State of Arizona v. Hon. butler/tyler B. ( 2013 )


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  •                     SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA
    En Banc
    THE STATE OF ARIZONA,             )   Arizona Supreme Court
    )   No. CV-12-0402-PR
    Petitioner, )
    )   Court of Appeals
    v.               )   Division Two
    )   No. 2 CA-SA 12-0065
    HON. JANE A. BUTLER, JUDGE PRO    )
    TEMPORE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF )    Pima County
    THE STATE OF ARIZONA, in and for )    Superior Court
    the County of Pima,               )   No. JV19004301
    )
    Respondent Judge, )
    )
    TYLER B.,                         )   O P I N I O N
    )
    Real Party in Interest. )
    __________________________________)
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County
    The Honorable Jane A. Butler, Commissioner Pro Tem
    REMANDED
    ________________________________________________________________
    Opinion of the Court of Appeals, Division Two
    
    231 Ariz. 42
    , 
    290 P.3d 435
     (2012)
    REVERSED
    ________________________________________________________________
    BARBARA LAWALL, PIMA COUNTY ATTORNEY                          Tucson
    By   Nicolette Kneup, Deputy County Attorney
    Attorneys for State of Arizona
    HERNANDEZ & ROBLES PC                                         Tucson
    By   Joshua F. Hamilton
    Attorneys for Tyler B.
    ARIZONA ATTORNEYS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE                  Chandler
    By   David J. Euchner
    Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Arizona Attorneys for Criminal
    Justice
    NESCI & ST LOUIS PLLC                                     Tucson
    By   James Nesci
    Attorneys for Amicus Curiae National College for DUI Defense,
    Inc.
    ACLU FOUNDATION OF ARIZONA                               Phoenix
    By   Daniel Pochoda
    Kelly J. Flood
    And
    PERKINS COIE LLP                                         Phoenix
    By   Jean-Jacques Cabou
    Thomas D. Ryerson
    Attorneys for Amicus Curiae ACLU Foundation of Arizona
    JUVENILE LAW CENTER                             Philadelphia, PA
    By   Lourdes M. Rosado
    And
    NUCCIO & SHIRLY                                            Tucson
    By   Jeanne Shirly
    Attorneys for Amici Curiae Juvenile Law Center, Center on
    Children and Families, Central Juvenile Defender Center,
    Children and Family Justice Center, The Children’s Law Center
    Inc., Children & Youth Law Clinic, Civitas ChildLaw Center,
    Juvenile & Special Education Law Clinic/University of the
    District of Columbia, Juvenile Justice Project of Louisiana,
    Justice Policy Institute, National Association of Criminal
    Defense Lawyers, National Center for Youth Law, National
    Juvenile Defender Center, National Juvenile Justice Network,
    Northeast Juvenile Defender Center, Pacific Juvenile Defender
    Center, Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia,
    Rutgers School of Law Camden Children's Justice Clinic, Rutgers
    Urban Legal Clinic, San Francisco Office of the Public
    Defenders, University of Michigan Juvenile Justice Clinic,
    Neelum Arya, Tamara Birckhead, Susan L. Brooks, Michele Deitch,
    Jeffrey Fagan, Barbara Fedders, Barry Feld, Frank Furstenberg,
    Theresa Glennon, Martin Guggenheim, Kristin Henning, Randy
    Hertz, Paul Holland, Julie E. McConnell, James R. Merikangas,
    Wallace Mlyniec, Catherine J. Ross, Elizabeth Scott, Abbe Smith,
    and Barbara Bennett Woodhouse
    ________________________________________________________________
    B A L E S, Vice Chief Justice
    ¶1        Arizona’s implied consent statute, A.R.S. § 28-1321,
    2
    outlines      how    law    enforcement          officers      can       obtain        consent    to
    blood and breath tests from persons arrested for driving under
    the influence (“DUI”) and provides consequences for arrestees
    who refuse to submit to a test.                            Against this backdrop, we
    address      whether       the    Fourth        Amendment         to     the      United      States
    Constitution         requires      that     a    juvenile          arrestee’s          consent    be
    voluntary to allow a warrantless blood draw.                                   We hold that it
    does and that the juvenile court properly ruled that evidence of
    a    blood    draw    was    inadmissible            because       the       juvenile      did    not
    voluntarily consent.
    I.
