State of Arizona v. James Clayton Johnson ( 2019 )


Menu:
  •                                   IN THE
    SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA
    STATE OF ARIZONA,
    Appellee,
    v.
    JAMES CLAYTON JOHNSON,
    Appellant.
    No. CR-16-0261-AP
    Filed August 13, 2019
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    The Honorable M. Scott McCoy, Judge
    No. CR2010-048824-001
    AFFIRMED
    COUNSEL:
    Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General, O.H. Skinner, Solicitor General,
    Lacey Stover Gard, Chief Counsel, Capital Litigation Section, Tucson,
    Jeffrey L. Sparks (argued), Ginger Jarvis, Assistant Attorneys General,
    Phoenix, Attorneys for State of Arizona
    James J. Haas, Maricopa County Public Defender, Mikel Steinfeld (argued),
    Rena P. Glitsos, Kevin Heade, Deputy Public Defenders, Law Office of the
    Public Defender, Phoenix, Attorneys for James Clayton Johnson
    CHIEF JUSTICE BRUTINEL authored the opinion of the Court, in which
    VICE CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER and JUSTICES BOLICK, GOULD, LOPEZ,
    BALES (RETIRED), and JUDGE MCMURDIE ∗ joined.
    ∗Pursuant to article 6, section 3 of the Arizona Constitution, the Honorable
    Paul J. McMurdie, Judge of the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One,
    was designated to sit in this matter.
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    CHIEF JUSTICE BRUTINEL, opinion of the Court:
    ¶1            This automatic appeal arises from James Clayton Johnson’s
    convictions and death sentence for the murder of Xiaohung Fu. We have
    jurisdiction under article 6, section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution and
    A.R.S. §§ 13-4031 and 13-4033(A)(1).
    ¶2           In December 2010, Johnson entered Taiwan Massage. Inside,
    he encountered its owner, Fu. A struggle ensued, in which Johnson bound
    and repeatedly stabbed Fu, killing her.
    ¶3            Next door, Marvin Pearce and Terry Weathers heard the
    commotion. Weathers rushed to check on Fu. When he entered Taiwan
    Massage, he found the front entrance in disarray. Weathers shouted “hello”
    but got no response. After a moment, Johnson exited the bathroom at the
    end of the hall, drying his hands. Weathers asked where Fu was, and
    Johnson replied she had cut herself and left in an ambulance. Weathers
    then rushed next door to tell Pearce what he witnessed and called for help.
    Weathers and Pearce then watched as Johnson got into his truck and sped
    away. When officers arrived on the scene, they found Fu dead. Fu had
    been stabbed several times, including one laceration down her back that
    penetrated through her lung and a near four-inch cut into her neck. She
    also suffered superficial cuts across her stomach.
    ¶4             Johnson fled to his girlfriend’s apartment where he washed
    his clothes and truck. Three days later, Johnson robbed a Christmas tree lot
    and was arrested. (Johnson pleaded guilty to armed robbery on December
    21, 2010.) Based on similarities between the two crimes, police linked
    Johnson to the Taiwan Massage killing. Cell phone tower data and DNA
    evidence substantiated Johnson’s involvement. The State charged Johnson
    with one count each of first degree murder, kidnapping, and burglary in
    the first degree.
    ¶5            The State noticed its intent to seek the death penalty, alleging
    the following aggravating circumstances: (1) Johnson was previously
    convicted of a serious offense, A.R.S. § 13-751(F)(2); (2) Johnson committed
    the offense for pecuniary gain, § 13-751(F)(5); (3) Johnson committed the
    offense in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner, § 13-751(F)(6);
    and (4) Johnson committed the offense while on release, § 13-751(F)(7)(a),
    and while on probation for a felony, § 13-751(F)(7)(b).
    2
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    ¶6            After trial, the jury found Johnson guilty on all counts and
    found that the State had proved the (F)(2), (F)(6), and (F)(7)(a) and (b)
    aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. After considering
    mitigation evidence, the jury found that Johnson’s proffered mitigation was
    not sufficiently substantial to call for leniency and sentenced Johnson to
    death.
    DISCUSSION
    A. The A.R.S. § 13-751 Sentencing Scheme
    ¶7            Johnson argues that Arizona has not complied with its
    constitutional obligation to legislatively narrow the class of first degree
    murders that are eligible for the death penalty. We review Johnson’s
    constitutional challenge de novo. See State v. Smith, 
    215 Ariz. 221
    , 228 ¶ 20
    (2007).
    ¶8            In 2013, Johnson joined in litigation challenging Arizona’s
    death penalty for failing to sufficiently narrow the class of first degree
    murders eligible for a capital sentence. As part of the challenge, the
    defendants requested but were denied an evidentiary hearing. The trial
    court denied the defendants’ consolidated challenge to the constitutionality
    of Arizona’s death penalty statutes. That litigation eventually led to our
    decision in State v. Hidalgo (Hidalgo I), 
    241 Ariz. 543
    , 549–52 ¶¶ 14–29 (2017).
    There, we observed that United States Supreme Court case law undermined
    the defendants’ position, 
    id. at 550
    ¶ 19, and affirmed the constitutionality
    of Arizona’s sentencing scheme, 
    id. at 550
    –52 ¶¶ 19–29. For the same
    reasons we expressed in Hidalgo I, we reject Johnson’s argument here.
    ¶9             Johnson next argues the court erred when it failed to hold the
    requested evidentiary hearing to allow defendants to support their
    challenge. Johnson further contends that the failure to hold an evidentiary
    hearing resulted in an incomplete record likely to preclude Supreme Court
    review. See Hidalgo v. Arizona (Hidalgo II), 
    138 S. Ct. 1054
    , 1057 (2018) (mem.)
    (Breyer, J., respecting the denial of certiorari). We review the denial of an
    evidentiary hearing for an abuse of discretion. See Hidalgo 
    I, 241 Ariz. at 548
    ¶ 7.
    ¶10          As we noted in Hidalgo I, neither Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 
    542 U.S. 507
    (2004), nor Mathews v. Eldridge, 
    424 U.S. 319
    (1976) requires an
    evidentiary 
    hearing. 241 Ariz. at 548
    –49 ¶¶ 10–13. And though Johnson
    3
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    points to Justice Breyer’s statement respecting the denial of certiorari in
    Hidalgo II, Justice Breyer neither implied that the Constitution requires an
    evidentiary hearing in that case nor explained why an expanded record
    would provide a more compelling basis for granting review than the
    explicit finding that the defendant’s factual claims were true. See Hidalgo 
    II, 138 S. Ct. at 1057
    (stating that the “opportunity to develop the record
    through an evidentiary hearing was denied” and, “[a]s a result,” the record
    was undeveloped).
    ¶11            Further, though Johnson argues that denying remand and an
    evidentiary hearing will condemn a future petition for writ of certiorari to
    the United States Supreme Court to the same fate as Hidalgo’s, he can
    include the deprivation of the hearing as a basis for review where Hidalgo
    chose not to. And to the extent Johnson argues that Hidalgo was unable to
    adequately present the issue to the Supreme Court, his argument ignores
    that Hidalgo was allowed to supplement the record on appeal with an
    expanded study of first degree murder cases in Arizona, which found that
    one or more aggravating circumstances were present in 856 of 866 murders.
    See Hidalgo 
    I, 241 Ariz. at 549
    ¶ 17. The trial court’s denial of the evidentiary
    hearing was not an abuse of discretion. See 
    id. ¶ 13.
    ¶12            Separately, Johnson claims the trial court’s rulings violated
    his right to effective assistance of counsel because his counsel’s ability to
    challenge the death penalty was impeded by the denial of the hearing. See
    Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 686 (1984) (providing that the right to
    counsel includes the right to effective assistance of counsel). But counsel is
    not ineffective where he requested, and the court denied, the exact hearing
    Johnson complains was required.
    ¶13            Lastly, Johnson argues that Hidalgo I did not address whether
    Arizona’s constitution provides broader protections or requires an
    evidentiary hearing. But Johnson fails to develop the argument or offer any
    legal support as to why the Arizona Constitution would mandate a
    different result than that required by the Constitution of the United States.
    We thus decline to consider it. See State v. Bolton, 
    182 Ariz. 290
    , 298 (1995)
    (stating that an argument not sufficiently developed on appeal is waived).
    4
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    B. The A.R.S. § 13-751(F)(6) Aggravator
    i. Unconstitutionality of the (F)(6) aggravator
    ¶14           Johnson argues that the (F)(6) especially cruel, heinous, or
    depraved aggravator is unconstitutionally vague and that the narrowing
    instructions were inaccurate and insufficient. We review de novo both the
    constitutional challenge, see Hidalgo 
    I, 241 Ariz. at 548
    ¶ 7, and whether the
    jury instructions correctly stated the law, see State v. Burbey, 
    243 Ariz. 145
    ,
    146 ¶ 5 (2017).
    ¶15           During the trial, the court instructed the jury as follows:
    Definition of especially heinous, cruel, or depraved.
    Concerning this aggravating circumstance, all first degree
    murders are to some extent heinous, cruel, or depraved.
    However, this aggravating circumstance cannot be found to
    exist unless the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt
    that the murder was especially cruel, especially heinous, or
    especially depraved.
    “Especially” means unusually great or significant. The terms
    “especially cruel,” or “especially heinous or depraved” are
    considered separately. Therefore the presence of any one
    circumstance is sufficient to establish this aggravating
    circumstance. However, to find that this aggravating
    circumstance is proven, you must find that the [sic] especially
    cruel has been proven unanimously beyond a reasonable
    doubt or that . . . especially heinous or depraved has been
    proven unanimously beyond a reasonable doubt.
    “Especially cruel.” The term “cruel” focuses on the victim’s
    pain and suffering. If you find the murder was committed in
    an especially cruel manner, you must find that the victim
    consciously suffered physical or mental pain, distress, or
    anguish prior to death. The defendant must know or should
    have known that the victim would suffer.
    “Especially heinous or depraved.” The term “especially
    heinous or depraved” focuses . . . upon the defendant’s state
    5
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    of mind at the time of the offense as reflected by the
    defendant’s words and acts. A murder is especially heinous
    if it is hatefully or shockingly evil. In other words, grossly
    bad. A murder is especially depraved if it is marked by
    de[b]a[s]ement, corruption, perversion, or deterioration.
    ¶16           The court then instructed on the State v. Gretzler factors of
    gratuitous violence, helplessness, and senselessness, stating:
    To determine whether a murder was especially heinous or
    depraved, you must find that the State proved beyond a
    reasonable doubt that the defendant exhibited such a mental
    state at the time of killing by inflicting gratuitous violence on
    the victim beyond that necessary to kill. To find that the
    defendant inflicted gratuitous violence you must find the
    defendant intentionally inflicted violence clearly beyond
    what was necessary to kill the victim and that the defendant
    continued to inflict this violence after the defendant knew or
    should have known that the defendant had inflicted a fatal
    injury.
    To assist you in determining whether the murder is heinous
    or depraved, you may consider the helplessness of the victim
    and the senselessness of the murder. Helplessness means that
    the victim is unable to resist. All murders are senseless
    because of their brutality and finality, yet not all are senseless
    as the term is used to distinguish those first degree murders
    that warrant a death sentence from those that do not. Rather
    a senseless murder is one that is unnecessary to achieve the
    defendant’s objective.
    A finding of helplessness and/or senseless[ness] alone or
    together is not sufficient to prove that a first degree murder
    was heinous or depraved. A first degree murder is not
    heinous or depraved unless you also unanimously find that
    the defendant inflicted gratuitous violence on the victim
    beyond that necessary to kill.
    See 
    135 Ariz. 42
    , 51–53 (1983).
    6
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    ¶17           First, Johnson argues that the (F)(6) “especially cruel”
    aggravator violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
    States Constitution because it does not adequately limit the jury’s discretion
    when deciding whether to impose the death penalty. See Walton v. Arizona,
    
    497 U.S. 639
    , 652–53 (1990), overruled on other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 
    536 U.S. 584
    (2002). We have repeatedly rejected this argument in light of
    further narrowing instructions, as were provided here. See, e.g., State v.
    Champagne, No. CR-17-0425-AP, 
    2019 WL 3676317
    , at *15 ¶¶ 75–76 (Ariz.
    Aug. 7, 2019).
    ¶18           Johnson next argues the trial court’s narrowing instructions
    failed to provide sufficient guidance on whether Johnson’s murder
    exceeded the norm of first degree murders. But again, we have repeatedly
    upheld jury instructions like those given here. See, e.g., State v. Chappell, 
    225 Ariz. 229
    , 237 ¶ 27 & n.6 (2010).
    ¶19           Nevertheless, Johnson argues that while the Walton Court
    affirmed Arizona’s capital sentencing scheme on the basis that the court—
    familiar with comparable first degree murder cases—determined whether
    the crime was “especially heinous, cruel or 
    depraved,” 497 U.S. at 652
    –56,
    the jury has no such contextual knowledge, and thus Walton’s justification
    no longer applies. Johnson further argues, citing State v. Mata (Mata II), 
    185 Ariz. 319
    , 324 (1996), that it is impossible to craft a formulaic set of
    narrowing instructions that can sufficiently guide the jury without
    comparative review. But we have previously rejected such challenges
    when the court provides further narrowing instructions based on Gretzler
    and State v. Knapp, 
    114 Ariz. 531
    , 543 (1977) (providing narrowing
    definitions for “heinous,” “cruel,” and “depraved”), see State v. (Ruben M.)
    Johnson, 
    212 Ariz. 425
    , 431–32 ¶¶ 19–22 (2006) (approving narrowing
    instructions and disavowing comparative review), and Johnson provides
    no persuasive reason for us to revisit those decisions here. See also Smith v.
    Ryan, 
    823 F.3d 1270
    , 1293–95 (9th Cir. 2016) (approving the narrowing
    construction employed in Gretzler).
    ¶20            Lastly, Johnson argues the “gratuitous violence” instruction
    incorrectly focused the jury’s attention on the physical violence rather than
    Johnson’s mental state. But the instruction specifically required the jury to
    find that Johnson “exhibited such a mental state” and “intentionally”
    inflicted gratuitous violence, thereby focusing the jury on Johnson’s mental
    state and intentions at the time he committed the crime. See State v.
    7
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    Bocharski, 
    218 Ariz. 476
    , 494 ¶ 87 (2008) (requiring the state to “show that
    the defendant continued to inflict violence after he knew or should have known
    that a fatal action had occurred,” because “[a] showing that a defendant
    continued to inflict violence after he knew or should have known that a
    fatal action had occurred provides essential evidence of the defendant’s
    intent to inflict gratuitous violence”).
    ¶21           The instructions, when viewed as a whole, required that to
    find the aggravator, the crime must be “unusually great or significant,”
    “especially cruel,” or “hatefully or shockingly evil,” and therefore correctly
    informed the jury that the crime must be above and beyond the normal first
    degree murder. These instructions sufficiently narrowed the (F)(6)
    aggravator. See State v. Prince, 
    226 Ariz. 516
    , 532 ¶ 51 (2011) (upholding jury
    instructions from vagueness challenge).
    ii. Arguing the (F)(6) aggravator during closing
    ¶22          Johnson next argues the trial court improperly prevented him
    from arguing during closing that the State failed to meet its burden in
    showing the murder was committed in an especially cruel, heinous, or
    depraved manner. We review the trial court’s ruling on the scope of closing
    argument for an abuse of discretion. State v. Pandeli, 
    215 Ariz. 514
    , 525 ¶ 30
    (2007).
    ¶23           During closing, Johnson reiterated the burden of proof
    required to prove the murder was “especially” cruel, heinous, or depraved,
    and rhetorically asked whether his crime was “unusually great or
    significant” where the jury had “nothing . . . to compare it to.” The State
    immediately objected.
    ¶24           Counsel is given wide latitude in closing argument to
    “comment on the evidence and argue all reasonable inferences therefrom.”
    State v. Zaragoza, 
    135 Ariz. 63
    , 68 (1983). “Counsel may not, however,
    comment on matters which were not introduced in evidence” or “call
    matters to the attention of the jury that the jury could not properly
    consider.” 
    Id. Just as
    we have denied the consideration of proportional
    review in jury instructions, supra ¶¶ 20–21, we decline to allow closing
    arguments suggesting comparative review. See State v. Bible, 
    175 Ariz. 549
    ,
    602 (1993) (limiting closing argument to the evidence presented at trial);
    State v. Greenway, 
    170 Ariz. 155
    , 171 (1991) (“The trial court’s consideration
    8
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    of other similarly situated defendants is inapposite to this defendant’s
    ‘character or record’, and does not show any of the circumstances
    surrounding this defendant’s ‘offense’ that would call for a sentence less
    than death.”).
    ¶25           Thus, Johnson could not argue that his crime was not cruel,
    heinous, or depraved by comparing it to other murders, nor could he argue
    that the State did not meet its burden by failing to introduce evidence of
    similarly situated defendants. He was allowed, however, to argue from the
    evidence that his crime was not especially cruel, heinous, or depraved; and
    he was free to point to jury instructions and elaborate upon them, based on
    the evidence in the record, which he did here. See 
    Prince, 226 Ariz. at 532
    ¶ 51 (allowing defendants to rely on “norm of first-degree murder”
    instruction and argue it during closing).
    iii. Sufficiency of (F)(6) evidence
    ¶26           Last, Johnson argues that there was insufficient evidence to
    support the (F)(6) aggravator. Although the (F)(6) aggravator is a single
    aggravating circumstance, it is written in the disjunctive, and thus we will
    uphold the (F)(6) finding so long as the murder was either especially cruel
    or especially heinous or depraved. See State v. Gunches, 
    225 Ariz. 22
    , 25 ¶ 15
    (2010). In reviewing Johnson’s claim, we “review[] the record to determine
    whether substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding, viewing the facts
    in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury verdict.” State v. Roque,
    
