¶47           For this reason, pretrial conferences have comparatively less
    importance in motion-initiated proceedings. Indeed, as the majority points
    out, they are frequently not necessary and, for reasons discussed above, a
    parents’ non-appearance at them risks no delay whatsoever in establishing
    permanency. In assessing whether to sanction a parent for non-appearance
    at a hearing, the effect of that non-appearance on subsequent proceedings
    would be far from “illogical” consideration. It would be the primary
    consideration.
    ¶48            To be sure, the parallel termination statutes do not themselves
    articulate the purpose for the textual distinction between the types of
    hearings at which the parent may be defaulted. Thus, any explanation for
    variation—both the majority’s and that posited here—involves judicial
    speculation. But we must apply the words the legislature chose, not those
    we think they should have chosen. See Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66
    v. State, 
    205 Ariz. 584
    , 592-93 ¶ 40 (App. 2003). At minimum, a plausible
    explanation exists for why the legislature established different default
    provisions for the two kinds of proceedings.
    ¶49           Indeed, the legislature has made plain its intent to enact
    distinct procedures for motion-initiated and petition-initiated severance
    proceedings. A.R.S. § 8-532(C) states: “This article [chapter 4, article 5;
    §§ 8-531 to 8-544] does not apply to termination proceedings conducted
    pursuant to article 11 of this chapter [§§ 8-861 to 8-864] . . . .” So directed,
    we demonstrate the greatest fidelity to legislative intent by applying
    16
    MARIANNE N. V. DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, O.N., I.T., A.G.
    JUDGE ECKERSTROM, joined by JUSTICES BOLICK and GOULD,
    DISSENTING
    differently worded provisions in accord with their semantically distinct
    text.
    ¶50            The majority, however, reads § 8-863(C) as expressing
    identical intent to § 8-537(C), the default procedure applicable to petition-
    initiated termination adjudication hearings. In so doing, the majority places
    considerable weight on the legislative history of the statutory scheme.
    From that history, it concludes that the legislature must have tacitly
    intended to create a default provision for parents who fail to attend a
    pretrial conference in motion-initiated proceedings.           But based on
    traditional principles of statutory construction and interpretation,
    consideration of legislative history should only be relied on to resolve
    unclear or ambiguous text. See Metzler v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A.,
    Inc., 
    235 Ariz. 141
    , 144-45 ¶ 13 (2014) (statute’s language controls “unless an
    absurdity or constitutional violation results”). The majority has not
    identified any ambiguity in § 8-863(C). No language in that provision
    creates any confusion about whether a parent may be defaulted in a motion-
    initiated severance proceeding for failing to appear at a pretrial conference.
    Although the statute identifies a circumstance under which default may
    occur, non-appearance at a pretrial conference is not that circumstance.
    ¶51             Our traditional standards of interpretation subordinate
    legislative history to plain language for good reason: such history is often
    scant, fails to articulate the entire legislature’s intent, and may be unclear in
    its intended application to specific legal problems. See Antonin Scalia &
    Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, 369-90 (2012)
    (itemizing the interpretive limitations of divining legislative intent from
    “legislative history”). I submit we encounter those very limitations in
    ascribing statutory intent from the legislative history here.
    ¶52            The majority directs us to the language in the Senate’s “Final
    Revised Fact Sheet” as expressing the legislature’s intentions when it
    enacted the statutory scheme. But, as a threshold matter, that fact sheet
    only purports to express the intentions of the Senate’s drafters—not those
    of the House of Representatives, whose vote was also necessary to pass it,
    or the Governor who signed it. Both were necessarily and primarily
    focused on whether they approved the procedures expressed by the words
    of § 8-863 itself. No individual legislator, in the House or the Senate, was
    17
    MARIANNE N. V. DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, O.N., I.T., A.G.
    JUDGE ECKERSTROM, joined by JUSTICES BOLICK and GOULD,
    DISSENTING
    procedurally or legally confined to the rationale expressed in the Senate
    Fact Sheet.