    ¶2            On     February     17,     2012,        Tyler   B.,       a     sixteen-year-old
    high school student, and two friends arrived late to school.                                        A
    school monitor smelled marijuana on the boys and also saw drug
    paraphernalia in Tyler’s car.                        School officials detained the
    boys in separate rooms and contacted the sheriff’s office.
    ¶3            A     deputy       sheriff        soon       arrived       and      read      Miranda
    warnings to Tyler.            In the presence of several school officials,
    Tyler    admitted      that      he   had       driven      his     car      to    school     after
    smoking       marijuana       and     that       he        owned       some       of    the      drug
    paraphernalia in the car.               The deputy informed Tyler that he was
    under arrest for DUI and other offenses.                            Tyler became agitated
    and the deputy placed him in handcuffs.                            The deputy left Tyler
    with    the       assistant      principal           for    about        ten      minutes     while
    3
    retrieving a phlebotomy kit to do a blood draw.
    ¶4          When     the    deputy    returned      to    the   room,   he    saw   that
    Tyler had calmed down, so he removed the handcuffs from the
    youth.      He read Tyler an “implied consent admonition” twice,
    first    verbatim    and    then     in   “plain    English.”       The      admonition
    provided in relevant part:
    Arizona law requires you to submit to and successfully
    complete tests of breath, blood or other bodily
    substance as chosen by the law enforcement officer to
    determine alcohol concentration or drug content.   The
    law enforcement officer may require you to submit to
    two or more tests.    You are required to successfully
    complete each of the tests.
    If the test results are not available . . . or
    indicate any drug defined in ARS 13-3401 or its
    metabolite, without a valid prescription, your Arizona
    driving privilege will be suspended for not less than
    90 consecutive days.
    If you refuse to submit or do not successfully
    complete the specified tests, your Arizona driving
    privilege will be suspended for 12 months, or for two
    years if there is a prior implied consent refusal,
    within the last 84 months, on your record.     You are,
    therefore, required to submit to the specified tests.
    Tyler agreed verbally and in writing to have his blood drawn,
    and the deputy drew two vials of Tyler’s blood.
    ¶5          The     State   charged       Tyler    with    DUI.    Tyler      moved   to
    suppress evidence of the blood draw, arguing that his consent
    had not been voluntary and that, as a minor, he lacked the legal
    capacity to consent.           The juvenile court granted the motion,
    finding that the blood draw violated Arizona’s Parents’ Bill of
    4
    Rights (“PBR”), A.R.S. § 1-602, and, notwithstanding the PBR,
    that Tyler’s consent had been involuntary under the totality of
    the circumstances.         The court relied in part on In re Andre M.,
    in which this Court recognized the “increased susceptibility and
    vulnerability of juveniles” in assessing whether a juvenile’s
    confession was voluntary under the Fifth Amendment to the United
    States Constitution.           
    207 Ariz. 482
    , 485 ¶ 9, 
    88 P.3d 552
    , 555
    (2004).
    ¶6             On the State’s petition for special action relief, the
    court of appeals reversed the juvenile court’s ruling.                         State v.
    Butler, 
    231 Ariz. 42
    , 45 ¶ 11, 
    290 P.3d 435
    , 438 (App. 2012).
    The court first held that the PBR did not apply because the
    deputy was acting within the scope of his official duties.                            
    Id.
    at   44   ¶ 6,    290   P.3d    at     437.        It   then   held    that   the   Fifth
    Amendment did not apply because the blood was not testimonial
    evidence.        Id. at 45 ¶ 10, 290 P.3d at 438.                 Stating that “the
    informed consent statute presents no Fourth Amendment issue,”
    the court of appeals held that the juvenile court abused its
    discretion in suppressing the blood draw evidence.                            Id. ¶ 10
    n.6.
    ¶7             We granted review because this case raises questions
    of     first     impression      and     statewide        importance.          We   have
    jurisdiction       under       Article        6,    Section     5(3)    of    Arizona’s
    Constitution and A.R.S. § 12-120.24.
    5
    II.
    ¶8             The    Fourth      Amendment       provides,     “The       right   of     the
    people    to    be     secure     in   their      persons,     houses,       papers,      and
    effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
    be violated . . . .”              U.S. Const. amend. IV.             Evidence obtained
    in violation of the Fourth Amendment is properly suppressed.