    213 Ariz. 193
    , 218 ¶ 93 (2006). “Substantial evidence is such proof that
    reasonable persons could accept as adequate and sufficient to support [the
    finding of the aggravator] beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
    Id. (internal quotation
    marks omitted) (citation omitted).
    ¶27           After deliberation, the jury unanimously found that the
    murder was especially cruel, inflicted gratuitous violence beyond that
    necessary to kill, was senseless, and that the victim was helpless.
    ¶28           The finding that the murder was especially cruel is supported
    by the record. “A murder is especially cruel if the victim consciously
    experiences physical abuse or mental anguish before death.” 
    Bolton, 182 Ariz. at 311
    . In addition to the fatal neck wound, which involved at least
    two cuts to Fu’s neck, Johnson inflicted a deep wound to her jaw, a gash to
    her ribs, and a long gash down her back that collapsed her lung. See State
    9
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    v. Boyston, 
    231 Ariz. 539
    , 555 ¶¶ 82–84 (2013) (stating the jury could
    conclude, based on the number of stab wounds, which included a 3.5-inch
    deep cut to the pericardium and heart, that the victim suffered physical
    pain and mental anguish while being stabbed to death and that the
    defendant knew or should have known that). Though Johnson argues the
    evidence did not establish that Fu was alive and conscious, Dr. Keen
    testified that Fu was likely alive during the attack: The angle of the back
    wound indicated Fu was standing, the evidence established that there was
    a struggle, and Fu suffered defensive hand wounds. See State v. McCray,
    
    218 Ariz. 252
    , 259 ¶¶ 31–33 (2008) (finding consciousness where the expert
    concluded, based on the nature of the victim’s injuries and condition of the
    apartment, that a struggle probably occurred).
    ¶29           Johnson next argues the murder was not especially cruel
    because there was no evidence that he inflicted pain and suffering in a
    wanton, insensitive, or vindictive manner. Johnson argues the infliction of
    pain “in a wanton, insensitive, or vindictive manner” focuses on the
    defendant’s state of mind and that there was no evidence that he committed
    the crime as revenge or to inflict harm, pain, or with no regard for the
    victim’s pain. Our caselaw defeats this argument. In State v. Stokley, we
    stated that “[c]ruelty focuses on the victim.” 
    182 Ariz. 505
    , 517 (1995)
    (contrasting that “[h]einousness and depravity” go to the “mental state and
    attitude” of the defendant “as reflected by his words or actions” (quoting
    State v. Brewer, 
    170 Ariz. 486
    , 502 (1992))). The evidence sufficiently
    supports the jury’s finding of cruelty.
    ¶30          The evidence also supports a finding that the murder was
    committed in an especially heinous or depraved manner. The state may
    prove the murder was especially heinous or depraved by establishing that
    the defendant inflicted gratuitous violence. 
    Gunches, 225 Ariz. at 25
    ¶ 15.
    A murder involves gratuitous violence when the defendant uses violence
    beyond that necessary to kill. See 
    Gretzler, 135 Ariz. at 52
    . To prove
    gratuitous violence, the state must first show that the defendant did “use
    violence beyond that necessary to kill.” 
    Bocharski, 218 Ariz. at 494
    ¶ 85.
    Second, the state must show “the defendant continued to inflict violence
    after he knew or should have known that a fatal action had occurred.” 
    Id. ¶ 87
    (emphasis removed). In addition to the multiple stab wounds, Johnson
    carved on the victim’s stomach. Based on the blood loss, Dr. Keen
    confirmed that the stomach carving likely occurred after the victim suffered
    the fatal neck wound, which itself likely required multiple cuts and
    10
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    penetrated four inches into Fu’s neck. Even if Johnson did not know that
    the neck wound was fatal, he should have.
    ¶31           Johnson argues that the instructions blurred the line between
    mutilation and gratuitous violence. Even if true, the manner of the murder
    and the stomach carving reflected mutilation. See State v. Vickers, 
    129 Ariz. 506
    , 515 (1981) (upholding the finding of depravity where the defendant
    carved “Bonzai” on the victim’s back after killing him). Either Fu was alive
    when Johnson carved into her stomach, establishing gratuitous violence, or
    she was already dead, resulting in mutilation. See State v. Bearup, 
    221 Ariz. 163
    , 173 ¶¶ 50–53 (2009) (upholding the finding of heinous or depraved
    where the defendant cut off the victim’s finger after beating the victim with
    an aluminum bat, reasoning that the removal of the finger constituted either
    gratuitous violence or mutilation).
    ¶32           Johnson does not challenge the jury’s finding that the murder
    was senseless and the victim helpless, but the evidence nonetheless
    supports those conclusions. 1 The evidence established that Fu was bound,
    and therefore helpless, and that her restraints prevented her from
    interfering with Johnson’s attempt to rob her or flee, indicating the murder
    was senseless. See State v. Ross, 
    180 Ariz. 598
    , 605 (1994) (“A murder is
    senseless when it is unnecessary to allow the defendant to complete his
    objective.”).
    C. The Lynch v. Arizona “Ineligible for Parole” Instruction
    ¶33            Johnson argues the court erred by initially failing to instruct
    the jury that he was ineligible for parole. Johnson further argues that,
    following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Lynch v. Arizona
    (Lynch II), 
    136 S. Ct. 1818
    (2016), the trial court erred by failing to declare a
    mistrial. We review jury instructions de novo “as a whole to ensure that
    the jury receives the information it needs to arrive at a legally correct
    decision.” 
    Prince, 226 Ariz. at 536
    ¶ 77 (quoting State ex rel. Thomas v.
    Granville, 
    211 Ariz. 468
    , 471 ¶ 8 (2005)). We review a trial court’s decision
    whether to grant a mistrial for an abuse of discretion. State v. Leteve, 
    237 Ariz. 516
    , 526 ¶ 33 (2015).
    1  Arizona law requires that we review the sentencing portion, including
    finding the aggravating factors, for reasonable evidence. See infra ¶¶ 192–
    93.
    11
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    ¶34            Before trial, Johnson requested a jury instruction that he was
    ineligible for parole, in accordance with Simmons v. South Carolina, 
    512 U.S. 154
    (1994). Under Simmons, when future dangerousness is placed at issue,
    the defendant has the right to a jury instruction that he is ineligible for
    parole if the only alternative to a death sentence is natural life. 
    Id. at 162,
    168–69. Relying on our decision in State v. Lynch (Lynch I), 
    238 Ariz. 84
    , 103
    ¶ 65 (2015), the trial court granted Johnson’s request to instruct the jury that
    parole was not currently available but declined his request to inform the
    jury that he was never eligible for parole since § 13-751(A) authorized
    release in the form of executive clemency. The court then instructed the
    jury that, among the sentences imposable if it found Johnson guilty, was “a
    life sentence with the possibility of parole after serving 25 years
    imprisonment.”
    ¶35            On the second day of the penalty phase, the United States
    Supreme Court issued Lynch II, reversed our decision in Lynch I, and held
    that the possibility of executive clemency did not justify refusing the parole-
    ineligible 
    instruction. 136 S. Ct. at 1819
    –20. Johnson moved for a mistrial.
    The State responded that future dangerousness was never placed at issue
    and that a curative instruction could be given regardless. The court denied
    Johnson’s motion.
    ¶36           After the penalty phase trial, the court instructed the jury as
    follows:
    Defendant ineligible for parole. A defendant sentenced to life
    without the possibility of release after [sic] 25 years must
    serve the entire 25 years before the defendant can apply for
    release. There is no automatic release after 25 years. Arizona
    law does not provide for parole. The only form of release for
    which defendant is eligible is executive clemency.
    ¶37           The trial court complied with Lynch II. It informed the jury
    that Johnson was ineligible for parole and that the only possibility for
    release was by executive clemency after he served at least twenty-five years.
    The jury thus “receive[d] the information it need[ed] to arrive at a legally
    correct decision.” 
    Prince, 226 Ariz. at 536
    ¶ 77.
    ¶38          Nevertheless, Johnson argues the post-Lynch II instruction
    could not cure the court’s original deficient instruction because the jury
    12
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    repeatedly heard during voir dire that Johnson was eligible for parole and
    the only way to ensure his right to a fair trial was to declare a mistrial.
    ¶39           But “[d]eclaring a mistrial is an unusual remedy for trial error
    and should not be resorted to unless justice requires such a result.” State v.
    White, 
    160 Ariz. 24
    , 33 (1989). The State neither raised nor argued future
    dangerousness. Johnson does not point to any evidence showing the jury
    was confused regarding the law, either before or after the curative
    instruction. And during closing, Johnson argued that the only alternative
    to a death sentence was life in prison; the State did not argue otherwise.
    ¶40           After the issuance of Lynch II, the trial court instructed the jury
    that Johnson was ineligible for parole and that “release” meant only
    executive clemency; we presume the jury followed those instructions. See
    State v. Dann, 
    205 Ariz. 557
    , 570 ¶ 46 (2003). The court did not abuse its
    discretion in denying Johnson’s motion for mistrial.
    D. The Significant Impairment Instruction
    ¶41            Johnson argues the court’s significant impairment instruction
    reflected the standard established by the guilty except insane (“GEI”)
    instruction and that it, therefore, imposed a higher burden than that
    required by the § 13-751(G)(1) mitigator. Because Johnson did not object at
    trial, we review his claim for fundamental error only. See State v. Velazquez,
    
    216 Ariz. 300
    , 309 ¶ 37 (2007). An error is fundamental if it goes to the
    foundation of the case, takes away from the defendant a right essential to
    his defense, or is of such magnitude that the defendant could not have
    possibly received a fair trial. State v. Escalante, 
    245 Ariz. 135
    , 142 ¶ 21 (2018).
    To prevail, a defendant must establish both that fundamental error
    occurred and that it caused him prejudice (though showing the former may
    establish the latter). 
    Id. at 140–41
    ¶¶ 13, 16 (stating that “an error of such a
    magnitude that a defendant could not possibly have received a fair trial is
    always prejudicial” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
    ¶42            Section 13-751(G)(1) provides mitigation when “[t]he
    defendant’s capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to
    conform his conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired,
    but not so impaired as to constitute a defense to prosecution.” During the
    trial, Johnson attempted to show that he was under the influence of Xanax
    13
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    and possibly cocaine at the time of the murder. The court instructed the
    jury as follows:
    Significant impairment. It is a mitigating circumstance that
    the defendant’s capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his
    conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law
    was significantly impaired but not so impaired as to
    constitute a defense to prosecution. The defendant has the
    burden of proving this mitigating circumstance by a
    preponderance of the evidence.
    “Significantly impaired” means that the defendant suffered
    from mental illness, personality disorder or substance abuse
    at or near the time of the offense that prevented the defendant
    from appreciating the wrongfulness of the conduct or
    conforming his conduct to the requirements of law.[2]
    ¶43           The State concedes that limiting the definition of
    “significantly impaired” to the defendant being prevented from appreciating
    the wrongfulness of the conduct was error, but argues the error is not
    prejudicial. The jury instructions specifically noted that the burden was not
    so high “as to constitute a defense to prosecution.” And the State did not
    argue that Johnson was required to prove the impairment fully prevented
    him from knowing the criminal act was wrong, but instead that he was not
    so high on Xanax that he was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his
    conduct. Indeed, the State argued that impairment only referred to an
    “impact [on] his ability to know right from wrong,” and it argued that the
    jury had heard how Johnson acted when he was actually impaired—
    slurring his speech, being unable to stay awake—but that on the day of the
    murder nobody described any such impairment. Instead, the evidence
    showed that Johnson took affirmative steps to conceal his role in the
    murder—Johnson falsely claimed that Fu had cut herself, reversed his truck
    when driving away to prevent his license plate from being seen, and went
    2  The Revised Arizona Jury Instructions (Criminal) now provide that
    significant impairment “substantially reduce[s] the defendant’s ability to
    appreciate the wrongfulness of the conduct . . . .” Rev. Ariz. Jury Instr.
    (Crim.)     Capital   Case    3.2,     at   620     (4th    ed.    2018),
    https://www.azbar.org/media/1904900/rajicriminal-4thed2018.pdf.
    14
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    to his girlfriend’s apartment to clean his truck and clothes—indicating that
    he knew his conduct was wrong.
    ¶44           Further, the court instructed the jury that it was “not limited
    to the mitigating circumstances offered by the defendant,” but must “also
    consider any other information that you find is relevant in determining
    whether to impose a life sentence so long as it relates to an aspect of the
    defendant’s background, character, propensities, history or record or
    circumstances of the offense.” Johnson presented a large mitigation case.
    He called several mitigation witnesses who testified that he was a student
    at Columbine during the infamous school shooting, about his history of
    substance abuse and a personality disorder, his family love and support,
    his adoption, and other struggles. Similarly, Johnson presented evidence
    of his behavior while on drugs. Yet, the jury heard and considered
    Johnson’s mitigation and found it lacking when compared to the three
    aggravating factors and the nature of the murder. Johnson was not
    prejudiced by the instruction.
    E. Prison Housing Conditions and Johnson’s Right to Trial
    ¶45            Johnson argues the court erred by allowing the State to
    introduce evidence of prison housing conditions and to comment on his
    exercise of the right to trial. We review the court’s rulings regarding the
    admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion. State v. Gill, 
    242 Ariz. 1
    , 3 ¶ 7 (2017). “An error of law committed in reaching a discretionary
    conclusion may, however, constitute an abuse of discretion.” State v. Wall,
    
