Jill Kennedy v. Joseph Lodge , 230 Ariz. 548 ( 2012 )


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  •                      SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA
    In Division
    JILL KENNEDY, an individual and     )   Arizona Supreme Court
    qualified elector,                  )   No. CV-12-0277-AP/EL
    )
    Plaintiff/Appellant,    )   Coconino County
    )   Superior Court
    v.                  )   No. CV2012-00508
    )
    JOSEPH LODGE, an individual,        )
    Real Parties in Interest, THE       )
    HONORABLE CARL TAYLOR, MATT RYAN,   )   O P I N I O N
    ELIZABETH ARCHULETA, LENA           )
    FOWLER, AND MANDY METZGER, THE      )
    DULY ELECTED OR APPOINTED           )
    MEMBERS OF THE COCONINO COUNTY      )
    BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, WHO ARE       )
    NAMED SOLELY IN THEIR OFFICIAL      )
    CAPACITY; WENDY ESCOFFIER, CLERK    )
    OF THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, WHO    )
    IS NAMED SOLELY IN HER OFFICIAL     )
    CAPACITY; THE COCONINO COUNTY       )
    BOARD OF SUPERVISORS; THE           )
    HONORABLE CANDACE D. OWENS, THE     )
    DULY ELECTED COCONINO COUNTY        )
    RECORDER, WHO IS NAMED SOLELY IN    )
    HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY, AND THE      )
    HONORABLE PATTY HANSEN, THE DULY    )
    APPOINTED COCONINO COUNTY           )
    ELECTION ADMINISTRATOR, WHO IS      )
    SOLELY NAMED IN HER OFFICIAL        )
    CAPACITY,                           )
    )
    Defendants/Appellees.   )
    _________________________________   )
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Coconino County
    The Honorable David L. Mackey, Judge
    REVERSED
    ________________________________________________________________
    WILLIAMS, ZINMAN, & PARHAM, P.C.                               Scottsdale
    By   Scott E. Williams
    Mark B. Zinman
    Melissa A. Parham
    Michael A. Parham
    Attorneys for Jill Kennedy
    COPPERSMITH, SCHERMER, & BROCKELMAN, P.L.C.                       Phoenix
    By   Andrew S. Gordon
    Roopali H. Desai
    Attorneys for Joseph Lodge
    DAVID W. ROZEMA, COCONINO COUNTY ATTORNEY                       Flagstaff
    By   Jean E. Wilcox, Deputy County Attorney
    Attorneys for Carl Taylor, Matt Ryan,
    Elizabeth Archuleta, Lena Fowler, Mandy Metzger,
    Wendy Escoffier, Candace Owens, and Patty Hansen
    WILLIAM G. MONTGOMERY, MARICOPA COUNTY ATTORNEY          Phoenix
    By   M. Colleen Connor, Deputy County Attorney
    Bruce P. White, Deputy County Attorney
    Attorneys for Amici Curiae
    Helen Purcell and Karen Osborne
    ________________________________________________________________
    B E R C H, Chief Justice
    ¶1         On August 21, 2012, we issued an order reversing the
    superior   court’s    ruling   and    disqualifying   Joseph   Lodge   from
    participating as a Libertarian Party write-in candidate for the
    August 28, 2012, primary election.           We further ordered that his
    name not be placed on the official ballot for the 2012 general
    election for the office of Coconino County Superior Court Judge,
    Division Five.   This opinion explains our Order.
    I.    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2         Joseph Lodge is the incumbent judge of Division Five
    of the Superior Court in Coconino County who seeks election to a
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    new term in that office.           In an earlier opinion, we held that
    Lodge’s omission of the superior court division number from his
    nominating      petitions    rendered      all    of    his    petitions      for     the
    primary election fatally defective.               Kennedy v. Lodge (Lodge I),
    
