Don Shooter v. Toby Farmer ( 2014 )


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  •                                 IN THE
    SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA
    DON SHOOTER, INDIVIDUALLY,
    Plaintiff/Appellant,
    v.
    TOBY FARMER, INDIVIDUALLY, REAL PARTY IN INTEREST; HELEN PURCELL,
    IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS MARICOPA COUNTY RECORDER; BOARD OF
    SUPERVISORS OF MARICOPA COUNTY, A PUBLIC ENTITY; ROBYN
    STALLWORTH POUQUETTE, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS YUMA COUNTY
    RECORDER; YUMA COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, A PUBLIC ENTITY;
    LESLIE M. HOFFMAN, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS YAVAPAI COUNTY
    RECORDER; YAVAPAI COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, A PUBLIC ENTITY;
    KEN BENNETT, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ARIZONA SECRETARY OF
    STATE,
    Defendants/Appellees.
    No. CV-14-0180-AP/EL
    Filed July 29, 2014
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    The Honorable John Christian Rea, Judge
    No. CV2014-008772
    AFFIRMED
    COUNSEL:
    Timothy A. La Sota, Tiffany & Bosco, P.A., Phoenix, for Don Shooter
    Keith Beauchamp, Roopali H. Desai, Coppersmith Brockelman PLC,
    Phoenix, for Toby Farmer
    William G. Montgomery, Maricopa County Attorney, M. Colleen Connor,
    Deputy County Attorney, Phoenix, for Maricopa County Appellees
    Thomas C. Horne, Arizona Attorney General, Michele L. Forney, Assistant
    Attorney General, Phoenix, for Ken Bennett
    SHOOTER V. FARMER
    Opinion of the Court
    The Court, by a panel comprising CHIEF JUSTICE BALES, VICE CHIEF
    JUSTICE PELANDER, and JUSTICE TIMMER, issued its decision per
    curiam.
    PER CURIAM:
    ¶1            This petition challenge seeks to remove Toby Farmer’s name
    from the primary ballot for the office of State Senator for Legislative District
    13. Don Shooter appeals from the trial court’s order declining to remove
    Farmer’s name based on alleged “petition forgery.” We entered an order
    affirming the trial court’s judgment and denying Farmer’s request for
    attorney’s fees, stating that a written decision would follow. This is that
    decision.
    I.
    ¶2              “[A]ll petitions . . . submitted by a candidate who is found
    guilty of petition forgery shall be disqualified and that candidate shall not
    be eligible to seek election to a public office for a period of not less than five
    years.” A.R.S. § 16-351(F). In Moreno v. Jones, 
    213 Ariz. 94
    , 101 ¶ 38, 
    139 P.3d 612
    , 619 (2006), we held that the term “petition forgery” in § 16-351(F)
    refers to the class 1 misdemeanor defined in A.R.S. § 16-1020. That statute
    prohibits a range of conduct, the most relevant being “[a] person knowingly
    signing any name other than his own to a nomination petition.” § 16-1020.
    Thus, candidates suffer automatic disqualification and a ban of five or more
    years if they sign another person’s name on their nomination petitions, or
    if they knowingly cause another person to do the same. See A.R.S. § 13-303
    (criminal liability based upon another’s conduct).
    ¶3             Shooter demonstrated at trial that seven of the signatures on
    two of Farmer’s petition sheets were signed by persons other than the
    voters whose names had been signed. He did not provide any evidence,
    however, as to who had forged the signatures, and he chose not to call
    Farmer as a witness. Farmer, on the other hand, presented a handwriting
    expert who opined that Farmer had not signed the questioned signatures.
    Shooter showed that Farmer had signed the circulator’s oath on both sheets,
    attesting that he had been present when the signatures were signed. Farmer
    signed the circulator’s oath on a total of thirty-three sheets, bearing 216
    voter signatures. From these facts, Shooter asked the trial court to infer that
    Farmer knew of the forgeries, which the court declined to do. Finding “no
    2
    SHOOTER V. FARMER
    Opinion of the Court
    evidence” that Farmer knew of the forgeries, the court determined that
    petition forgery had not been proved and therefore did not remove
    Farmer’s name from the ballot.
    II.
    ¶4             We defer to the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are
    clearly erroneous. State v. Forde, 
    233 Ariz. 543
    , 556 ¶ 28, 
    315 P.3d 1200
    , 1213
    (2014). Shooter argues that whether an inference ought to be drawn is a
    matter of law. However, the inference that Shooter seeks is the presence of
    a fact, namely, Farmer’s alleged knowledge of the forgeries. “The trial
    court, not this court, weighs the evidence and resolves any conflicting facts,
    expert opinions, and inferences therefrom.” In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights
    to Use Water in Gila River Sys. & Source, 
    198 Ariz. 330
    , 340 ¶ 25, 
    9 P.3d 1069
    ,
    1079 (2000) (emphasis added).
    ¶5            Because we cannot say that the trial court’s factual findings
    were clearly erroneous, we affirm the trial court’s ruling that petition
    forgery was not proved. Even without the seven signatures that the trial
    court found to be forgeries, Farmer still had hundreds more valid
    signatures than he needed for his name to appear on the ballot.
    ¶6            Farmer requests attorney’s fees, arguing that Shooter’s
    petition forgery claim was “without substantial justification,” A.R.S. § 12-
    349(A)(1), meaning that it “is groundless and is not made in good faith,”
    § 12-349(F). Because we do not conclude that Shooter acted in bad faith, we
    deny Farmer’s request for fees. We also deny his request for fees under
    § 12-349(A)(2)–(3).
    III.
    ¶7           We therefore affirm the trial court’s judgment and deny
    Farmer’s request for attorney’s fees.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: CV-14-0180

Filed Date: 7/29/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014