    212 Ariz. 1
    , 3 ¶ 12 (2006).
    i. Prison housing conditions
    ¶46           Before trial, Johnson moved to admit his offers to plead guilty
    as mitigating evidence, per Busso-Estopellan v. Mroz, 
    238 Ariz. 553
    , 554–55
    ¶¶ 5–7 (2015). The State responded that it intended to rebut Johnson’s plea
    offers with evidence that the offers were conditioned on receiving a life
    sentence and that prisoners serving such sentences have better prison
    housing conditions than those on death row. While Johnson agreed that
    the State could rebut his plea offers by showing they were conditioned, he
    argued that the prison housing evidence was irrelevant because he was
    unaware of preferable prison housing conditions and the State had no
    evidence showing he offered to plead guilty to obtain them. The court
    15
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    granted Johnson’s motion to admit his plea offers, but deferred ruling on
    the scope of the State’s rebuttal until trial.
    ¶47            During trial, Johnson repeated his objection, filing a motion
    to preclude the evidence. The State countered that it did not “have to prove
    that this was the defendant’s sole motivation,” but that “this is a man who’s
    been to [the Department of Corrections] twice” and thus was “aware of
    classifications and movement systems and numbering.” The court denied
    Johnson’s motion.
    ¶48            At trial, Johnson introduced his conditioned plea offers. In
    rebuttal, the State presented the testimony of a Department of Corrections
    administrator, who explained the potential housing differences, based on
    custody levels, between an inmate serving a life sentence and one serving a
    death sentence. In her testimony, she described the “privileges” and
    “incentives” a life sentence inmate can receive as a result of potential lower
    custody levels.
    ¶49          At the close of mitigation, Johnson allocuted. He apologized
    for the murder, stated that he “would have pled guilty to this first-degree
    murder as early as March of 2012,” and asked for leniency.
    ¶50           In closing, the State argued:
    And you never heard once, in the mitigation claim or the
    defendant standing in front of you, that he only made a
    conditional offer to plead guilty to the crimes. That condition
    being you give me the sentence I want and I’ll plead guilty.
    Nothing stops a defendant from pleading guilty if that’s what
    they choose. But in this case, the defendant would only plead
    guilty if he could get the least sentence available. Is that truly
    admitting guilt and accepting responsibility, to demand he
    get the least sentence available if convicted of this crime?
    How worthy is that evidence when the defendant slaps a
    condition on it?
    And you heard from [the Department of Correction’s
    administrator] the possible benefits he can get with a natural
    life sentence, that being within the first five years and on a
    16
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    review period thereafter, being reduced all the way down
    from maximum custody, to closed custody, to medium
    custody, enjoying all of those privileges, freedoms and
    benefits. In light of that evidence introduced to solely rebut
    the defendant’s claim of an offer of responsibility, of an
    acceptance of responsibility, how mitigating are those facts
    when compared to that defendant would only plead guilty if
    the State gave him what he wanted?
    ¶51           In Busso-Estopellan, we held that the “[a]cceptance of
    responsibility is a non-statutory mitigating circumstance” and that
    defendant’s plea offer “is relevant because it tends to make his acceptance
    of responsibility . . . more 
    probable.” 238 Ariz. at 554
    –55 ¶ 67. We further
    stated that “the court may exercise its discretion to determine how best to
    admit the evidence,” “may avert . . . confusion . . . by instructing the jury
    that the State was not required to extend a plea offer,” and “may permit
    introduction of part of the offer letter.” 
    Id. at 555
    ¶¶ 10–11.
    ¶52           Johnson argues that evidence of prison housing conditions is
    irrelevant. See, e.g., People v. Quartermain, 
    941 P.2d 788
    , 807 (Cal. 1997)
    (“[E]vidence of the conditions of confinement that a defendant will
    experience if sentenced to life imprisonment without parole is irrelevant to
    the jury’s penalty determination because it does not relate to the
    defendant’s character, culpability, or the circumstances of the offense.”).
    The State argues that it was permitted to include evidence of prison housing
    conditions to rebut Johnson’s plea offers by establishing a motivation for
    pleading guilty other than remorse or acceptance of responsibility. See
    People v. Ledesma, 
    140 P.3d 657
    , 724 (Cal. 2006) (finding nothing improper
    about the prosecutor questioning defense witnesses about the defendant’s
    motive to plead guilty to rebut defendant’s claim that he pled guilty to
    accept responsibility).
    ¶53          But the State presented no evidence that Johnson was aware
    of the housing differences or that a difference in housing conditions
    motivated his plea offer. The State thus failed to prove the antecedent fact
    necessary to make the evidence relevant and thus admissible.
    ¶54           And even if the State introduced evidence that Johnson knew
    of the differences and made his plea offer based on those differences,
    evidence of prison housing conditions would still likely be inadmissible.
    17
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    The State may rebut the motivation of the plea offers by showing that some
    motivating factor compelled the plea offer other than remorse or an
    acceptance of responsibility. 
    Busso-Estopellan, 238 Ariz. at 554
    –55 ¶¶ 5–7,
    10–11. But evidence of prison housing conditions is only marginally
    probative of an alternative motive for the plea offer and is likely
    outweighed by the potential prejudice from the inference that a defendant
    would receive enhanced living conditions if not sentenced to death. See 
    id. at 554
    ¶ 6 (stating that though “the Arizona Rules of Evidence do not apply
    in the penalty phase, we are ‘guided by fundamentally the same
    considerations’” (quoting State v. Guarino, 
    238 Ariz. 437
    , 439 ¶ 6 (2015)); see
    also 
    Guarino, 238 Ariz. at 441
    ¶ 15 (noting that unduly prejudicial evidence
    in the penalty phase may be precluded, even where it would otherwise be
    relevant). The trial court erred in denying Johnson’s motion.
    ¶55            The State argues the error is nevertheless harmless. See
    
    Escalante, 245 Ariz. at 144
    ¶ 30 (stating that under this standard the state
    must show “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to
    or affect the verdict or sentence” (internal quotation marks omitted)). We
    agree.
    ¶56            Johnson did not object to the evidence’s prejudicial impact
    nor does he now argue that the evidence deprived him of due process
    because it was unduly prejudicial. Cf. 
    Prince, 226 Ariz. at 534
    ¶ 65 (“[T]he
    Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause prohibits . . . evidence that
    ‘is so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair.’”
    (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 
    501 U.S. 808
    , 825–26 (1991))). Even so, in cross-
    examination of the Department of Corrections administrator and closing,
    Johnson showed the differences in housing conditions were minimal.
    Further, the State offered evidence of the prison housing conditions for a
    limited purpose—“to solely rebut the defendant’s claim of an offer of
    responsibility” (which was also motivated by Johnson’s desire to escape the
    death penalty). It did not rely on the evidence of prison housing conditions
    to argue that death was required because a life sentence would otherwise
    reward Johnson and the evidence was cumulative to the State’s evidence
    that his plea offer was contingent on his receiving a natural life sentence.
    Last, the jury found significant aggravation in this case—the (F)(2), (F)(6),
    and (F)(7)(a) and (b) aggravators. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that
    even if the erroneously admitted evidence had been excluded, no
    reasonable jury would have reached a different result. Cf. State v. Dann, 
    206 Ariz. 371
    , 374 ¶ 14 (2003) (asking whether, after reviewing the evidence, a
    18
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    reasonable jury would weigh the mitigation evidence differently and thus
    reach a different result).
    ii. Comment on plea offers and Johnson’s allocution
    ¶57            Johnson next argues the court erred by allowing the State to
    comment during the penalty phase closing that “[n]othing stops a
    defendant from pleading guilty if that’s what they choose. . . . Is [it] truly
    admitting guilt and accepting responsibility, to demand he get the least
    sentence available if convicted of this crime?” But the State’s comment
    related to evidence in the record and was proper rebuttal to Johnson’s
    allocution and plea offers. See 
    Chappell, 225 Ariz. at 238
    ¶ 32 (stating the
    right to allocution is not absolute and that the state may present appropriate
    rebuttal); United States v. Fell (Fell II), 
    531 F.3d 197
    , 220–21 (2d Cir. 2008)
    (finding the prosecutor’s comment—“if [the defendant] wanted to plead
    guilty he could have”—to be a reasonable response to defendant’s use of
    his plea offer and that no Fifth or Sixth Amendment right was violated).
    And the State’s closing did not otherwise comment on or reference
    Johnson’s allocution in a way that penalized him for exercising his right to
    go to trial. Cf. United States v. Whitten, 
    610 F.3d 168
    , 195 (2d Cir. 2010)
    (stating that the defendant’s “constitutionally protected decision to go to
    trial was cited as a reason to sentence him to death, and thus to ‘enhance’
    what would otherwise be a life sentence”).
    F. Inconsistent Mercy, Sympathy, and Presumption of Death
    Instructions
    ¶58            Johnson argues the trial court gave internally inconsistent
    jury instructions regarding mercy, sympathy, and the presumption of death
    and that the instructions likely caused juror confusion resulting in an
    unconstitutional sentence. Because Johnson failed to object at trial, we
    review for fundamental error only. 
    Velazquez, 216 Ariz. at 309
    ¶ 37.
    ¶59           During the trial, the jury was instructed as follows:
    Each one of you must decide individually whether any
    mitigating circumstance exists.
    You are not limited to the mitigating circumstances offered by
    the defendant. You must also consider any other information
    19
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    that you find is relevant in determining whether to impose a
    life sentence so long as it relates to an aspect of the
    defendant’s background, character, propensities, history or
    record or circumstances of the offense.
    The defendant bears the burden of proving the existence of
    any mitigating circumstance that the defendant offers by a
    preponderance of the evidence . . . .
    ....
    Even if a juror believes that the aggravating and mitigating
    circumstances are of the same quality or value, that juror is
    not required to vote for a sentence of death and may instead
    vote for a sentence of life in prison. A juror may find
    mitigation and impose a life sentence even if the defendant
    does not present any mitigation evidence.
    ....
    [E]ach of you must determine whether, in your individual
    assessment, the mitigation is of such quality or value that it
    warrants leniency in this case.
    The law does not presume what is the appropriate sentence.
    The defendant does not have the burden of proving that life
    is the appropriate sentence. The State does not have the
    burden of proving that death is the appropriate sentence. It
    is for you as jurors to decide what you individually believe is
    the appropriate sentence.
    In reaching a reasoned, moral judgment about which sentence
    is justified and appropriate, you must decide how compelling
    or persuasive the totality of the mitigating factors is when
    evaluated in connection with the totality of the aggravating
    factors and the facts and circumstances of the case. This
    assessment is not a mathematical one, but instead must be
    made in light of each juror’s individual qualitative evaluation
    of the facts of the case, the severity of the aggravating factors,
    and the quality of the mitigating factors found by each juror.
    20
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    If you unanimously agree there is mitigation sufficiently
    substantial to call for leniency, then you shall return a verdict
    of life. If you unanimously agree there is no mitigation, or the
    mitigation is not sufficiently substantial to call for leniency,
    then you shall return a verdict of death.
    Your decision is not a recommendation. Your decision is
    binding. . . .
    ¶60           Johnson argues the stated instructions were confusing
    because at separate times they suggested there was a presumption for life,
    then death. But the above instructions correctly conveyed that Arizona
    “law does not presume [there] is [an] appropriate sentence.” See State v.
    Glassel, 
    211 Ariz. 33
    , 52 ¶ 72 (2005) (discussing scheme’s constitutionality
    where it does not create a “presumption of death”). Further, the
    instructions accurately describe that it is the duty of each juror to decide
    whether a life or death sentence is appropriate “in light of each juror’s
    individual qualitative evaluation of the facts of the case, the severity of the
    aggravating factors, and the quality of the mitigating factors found by each
    juror.”
    ¶61           Johnson additionally argues the instructions allowed the jury
    to believe that the responsibility for determining whether a death sentence
    should be imposed rested elsewhere, i.e., with the state or defense upon
    meeting their burdens of proof. See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 
    472 U.S. 320
    , 328–
    32 (1985) (noting concern that jurors could “delegate” their responsibility to
    a higher court in review). The instructions, however, reinforced that each
    juror’s decision was his or her own, that the jury’s “decision [was] not a
    recommendation” but was “binding,” and that neither Johnson nor the
    State had a burden to prove that a life or death sentence was appropriate.
    ¶62           Johnson next argues the court gave conflicting “mercy” and
    “sympathy” instructions and that this error prevented the jury from giving
    a “reasoned moral response” to Johnson’s mitigation. We rejected a similar
    argument in State v. Carreon, 
    210 Ariz. 54
    , 70–71 ¶¶ 81–87 (2005), and State
    v. Kuhs, 
    223 Ariz. 376
    , 386–87 ¶¶ 51–56 (2010), and Johnson provides no
    reason to revisit those decisions. The instructions did not obfuscate the
    concepts of mercy or sympathy, nor did they prevent the jury from giving
    Johnson’s mitigation a reasoned moral response. The instructions limited
    the jury’s consideration to the evidence presented as it related to Johnson’s
    21
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    character, record, and the circumstances of the offense. See California v.
    Brown, 
    479 U.S. 538
    , 545 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating that “the
    sentence imposed at the penalty stage should reflect a reasoned moral
    response to the defendant’s background, character, and crime rather than
    mere sympathy or emotion”). No error occurred.
    G. Execution Impact Evidence
    ¶63           Johnson argues the trial court erred by excluding execution
    impact evidence because it was relevant to his character and showed his
    family’s love and support, citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 
    428 U.S. 280
    ,
    288, 304 (1976), State v. Carriger, 
    143 Ariz. 142
    , 162 (1984), and People v.
    Ochoa, 
    966 P.2d 442
    , 505–06 (Cal. 1998). But we have previously held
    execution impact evidence inadmissible. See State v. Rose, 
    231 Ariz. 500
    ,
    513–14 ¶¶ 63–65 (2013); 
    Chappell, 225 Ariz. at 238
    ¶¶ 28–30; 
    Roque, 213 Ariz. at 222
    ¶¶ 117–20. We decline to revisit those decisions.
    ¶64             To the extent Johnson argues that the court prevented him
    from presenting evidence touching on his character and family support, we
    note that the court’s ruling “[did] not preclude the defendant’s family,
    friends, associates or representatives from expressing support and/or
    mitigation.” The “ruling simply restrict[ed] anyone on behalf of the family
    from expressing views regarding the impact upon the family should the
    defendant be executed.” See 
    Rose, 231 Ariz. at 514
    ¶ 65 n.3 (“To the extent
    Rose argues that his family ties and the love of a defendant’s family has
    been held by this Court to be mitigation, we agree that the existence of
    family ties is a mitigating factor.” (alterations omitted) (citation and internal
    quotation marks omitted)).
    ¶65           To the extent Johnson urges this Court to allow execution
    impact evidence to counter victim impact evidence, we are not persuaded.
    Allowing victim impact evidence reflects the view that for a “jury to assess
    meaningfully the defendant’s moral culpability and blameworthiness, it
    should have before it at the sentencing phase evidence of the specific harm
    caused by the defendant.” See 
    Payne, 501 U.S. at 825
    . Victim impact
    evidence bears on the “harm imposed[] upon the victims” of the crime, and
    thus relates to the circumstance of the offense, 
    id. at 826–27,
    whereas
    execution impact evidence relates only to the impact on the defendant’s
    family, cf. 
    Chappell, 225 Ariz. at 238
    ¶ 29 (stating that the requirements of
    the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments do not limit the trial court’s
    22
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    authority “to exclude, as irrelevant, evidence not bearing on the defendant’s
    character, prior record, or the circumstances of his offense” (quoting Lockett
    v. Ohio, 
    438 U.S. 586
    , 604 n.12 (1978)). No error occurred.
    H. Limitation of Mitigation Evidence
    ¶66           Johnson argues the court erred by limiting his presentation of
    mitigation evidence. We review the trial court’s rulings on the admissibility
    of evidence for an abuse of discretion. 
    Gill, 242 Ariz. at 3
    ¶ 7.
    ¶67            Under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, a defendant
    may present mitigation evidence based on any aspect of his character,
    record, or the circumstances of the offense. 
    Chappell, 225 Ariz. at 238
    ¶ 29
    (citing 
    Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604
    ). Consequently, § 13-751(G) provides that the
    jury shall consider any factors proffered by the defendant that are relevant
    in determining whether to impose a sentence less than death. And § 13-
    751(C) provides that “the defendant may present any information that is
    relevant to any of the mitigating circumstances included in subsection G . .
    . regardless of its admissibility under the rules governing admission of
    evidence at criminal trials.” Though the Arizona Rules of Evidence do not
    apply in the penalty phase of a first degree murder trial, we are nevertheless
    “guided by fundamentally the same considerations.” 
    Busso-Estopellan, 238 Ariz. at 554
    ¶ 6.
    i. Columbine
    ¶68           Johnson was a student at Columbine High School at the time
    of the school shooting. Before trial, the State filed a motion to narrow the
    scope of Columbine mitigation to evidence “relevant as it relates to
    defendant’s character, prior record or the circumstances of his offense.”
    The State sought to limit, at the time, roughly 23,000 pages of evidence
    touching on the effect Columbine had not only on Johnson, but on other
    students and the community generally. As such, the State sought to
    preclude irrelevant information and limit unduly cumulative evidence.
    The court agreed. While it allowed Johnson to “tell the story” of the
    Columbine shooting with approximately three to five witnesses, introduce
    evidence of Johnson’s reactions during and after the shooting, its effects on
    him, and its effects on the school and town generally, the court precluded
    testimony from fellow students of Columbine’s impact on their lives and
    on the lives of other individuals, finding it irrelevant.
    23
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    ¶69           The court did not abuse its discretion. Johnson introduced
    evidence about the Columbine shooting, that he was a freshman at
    Columbine High School at the time of the shooting, its effects generally on
    the community, its effects personally on him, and that he was thereafter
    diagnosed as suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”).
    Testimony by other Columbine survivors as to its effects on their lives does
    not bear specifically on Johnson’s character. The trial court correctly noted
    that such testimony risks confusing the jury, unfair prejudice, and wasting
    time, and is cumulative to the other, admissible, Columbine-related
    evidence. The court did not abuse its discretion by excluding this
    testimony.
    ii. Adopted-child syndrome
    ¶70           Johnson argues the court incorrectly limited his presentation
    of adopted-child syndrome evidence. During the trial, Johnson introduced
    evidence that he was adopted from Korea as an infant and that Dr.
    Kirschner had diagnosed him with a dissociative disorder called “adopted-
    child syndrome.” But adopted-child syndrome is not officially recognized
    in any edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
    (“DSM”). Johnson claims the court prevented him from asking Dr.
    Kirschner why adopted-child syndrome was not yet recognized.
    ¶71            Reviewing the record, the court simply prevented Dr.
    Kirschner from speculating why the diagnosis was not officially recognized
    in the DSM, a matter outside of the scope of his testimony and the trial. The
    court did not prevent Johnson from asking whether the DSM was the “be-
    all-end-all” as it pertains to diagnoses to establish that it was not. Nor did
    it prevent Johnson from asking Dr. Kirschner to identify the basis for his
    diagnosis. No abuse of discretion occurred.
    iii. Drug-seeking behavior
    ¶72            Johnson argues the court erred by preventing him from
    eliciting testimony during redirect examination that he sought counseling
    for psychological benefits and not to obtain prescription drugs.
    ¶73          During cross-examination of Dr. Abrams, the State elicited
    testimony that in 2008, Johnson “wanted something to help him relax,”
    24
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    “that he was out of Xanax,” and that “[h]e was at the hospital asking for
    more Xanax.” On redirect, Johnson sought to ask whether “there [was] any
    indication at that point in time [that] Johnson [was] going to the hospital in
    order to obtain drugs?” The State objected, arguing that it elicited only
    testimony showing that Johnson minimized his substance abuse issues. See
    State v. Hicks, 
    133 Ariz. 64
    , 69 (1982) (limiting redirect examination to the
    scope of cross-examination). Though the State claimed during its objection
    that it did not elicit testimony of drug-seeking behavior during its cross-
    examination of Dr. Abrams, the question implied that the reason for
    Johnson’s hospital visit was to obtain drugs. The court’s ruling sustaining
    the State’s objection was therefore arguably error. But because Johnson
    admitted that the inference was only implied, not directly stated, and
    because his question was unclear, any error was harmless.
    ¶74           Further, the record reveals that some of Johnson’s redirect
    questions on this issue were answered before the State’s objection and
    Johnson addressed the alleged drug-seeking behavior by asking the same
    questions to Dr. DeMarte, who testified later during the trial. To the extent
    Johnson generally argues that the court improperly limited mitigation
    evidence regarding drug-seeking behavior, Johnson introduced evidence
    that he had a genetic predisposition to substance abuse, was an adolescent
    when he started abusing drugs, and that he had a history of substance
    abuse, which he tied back to Columbine and his PTSD diagnosis.
    iv. PTSD
    ¶75            Johnson argues that the court prevented him from fully
    detailing the effects of his PTSD. However, as discussed above, Johnson
    presented evidence of his PTSD diagnosis to the jury. To the extent Johnson
    argues the court improperly limited redirect on PTSD criteria, Johnson’s
    objected-to question related to substance abuse, whereas, as Johnson
    acknowledged at trial, the portion of the State’s cross-examination at issue
    related only to nightmares. After sustaining the State’s objection, the trial
    court nevertheless allowed Johnson to ask, “Why [are] nightmares
    important?” to which Dr. Abrams answered that nightmares were “one of
    the criteria for [PTSD].” The court did not abuse its discretion.
    v. Counseling
    ¶76           Johnson argues the court limited his ability to discuss
    25
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    counseling as mitigation evidence. Johnson has waived this argument by
    not developing it. See 
    Bolton, 182 Ariz. at 298
    . Nevertheless, we note that
    Johnson introduced evidence that he attended counseling and therapy post-
    Columbine and sought out counseling when he was having issues with his
    marriage; he was not prevented from arguing that he fared better and
    improved with counseling. No error occurred.
    vi. Antisocial personality disorder
    ¶77          Last, Johnson inconsistently argues (1) that the State
    impermissibly implied that he had an antisocial personality disorder
    diagnosis the State knew did not exist, and (2) that he should have been
    allowed to introduce evidence that he had an antisocial personality
    disorder as mitigating evidence.
    ¶78           In mitigation, Johnson introduced evidence that he displayed
    paranoid, avoidant, and alexithymic features and that Dr. Abrams
    diagnosed him with personality disorder “NOS” (“not otherwise
    specified”). However, neither Dr. Abrams nor Dr. Kirschner diagnosed him
    with a specified personality disorder, such as antisocial personality
    disorder. Nevertheless, Dr. Abrams and Dr. Kirschner discussed Johnson’s
    antisocial tendencies, as well as antisocial and conduct disorders generally,
    effects of which dated back to Columbine.
    ¶79            In rebuttal, the State called Dr. DeMarte, who defined
    antisocial personality disorder as “a personality disorder where an
    individual has a pervasive pattern of disregarding societal standards and
    following rules and engaging in society in a productive manner.” She
    further testified that adolescent conduct disorder was indicative of later
    antisocial personality disorder, and thus a diagnosis of a conduct disorder
    in youth usually preceded a diagnosis of an antisocial personality disorder
    in adulthood. Because she found evidence of a conduct disorder lacking,
    Dr. DeMarte determined there was no antisocial personality disorder,
    though Johnson displayed antisocial traits. The State then elicited
    testimony indicating that Johnson withheld instances of antisocial conduct
    from her which occurred when he was younger, and Dr. DeMarte answered
    that such adolescent behavior “would support evidence for antisocial
    personality disorder.” Johnson objected, arguing the State was attempting
    to back-door an antisocial personality disorder diagnosis, and moved for a
    mistrial. The State responded that it was only seeking to show that Johnson
    26
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    underreported his adolescent activities. The court denied Johnson’s
    motion, and ordered the State to confirm with Dr. DeMarte that there was
    no diagnosis, which she did.
    ¶80           The court did not abuse its discretion. The court sustained
    Johnson’s objection and remedied the improper inference by requiring the
    State to ask whether there was a diagnosis, to which Dr. DeMarte
    responded there was not. Nor was there any harm. Johnson introduced
    evidence of antisocial traits and his personality disorder. And he presented
    evidence generally describing antisocial personality disorders and conduct
    disorders. Lastly, he introduced evidence that doctors did not diagnose
    him with an antisocial personality disorder. The State’s cross-examination,
    challenging Johnson’s underreporting to Dr. Abrams, Dr. Kirschner, and
    Dr. DeMarte, was permissible rebuttal. To the extent Johnson argues
    evidence of an antisocial personality disorder should have been allowed, he
    was not prevented from arguing that his personality disorder and antisocial
    traits were mitigating circumstances, which he did.
    ¶81            Contrary to Johnson’s claims, he presented evidence
    regarding the Columbine shooting, his PTSD, his history of substance abuse
    and his biological predisposition, and how his adoption affected him. Each
    of the court’s rulings correctly excluded irrelevant, cumulative evidence, or
    testimony outside the scope of cross or redirect examination.
    I. Defense Counsel’s Attorneys’ Notes
    ¶82           Johnson argues the court erred by ordering the disclosure of
    his attorneys’ notes. We review the legal scope of disclosure under Arizona
    Rule of Criminal Procedure 15 de novo, while we review the judge’s rulings
    for an abuse of discretion. 
    Roque, 213 Ariz. at 205
    ¶ 21.
    ¶83          In his July 2015 notice of mitigation witnesses, Johnson
    included summaries of witness statements. The State argued the
    summaries did not comply with Rule 15.2(h) and asked the court to order
    that Johnson turn over all written witness statements, not just summaries.
    Johnson responded that the notes were not subject to disclosure because
    they were investigatory notes of the defense team and reflected counsel’s
    opinions, conclusions, and impressions. Johnson further asserted that
    counsel’s notes of meetings were inaccurate because they did not reflect
    verbatim statements and instead were “only quick notes of their own
    27
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    impressions of the statements made by the witnesses,” and that a conflict
    might arise should counsel be called to verify the veracity of any
    statements. See Dean v. Superior Court, 
    84 Ariz. 104
    , 110–13 (1958). The court
    entered an order for Johnson to “disclose as soon as possible . . . any and all
    witness statements not previously disclosed, with defense team opinions,
    theories and conclusions redacted.” The court further informed Johnson
    that he could seek in camera review if he believed disclosure of a specific
    witness statement would violate an ethical obligation.
    ¶84           Johnson sought special action relief, which was denied. The
    court of appeals concluded that the order allowed Johnson to redact
    opinions, theories, and conclusions from the handwritten notes, and stated
    that “[p]ending the result of an in camera review,” it was “in no position to
    rule in the abstract on whether disclosure of any specific witness statement
    may raise ethical concerns.”
    ¶85              Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 15.2(h)(1)(A)(ii) requires
    disclosure of any written or recorded statement. Rule 15.4 defines a
    statement to include “a written record or summary of a person’s oral
    communications,” but protects “[s]uperseded [n]otes” which are not
    “statement[s] if they were substantially incorporated into a document or
    report . . . .” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.4(a)(1)(C), (a)(3). Further, Rule 15.4 protects
    an attorney’s work product, providing that a “party is not required to
    disclose . . . records, . . . reports, or memoranda to the extent they contain
    the opinions, theories, or conclusions of the prosecutor or defense counsel.”
    