    Mapp v. Ohio, 
    367 U.S. 643
    , 655 (1961).                       Trial court rulings on
    motions to suppress are reviewed for abuse of discretion.                                 See
    State v. Hausner, 
    230 Ariz. 60
    , 70 ¶ 23, 
    280 P.3d 604
    , 614
    (2012).      “We consider the evidence presented at the suppression
    hearing      and     view   the    facts    in    the   light       most    favorable      to
    sustaining the trial court’s ruling.”                   
    Id.
    ¶9             Tyler argues that a blood draw is a search subject to
    the Fourth Amendment and, to be valid, requires either a warrant
    or an exception such as voluntary consent.                          The State responds
    that every Arizona motorist gives “implied consent” under § 28-
    1321   and     that     tests     administered      under      the    statute      are    not
    subject to a Fourth Amendment voluntariness analysis.                           The State
    further        argues        that      “adult        privileges            carry        adult
    responsibilities,”          and     thus    juveniles     should       not    be   treated
    differently          from   adults     in    assessing        the    voluntariness         of
    consent to a blood draw.
    ¶10            Contrary to the State’s argument, a compelled blood
    draw, even when administered pursuant to § 28-1321, is a search
    6
    subject to the Fourth Amendment’s constraints.                        See Missouri v.
    McNeely, 
    133 S. Ct. 1552
    , 1556 (2013) (holding that a compelled
    blood draw taken pursuant to Missouri’s implied consent law is
    subject to the Fourth Amendment’s restrictions on warrantless
    searches).        “Such an invasion of bodily integrity implicates an
    individual’s       ‘most     personal       and      deep-rooted      expectations      of
    privacy.’”        
    Id. at 1558
     (quoting Winston v. Lee, 
    470 U.S. 753
    ,
    760 (1985)).
    ¶11          McNeely     also      forecloses        the    State’s    arguments      that
    requiring     warrants       for    blood         draws    will   unduly    burden     law
    enforcement officials or render Arizona’s implied consent law
    meaningless.           “In   those      drunk-driving         investigations         where
    police officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood
    sample    can     be    drawn      without        significantly       undermining      the
    efficacy of the search, the Fourth Amendment mandates that they
    do so.”     Id. at 1561.
    ¶12          In    general,     under    the       Fourth    Amendment,     warrantless
    searches “are per se unreasonable . . . subject only to a few
    specifically        established         and         well-delineated        exceptions.”
    Arizona v. Gant, 
    556 U.S. 332
    , 338 (2009).                        One such exception
    is exigent circumstances, but the State has not argued that this
    exception authorized the blood draw here.
    ¶13          Consent can also allow a warrantless search, provided
    the consent is voluntary.               Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 
    412 U.S. 7
    218, 226-28 (1973).           Voluntariness is assessed from the totality
    of    the   circumstances.             Id.     at   227.          Relevant        circumstances
    include the suspect’s age and intelligence as well as the length
    of detention.        See id. at 226-27, 229.
    ¶14           We reject the State’s contention that age should be
    disregarded in assessing a juvenile’s consent to a blood draw.
    In various contexts, the law recognizes a juvenile’s age as a
    relevant      consideration.                   See,        e.g.,        J.D.B.        v.     North
    Carolina,     
    131 S. Ct. 2394
    ,      2399,       2406       (2011)    (holding      that
    child’s age is relevant, although not necessarily determinative,
    in assessing whether a child is in custody); Roper v. Simmons,
    
    543 U.S. 551
    ,        571-73      (2005)       (recognizing            the      “diminished
    culpability”        of     juveniles      under       18    and       holding        that   “[t]he
    differences between juvenile and adult offenders are too marked
    and    well   understood          to    risk    allowing          a    youthful       person    to
    receive the death penalty”).                    Juveniles tend to possess less
    maturity and are “more vulnerable or susceptible to negative
    influences     and       outside       pressures.”           
    Id. at 569-70
    .         Courts
    should not blind themselves to this reality when assessing the
    voluntariness of consent to a blood draw.
    ¶15           Consent can be voluntary for purposes of the Fourth
    Amendment       in         circumstances            that      would            not     establish
    voluntariness under the Fifth Amendment.                               See Bustamonte, 412
    U.S. at 234, 240 (holding that, although Miranda v. Arizona, 384
    
    8 U.S. 436
     (1966), requires an arrestee to be advised of right to
    remain silent in order for waiver to be valid, knowledge of
    right      to       withhold    consent     is   just       one    factor    in    determining
    voluntariness of a consent to search).                         But, when the accused is
    a juvenile, factors such as age and the presence of parents are
    properly considered when assessing the voluntariness of consent
    to     a    search,      just     as   they      are       relevant    in     assessing         the
    voluntariness of a confession.                   Cf. In re Andre M., 
    207 Ariz. at
    485 ¶ 11, 
    88 P.3d at 555
     (noting in the Fifth Amendment context
    that       parents      can    “help   ensure        that    a     juvenile       will    not    be
    intimidated, coerced or deceived”).