    ¶53            Furthermore, the fact sheet’s reference to Don L. v. Ariz. Dep’t
    of Econ. Sec., 
    193 Ariz. 556
    (App. 1998), does not necessarily demonstrate
    any intention by the drafters to be constrained by the specific features of that
    case. Indeed, the fact sheet itself suggests that the Senate understood Don
    L. to describe a more general problem—“that the juvenile court lacked
    authority to sever parental rights by default in the absence of a court rule
    or statute granting that authority.” Ariz. State Senate Fact Sheet for S.B.
    1109, 44th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Apr. 30, 1999). Thus, nothing in the fact
    sheet demonstrates any legislative intent that the parallel statutes, §§ 8-
    837(C) and 8-863(C), which provide such authority to juvenile courts, be
    read more expansively than the carefully-calibrated balance articulated
    therein.
    ¶54          Furthermore, as the majority points out, in Don L., the
    proceeding had been initiated by petition, 
    193 Ariz. 556
    , 557 ¶ 2, as all
    proceedings were at the time. See 1999 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1st Reg. Sess., ch.
    81, § 19 (adding § 8-862(E), directing courts to order parties to file
    termination motion). The father had failed to attend a status hearing and
    was defaulted. Don 
    L., 193 Ariz. at 557
    ¶ 3. The court of appeals reversed,
    determining that neither the statutes nor the rules provided for a default.
    
    Id. ¶ 8.
    ¶55            To be sure, the petition in Don L. arose from a dependency
    proceeding, 
    id. ¶ 2,
    and thus, to that extent would parallel the instant case.
    But the legislature responded to Don L. by enacting distinct provisions for
    terminations by motion and terminations by petition, each with its unique
    default language. In my view, we stand on uncertain ground to assume
    that the Senate’s reference in the fact sheet to Don L. expresses a legislative
    intent that the two default provisions should be read as facsimiles.
    ¶56           For the above reasons, I conclude that § 8-863(C) is subject to
    only one interpretation that pays primary allegiance to its text and pertinent
    context: a default is not authorized in a termination proceeding initiated by
    motion when a parent fails to appear at a pretrial conference.
    18
    MARIANNE N. V. DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, O.N., I.T., A.G.
    JUDGE ECKERSTROM, joined by JUSTICES BOLICK and GOULD,
    DISSENTING
    ¶57            Rule 64(C), however, is broader than § 8-863(C). And, it is
    subject to two plausible interpretations: that it conflicts with the statute by
    adding types of hearings the legislature deliberately omitted, or that it can
    be harmonized with the statute because it is an over-inclusive, omnibus
    notice provision, subject to the limitations of the statute. For the reasons
    that follow, it is best understood as the latter.
    ¶58             Rule 64 (C) requires the movant or petitioner to warn parents
    that “failure to appear at the initial hearing, pretrial conference, status
    conference or termination adjudication hearing, without good cause” may
    result in a finding that the parent has admitted the allegations in the petition
    or motion, and has waived the parent’s legal rights. The next sentence
    requires a specific warning that, under such circumstances, “the hearing[]
    may go forward in the absence of the parent . . . and may result in the
    termination of parental rights . . . .” And, under the rule, the same notice—
    including the notice of potential forfeiture of rights for non-appearance at a
    pretrial conference—must be given in the context of terminations initiated
    by either petition or motion.
    ¶59            By its terms, then, Rule 64(C) requires the notice to warn
    parents, even those whose proceedings have been initiated by motion, that
    their rights may be forfeited by non-appearance at a pretrial conference.
    The rule therefore implies that the law authorizes such a forfeiture. Read
    this way, Rule 64(C) would add grounds for forfeiture not found in
    § 8-863(C). So construed, Rule 64(C) would constitute a supplementary
    forfeiture provision in contradiction to the statutory balance struck by the
    legislature in § 8-863.