    Id. 15.4(b)(1). ¶86
              Rule 15.2(h) statements, however, “do not meet the ‘work
    product’ exception to disclosure under Rule 15.4(b)(1), . . . as they are not
    ‘theories, opinions and conclusions’ of the parties or their agents.” See State
    v. Nunez, 
    23 Ariz. App. 462
    , 463 (1975) (citation omitted). “To rule otherwise
    would make a premium out of [n]ot taking verbatim statements in order to
    avoid the disclosure required by the rules.” Id.; see also Austin v. Alfred, 
    163 Ariz. 397
    , 403 (App. 1990) (stating that it “would be incongruous to allow a
    party” to use the attorney-client privilege as a strategic tool to “deny access
    of the opposing party to relevant information”).
    ¶87         Johnson cites Hickman v. Taylor, 
    329 U.S. 495
    , 508–14 (1947),
    and Upjohn Co. v. United States, 
    449 U.S. 383
    , 399–401 (1981), to support his
    argument, but neither compels a different result. In Hickman, the petitioner
    28
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    sought the disclosure of witness statements, private memoranda, and
    personal 
    recollections. 329 U.S. at 510
    . The Court found the petitioner’s
    request to be a simple attempt, “without purported necessity or
    justification,” 
    id., to gather
    evidence “revealed to him already through the
    interrogatories or . . . readily available to him direct from the witnesses for
    the asking,” 
    id. at 509,
    “only to help prepare himself to examine witnesses
    and to make sure that he ha[d] overlooked nothing,” 
    id. at 513.
    The Court
    stated that “[u]nder ordinary conditions, forcing an attorney to repeat or
    write out all that witnesses have told him and to deliver the account to his
    adversary gives rise to grave dangers of inaccuracy and untrustworthiness”
    and that “[n]o legitimate purpose” would be served. 
    Id. at 512–13.
    ¶88            But the Court did not preclude the production of statements
    in all cases. Instead, it stated that “[w]here relevant and non-privileged
    facts remain hidden in an attorney’s file and where production of those facts
    is essential to the preparation of one’s case, discovery may properly be
    had.” 
    Id. at 511.
    Indeed, “[w]ere production of written statements and
    documents to be precluded under such circumstances, the liberal ideals of
    [discovery] would be stripped of much of their meaning.” 
    Id. at 511–12.
    ¶89            In Upjohn, the Court reiterated that “[f]orcing an attorney to
    disclose notes and memoranda of witnesses’ oral statements is particularly
    disfavored because it tends to reveal the attorney’s mental 
    processes.” 449 U.S. at 399
    ; see also Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 
    209 F.3d 1051
    , 1054 (8th Cir.
    2000) (reasoning that attorney notes reveal the attorney’s legal conclusions
    because, when taking notes, attorneys focus on those facts they deem
    legally relevant). But as in Hickman, the Upjohn Court explicitly stated that
    it was not adopting a bright-line 
    rule. 449 U.S. at 401
    (“We do not decide
    the issue at this time.”).
    ¶90           Here, the statements being sought were not protected by any
    privilege, see 
    Nunez, 23 Ariz. App. at 463
    , nor did the court allow
    “unfettered scrutiny” of the notes, cf. State ex rel. Corbin v. Ybarra, 
    161 Ariz. 188
    , 192 (1989). Rather, it properly ordered production by in camera review
    to allow Johnson to redact any “opinions, theories, or conclusions” that
    defense notes included, and Johnson does not raise any dispute arising
    from that process.
    ¶91          No abuse of discretion occurred. And although Johnson
    challenges the court’s ruling on Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
    29
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    Amendment grounds, as well as on article 2, sections 4, 15, and 24 of the
    Arizona Constitution, he provides no basis to conclude the trial was unfair
    or that a due process or right to counsel violation occurred, fails to develop
    this portion of his argument, and thus waives it. 
    Bolton, 182 Ariz. at 298
    .
    J. Motion to Withdraw from the 2010 Armed Robbery Plea
    ¶92            Johnson argues the court denied him the presumption of
    innocence when it refused to allow him to withdraw from his guilty plea in
    his unrelated armed robbery case. As the State correctly notes, however,
    this Court is limited to the issues raised in this appeal. See Ariz. R. Crim. P.
    31.2(b) (stating that the automatic appeal of a death penalty verdict operates
    “with respect to all judgments entered and sentences imposed in that case”
    (emphasis added)). This Court has no jurisdiction over the armed robbery
    plea or the court’s denial of Johnson’s motion to withdraw his plea
    agreement in that case.
    K. Compelled Releases
    ¶93           Johnson argues the court erred by ordering him to sign
    releases for certain records. We review the trial court’s discovery rulings
    for an abuse of discretion, but note that when the court commits an error of
    law in the process of reaching a discretionary conclusion, it may be
    regarded as having abused its discretion. Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Burke,
    