    230 Ariz. 134
    , 137 ¶ 16, 
    281 P.3d 488
    , 491 (2012).                        Accordingly,
    Lodge was ineligible for the 2012 Democratic primary election.
    Id. at 135 ¶ 5, 137 ¶ 16, 281 P.3d at 489, 491; see also A.R.S.
    § 16-333 (2006).
    ¶3             Lodge then sought to run as a write-in candidate in
    the     Libertarian     Party    primary     election.             Jill    Kennedy,     a
    qualified       elector,    challenged       Lodge’s          write-in      candidacy,
    arguing that A.R.S. § 16-312(F)(3) (Supp. 2011) bars Lodge from
    running    as    a   write-in    candidate       because      he   filed    nomination
    petitions, but failed to secure enough valid signatures to run
    in the Democratic primary.          Kennedy also asserts that the trial
    court     in    Lodge   I   implicitly      held       the    individual      petition
    signatures to be invalid, therefore barring Lodge from asserting
    their validity here under the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
    ¶4             Distinguishing     invalid        nominating         petitions       from
    invalidation of the individual signatures on those petitions,
    the superior court ruled that the invalidated petitions did not
    trigger     application     of    A.R.S.     §    16-312(F)(3).            The   court
    reasoned that the invalidity of the petitions did not imply a
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    “fail[ure]     to   provide   a    sufficient          number    of     valid   petition
    signatures” so as to disqualify Lodge’s write-in candidacy.
    ¶5            Kennedy timely appealed.                 We have jurisdiction over
    this   expedited     appeal   pursuant           to   A.R.S.    §     16-351(A)   (Supp.
    2011).        See   also   ARCAP       8.1       (setting     forth     procedures    for
    expedited election appeals).
    II.          DISCUSSION
    ¶6            The   outcome       of        this      case     turns     on     statutory
    interpretation, an issue of law that we review de novo.                             Duncan
    v. Scottsdale Med. Imaging, Ltd., 
    205 Ariz. 306
    , 308 ¶ 2, 
    70 P.3d 435
    , 437 (2003).          Section 16-312(F), A.R.S., bars persons
    from     running     as     write-in          candidates        in      four    specific
    circumstances.       At issue in this case is § 16-312(F)(3), which
    applies to candidates who have “filed a nomination petition for
    the current primary election for the office sought and failed to
    provide   a    sufficient     number        of     valid     petition    signatures    as
    prescribed by § 16-322.”               Thus, we must determine whether this
    statutory     bar   applies    to       a    candidate        whose     petitions    were
    invalid in their entirety for failure to substantially comply
    with the statutory requirements.1
    1
    Lodge had timely filed 99 petitions containing 1,110
    signatures in total, but all of the petitions were invalidated
    in Lodge I, 230 Ariz. at 135 ¶ 3, 137 ¶ 16, 281 P.3d at 489,
    491. Our decision here does not rest on whether the number of
    signatures would otherwise have been sufficient.
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    ¶7           Lodge     urges      this    Court     to   distinguish         between
    defective     petitions     and     petitions      containing    an    inadequate
    number   of     signatures      after      all     challenges    to    individual
    signatures have been resolved.              He asserts that § 16-312(F)(3)
    applies only in the latter situation, construing the phrase “as
    prescribed     by     § 16-322”      as     limiting     subsection         (F)(3)’s
    preceding language.
    ¶8           We disagree.       Section 16-322 merely sets forth methods
    for calculating the number of signatures required on nomination
    petitions     for    various   elected      offices.     Contrary      to   Lodge’s
    suggestion, § 16-322 does not provide any method for determining
    the validity of signatures and does not form an independent
    legal basis for disqualifying candidates or signatures.
    ¶9           Lodge also reasons that signatures may still be valid
    for purposes of § 16-312(F)(3) even though the petition forms
    containing     the    signatures     were    defective.2        This   Court     has
    previously     observed,       however,     that    signatures    on    defective
    petitions are themselves invalid.                 Moreno v. Jones, 
    213 Ariz. 2
    Lodge argues that Kennedy stipulated during the evidentiary
    hearing in Lodge I that Lodge had enough valid signatures. The
    record, however, clearly reflects that Kennedy intended only to
    waive    previously  asserted   challenges   to  the   individual
    signatures themselves.      The Lodge I trial court correctly
    determined that Kennedy conceded that if all the petitions were
    valid, “Mr. Lodge still had sufficient potentially valid
    signatures.” (Emphasis added.)         But Kennedy consistently