    ¶60           But Rule 64(C) can also be plausibly read in conformity with
    its apparent contextual role: to facilitate the pre-existing statutory default
    scheme, set forth in §§ 8-537(C) and 8-863(C), by providing comprehensive
    and clear notice to parents of the potential consequences of non-appearance
    under either statute. Read in this manner, the notice’s warning of forfeiture
    for non-appearance at pretrial conferences pertains only to parents whose
    rights are being terminated by petition, in accordance with §§ 8-533 and
    8-537. The same warning is equally necessary, but over-inclusive, as to
    parents in motion-initiated proceedings who may be defaulted only if they
    fail to appear at a termination hearing. Notably, the drafters may have
    19
    MARIANNE N. V. DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, O.N., I.T., A.G.
    JUDGE ECKERSTROM, joined by JUSTICES BOLICK and GOULD,
    DISSENTING
    viewed any over-inclusiveness as procedurally helpful given that such
    parents should appear at all hearings.
    ¶61           While both interpretations can be logically derived from the
    language of the rule, there are sound reasons to adopt the latter. First,
    Rule 64(C) plainly reads more as a notice statute than as an independent,
    supplementary default provision. It is entitled “Notice of Hearing” rather
    than “Grounds for Forfeiture” and its language is exclusively devoted to
    describing the contents of a “notice” rather than substantive grounds for
    forfeiture. Furthermore, had this Court intended to expand the grounds for
    forfeiture beyond those established by statute, it presumably would have
    done so in a separate subsection, rather than by implication from a sentence
    buried in a notice provision. Indeed, the juvenile rules do make direct
    provision for default in the immediately subsequent Rules 65 and 66, which
    squarely address the procedural features of initial and final termination
    hearings, respectively.
    ¶62           The remaining language in Rule 64(C) comprehensively
    addresses every possible default scenario: the notice must include
    advisories for terminations by “motion or petition,” it must be served on
    “parent[s], guardian[s] or Indian custodian[s],” and it must contain the
    “location, date and time” of the initial termination hearing. In that context,
    one can view the rule as an omnibus notice provision, harmlessly over-
    inclusive in an effort to provide an exhaustive warning to parents whose
    rights may be terminated in their absence.
    ¶63            Perhaps most importantly, however, our jurisprudence
    provides clear direction as to which plausible interpretation of Rule 64(C)
    we should adopt. That precedent instructs that we should seek “to
    harmonize, whenever possible, related statutory and rule provisions.”
    
    Metzler, 235 Ariz. at 144-45
    ¶ 13; State v. Hansen, 
    215 Ariz. 287
    , 289 ¶ 7 (2007).
    If we interpret Rule 64(C) as a notice provision designed to facilitate
    § 8-863(C)—rather than as a supplementary forfeiture provision that would
    conflict with the statute—we would comply with that directive.
    ¶64           In summary, § 8-863(C) contains no language authorizing a
    parent’s forfeiture of procedural rights for non-appearance at a pretrial
    conference. That omission was no oversight but rather the result of a
    20
    MARIANNE N. V. DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, O.N., I.T., A.G.
    JUDGE ECKERSTROM, joined by JUSTICES BOLICK and GOULD,
    DISSENTING
    specific legislative directive to treat motions for termination differently
    than petitions for termination. Therefore, the juvenile court’s finding—that
    Marianne had forfeited her right to attend the termination hearing by
    failing to attend the pretrial conference—was not a finding authorized by
    statute.
    ¶65           Nor was it a finding authorized by Rule 64(C). Although that
    rule can plausibly be construed as expressing the Court’s intent to strike a
    different balance than the legislature, it can also be read to instead facilitate,
    but not expand, the legislature’s default scheme with an exhaustive—and
    benignly over-inclusive—notice provision. The latter reading conforms
    best to the commands of our separation of powers jurisprudence and the
    evident textual purpose of Rule 64 understood as a whole.
    ¶66           I therefore respectfully dissent and would reverse the juvenile
    court’s termination of Marianne’s parental rights.
    21