    ¶16                 This Court has previously held that, for an officer to
    administer a test of breath or bodily fluids on an arrestee
    without         a    search    warrant      under      §    28-1321,    consent          must    be
    express.            Carrillo v. Houser, 
    224 Ariz. 463
    , 463 ¶ 1, 
    232 P.3d 1245
    ,       1245      (2010).      Carrillo          turned,      however,       on   statutory
    grounds and did not address any constitutional issues.                                    
    Id.
     at
    467 ¶ 21, 
    232 P.3d at 1249
    .
    ¶17                 The State unconvincingly argues that the “consent” in
    § 28-1321(A)           either    constitutes          an    exception       to    the    warrant
    requirement or satisfies the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that
    consent         be    voluntary.       We     explained           previously      that    “[t]he
    ‘consent’ by motorists referenced in subsection (A) does not
    always authorize warrantless testing of arrestees.”                                   Carrillo,
    9
    224 Ariz. at 465 ¶ 10, 
    232 P.3d at 1247
    .                     Rather, the officer is
    directed to ask the arrestee to submit to the test, and the
    arrestee may then refuse by declining to expressly agree to take
    the test.         A.R.S. § 28-1321(B); Carrillo, 224 Ariz. at 465 ¶ 11,
    
    232 P.3d at 1247
    .        If    the    arrestee        refuses,      the   statute
    specifies that a warrant is required to administer the test and
    the arrestee shall have his license suspended.                                A.R.S. § 28-
    1321(D); Carrillo, 224 Ariz. at 465 ¶ 11, 
    232 P.3d at 1247
    .
    ¶18              We hold now that, independent of § 28-1321, the Fourth
    Amendment        requires      an   arrestee’s        consent     to     be    voluntary    to
    justify      a     warrantless       blood      draw.       If     the    arrestee     is    a
    juvenile, the youth’s age and a parent’s presence are relevant,
    though not necessarily determinative, factors that courts should
    consider in assessing whether consent was voluntary under the
    totality of the circumstances.
    ¶19              Voluntariness is a question of fact, Bustamonte, 412
    U.S. at 248-49, and “[w]e review the trial court's voluntariness
    finding for abuse of discretion,” State v. Cota, 
    229 Ariz. 136
    ,
    144 ¶ 22, 
    272 P.3d 1027
    , 1035 (2012) (reviewing voluntariness of
    confession).           The State has the burden of proving that consent
    to a search is “freely and voluntarily given.”                            Bumper v. North
    Carolina, 
    391 U.S. 543
    , 548-50 (1968).
    ¶20              Although   Tyler        did    not   testify      at    the    suppression
    hearing,         sufficient     evidence         supports    the        juvenile     court’s
    10
    finding that he did not voluntarily consent to the blood draw.
    At the time, Tyler was nearly seventeen and in eleventh grade.
    He    had    been    arrested      once   previously,        but    not    adjudicated
    delinquent.         Tyler was detained for about two hours in a school
    room in the presence of school officials and a deputy.                         Neither
    of his parents was present.                  Tyler initially was shaking and
    visibly nervous.           When he became loud and upset after being told
    he was being arrested, the deputy placed him in handcuffs until
    he calmed down.             A second deputy sheriff arrived before the
    blood draw was taken.             After removing the handcuffs, the first
    deputy      read    the    implied    consent      admonition       to    Tyler,     once
    verbatim and once in what the deputy termed “plain English,”
    concluding with the statement, “You are, therefore, required to
    submit to the specified tests.”                   Tyler then assented to the
    blood draw.
    ¶21           Viewing      the    facts   in    the   light    most       favorable    to
    sustaining the ruling below, we hold that the juvenile court did
    not   abuse    its    discretion     by   ruling      that    Tyler’s      consent    was
    involuntary and granting the motion to suppress.                         We decline to
    address Tyler’s arguments that he lacked the legal capacity to
    consent      and    that    the    Arizona      Constitution       provides    greater
    protection than the Fourth Amendment in this context.