    maintained that all signatures were invalid because the
    petitions containing them were invalid.
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    94, 101 n.4 ¶ 39, 
    139 P.3d 612
    , 619 n.4 (2006); Brousseau v.
    Fitzgerald, 
    138 Ariz. 453
    , 456, 
    675 P.2d 713
    , 716 (1984).                                This
    principle applies even though the grounds for invalidation here
    differ from those in Brousseau and Moreno.
    ¶10            In Brousseau, we voided petitions that were falsely
    certified as having been circulated by individuals who had not
    collected the signatures.                  138 Ariz. at 454, 456, 675 P.2d at
    714, 716.       We held that signatures on such petitions “may not be
    considered       in    determining         the     sufficiency      of    the     number   of
    signatures to qualify for placement on the ballot.”                              Id. at 456,
    675 P.2d at 716.            Counting signatures on defective petitions, we
    noted,     was      inconsistent           with     the     goal    of     the     statutory
    requirements:             to      ensure    the     integrity       of    nominations       by
    guarding       against         misrepresentations           and     reducing       erroneous
    signatures.         Id.
    ¶11            The reasoning in            Brousseau       is especially persuasive
    where,    as     here,      the    face    of     the    petition   might       have   misled
    signers      regarding         the   office        for    which     the    candidate       was
    running.       As we noted in Lodge I, because Lodge failed to list
    “Division Five” on his petitions, signers could not know from
    the   face     of     the    petitions      for     which    office       he   was     seeking
    nomination.         230 Ariz. at 136 ¶ 12, 281 P.3d at 490.                       Therefore,
    the defects in Lodge’s petitions, although different from those
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    in    Brousseau,      are    no     less    fatal       to   the    validity          of     the
    signatures contained on the invalid petitions.
    ¶12          Other       election       statutes        support     this       conclusion.
    Section     16-321,      which      governs       the    validity       of     signatures,
    directs that signatures “shall not be counted” unless they are
    “on a sheet bearing the form prescribed by § 16-314.”                                  A.R.S.
    § 16-321(A)      (Supp.      2011).        “The    applicable       statutes          require
    superior    court     judicial       nominating         petitions       to    specifically
    designate the division number of the judicial office sought.”
    Lodge I, 230 Ariz. at 137 ¶ 16, 281 P.3d at 491.                                      Because
    Lodge’s    petitions        did   not    contain    that     required         information,
    they did not “substantially comply with statutory requirements.”
    Id. at 136 ¶ 12, 281 P.3d at 490.                  And “[a]ny petition filed by
    a candidate for [judicial office that] does not comply with the
    provisions of this chapter shall have no force or effect at any
    such election.”       A.R.S. § 16-333.
    ¶13          We hold that a candidate whose nominating petitions
    have “no force or effect,” id., “fail[s] to provide a sufficient
    number     of    valid      petition       signatures”        under          A.R.S.        § 16-
    312(F)(3).       Kennedy’s successful challenge to all of Lodge’s
    petitions       placed      Lodge     squarely      within        the    scope        of     the
    statutory bar in § 16-312(F)(3).
    ¶14          In view of this conclusion, we need not address the
    res judicata and collateral estoppel arguments Kennedy raised.
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    III.   CONCLUSION
    ¶15       For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of
    the superior court.   Appellee Joseph Lodge is disqualified from
    participating as a Libertarian Party write-in candidate for the
    office of Coconino County Superior Court Judge, Division Five,
    in the August 28, 2012, primary election.     The Coconino County
    Recorder and Elections Administrator shall not count any votes
    for him in the tally of ballots for that election.      Nor shall
    Joseph Lodge’s name be placed on the official ballot for the
    2012 general election for the office of Coconino County Superior
    Court Judge, Division Five.
    __________________________________
    Rebecca White Berch, Chief Justice
    CONCURRING:
    __________________________________
    A. John Pelander, Justice
    __________________________________
    Robert M. Brutinel, Justice
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Document Info

Docket Number: CV-12-0277-APE-EL

Citation Numbers: 230 Ariz. 548, 288 P.3d 108, 2012 Ariz. LEXIS 234

Judges: Berch, Pelander, Brutinel

Filed Date: 11/15/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/2/2024