    204 Ariz. 251
    , 253–54 ¶ 10 (2003).
    ¶94           Both before and during the trial, the State requested records
    from BYU-Idaho, Mesa Community College, and Johnson’s Colorado
    presentence report. See A.R.S. § 13-752(G) (providing that “the state may
    present any evidence that is relevant to the determination of whether there
    is mitigation that is sufficiently substantial to call for leniency” and may
    present “any evidence regarding the defendant’s character, propensities,
    criminal record or other acts”). After the State encountered difficulty
    obtaining the records, the court ordered Johnson to sign releases so the State
    could obtain them. Johnson does not challenge the disclosure of the
    records, but instead only being compelled to sign the releases.
    ¶95            Johnson argues the compelled release order was improper,
    citing Sherlock v. Fontainebleau, 
    229 F. Supp. 3d 1277
    , 1282–83 (S.D. Fla. 2017)
    (holding that, under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
    30
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”), a party must comply with the disclosure
    procedures of HIPAA and the court may not compel a party to sign release
    authorizations). Johnson further argues that a compelled release is not
    voluntary and that the court’s orders cast doubt upon the fairness of the
    proceedings.
    ¶96           But in Sherlock, the court recognized the “absence of
    controlling authority” and that courts were split regarding whether the
    compelled signing of releases was permissible. See 
    id. at 1281–82.
    And its
    holding was dependent upon, and limited to, Federal Rule of Civil
    Procedure 34 and the disclosure procedures of HIPAA. See 
    id. at 1282–83
    (stating that “[u]nder the HIPAA regulations, a health care provider is
    authorized to produce records in response to a subpoena,” which “should
    be more than sufficient to cause a provider to turn over the responsive
    medical records”).
    ¶97           Here, the court had the authority to order Johnson to make
    records available to the State. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.2(g)(1) (granting the
    court the authority to order, upon the state’s motion, the disclosure of
    material or information not already included if the state has substantial
    need for it, the “State cannot obtain the substantial equivalent by other
    means without undue hardship,” and the disclosure would not violate the
    defendant’s constitutional rights). The State sought relevant records, to
    which it was entitled, but as it related to BYU-Idaho, claimed its only access
    to such records was by an Idaho court order or signed authorization; BYU-
    Idaho would not recognize an Arizona court order. As for Mesa
    Community College, the State argued that Mesa Community College waits
    ten days for an opposing side to respond to a court order and that the
    college failed to respond to the last court order because it did not believe
    the order was served properly. Similarly, the State informed the court that
    Colorado required a court order or signed release.
    ¶98          Given the State’s right to the records and the difficulty in
    otherwise obtaining the records, we find no error.
    L. Voir Dire
    ¶99           Johnson argues the court prevented him from choosing a
    constitutionally adequate jury by limiting his ability to question jurors on
    whether they would be willing to consider mitigation evidence. We review
    31
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    rulings on voir dire and motions to strike for an abuse of discretion. 
    Glassel, 211 Ariz. at 45
    ¶ 36.
    ¶100          Before trial, the State filed a motion to prohibit Johnson from
    asking potential jurors their views on specific types of mitigating
    circumstances. In opposition, Johnson argued the court should allow “case
    specific” questions regarding whether jurors could impartially vote for life
    or death in light of certain mitigating circumstances. The court forbade
    questions “that groom or condition prospective jurors regarding evidence
    that may be presented at trial,” but stated that it might allow appropriate
    case-specific questions.
    ¶101           After voir dire, Johnson filed a motion declining to pass the
    jury panel, arguing that he had inadequate “time and opportunity” to “vet”
    the jury panel pursuant to Morgan v. Illinois, 
    504 U.S. 719
    (1992). Johnson
    further argued that he should have been allowed to ask the jurors whether,
    given the facts of the case as set out in the defendant’s proposed juror
    questionnaire, they would render a verdict of death. The court denied
    Johnson’s motion, finding “its rulings have all been within the [sic] its
    discretion and consistent with Arizona Supreme Court precedent.” We
    agree.
    ¶102          A defendant is entitled to a fair and impartial jury. 
    Velazquez, 216 Ariz. at 306
    ¶ 18. As such, due process requires that trial courts permit
    a defendant to inquire whether prospective jurors would always impose
    the death penalty. 
    Morgan, 504 U.S. at 729
    –33. However, this principle does
    not permit the defendant to “ask a juror to speculate or precommit on how
    that juror might vote based on any particular facts,” 
    Smith, 215 Ariz. at 231
    ¶ 42 (internal quotation marks omitted), nor does it allow the defendant to
    ask questions regarding specific aggravating circumstances or “what types
    of evidence the [jury] will consider to be mitigating,” State v. Patterson, 
    230 Ariz. 270
    , 273 ¶ 8 (2012) (quoting 
    Glassel, 211 Ariz. at 47
    ¶ 44).
    ¶103          Here, Johnson sought to ask whether, based on the facts of the
    case, potential jurors would render a death verdict. He further sought to
    ask, “[w]hat would ‘mitigation’ mean to you?” He thus tried to ask the
    case-specific questions our case law generally prohibits.
    ¶104         Insofar as Johnson argues he should have been allowed to ask
    permissible case-specific questions, he ignores that the court granted him
    32
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    the opportunity to ask such questions when appropriate. See State v. Garcia,
    
    224 Ariz. 1
    , 8–9 ¶¶ 14–16 (2010) (allowing case-specific questions in order
    to “properly probe[] beyond abstract juror views on capital punishment”
    so long as they “merely asked [whether] jurors . . . could consider the death
    penalty in circumstances in which it is permitted under Arizona law”). In
    addition to multiple juror questionnaire questions about predispositions on
    capital punishment, see 
    Glassel, 211 Ariz. at 46
    ¶ 38, Johnson asked jurors
    “whether [they] could imagine a situation where the totality of a
    defendant’s character, including things he’s endured or accomplished,
    could warrant mercy, despite his crimes.”
    ¶105          Separately, Johnson argues that voir dire was inadequate
    because the court limited the parties to roughly four-and-a-half minutes per
    juror. Johnson’s claim is meritless. First, the jurors completed a 100-
    question juror questionnaire to help the parties narrow their follow-up
    questions. Second, the court stated that it was “willing to work with [the
    parties] if somebody says something that needs more follow-up than
    anticipated,” and would allow “reasonable continuances where
    appropriate.” The court showed overall flexibility by granting additional
    time when needed. See State v. Acuna Valenzuela, 
    245 Ariz. 197
    , 208 ¶ 19
    (2018). No abuse of discretion occurred. See State v. Escalante-Orozco, 
    241 Ariz. 254
    , 271 ¶¶ 33–34 (2017) (affirming five-minute-per-juror time limit),
    abrogated on other grounds by Escalante, 
    245 Ariz. 135
    .
    M. Motions to Strike Jurors for Cause
    ¶106           Johnson argues he was precluded from using peremptory
    strikes on prospective jurors 56, 154, and 294 because he was forced to use
    them on prospective jurors 9, 31, and 59, whom the court refused to strike
    for cause. We review the trial court’s denial of a motion to strike a juror for
    an abuse of discretion, giving deference to the trial court, which was in the
    best position to observe the potential jurors. 
    Patterson, 230 Ariz. at 274
    ¶ 14.
    i. Non-strike of prospective jurors 9, 31, and 59
    ¶107          During voir dire, Johnson posed the following question to
    prospective juror 9:
    [L]et’s say you’re sitting as a juror on a case, and that it’s a
    first-degree murder case, intentional premeditated murder;
    33
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    that you and 11 other members of that jury found the
    defendant, beyond a reasonable doubt, guilty of intentional
    premeditated killing of an innocent victim; that you and the
    11 other jurors considered any defenses that might have been
    offered, whether it was self-defense, defense of others, heat of
    passion. For you, in that case, would the death penalty be the
    only reasonable penalty that you would consider?
    Johnson asked similar questions to prospective jurors 31 and 59.
    ¶108          The State objected, arguing that “[w]hile [Johnson] can
    ascertain whether going into a penalty phase . . . a juror may be leaning one
    way or the other, that hypothetical is improper because it does not fully tell
    the juror—and they can’t bait the juror into yes or no, without telling them
    they have to consider mitigation.” The court agreed, finding the question
    misleading. Nevertheless, the court allowed Johnson to ask the question as
    a three-part question, with follow-up questions whether the juror could
    apply the law as it pertained to finding an aggravating circumstance and
    considering mitigation. Prospective jurors 9 and 31 answered “no,” that
    they could not imagine a situation where the totality of someone’s character
    could warrant mercy in such a scenario, while prospective juror 59
    answered that she would lean towards the death penalty. Johnson then
    moved to strike the three prospective jurors for cause. The court denied
    Johnson’s motion, finding that the hypothetical posed was confusing and
    misleading, and stated that the core question was whether the jurors could
    be impartial at the beginning of the penalty phase, which the court believed
    they could be.
    ¶109          “A juror who will automatically vote for the death penalty
    without considering the presence of mitigating circumstances does not
    meet th[e] threshold requirement of impartiality.” 
    Velazquez, 216 Ariz. at 306
    –07 ¶ 18 (internal quotation marks omitted). But a prospective juror is
    not precluded from serving on the jury simply because he favors the death
    penalty. 
    Id. at 307
    ¶ 19. “[I]f the juror is willing to put aside his opinions
    and base his decisions solely upon the evidence, he may serve.” 
    Id. (citation and
    internal quotation marks omitted).
    ¶110        Here, prospective jurors 9, 31, and 59 all stated they would
    keep an open mind during the trial, could consider mitigation evidence,
    and would not automatically vote for the death penalty. See Wainwright v.
    34
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    Witt, 
    469 U.S. 412
    , 423 (1985) (requiring jurors to “conscientiously apply the
    law and find the facts”). Further, prospective juror 31 answered that she
    could responsibly and respectfully make a decision based on the facts of the
    case, but only after she heard the case details and was provided evidence.
    And prospective juror 59 added that even in the face of absolute guilt, she
    would find sentencing the defendant to death to be difficult.
    ¶111          Though prospective jurors 9 and 31 answered that they could
    not imagine a situation where the totality of the defendant’s character could
    warrant mercy, they did so only after a misleading hypothetical that
    presupposed guilt and an aggravating circumstance, omitted mitigation,
    and risked implying that a death sentence was required. Indeed,
    prospective juror 59 answered that she would lean towards the death
    penalty but qualified that her answer was based on Johnson’s hypothetical.
    The court was in the best position to observe the prospective jurors and
    determine whether they were impaired. See 
    Patterson, 230 Ariz. at 274
    ¶ 14.
    And the record does not indicate that prospective jurors 9, 31, or 59 were
    substantially impaired or unable to perform their duties as jurors in
    accordance with the instructions and oath such that denying Johnson’s
    motion to strike was an abuse of discretion.
    ii. Failure to strike prospective jurors 56, 154, and 294
    ¶112          Johnson next claims the court erred by refusing to strike
    prospective jurors 56, 154, and 294 for cause. Johnson did not move to strike
    prospective jurors 56 or 154, however, so we review Johnson’s challenge as
    to them for fundamental error. See 
    Velazquez, 216 Ariz. at 309
    ¶ 37.
    ¶113           Section 21-211(2) and (4), A.R.S., provides that any person
    who is “interested directly or indirectly in [a] matter” is disqualified from
    sitting on a jury in that case, as are those who are “biased or prejudiced in
    favor of or against either of the parties.” Further, Arizona Rule of Criminal
    Procedure 18.4(b) provides that “[o]n motion or on its own, the court must
    excuse a prospective juror or jurors from service in the case if there is a
    reasonable ground to believe that the juror or jurors cannot render a fair
    and impartial verdict.” See also State v. Moore, 
    222 Ariz. 1
    , 10 ¶ 38 (2009)
    (stating a judge must remove a potential juror if that person’s “views may
    ‘prevent or substantially impair the performance of [the juror’s] duties’”
    (alteration in original) (quoting 
    Witt, 469 U.S. at 424
    )). However, a
    “prospective juror need not be disqualified unless his opinion is
    35
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    unqualified” or “fixed.” State v. Narten, 
    99 Ariz. 116
    , 122 (1965). And “a
    juror’s assurances of impartiality need not be couched in absolute terms.”
    State v. Hoskins, 
    199 Ariz. 127
    , 139 ¶ 37 (2000). “If a juror is willing to put
    aside his opinions and base his decision solely upon the evidence, he may
    serve.” State v. Martinez, 
    196 Ariz. 451
    , 459 ¶ 28 (2000) (citation omitted).
    a. Prospective juror 56 (impaneled juror 1)
    ¶114           Johnson claims prospective juror 56 (hereinafter impaneled
    juror 1) was predisposed in favor of the State and believed the State had
    “godly authority.” But a review of juror 1’s responses does not indicate
    bias. In his questionnaire, juror 1 stated he believed Arizona’s criminal laws
    were generally appropriate and that he “believe[d] that the government has
    the authority from God to uphold the law and to keep citizens safe.” When
    asked whether he would accept the responsibility of serving on a death
    sentence jury, juror 1 answered that God gave the authority to the State and
    it was juror 1’s faith in God that allowed him to accept the responsibility.
    ¶115          None of his answers indicated that he believed God favored
    the State or imposition of the death penalty. Rather, each of his answers
    provided why he felt the death penalty could be imposed, as he wrote, “if
    necessary.” Indeed, juror 1 stated that he neither opposed nor favored the
    death penalty, was willing to follow the law as instructed, that “it would be
    hard to have someone’s life in [his] hands, but [he] could be impartial,” he
    would keep an open mind, and that he would not automatically vote for
    the death penalty without considering the evidence.
    b. Prospective juror 154 (impaneled juror 8)
    ¶116          Johnson claims prospective juror 154 (hereinafter impaneled
    juror 8) had a strong, pro-law enforcement bias and was more likely to
    believe police officers. In his questionnaire, juror 8 disclosed that he had a
    friend in the Phoenix Police Department and answered that he had
    favorable experiences with law enforcement because he “work[ed] with law
    enforcement at [his] church.” However, juror 8 answered that he would
    follow Arizona law requiring him to give no greater or lesser weight to a
    law enforcement officer’s testimony, stated he would keep an open mind,
    and would follow the law as instructed.
    36
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    ¶117           During follow-up questioning, Johnson asked whether juror
    8 would lean towards believing law enforcement based on his relationships.
    Juror 8 responded, “You know, I’ll be honest. I want to say no that I
    wouldn’t, but I would do my best not to.” When asked again whether his
    close relationship with law enforcement would prevent him from
    impartially judging the credibility of law enforcement officers, juror 8
    answered “no.” Only when Johnson pushed further, asking “in [juror 8’s]
    heart of hearts” whether it was not a “no” but a “maybe,” did juror 8 state
    that though he would do his best to check his prejudices, he would be lying
    if he said it was a definite no, and that his close friendship with a “good”
    officer might cause him to give other officers the benefit of the doubt.
    ¶118          But juror 8 also stated that he would do his best to check any
    prejudice or bias, and repeatedly answered that he would follow the
    instructions and law. Subsequently, juror 8 stated that he would not believe
    every word an officer said just because of his or her title but instead would
    look at what was being said and determine on his own whether it made
    sense to him. Taken as a whole, juror 8’s answers do not evidence a pro-
    law enforcement bias or inability on his part to be impartial. See State v.
    Clabourne, 
    142 Ariz. 335
    , 344 (1984) (finding no bias, and thus no error,
    where, though a juror had acquaintances with members of law
    enforcement, all jurors stated they would view the evidence fairly).
    c. Prospective juror 294 (impaneled juror 12)
    ¶119           Johnson argues that prospective juror 294 (hereinafter
    impaneled juror 12) was biased because she voiced strong feelings
    regarding victims’ rights and had a friend who suffered domestic violence.
    On her questionnaire, juror 12 revealed that a good friend had been the
    victim of domestic violence and that her view of the criminal justice system
    was negatively affected because restraining orders did not seem to work.
    However, in the very next question, she answered that those views would
    not impact her ability to be fair and impartial in the case. And as with jurors
    1 and 8, juror 12 responded that she would keep an open mind during each
    phase of the trial.
    ¶120           During follow-up, Johnson asked juror 12 to clarify her
    questionnaire statement that she was “a strong believer in victim’s rights.”
    Juror 12 said that while she regularly heard about the rights of the accused,
    she rarely hears about the possible horror the victim might have gone
    37
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    through and would be interested in hearing that. When asked whether
    hearing victim impact testimony would sway her, juror 12 answered that
    she did not know how it would affect her but stated she “would try very
    hard to be open minded, and strong and impartial.” Upon further
    questioning by the court, juror 12 answered that she could set aside any
    feelings and be fair and impartial.
    ¶121            Jurors 1, 8, and 12 all answered that they could be fair and
    impartial, and none of their colloquies indicate otherwise. The court did
    not abuse its discretion in failing to strike them for cause. See State v. Tison,
    