    III.
    ¶22           We also decline to address Tyler’s argument that the
    11
    blood draw must be suppressed because it violated the PBR.                     The
    statute   provides     that   parents      have   a   “right   to    consent    in
    writing     before   any   record   of      the   minor    child’s    blood     or
    deoxyribonucleic acid is created, stored or shared.”                     A.R.S.
    § 1-602(A)(8).       The PBR, however, concerns the rights of parents
    and does not purport to affect a juvenile’s right to consent to
    a search.      See id. § 1-602(A) (referencing “parental rights”).
    Nor does the statute provide that evidence will be suppressed if
    the statute is violated.        See id. § 1-602.           Even if the blood
    draw was taken in violation of the rights of Tyler’s parents (an
    issue we do not decide), Tyler would not have standing to argue
    that   this    violation   required      suppression      of   the   blood    draw
    evidence.      Cf. Rakas v. Illinois, 
    439 U.S. 128
    , 133-34 (1978)
    (holding that person lacks standing to suppress evidence seized
    in violation of another’s Fourth Amendment rights).
    IV.
    ¶23           For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of
    the court of appeals and remand the case to the superior court
    for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    __________________________________
    Scott Bales, Vice Chief Justice
    CONCURRING:
    __________________________________
    Rebecca White Berch, Chief Justice
    12
    __________________________________
    Robert M. Brutinel, Justice
    __________________________________
    Ann A. Scott Timmer, Justice
    P E L A N D E R, Justice, concurring
    ¶24           As a matter of statutory interpretation, we previously
    held that, absent a search warrant, Arizona’s “implied consent”
    statute,      A.R.S.   §   28-1321,      requires     an    arrestee’s    express
    consent to a chemical test.             Carrillo v. Houser, 
    224 Ariz. 463
    ,
    463 ¶ 1, 
    232 P.3d 1245
    , 1245 (2010).                The Court now holds that
    the Fourth Amendment also applies to a blood draw administered
    under   the    statute     and   thus    an   arrestee’s      consent    must   be
    voluntary.      Supra ¶ 18.       I have no quarrel with that holding,
    but reluctantly concur only because the parties acknowledge, and
    our case law indicates, that voluntariness determinations are
    reviewed   for    abuse    of    discretion.        Under    that   standard    of
    appellate review, I cannot say that the juvenile court erred in
    finding Tyler’s consent involuntary when some evidence arguably
    supports an inference to that effect.               Cf. State v. Chapple, 
    135 Ariz. 281
    , 297 n.18, 
    660 P.2d 1208
    , 1224 n.18 (1983) (A court
    abuses its discretion when “the reasons given by the court for
    its action are clearly untenable, legally incorrect, or amount
    to a denial of justice.”).
    13
    ¶25            As the majority notes, voluntariness issues often are
    fact-intensive          and    are     assessed         from     the     totality     of    the
    circumstances.           Supra ¶ 13 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
    
    412 U.S. 218
    , 227 (1973)).                  The majority correctly observes that
    we generally review rulings on motions to suppress evidence for
    an abuse of discretion, supra ¶¶ 8, 19, and finds no such abuse
    in the trial court’s ruling, supra ¶ 21.                         I write separately to
    express concern with indiscriminately applying those principles
    and     to    suggest,        for     future     purposes        only,      that    abuse-of-
    discretion       review       might    not     be    appropriate       in   cases    such    as
    this.
    ¶26            Only the deputy sheriff and Tyler’s father testified
    at the suppression hearing in this case.                               Significantly, the
    pertinent facts are undisputed and the juvenile court’s ruling
    is not based on witness credibility, weighing of conflicting
    evidence,       or     discretionary          determinations.            Accordingly,       the
    court’s       ultimate    ruling       on     voluntariness       could,      and    arguably
    should, be deemed a mixed question of fact and law subject to
    our     de    novo      review.         That         approach,     although        admittedly
    conflicting with extant Arizona case law, would be consistent
    with    our     approach       in     other    criminal-case           contexts     involving
    constitutional issues.               See State v. Moore, 
    222 Ariz. 1
    , 7 ¶ 17,
    
    213 P.3d 150
    , 156 (2009) (noting that, although we review trial
    court        rulings     on     pretrial        identifications             for     abuse    of
    14
    discretion       and       defer    to    factual     findings      supported      by    the
    record, the ultimate question of constitutionality is “a mixed
    question of law and fact” subject to our de novo review); State
    v. Gonzalez-Gutierrez, 
    187 Ariz. 116
    , 118, 
    927 P.2d 776
    , 778
    (1996)    (applying          same        principles    to        question    of    whether
    sufficient legal basis existed for vehicular stop); State v.