    129 Ariz. 526
    , 533 (1981) (“Without a showing of unqualified partiality of
    the juror, we will not upset a determination so clearly within the province
    of the [trial] court.”).
    N. Motion to Strike Juror 6
    ¶122         Johnson argues the court erred by denying his motion to
    strike impaneled juror 6 for cause. Again, we review the court’s denial for
    an abuse of discretion. See Lynch 
    I, 238 Ariz. at 105
    ¶ 71.
    ¶123          During the trial, Johnson moved to disqualify juror 6 because
    the juror’s daughter had been the victim in an unrelated case arising in
    February 2016, and Johnson argued this would bias juror 6 in favor of the
    prosecution. Juror 6 said she had only learned of the incident involving her
    daughter months after completing the juror questionnaire.
    ¶124           Rule 18.4(b) requires dismissal of “jurors who cannot render
    a fair and impartial verdict,” 
    Eddington, 228 Ariz. at 363
    ¶ 7, while § 21-
    211(2), (3), and (4) bar jurors who are interested in the matter or “biased or
    prejudiced in favor of or against either of the parties.” Johnson argues that
    juror 6’s daughter becoming a victim in another case biased juror 6 in favor
    of the State. We disagree.
    ¶125         In Eddington, we held that “a peace officer currently employed
    by the law enforcement agency that investigated the case [was] an
    ‘interested person’ who [was] disqualified from sitting as a juror,”
    regardless whether he believed he could be 
    impartial. 228 Ariz. at 365
    ¶ 18.
    There, the officer was an “interested person” due to his working
    relationship with his law enforcement employer, and by extension, the
    prosecution. Here, no such relationship exists.
    38
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    ¶126          Even though a juror may have an experience with law
    enforcement or a victim of a crime, such experience alone is not
    disqualifying. See, e.g., 
    Hoskins, 199 Ariz. at 139
    ¶ 40, 141 ¶ 48 (affirming
    refusal to disqualify juror who had once been the victim of an armed
    robbery). Upon further questioning, juror 6 answered that she would be
    fair and impartial, that her daughter’s incident had nothing to do with
    Johnson’s case, and that she was “100 percent here.” The court found her
    answers appropriate, candid, and credible, leaving the court confident that
    she could serve. The law requires nothing more. See 
    id. at 141
    ¶ 48. No
    abuse of discretion occurred.
    O. Arizona Rule of Evidence 106
    ¶127            Johnson argues the court erred during trial by limiting
    questioning and giving Arizona Rule of Evidence 106 preclusive effect. We
    review the trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion but
    review de novo the court’s interpretation of the Arizona Rules of Evidence.
    State v. Steinle, 
    239 Ariz. 415
    , 417 ¶ 6 (2016).
    ¶128          Rule 106, the rule of completeness, provides that “[i]f a party
    introduces all or part of a writing or recorded statement, an adverse party
    may require the introduction, at that time, of any other part—or any other
    writing or recorded statement—that in fairness ought to be considered at
    the same time.” It is thus “a rule of inclusion rather than exclusion.” 
    Steinle, 239 Ariz. at 418
    ¶ 10. Johnson argues that the court incorrectly relied on
    Rule 106 to limit Johnson’s cross-examination of Ms. Legg—the DNA
    technician—as well as his examination of mitigation witness Jonathan W.
    ¶129          First, the State objected to Johnson’s cross-examination of Ms.
    Legg. Johnson sought to impeach Ms. Legg by introducing evidence of lab
    errors. Although the court at one point stated the objection was on Rule 106
    grounds, the State’s objections focused on lack of foundation and relevance:
    Johnson failed to cite which records he was relying on and attempted to
    impeach Ms. Legg by introducing evidence of lab errors in unrelated cases.
    Regardless, the court allowed Johnson to cross-examine Ms. Legg on each
    of his proffered grounds, so no exclusion of evidence occurred. There was
    no error.
    39
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    ¶130          Second, the State objected, citing Rule 106, to Johnson’s
    introduction of an incomplete statement that Johnson’s DNA could neither
    be included nor excluded from the zip ties found binding the victim.
    During cross-examination of Ms. Legg, Johnson asked whether she had
    emailed Detective Denning telling him that Johnson was not a match. The
    State objected and argued that Ms. Legg’s full statement was that “[i]t [was]
    not possible to include or exclude . . . Johnson.” The trial court correctly
    sustained the State’s objection. And though Johnson claims error, he
    received the answer he wanted: that the test was inconclusive, and that
    Johnson could not definitively be considered a “match.”
    ¶131          Third, the State objected during Johnson’s examination of
    family friend Jonathan W. Johnson asked Jonathan whether he thought
    Johnson “was the type of person that is open to growth and change,” based
    on a letter Jonathan had written on Johnson’s behalf. The State objected,
    citing Rule 106, argued that Johnson was picking and choosing words from
    the letter, and asked that it be allowed to re-cross Jonathan if the court
    allowed Johnson to continue. The court sustained the State’s objection.
    Rule 106 arguably applied, but the court allowed Johnson to continue
    asking Jonathan about his opinion, so even if its decision was wrong, no
    harm resulted.
    ¶132          Johnson argues the court improperly gave Rule 106
    exclusionary effect, in that he believes the court precluded him from
    introducing evidence on Rule 106 grounds. Johnson’s argument borders on
    the frivolous: in each instance, the court allowed Johnson to introduce the
    evidence he sought. No error occurred.
    P. Prosecutorial Misconduct
    ¶133           Johnson argues his conviction was tainted by prosecutorial
    misconduct. We review claims of prosecutorial misconduct by assessing
    each claim independently. Acuna 
    Valenzuela, 245 Ariz. at 216
    ¶ 66. If
    Johnson objected, we review the purported misconduct for harmless error;
    if he failed to object, we review for fundamental error only. 
    Id. “After determining
    which claims constitute error,” we consider whether their
    cumulative effect resulted in an unfair trial. 
    Id. (quoting State
    v. Hulsey, 
    243 Ariz. 367
    , 388 ¶ 88 (2018)). “To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial
    misconduct, a defendant must demonstrate that the prosecutor’s
    misconduct so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting
    40
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    conviction a denial of due process.” 
    Id. (quoting State
    v. Martinez, 
    230 Ariz. 208
    , 214 ¶ 24 (2012)).
    i. DNA evidence
    ¶134           During the trial, the State produced evidence that officers
    found fourteen zip ties left behind at Taiwan Massage in addition to the
    pair of zip ties found binding the victim. Ms. Legg testified that Johnson’s
    DNA matched DNA left on the fourteen zip ties in at least ten of sixteen
    allele locations and that his DNA was found at the other allele locations but
    at insufficient levels to contribute to a result. Ms. Legg testified that the
    random match probability of the result was one in 600 trillion Caucasians,
    one in 3.40 quadrillion Southwestern Hispanics, and one in 145 quadrillion
    African-Americans. While Korean statistics were not used, Ms. Legg
    testified that the random match probability was generated based on the
    expected population in a given area—here, Mesa, Arizona—so the
    inclusion of any Asian statistics would have likely only increased the rarity
    of a match. As to the zip ties found binding the victim, Ms. Legg testified
    that Johnson’s DNA profile was present at between four and five allele
    locations, so his DNA could be included, but that there was not enough
    DNA present at enough allele locations to establish Johnson as a “match.”
    ¶135           During closing, the State argued that Johnson’s DNA was on
    the zip ties found binding the victim, stating this his “DNA remains [at] up
    to five locations” and that his “DNA is there.” During rebuttal closing, the
    State further argued, in response to Johnson’s defense that his DNA was
    not on the zip ties, that “[h]is DNA is on those zip ties . . . . He’s there
    between four and five loci. He’s just not there enough to call and he’s there
    on the zip ties, not just at 10 locations.” Johnson objected that the
    prosecutor’s closing misstated the evidence but was overruled.
    ¶136          Johnson argues the State’s closing argument was improper
    because it misstated the strength of the DNA evidence, citing Duncan v.
    Commonwealth, 
    322 S.W.3d 81
    , 91–92 (Ky. 2010). But in Duncan, the court
    only concluded the state’s argument—that “not excluded” meant
    “included” and that the defendant’s DNA was a “match”—was improper
    because there was no scientifically valid estimate of the probability that
    alleles would match. 
    Id. Thus, by
    asking the jury to infer on the basis of the
    expert’s testimony that the defendant was the source of the DNA, “the
    41
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    prosecutor sought to wring from that testimony a conclusion it could not
    reasonably yield.” 
    Id. at 92.
    ¶137           Here, Johnson’s argument borders on frivolous. The evidence
    showed that Johnson “matched” the DNA found on the fourteen zip ties
    left at Taiwan Massage and that Johnson’s DNA profile was consistent with
    the zip ties found on the victim at between four and five allele locations.
    The State did not use the word “match” to link Johnson’s DNA to the ties
    found binding Fu, and its comment that Johnson’s DNA “is there” was
    nothing more than a reasonable argument based on the evidence. Further,
    because the State itself emphasized during closing that Ms. Legg wrote in
    an email to Detective Denning that Johnson could neither be included nor
    excluded, the jury knew the State was arguing a reasonable inference and
    not mispresenting a determined fact. Contrast 
    id. at 91–92.
    There was no
    misconduct.
    ii. Withholding evidence
    ¶138           Johnson argues the State violated its Rule 15 disclosure
    obligations, in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 
    373 U.S. 83
    (1963), based on
    the State’s 2012 failure to timely disclose supplemental police reports and a
    letter purportedly written by Johnson.
    ¶139           Under Brady, the State must disclose all material, exculpatory
    
    evidence. 373 U.S. at 87
    . But though the State’s failure to timely disclose
    the police reports and letter constituted a late disclosure violation, the late
    disclosure did not result in the suppression of favorable evidence, and thus
    no Brady violation occurred. See United States v. Walters, 
    351 F.3d 159
    , 169
    (5th Cir. 2003) (finding no Brady violation where the defendant received
    evidence four weeks before trial and “had almost a month after the
    government disclosed” it to investigate the material and “put it to effective
    use at trial” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The disclosure dispute
    occurred nearly four years before trial and Johnson admitted that no
    prejudice resulted.
    iii. Comment on Columbine evidence and Johnson’s allocution
    ¶140           Johnson argues the State misled the jury into believing that
    the lack of evidence regarding Columbine and Johnson’s allocution proved
    Johnson was neither affected by Columbine nor sorry for his actions, where
    42
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    the State had successfully precluded such evidence before trial. Johnson
    further argues the State improperly commented on the invocation of his
    right to remain silent. Johnson did not object at trial.
    ¶141          At the close of mitigation, Johnson presented his allocution,
    stating:
    I’m very sorry for killing Ms. Fu. It was senseless and
    horrible. You have heard the mitigating factors of my life that
    my attorneys feel is relevant in bringing me to this point in
    my life. I would have pled guilty to this first-degree murder
    as early as March of 2012.
    ¶142             The State responded, relying on evidence adduced at trial,
    and argued that “[Johnson] didn’t touch on the tremendous harm and
    suffering and pain. . . . He didn’t care at the time he murdered [the victim]
    after dragging her into the back room, whether she was a mother or that he
    would absolutely destroy a family. He certainly never told you
    that. . . . Instead, when he talks about this crime, he asks about a book
    deal. . . . [H]e laughed when he was talking to Dr. DeMarte, both about the
    murder and the armed robbery. . . . How much sympathy did the
    defendant show any of his victims at any time[?]” The State further argued
    that Johnson “didn’t address a single factor in his life” but “told [the jury]
    that the mitigation [it was] presented . . . [is] what his attorneys believe [is]
    what brought the defendant to that point in his life,” and that, as it related
    to Columbine, “[n]ever once, ever, other than the mention of [his friend]
    Steven, did [the jury] ever hear any statement made by the defendant . . .
    about feeling bad for the murdered classmates, or teachers or the
    wounded.”
    ¶143         Johnson argues that it is improper for the State to take unfair
    advantage of the court’s evidentiary rulings, citing People v. Daggett, 
    225 Cal. App. 3d 751
    , 758 (1990). Daggett is inapposite. There the trial court
    erroneously precluded relevant information—that the child molestation
    victim, who was himself accused in an unrelated case of molesting other
    children, had been molested by other children in the past—and this error
    was compounded by the prosecutor’s argument during closing that the
    victim had learned the inappropriate behavior from being molested by the
    defendant. 
    Id. at 754–57.
    43
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    ¶144          Here, the prerequisite error is missing. The court correctly
    precluded irrelevant Columbine evidence. See supra ¶¶ 68–69, 81. And as
    to his allocution, neither the court nor the State prevented Johnson from
    allocuting; the State argued that it had the right to rebut Johnson’s
    allocution should he claim remorse. See State v. Goudeau, 
    239 Ariz. 421
    , 468
    ¶¶ 207–09 (2016).
    ¶145           As to his claim that the State improperly commented on the
    invocation of his right to remain silent, the State’s comments came in
    response to his allocution, see 
    id. (finding no
    improper comment on the
    defendant’s Fifth Amendment right where the prosecutor’s comments
    came in response to the defendant’s allocution), and were based on
    evidence in the record, see State v. Anderson, 
    210 Ariz. 327
    , 350 ¶ 97 (2005)
    (allowing the prosecutor to comment that evidence was “not particularly
    relevant” or “entitled to little weight”). The State’s Columbine comments
    followed its argument that although Johnson presented a large portion of
    evidence regarding the Columbine shooting, no mitigation witness could
    testify that Johnson expressed remorse for the Columbine victims. Instead,
    the State argued, the evidence showed that Johnson felt sympathy for the
    shooters because they were bullied. No misconduct occurred.
    iv. Misstating the law
    ¶146         Johnson argues the State misstated the law by arguing that
    the jurors had to find one mitigating circumstance was alone sufficient to
    warrant leniency, where mitigation is correctly considered in the aggregate.
    Johnson bases his argument on a statement in the State’s closing:
    What value, what import, what importance, what weight, if
    any, do you give to a fact you believe was proven? Does it
    reduce      the    defendant’s    moral   culpability,  his
    blameworthiness for the murder?         And, finally, is it
    sufficiently substantial—is it proven and sufficiently
    substantial to call for leniency?
    ¶147          But the entirety of the State’s closing argument shows no
    misconduct occurred. The State correctly reiterated that the jurors “must
    decide how compelling or persuasive the totality of the mitigating factors
    are against the totality of the aggravating factors.” The State’s comment
    was only an argument that, as to each of Johnson’s ten proffered mitigating
    44
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    circumstances, the jurors should evaluate each one to determine whether it
    was proven by a preponderance of the evidence and whether it truly related
    to an aspect of Johnson’s background, character, propensities, record or
    circumstance of the offense. The State never argued that the jurors were
    limited to considering one mitigating factor to the exclusion of others or
    that Johnson had to prove that any single mitigating factor was sufficiently
    substantial on its own to warrant leniency.
    v. Shifting the burden of proof
    ¶148         Johnson argues the State shifted the burden of proof to
    Johnson to submit evidence and prove his innocence. During the guilt
    phase closing argument, the State argued in rebuttal:
    The physical evidence in this case does not have a motive or
    a reason to lie. And the plain and simple matter is that if what
    the defense is arguing to you is true there would be evidence
    to support those claims and there’s an overwhelming lack of
    any evidence that anyone, other than the defendant,
    committed these crimes. This was a thorough and complete
    investigation regardless of the attacks you just heard.
    Johnson did not object.
    ¶149           Due process requires the State to prove every element of a
    charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 
    397 U.S. 358
    , 364
    (1970). The State improperly shifts the burden when it implies a duty upon
    the defendant to prove his innocence or the negation of an element, see State
    v. Corona, 
    188 Ariz. 85
    , 91 (App. 1997), and otherwise errs when it comments
    upon the failure of a defendant to testify or present a defense, see State v.
    Still, 
    119 Ariz. 549
    , 551 (1978). However, “[a] comment that certain facts
    brought out by the prosecution are uncontradicted is not objectionable.”
    
    Still, 119 Ariz. at 551
    .
    ¶150          The entirety of the State’s rebuttal closing argument was that,
    while Johnson argued in closing that the State did not prove that he
    committed the crime, “[Johnson] just did not count on the phone evidence,
    the DNA evidence, and those cell phone towers we know now he drove by
    going to the scene, while waiting at the scene, and running away, driving
    away from the scene.” Further, the State did not argue unprompted that
    45
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    Johnson failed to show someone else committed the murder. During his
    closing, Johnson argued the investigation was inadequate and inferred that
    someone else committed the crime even though he never noticed a third-
    party defense. The State objected. Cf. State v. Acosta, 
    101 Ariz. 127
    , 129
    (1966) (“The general context of the argument surrounding the statements
    complained of was not to allude to defendant’s failure to testify, but rather
    to bring home the point that the evidence was, at least in the view of counsel
    for the state, uncontroverted, and justified a verdict of guilt.”). No
    misconduct occurred.
    vi. Impugning the integrity of defense counsel
    ¶151           Johnson argues the State repeatedly impugned the integrity
    of defense counsel. Johnson fails to develop his argument, however, and so
    we find it waived. 
    Bolton, 182 Ariz. at 298
    . Regardless, we note that the
    comments Johnson cites were either made in response to defense theories,
    mischaracterized in Johnson’s briefing, or occurred outside the presence of
    the jury. See Acuna 
    Valenzuela, 245 Ariz. at 220
    ¶ 93 (“[R]eferring to defense
    evidence as ‘myth’ or ‘fanciful’ and attacking defense theories [is]
    permissible, so long as it is directed at defense theories rather than defense
    counsel.”) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
    vii. Arguing inferences and conclusions during openings
    ¶152            Johnson argues the State improperly argued inferences and
    conclusions during opening. “Opening statement is counsel’s opportunity
    to tell the jury what evidence they intend to introduce. [It] is not a time to
    argue the inferences and conclusions that may be drawn from evidence not
    yet admitted.” 
    Bible, 175 Ariz. at 602
    (citation omitted).
    ¶153           During the guilt phase opening, Johnson claims the State
    improperly focused on the victim’s family’s use of an interpreter by stating
    “their home language . . . is what is comfortable and safe . . . [a]s they listen
    to these horrific details of the murder.” Johnson argues this opening
    comment was paired with the State’s request during closing that the jury
    remember “how [the family] appeared in front of [them] heartbroken and
    the difficulties they encountered . . . trying to put into words in a language
    with letters and symbols we don’t understand, with the use of an
    interpreter[, t]he enormity of this loss, their grief, funneled through the
    interpreter.”
    46
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    ¶154          Johnson also argues the State impermissibly implied that the
    crime included deliberation, a conclusion, during its opening by arguing
    that Johnson took “the time effort and deliberation” to commit the murder.
    Again, Johnson timely objected.
    ¶155          As to the first statements, the prosecutor’s comments were not
    improper, but even if they were, any error was harmless. The jury was
    repeatedly instructed that the lawyer’s arguments were not evidence and
    the jurors were able to judge for themselves the manner in which the family
    spoke and the murder’s effect on them. See State v. Newell, 
    212 Ariz. 389
    , 403
    ¶ 68 (2006) (stating “[w]e presume that . . . jurors follow[] the court’s
    instructions”).
    ¶156          As to the second statement, the prosecutor’s comment was a
    conclusion drawn from the facts and thus improper argument in opening
    remarks. But again, the error was harmless. The jury was instructed that
    the lawyer’s arguments were not evidence. 
    Id. And “[w]hile[]
    the comment
    during opening statement was improper at that point, it was a reasonable
    inference from evidence later introduced and would have been proper
    during closing argument.” 
    Bible, 175 Ariz. at 602
    .
    viii. Vouching
    ¶157          Johnson argues the State engaged in vouching. “Two general
    forms of prosecutorial vouching exist: (1) when ‘the prosecutor places the
    prestige of the government behind its witness’; or (2) when ‘the prosecutor
    suggests that information not presented to the jury supports the witness’s
    testimony.’” Acuna 
    Valenzuela, 245 Ariz. at 217
    ¶ 75 (quoting State v.
    Vincent, 
    159 Ariz. 418
    , 423 (1989)). “Placing the prestige of the state behind
    its witness ‘involves personal assurances of a witness’s veracity,’ while
    ‘[t]he second type of vouching involves prosecutorial remarks that bolster
    a witness’s credibility by reference to matters outside the record.’” Acuna
    
    Valenzuela, 245 Ariz. at 217
    ¶ 75 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. King,
    
    180 Ariz. 268
    , 277 (1994)).
    47
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    a. The prestige of the government
    ¶158          Johnson first argues that the State placed the weight of the
    government behind the witnesses by arguing that the victim’s daughter
    testified with “wisdom beyond her years” and that her husband “stood
    before you and told you how his family suffered a profound loss” which
    was “the measure of a man.” Johnson did not object.
    ¶159           But these statements, taken in the context of closing
    argument, do not establish vouching. Neither statement placed the weight
    of the government behind a witness by providing personal assurances of a
    witness’s veracity, cf. 
    Vincent, 159 Ariz. at 423
    (where the prosecutor argued
    that “the State wouldn’t have put Mr. Calaway on the witness stand if [it]
    didn’t believe every word out of his mouth”), nor did the statements imply
    that the jury should find them more credible because they were State
    witnesses, see Acuna 
    Valenzuela, 245 Ariz. at 217
    ¶ 75 (stating that vouching
    of this kind “involves personal assurances of a witness’s veracity” (quoting
    