    Blackmore, 
    186 Ariz. 630
    , 632, 
    925 P.2d 1347
    , 1349 (1996) (same
    regarding question of whether an arrest was illegal); State v.
    Rogers, 
    186 Ariz. 508
    , 510, 
    924 P.2d 1027
    , 1029 (1996) (same
    regarding question of whether there was reasonable suspicion for
    an investigatory stop of a pedestrian).
    ¶27            Recently,       the        Vermont     Supreme        Court     thoroughly
    expounded on the appropriate standard of appellate review for
    voluntariness-of-consent issues.                    State v. Weisler, 
    35 A.3d 970
    (Vt. 2011).       An appellate court, of course, appropriately defers
    “to the trial court’s underlying findings of historical fact” as
    a “fundamental principle of appellate review.”                        Id. at 976, 985;
    see also Chapple, 
    135 Ariz. at
    297 n.18, 
    660 P.2d at
    1224 n.18.
    But as the Vermont court observed, Schneckloth did not address
    the subject of appellate review, and “[s]imply labeling consent
    to    search    as     a   question       of   fact   to    be    determined      from   the
    totality of the circumstances” at the trial court level “does
    little to advance the standard-of-review analysis.”                          Weisler, 35
    A.3d at 977.           Noting that “appellate courts have traditionally
    15
    reviewed      and        resolved       independently         the      question        of
    voluntariness in order to ‘guide police, unify precedent, and
    stabilize the law,’” id. at 985 (quoting Thompson v. Keohane,
    
    516 U.S. 99
    , 115 (1995)), the Weisler court held that “a trial
    court’s    decision      on    the     question   of    the   voluntariness       of    a
    consent to search, and thus the ultimate constitutional validity
    of the search, must be reviewed independently . . . on appeal,”
    id. at 983.
    ¶28         Vermont is not alone.               Other courts also follow this
    approach.     See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 
    921 F.2d 1294
    ,
    1301 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (conducting de novo review of a trial
    court’s     finding       of     involuntary      consent       when    facts     were
    uncontested and government presented uncontroverted evidence on
    that issue); United States v. Garcia, 
    890 F.2d 355
    , 359–60 (11th
    Cir. 1989) (same); State v. $217,590.00 in U.S. Currency, 
    18 S.W.3d 631
    , 633 (Tex. 2000) (assessing whether the trial court’s
    factual findings demonstrate voluntariness under the totality of
    the circumstances is a question of law); State v. Hansen, 
    63 P.3d 650
    , 663 (Utah 2002) (“While consent is a factual finding,
    voluntariness       is    a    legal    conclusion,     which    is    reviewed    for
    correctness.”); State v. Phillips, 
    577 N.W.2d 794
    , 800 (Wis.
    1998)   (rejecting        proposition      that   the    standard      of   appellate
    review “turn[s] on whether the underlying determination of the
    [trial] court was fact-specific”); see also Weisler, 35 A.3d at
    16
    976, 980 (collecting cases).
    ¶29          The analyses of those courts would support de novo
    review of rulings on whether an arrestee’s consent to search was
    voluntary or involuntary, at least when, as here, the underlying
    facts are undisputed and the trial court’s ruling is not based
    on    conflicting    evidence    or    credibility      determinations.        This
    Court has not yet engaged in the type of nuanced explication
    found in cases such as Weisler on the appropriate standard of
    appellate    review    for    Fourth    Amendment     voluntariness     rulings.
    This, however, is not the case in which we should do so.                           The
    parties have not raised or argued any issues relating to the
    standard of review, but rather concede that abuse-of-discretion
    review applies.        Accordingly, the Court appropriately applies
    that standard in deciding this particular case.
    ¶30          Stating   that     voluntariness      determinations      are    fact-
    intensive inquiries, based on the totality of circumstances, and
    subject     to     abuse-of-discretion        review,     however,     does        not
    directly answer the ultimate question:                   What is the test or
    standard     for    establishing       valid,      voluntary    consent       to     a
    warrantless search under the Fourth Amendment?                 Generally, to be
    voluntary,       “[c]onsent   must     ‘not   be   coerced,    by    explicit       or
    implicit means, by implied threat or covert force.’”                    State v.