    King, 180 Ariz. at 277
    )).
    ¶160           Johnson also claims the prosecutor improperly vouched by
    placing the weight of the government behind herself during arguments to
    the court, by avowing that she “probably touched those pages more times
    than the defense,” by arguing that she was “so detailed” and “so prepared”
    for her interviews, and by stating her “office’s position” on certain issues—
    “Judge, our office’s position is that the . . . State shouldn’t be in a position
    to come up with it just because the State disagrees.” But reviewing the
    record, we do not find that the State’s arguments to the court regarding its
    position on a disputed matter constitute vouching. And further, we note
    that each cited argument was made outside the presence of the jury. 3
    b. Facts not in evidence
    ¶161          Johnson next argues the State vouched by implying that facts
    not in evidence supported the State’s desired verdict. First, Johnson argues
    3  Johnson argues, for the first time in his reply brief, that the State
    improperly vouched by using “we know” statements. See Acuna 
    Valenzuela, 245 Ariz. at 218
    ¶ 85. Because Johnson did not raise the issue in his opening
    brief, we do not consider it. State v. Cannon, 
    148 Ariz. 72
    , 79 (1985).
    48
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    the State improperly vouched by implying that the judicial system already
    dismissed Johnson’s claim of innocence:
    You would have to believe this man is the unluckiest man on
    the face of the planet if you’re to buy he was just merely
    present. You would also have to think the last four weeks of
    your life were an absolute waste because he just happened to
    be there. It’s not a coincidence. It’s not dumb, bad luck.
    Everything you’ve heard, everything the state has shown you
    is evidence of the defendant’s guilt.
    Johnson did not object.
    ¶162           The State’s comment was based on evidence in the record and
    did not imply that facts not in evidence supported the State’s desired
    verdict. Cf. State v. Leon, 
    190 Ariz. 159
    , 161–62 (1997) (where the prosecutor
    argued that the jury was “not going to have the inside information as to
    what occurred”).        Neither was the State’s comment isolated nor
    unprompted. Rather, the State’s comment came in response to Johnson’s
    cross-examination that attempted to portray Johnson as an unlucky,
    innocent bystander. To the extent the comment that “[y]ou would also have
    to think the last four weeks of your life were an absolute waste because he
    just happened to be there” was improper, any error was harmless, as the
    jury was properly instructed that the law presumed Johnson to be innocent
    and the jury “must not think that the defendant is guilty just because of a
    charge.”
    ¶163          Johnson next claims the State improperly vouched by
    referencing the victim’s family’s use of an interpreter, as discussed above.
    See supra ¶¶ 153, 155. But just as the comments did not suggest the family
    was more credible because the State believed them, neither did they bolster
    the family’s credibility by reference to something other than the facts in the
    record. No misconduct occurred.
    ix. Appealing to fears and sympathy
    ¶164         Johnson claims the State improperly played to the jury’s fears
    and sympathies. During its guilt phase closing argument, the State argued
    the following:
    49
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    These were the last injuries inflicted, completely, totally
    without a doubt unnecessary. Completely. Completely.
    Completely unnecessary. As she was dying, as her heart no
    longer could beat, as her lungs could no longer fill with air,
    he’s carving into her stomach.
    ....
    If the defendant did nothing wrong or was just simply at the
    wrong place at the wrong time, why the lies and why the
    nature that little cutting mocking humor, but then again this
    is the same man who within an hour of leaving [Fu] tucked
    away in that back room could eat dinner with [his girlfriend]
    and spend part of the evening with his parents.
    ....
    The killer is the defendant and he killed with premeditation.
    He killed with deliberation. He killed after thinking about it
    and he killed after he could have stopped and he killed
    because he wanted to and then he carved into her body
    because he wanted to.
    Johnson did not object.
    ¶165          “Attorneys, including prosecutors in criminal cases, are given
    wide latitude in their closing arguments to the jury.” State v. Comer, 
    165 Ariz. 413
    , 426 (1990). Within that wide latitude, the State “may comment
    on the vicious and inhuman nature of the defendant’s acts.” 
    Id. The State
    may not, however, make arguments which appeal to the passions, fears, or
    prejudices of the jury. 
    Id. at 426–27.
    ¶166          The arguments here were not an appeal to fear, as the State
    made no argument that, in the absence of a guilty verdict, Johnson would
    pose a future danger. Instead, the arguments were directed at how terrible
    the murder was. To the extent the argument should have been reserved for
    the aggravation phase of the trial and went to the (F)(6) aggravator, any
    impropriety in the guilt phase closing was harmless. The comments did
    not have the effect of encouraging the jury to convict on a basis other than
    the evidence and the elements of the offense. Further, as in Escalante-
    Orozco, the comments were fleeting and unconnected, and the jury was
    instructed that the lawyer’s comments were not evidence and that they
    50
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    were “not [to] be influenced by 
    sympathy.” 241 Ariz. at 282
    ¶ 102
    (alteration in original). The comments were “not of such magnitude to
    deprive [Johnson] of a fair trial” during either the guilt phase or the
    aggravation phase. 
    Id. (citation omitted).
    x. Encouraging the jury to use the verdict to send a message
    ¶167         Johnson argues the State improperly encouraged the jury to
    use its verdict to send a message. During her penalty phase closing
    argument, the prosecutor argued:
    Someone much smarter than I am gave a quote that a society
    declares its attitude toward crime by the punishment it exacts.
    We express how we feel about crime by the punishment we
    impose.
    Another simple, less artful way to say this is that the
    punishment should fit the crime. And should reflect the
    horror, the disgust, that all of you must have felt as these days
    in trial unfolded and you saw the full extent of what this man
    has been capable—capable of in his life.
    ¶168          The prosecutor further argued later in closing that:
    The death penalty is such an expression of moral outrage for
    crimes that some people choose to commit. Our society has a
    death penalty because we have a right to express our moral
    outrage for such behavior, and because you have a right to
    demand where does personal responsibility fit in? Because
    the exaggerations, the blame, and the excuses, and the lies are
    all going to stop now.
    Johnson did not object to either comment.
    ¶169         But the State did not ask the jury to send a message to the
    community. Cf. United States v. Runyon, 
    707 F.3d 475
    , 514–15 (4th Cir. 2013)
    (“Whereas reminding the jury that it ‘express[es] the conscience of the
    community’ nevertheless maintains a proper focus on the defendant (since
    any ‘expression’ is directed at the defendant alone), urging it to ‘send a
    message to the community’ invites it to play to an audience beyond the
    51
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    defendant” and “to use its decision . . . to serve some larger social objective,”
    which “is at least in tension with the individualized assessment of the
    defendant’s culpability that the Constitution requires.”) (alteration in
    original; Sinisterra v. United States, 
    600 F.3d 900
    , 910–11 (8th Cir. 2010)
    (finding error where the prosecutor linked the defendant’s charges to the
    broader drug problem, told the jury to act as the “conscience of the
    community,” and asked the jury to send a message with its verdict)). The
    State focused its argument on Johnson and argued that “the punishment
    should . . . fit the defendant, the criminal, in addition to fitting the crime.”
    xi. Improperly seeking to inflame the jury
    ¶170          Johnson argues the State committed misconduct by
    attempting to inflame the jury, by arguing the murder was “grotesque,”
    “brutal,” “bizarre,” “horrific,” and “violent,” and by using the following
    adjectives to describe Johnson’s actions: “severely,” “terribly,” “vicious,”
    and “ceremoniously.”
    ¶171         Johnson claims that during its mitigation phase opening
    statements, the State further attempted to inflame and taint the jury by
    arguing that Johnson’s mitigation witnesses had “bias,” “motive,” and
    maybe even “an agenda.”
    ¶172         Finally, Johnson claims the State, during its closing argument,
    improperly tarnished the defense and its witnesses by telling the jury:
    The problem with all of the evidence [Johnson] wants and
    needs you to believe is that a lot of it is simply just not true,
    was just not proven, or is exaggerated, or is presented in such
    a way to make you feel responsible that the defendant is now
    found guilty of first-degree murder with circumstances, those
    three [aggravators] that you found, that made the defendant
    eligible for the death penalty.
    The bottom line is that the mitigation presented is not
    sufficiently substantial to justify leniency in this case.
    Johnson never objected.
    52
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    ¶173           The State certainly used strong language during opening
    statements to describe the murder, but the evidence would later indicate
    that the murder was violent and brutal. See State v. Phillips, 
    202 Ariz. 427
    ,
    437 ¶ 47 (2002) (finding no impropriety in the prosecutor’s opening
    statement that defendant’s actions were “terrorizing,” that he appeared
    “outraged, beyond control, and absolutely terrifying,” and that the victims
    were “cowering, hiding, and praying to God Almighty” because those
    remarks were based on the evidence), superseded by statute on other grounds
    as recognized in State v. Carlson, 
    237 Ariz. 381
    (2015).
    ¶174           The State’s warning of “bias” and “motive” addressed the
    credibility of Johnson’s witnesses and responded to Johnson’s attempt to
    bolster his mitigation witnesses’ credibility. During Johnson’s opening, he
    stated:
    Ladies and gentlemen, you’re going to hear from [Johnson’s]
    friends, family, former classmates. We all know they’re going
    to be put in an uncomfortable seat as witnesses . . . . They’re
    not professional witnesses . . . .
    ....
    They’re certainly not going to be as polished as some of those
    other witnesses that you heard . . . .
    ....
    They’re going to be subject to cross-examination, too. And
    like all witnesses, you have to consider their credibility; but
    again, consider their situation. They’re here because they love
    [Johnson]. . . . Decide their credibility, but these folks are
    coming from a good place to come and testify for [Johnson],
    and they didn’t do anything wrong.
    The State’s comments were not improper.
    ¶175          Nor were the State’s final comments, supra ¶ 172, an attempt
    to appeal to the jurors’ emotions by telling them the defense was trying to
    make them feel guilty about their decisions. Even if the comments could be
    read to represent an attack on the defense, see 
    Hulsey, 243 Ariz. at 390
    ¶¶ 98–
    99, they were minor and couched in the State’s argument that the jury was
    to impose the death penalty if it did not find mitigation sufficiently
    53
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    substantial to call for leniency. On this record, we cannot say that any of
    these statements affected the jury’s verdict or deprived Johnson of a fair
    trial, especially in light of the jury instructions that counsel’s arguments
    were not evidence.
    xii. Cumulative effect
    ¶176           Johnson argues the State repeatedly used improper
    arguments to obtain a conviction and death sentence and that the
    cumulative impact of its misconduct deprived him of due process. See
    Acuna 
    Valenzuela, 245 Ariz. at 223
    ¶ 118. But “[c]umulative error requires
    reversal only when misconduct is ‘so pronounced and persistent that it
    permeate[s] the entire atmosphere of the trial, indicating that the prosecutor
    intentionally engaged in improper conduct and did so with indifference, if
    not a specific intent, to prejudice the defendant.’” 
    Id. at 224
    ¶ 119 (quoting
    State v. Payne, 
    233 Ariz. 484
    , 515 ¶ 134 (2013)).
    ¶177          Here, the record does not support Johnson’s claim. Johnson
    rarely objected and ignores that several of the purported improper
    comments occurred outside the presence of the jury during argument to the
    court. Indeed, the record reveals only a few minor instances of misconduct
    relating to improper inferences during opening statements. Accordingly,
    Johnson has failed to show the allegations so infected his trial as to deprive
    him due process.
    Q. Motion to Change Counsel
    ¶178          Johnson argues the court improperly denied his two motions
    to change counsel. We review the court’s denial of a request for new
    counsel for an abuse of discretion. State v. Cromwell, 
    211 Ariz. 181
    , 186 ¶ 27
    (2005).
    ¶179          “A criminal defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to
    representation by competent counsel.” 
    Id. ¶ 28;
    see also U.S. Const. amend.
    VI. “The presence of an irreconcilable conflict or a completely fractured
    relationship between counsel and the accused ordinarily requires the
    appointment of new counsel.” 
    Id. ¶ 29.
    However, “single allegation[s] of
    lost confidence,” “disagreements over defense strategies,” or other conflicts
    “less than irreconcilable” do not necessarily require the appointment of
    new counsel. 
    Id. Rather, “[t]o
    constitute a colorable claim, a defendant’s
    54
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    allegations must go beyond personality conflicts or disagreements”; the
    defendant instead bears the burden to demonstrate “facts sufficient to
    support a belief that an irreconcilable conflict exists warranting the
    appointment of new counsel in order to avoid the clear prospect of an unfair
    trial.” 
    Id. at 187
    ¶ 30.
    i. Johnson’s 2015 motion to change counsel
    ¶180          In September 2015, Johnson filed a motion to change counsel
    and asked that “any competent lawyer” be substituted for all future
    proceedings. Johnson complained that (1) he wanted to see every motion
    defense counsel had filed on his behalf, but his lawyers had not sent them;
    (2) he had not seen the most recent “plea proposal” and that his lawyers
    included jail intel in the proposals over his objection; (3) his lawyers had
    not filed motions that other capital defendants had filed in their cases; and
    (4) his lawyers had not given him copies of his mental health reports.
    ¶181           Johnson’s lawyers explained that they had not sent the mental
    health records to the prison for confidentiality reasons and that they had
    not sent a copy of every motion filed because the agency did not have the
    staff to send him five years’ worth of information at the time. His lawyers
    assured the court that they had filed all appropriate motions on Johnson’s
    behalf and spoke with Johnson “on a regular basis.” His lawyers denied
    that there was an irreconcilable conflict but acknowledged that if Johnson
    refused to cooperate in the future or insisted on inappropriate trial
    strategies, then one could develop.
    ¶182           The court informed Johnson that it found his lawyers were
    thorough, prepared, and diligent. The court further praised how
    consistently prepared Johnson’s lawyers were, despite complex issues, and
    how well they had worked with opposing counsel. The court denied
    Johnson’s motion, advised Johnson that he would be disadvantaged by a
    change of counsel because his current counsel had firsthand knowledge of
    all aspects of his case, and recommended that Johnson cooperate with his
    counsel.
    ¶183           Johnson has not met his burden to show that an irreconcilable
    conflict existed. Johnson’s disagreements in his 2015 motion were minor,
    and his attorneys regularly contacted him. Cf. State v. Gomez, 
    231 Ariz. 219
    ,
    224 ¶ 20, 225–26 ¶ 29 (2012) (concluding trial court did not err in denying
    55
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    motion for change of counsel where defendant alleged that defense counsel
    had not visited him in more than a year and had not devoted enough time
    to prepare for the case). And though defense counsel noted there were
    some frustrations, counsel advised the court that they could continue to
    work together. The court was in the best position to consider the evidence
    of a conflict, found it insufficient, and so do we. See 
    Cromwell, 211 Ariz. at 187
    ¶ 35 (stating that the denial of the motion for change of counsel is
    discretionary and finding no abuse of discretion).
    ¶184           Nevertheless, Johnson argues the court erred by failing to
    consider the State v. LaGrand factors. See 
    152 Ariz. 483
    , 486–87 (1987)
    (stating that the court should consider “whether new counsel would be
    confronted with the same conflict; the timing of the motion; inconvenience
    to witnesses; the time period already elapsed between the alleged offense
    and trial; the proclivity of the defendant to change counsel; and quality of
    counsel”).
    ¶185          But “[t]he nature of the inquiry will depend upon the nature
    of the defendant’s request.” State v. Torres, 
    208 Ariz. 340
    , 343 ¶ 8 (2004).
    And in the grand scheme, the “request for new counsel should be examined
    with the rights and interest of the defendant in mind tempered by
    exigencies of judicial economy.” 
    LaGrand, 152 Ariz. at 486
    .
    ¶186           Johnson argues the court erred by focusing on his counsel’s
    competence, citing 
    Torres, 208 Ariz. at 344
    ¶ 15 (stating that “in most cases,
    . . .‘quality of counsel’” will not be a factor to consider when defendant
    requests substitution of counsel), but Johnson’s complaints regarding the
    motions his lawyers were filing on his behalf necessarily concern the
    adequacy of counsel and whether they were properly representing his
    interests. As the court recognized, nothing in the record indicated they
    were not.
    ¶187           As to the other LaGrand factors, “although the trial court could
    have engaged in a more searching exploration” of Johnson’s claims and
    counsel’s responses, “the court did not abuse its discretion because it
    sufficiently inquired into the purported [breakdown.]” State v. Champagne,
    No. CR 17-0425, 
    2019 WL 3676317
    , at *3 ¶ 13 (Ariz. Aug. 7, 2019) (alteration
    omitted) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The court sought
    out counsel’s responses to Johnson’s claim of a breakdown and found them
    sufficient to dispel any concern. Further, the court considered that
    56
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    Johnson’s motion came four years into his case after many complex issues
    were resolved and found that he would be disadvantaged because not all
    firsthand knowledge his counsel possessed could be communicated to new
    counsel. The court did not abuse its discretion in denying Johnson’s 2015
    motion to change counsel.
    ii. Johnson’s 2016 motion to change counsel
    ¶188         During the penalty phase, Johnson made an oral motion for
    change of counsel. Johnson complained that (1) his lawyers were not asking
    the questions he wanted; (2) his attorneys did not impeach Detective
    Denning with a statement he believed was impeachment worthy; (3) his
    lawyers were not objecting to statements Dr. DeMarte assigned to him as
    Johnson expected they would; and (4) when Johnson requested to waive his
    presence because his friend was in attendance, his lawyers were overly
    concerned when told the friend’s identity.
    ¶189          The court responded that Johnson’s case was complicated and
    informed him that his lawyers had to make “difficult decisions on the fly,”
    so “there’s always a possibility of miscommunication [and] changes in
    strategy, depending on how the evidence comes in.” However, nothing
    Johnson told the court persuaded it that the level of communication was
    diminished enough that the attorney-client relationship was affected.
    Rather, the court advised Johnson that his counsel was doing a “pretty darn
    good job, and they’re doing their best for you,” and denied his motion.
    ¶190           The court did not abuse its discretion in denying Johnson’s
    2016 motion to change counsel. Again, the disagreements were minor and
    related to trial strategy. See 
    Cromwell, 211 Ariz. at 186
    ¶ 29 (stating that
    differences in strategy are not an irreconcilable conflict). Though Johnson
    guessed that he and his counsel had “this communication breakdown
    between us” and that the relationship was “strained,” the record does not
    suggest the relationship was fractured. After his 2015 motion to change
    counsel request, but before trial, Johnson filed a request to represent himself
    in the armed robbery matter, but specifically stated, when asked if he was
    getting along with his current counsel, “Yeah, yes, I am.” Johnson further
    stated that nothing about his current counsel was bothering him and
    accepted that his current counsel would remain his advisory counsel for the
    armed robbery matter, without complaint.
    57
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    ¶191          Based on Johnson’s general complaints, the timing of his
    motion to change counsel, and the lack of evidence indicating the
    relationship was fractured or that communication was impaired, we hold
    the court did not abuse its discretion in denying his 2016 motion to change
    counsel.
    R. Abuse of Discretion Review
    ¶192           Arizona law requires that we “review the sentencing portion
    of the trial even when a defendant fails . . . to challenge the jury’s decision
    with regard to either the aggravating factors or the imposition of the death
    sentence.” State v. Morris, 
    215 Ariz. 324
    , 340 ¶¶ 75–76 (2007); see also A.R.S.
    § 13-756(A).
    i. Aggravating circumstances
    ¶193           We will uphold the jury’s findings of aggravating
    circumstances “if there is ‘any reasonable evidence in the record to sustain
    it.’” 
    Morris, 215 Ariz. at 341
    ¶ 77 (quoting State v. Veatch, 
    132 Ariz. 394
    , 396
    (1982)). As to the (F)(6) aggravator, we have already confirmed that
    substantial evidence supports it. See supra ¶¶ 26–32. Evidence also
    supports the jury’s findings of the (F)(2) and (F)(7) aggravators: for the
    (F)(2) aggravator, that Johnson was previously convicted of a serious
    offense—the armed robbery—and for the (F)(7) aggravator, that Johnson
    committed the murder while on probation and release.
    ii. Imposition of the death sentence
    ¶194          We will uphold the jury’s death verdict “if any reasonable
    juror could conclude that the mitigation presented was not sufficiently
    substantial to call for leniency.” State v. Naranjo, 
    234 Ariz. 233
    , 250 ¶ 89
    (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    ¶195          Johnson presented the following mitigating factors to the
    jury: (1) Johnson’s capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct
    or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was significantly
    impaired but not so impaired as to constitute a defense to prosecution;
    (2) Johnson has a genetic predisposition to substance abuse; (3) Johnson has
    a genetic predisposition to mental health issues; (4) Johnson was adopted
    as an infant and has been diagnosed as suffering from dissociative disorder
    58
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    as a result of his adoption, i.e., “adopted-child syndrome”; (5) Johnson was
    a freshman at Columbine High School at the time of the infamous school
    shooting and has been diagnosed with PTSD as a result; (6) Johnson was an
    adolescent when he started abusing substances and has a history of
    substance abuse; (7) Johnson has a history of mental illness; (8) Johnson’s
    willingness to accept full responsibility for his actions and his willingness
    to plead guilty to all charges and agree to be sentenced to life in prison
    without the possibility of parole; (9) Johnson’s life has value to his family
    and friends; and (10) Johnson has the love and support of his family.
    ¶196           Johnson’s mitigation focused mainly on his substance abuse,
    the Columbine shooting, and his PTSD, but was countered by the State
    during rebuttal. Though Johnson argued that Columbine changed and
    affected him, the State produced evidence showing that Johnson abused
    drugs and acted recklessly before the Columbine shooting. The State also
    presented rebuttal showing the Columbine shooting’s impact on Johnson
    was not as severe as he claimed. Johnson presented evidence that he was
    bullied because of his adoption and race, but the evidence also indicated
    that his family loved and supported him and that his cousins protected him
    from bullying. Further, although Johnson presented the testimony of Dr.
    Kirschner to establish adopted-child syndrome, family members testified
    that Johnson did not display anger about his adoption or otherwise show
    that it negatively affected him. And despite his family’s love and support,
    Johnson’s family recognized he was untruthful and dangerous at times.
    ¶197           Johnson argued that he had a genetic predisposition to
    substance abuse, but the State showed Johnson’s erratic behavior was not
    limited to drugs: he street-raced cars, passed counterfeit money, and
    engaged in fights. To the extent medical experts diagnosed Johnson with
    PTSD and personality disorder NOS, the State produced evidence
    indicating that Johnson underreported or misrepresented his behavior.
    Last, to the extent Johnson claimed remorse, his sincerity was undercut by
    testimony from Dr. DeMarte that he laughed and was dismissive about the
    murder.
    ¶198           Even if Johnson’s mitigation evidence were given its full
    weight, the jurors could reasonably have concluded that it did not call for
    leniency in light of the brutality and senselessness of the murder along with
    the other aggravating factors. The jury did not abuse its discretion when it
    sentenced Johnson to death.
    59
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    S. Excessive Page Limits
    ¶199           Though not raised by either party, we must address the
    excessive lengths of Johnson’s briefs. Some cases are more complex than
    others, and in those cases, flexibility is required. But Johnson’s filings
    stretch that flexibility too far.
    ¶200           Johnson submitted an original opening brief totaling 105,621
    words and covering more than 400 pages, nearly four times our limit, which
    itself is greatly expanded beyond page limits in civil and non-capital
    criminal cases. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.14(a) (limiting opening briefs to
    28,000 words). We struck it but nevertheless granted him 42,000 words to
    file a revised opening brief. In doing so, we stated:
    In all capital cases, the Court independently reviews the
    record in its entirety, including all evidence, transcripts, and
    briefs. For that reason counsel’s arguments regarding the
    need to file a brief far exceeding the extended page limits
    provided for capital cases are not well-taken, and in any event
    they should have been raised in advance of the due date to
    prevent further delay in this case.
    ¶201          Johnson complied, submitting 41,958 words, but did so by
    shortening some of his arguments and relegating record citations and legal
    citations to footnotes without legal analysis. See Ariz. R. Crim. P.
    31.10(a)(7)(A) (requiring arguments to contain (1) “appellant’s contentions
    with supporting reasons for each contention,” along with (2) “citations of
    legal authorities and appropriate references” to the record). Johnson
    essentially “evade[d] our page limit by manipulating the format of his
    brief,” of which we disapprove. 
    Bolton, 182 Ariz. at 298
    .
    ¶202          In response, the State argued that Johnson had waived issues
    that were not sufficiently developed, specifically issues H, M, O, and P.
    Johnson then claimed this Court’s previous order and imposition of a
    42,000-word limit prevented him from fully developing his arguments. In
    Bolton, we rejected that exact argument. 
    Id. (noting the
    “[d]efendant could
    very well have complied with our rules in the first instance”). There, we
    “strongly disapprove[d] of defendant’s attempt to create legal issues out of
    60
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    his own failure to cooperate with this [C]ourt in reviewing his case.” 
    Id. We do
    so again here. 4
    ¶203           Nevertheless, we granted Johnson 21,000 words in his reply
    brief, 7,000 more than our traditional limit, see Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.14(a)
    (limiting reply briefs to 14,000 words), to further develop the arguments
    that the State claimed were waived. Johnson submitted a 41,853 word reply
    brief. By Johnson’s own recording, 9,072 words were spent supplementing
    the challenged issues, while 32,781 words were for its regular reply. Its
    32,781-word reply alone exceeds our order by over 10,000 words.
    ¶204         Johnson argues he could not comply with our word limits
    because winnowing issues is unethical, citing ABA Guidelines 6.8(a)(5) and
    comment to Guideline 10.15.1.C, along with 
    Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604
    (noting
    the importance of procedural protections to ensure the reliability of
    sentencing). We reject Johnson’s argument. As we stated in State v. Atwood:
    Each member of this court is acutely aware of the gravity of
    the decisions we are called upon to make in capital cases.
    Therefore, to argue that such deviations from professional
    appellate practice as occurred in this case are justifiable
    because the death penalty is at issue is unpersuasive. Rather
    than aiding our review of defendant’s case by judiciously
    selecting, fully researching, and concisely arguing the
    colorable issues raised by the trial record, appellate counsel
    has bombarded this court with a salvo of dubious claims
    serving little purpose other than to detract from those issues
    having arguable legal merit.
    
    171 Ariz. 576
    , 659 (1992).
    ¶205          Good advocacy requires winnowing.
    Legal contentions, like the currency, depreciate through over-
    issue. The mind of an appellate judge is habitually receptive
    4 To dispel any concern that Johnson did not have time to edit his briefs to
    comply with our limits, he requested, and we granted, five extensions. And
    when we struck his original opening brief in April 2018, we granted him an
    additional month to edit his brief to comply.
    61
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    to the suggestion that a lower court committed an error. But
    receptiveness declines as the number of assigned errors
    increases. Multiplicity hints at lack of confidence in any
    one. . . . [E]xperience on the bench convinces [us] that
    multiplying assignments of error will dilute and weaken a
    good case and will not save a bad one.
    Robert H. Jackson, Advocacy Before the United States Supreme Court, 25
    Temple L.Q. 115, 119 (1951).
    ¶206          Similarly, good advocacy requires editing. It may be that it is
    “harder to write shorter and crisper,” Bryan A. Garner, Interview with Chief
    Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., 13 Scribes J. Legal Writing 5, 33 (2010) (quoting
    Chief Justice Roberts), and that writing with “[s]implicity and clarity”
    requires more “rounds of editing,” Bryan A. Garner, Interview with Justice
    Clarence Thomas, 13 Scribes J. Legal Writing 99, 99 (2010) (quoting Justice
    Thomas), but such is the price of good advocacy. We do not read the ABA
    Guidelines to provide otherwise.
    ¶207           Indeed, in State v. Amaya-Ruiz, we were “able to address the
    21 arguments submitted by defendant under 11 issues, reflecting our belief
    that the brief could have withstood further editing without compromising
    the quality of its arguments.” 
    166 Ariz. 152
    , 183 (1990) (stating that the
    court’s page limits do not infringe due process rights). Here, we
    consolidated twenty-one arguments into seventeen issues, some of which
    were foreclosed by previous decisions. And without stating which
    arguments were overdeveloped (or without merit), we conclude that
    Johnson could have effectively edited his arguments to fit within the
    provided word count. Our conclusion is bolstered by our independent
    review of the record, finding no reversible error.
    ¶208         Johnson is entitled to a meaningful opportunity to be heard,
    but that does not mean that he may decline to comply with this Court’s
    requirements and orders or that he is excused from the obligation to edit
    his work.
    T. Issues Preserved for Federal Review
    ¶209          Johnson identifies thirty-two issues he seeks to preserve for
    federal review. As he concedes, we have previously rejected each of his
    62
    STATE V. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court
    claims. We decline to revisit them.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶210         For the reasons above, we affirm Johnson’s convictions and
    sentences.
    63