    Guillen, 
    223 Ariz. 314
    , 317 ¶ 11, 
    223 P.3d 658
    , 661 (2010)
    (quoting Schneckloth, 
    412 U.S. at 228
    ).                 “Consent to search is
    17
    voluntary     if    it    is   ‘the    product     of     an     essentially      free      and
    unconstrained        choice     by    its   maker,’        and      not    the   result      of
    circumstances        which     overbear     the    consenting         party’s     will      and
    critically impair his or her capacity for self-determination.”
    People   v.    Magallanes-Aragon,           
    948 P.2d 528
    ,      530    (Colo.    1997)
    (quoting Schneckloth, 
    412 U.S. at 225
    ).                             Stated differently,
    “before a court may conclude that consent was voluntarily given,
    it    must    find       no    objective        evidence       of    coercion,     duress,
    deception, promises, threats, intrusive conduct or other undue
    influence      by     the      police,      which       critically          impaired        the
    defendant’s judgment.”               Id. at 531; see also id. at 533 (“The
    essential      consideration          in    determining          voluntariness         of     a
    consent to search is the impact of overbearing, coercive, or
    deceptive     police      conduct     on    a    person    with      the    knowledge       and
    particular characteristics of the defendant.”).
    ¶31           Applying those standards, only with some difficulty do
    I agree with the majority that the juvenile court did not abuse
    its discretion in finding Tyler’s consent was involuntary.                                  Cf.
    Chapple, 
    135 Ariz. at
    297 n.18, 
    660 P.2d at
    1224 n.18 (When
    trial court determinations hinge not on “conflicting procedural,
    factual or equitable considerations,” but rather are made on
    undisputed facts, “resolution of the question is one of law or
    logic,” obligating us “to ‘look over the shoulder’ of the trial
    judge and, if appropriate, substitute our judgment for his or
    18
    hers.”).     But based on the uncontroverted facts in this case,
    were de novo review applicable here, I would readily conclude
    that the State met its burden of proving by a preponderance of
    the evidence that Tyler’s consent to the warrantless blood draw
    was     voluntary        and,   therefore,        complied         with     the     Fourth
    Amendment.       See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 16.2(b) (prescribing burden
    and     standard     of    proof      on    whether     evidence           was    lawfully
    obtained).
    ¶32          The    majority       appropriately      recites          certain   facts    to
    support the conclusion that the juvenile court did not abuse its
    discretion in finding Tyler’s consent involuntary.                             Supra ¶¶ 2–
    4, 20.      The totality of the circumstances, however, includes
    other    undisputed        facts     indicating       that     Tyler’s         verbal    and
    written consent to the blood draw was indeed voluntary and not
    obtained    by     any    “overbearing,       coercive,       or       deceptive    police
    conduct.”          Magallanes-Aragon,           948   P.2d        at    533.       Without
    belaboring    all    those      facts,     suffice     it    to    say    that     had   the
    juvenile court found Tyler’s consent voluntary, I would have had
    no difficulty affirming that ruling, and I doubt my colleagues
    would have either.          But, as noted above, I cannot conclude under
    an    abuse-of-discretion          standard     of    review       that    the    juvenile
    court erred and, therefore, join in the Court’s opinion.
    ¶33          In addition, In re Andre M., on which the juvenile
    court relied, is materially distinguishable.                           Unlike this case,
    19
    In re Andre M. involved issues of voluntariness under the Fifth
    Amendment’s self-incrimination clause and was heavily influenced
    by    “the   absence       of   a   parent         who     attempted     to    attend     the
    [minor’s] interrogation but was prevented from doing so by the
    police officers.”           
    207 Ariz. 482
    , 485 ¶ 12, 
    88 P.3d 552
    , 555
    (2004).      Here, Tyler and his father (who had been contacted by
    the school, came there, and waited in the lobby) never asked to
    see or speak with each other, and the deputy was not informed
    until after the blood draw that a parent was present at the
    school.      Once he learned of that, the deputy spoke with the
    parents, who understood the reasons for Tyler’s arrest and had
    no questions.
    ¶34          It is also clear from its ruling that the juvenile
    court   deemed      very    significant            the   alleged     violation       of   the
    Parents’ Bill of Rights, A.R.S. § 1-602.                      The majority, however,
    correctly     rejects      that     as   an    appropriate         basis      for   ordering
    suppression.        Supra ¶ 22.
    ¶35          Finally,      I    understand          that    Fourth     Amendment      issues
    usually,      and      necessarily,           entail         “case-by-case,”          “fact-
    intensive, totality of the circumstances analyses.”                            Missouri v.
    McNeely, 
    133 S. Ct. 1552
    , 1564 (2013).                       But a core objective of
    our   criminal-case        jurisprudence            should    be   “to     ‘guide     future
    decisions’ as well as to ‘guide police, unify precedent, and
    stabilize the law.’”            Weisler, 35 A.3d at 979 (quoting Thompson,
    20
    
    516 U.S. at
    114–15).            In that regard, I have concerns similar to
    those recently expressed by Chief Justice Roberts in McNeely:
    “A police officer reading this Court’s opinion would have no
    idea — no idea — what the Fourth Amendment requires of him, once
    he decides to obtain a blood sample from,” in this case, a
    juvenile DUI arrestee to ensure that the juvenile’s consent to a
    blood draw is voluntary.                 
    133 S. Ct. at 1569
     (Roberts, C.J.,
    concurring in part and dissenting in part).                         The majority here
    says that “[i]f the arrestee is a juvenile, the youth’s age and
    a     parent’s    presence        are     relevant,       though     not   necessarily
    determinative, factors that courts should consider in assessing
    whether     consent       was     voluntary       under       the   totality      of    the
    circumstances.”       Supra ¶ 18.           The Court also refers generally to
    juveniles’       relative       immaturity,       and     specifically      to     Tyler’s
    interactions       with     the    deputy       and     his   fluctuating        emotional
    states during the arrest.               Supra ¶¶ 14, 20.
    ¶36          But faced with the not uncommon scenario presented in
    this case, a reasonable officer, before drawing blood pursuant
    to    the   juvenile’s      ostensibly         valid    consent,     surely      will   now
    wonder whether he or she must first take steps to have a parent
    notified and present, and inquire about the juvenile’s maturity,
    general     comprehension         levels,      and    emotional     status,      lest    the
    juvenile’s       consent        later     be     deemed       involuntary.             Those
    individualized, unpredictable variables afford little guidance
    21
    and     certainty      to    law        enforcement      officers,       school
    administrators, parents, minor drivers, or juvenile courts.                Nor
    does such unpredictability advance the overarching purpose of
    the implied consent law — “to remove from the highways of this
    state drivers[, including juvenile motorists,] who are a menace
    to themselves and to others because they operate a motor vehicle
    while   under   the   influence    of    intoxicating    liquor”   or    drugs.
    Campbell v. Superior Court, 
    106 Ariz. 542
    , 546, 
    479 P.2d 685
    ,
    689 (1971); see also Carrillo, 224 Ariz. at 465 ¶ 13, 
    232 P.3d at 1247
    ; cf. State v. Randy J., 
    265 P.3d 734
    , 742 (N.M. Ct. App.
    2011) (holding that state’s implied consent law applies to any
    person, including juveniles, who drives a vehicle in the state).
    ¶37        Possibly    compounding      the   problem,   our   opinion    today
    might well engender dubious involuntariness claims and related
    suppression hearings aimed at excluding evidence derived from
    chemical testing of impaired drivers whose express consent was
    ostensibly voluntary and valid under Arizona’s implied consent
    law.    Such challenges can be made by defendants who, because
    they submitted to testing, retain their driving privileges in
    the interim.     Audio or video recording of a suspect’s consent
    might be a solution.        But in view of the various contingencies
    and uncertainties surrounding determinations by officers in the
    field (and subsequently by courts) on whether express consent of
    DUI arrestees (particularly juveniles) is voluntary, the safest
    22
    course of action for law enforcement might simply be to obtain
    search warrants, when reasonably feasible, for obtaining blood
    samples in DUI investigations.             See A.R.S. §§ 13-3914, -3915,
    28-1321(D)(1).       That    default       approach,   although   arguably
    diluting the effectiveness of the implied consent law, and not
    constitutionally required under McNeely (which neither involved
    nor   discounted   consent   as   a   valid    exception   to   the   Fourth
    Amendment’s warrant requirement), would certainly comport with
    the Fourth Amendment and alleviate many potential, foreseeable
    problems in this area.
    __________________________________
    John Pelander, Justice
    23