Bill Parrot v. Daimlerchrysler Corporation ( 2006 )

SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA
En Banc
BILL PARROT, ) Arizona Supreme Court
) No. CV-05-0104-PR
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
) Court of Appeals
v. ) Division One
) No. 1 CA-CV 04-0121
DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION, )
) Maricopa County
Defendant-Appellee. ) Superior Court
) No. CV02-008392
)
__________________________________) O P I N I O N
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
The Honorable Jonathan H. Schwartz, Judge
AFFIRMED
Opinion of the Court of Appeals, Division One
210 Ariz. 143, 108 P.3d 922 (App. 2005)
VACATED
________________________________________________________________
KROHN & MOSS, LTD. Phoenix
By Marshall Meyers
Ian Pryor
Attorneys for Bill Parrot
BOWMAN AND BROOKE LLP Phoenix
By Negatu Molla
Jennifer L. Haman
Attorneys for DaimlerChrysler Corporation
________________________________________________________________
R Y A N, Justice
¶1 In this case, we must determine whether an automobile
lessee can maintain an action under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty
Act (“Warranty Act” or “Act”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (2000),
and whether the lessee has a right to pursue remedies under the
Arizona Motor Vehicle Warranties Act (“Lemon Law”), Ariz. Rev.
Stat. (“A.R.S.”) §§ 44-1261 to -1267 (2003 & Supp. 2005). We
hold that, under the circumstances of this case, a lessee
neither can sue under the Warranty Act nor have remedies under
the Lemon Law.
I
¶2 Bill Parrot leased a 2000 Jeep Cherokee from Pitre
Chrysler Plymouth Jeep Eagle (“Pitre”) in Scottsdale, Arizona.
The Jeep came with “Chrysler’s standard limited warranty.”
Simultaneously with executing its lease with Parrot, Pitre
assigned the lease to the lender, Chrysler Financial Company,
L.L.C. Pitre apparently retained title to the vehicle.1
¶3 Parrot alleges that while he possessed the vehicle, he
had to bring it to various dealerships at least thirteen times
for repairs including: at least eleven times for suspension/axle
defects; four times for alignment defects; three times for a
windshield leak; three times for brake defects; and once for an
exhaust system defect.
¶4 Dissatisfied with the repair work done on the Jeep,
1
At oral argument, Parrot claimed for the first time that
Pitre sold the Jeep to Chrysler Financial. However, nothing in
the record establishes that any such sale occurred.
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Parrot filed suit in superior court alleging that
DaimlerChrysler had breached its written warranty and seeking
remedies under the Warranty Act and the Lemon Law. The parties
filed cross motions for summary judgment. The trial court
granted DaimlerChrysler’s motion for summary judgment.
¶5 Parrot appealed. The court of appeals reversed,
concluding that Parrot was a consumer subject to protection
under both the Warranty Act and the Lemon Law. Parrot v.
DaimlerChrysler Corp., 210 Ariz. 143, 150-51, ¶¶ 30, 33, 39, 108
P.3d 922, 929-30 (App. 2005).
¶6 We granted DaimlerChrysler’s petition for review
because the applicability of the Warranty Act and the Lemon Law
to lessees is an issue of first impression for this Court. We
have jurisdiction under Article 6, Section 5(3), of the Arizona
Constitution and A.R.S. § 12-120.24 (2003).
II
¶7 This matter concerns the interpretation of the
Warranty Act and the Lemon Law. Statutory interpretation is an
issue of law and is decided de novo. Canon Sch. Dist. No. 50 v.
W.E.S. Constr. Co., 177 Ariz. 526, 529, 869 P.2d 500, 503
(1994). “We interpret statutes to give effect to the
legislature’s intent. When a statute is clear and unambiguous,
we apply its plain language” to find the legislature’s intent
and do “not engage in other means of statutory interpretation.”
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Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 283, ¶ 14, 110 P.3d 1013,
1017 (2005) (citing Aros v. Beneficial Ariz., Inc., 194 Ariz.
62, 66, 977 P.2d 784, 788 (1999)). A statute is clear and
unambiguous when it admits of only one meaning. Millett v.
Frohmiller, 66 Ariz. 339, 345, 188 P.2d 457, 461 (1948).
¶8 We first examine the Warranty Act and then turn to
Arizona’s Lemon Law. Under neither is Parrot entitled to
relief.
III
A
¶9 In response to complaints “from irate owners of motor
vehicles complaining that automobile manufacturers and dealers
were not performing in accordance with the warranties on their
automobiles,” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. Abrams, 899
F.2d 1315, 1317 (2d Cir. 1990) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 93-1107
(1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7702, 7708), Congress
enacted the Warranty Act in 1975. The purpose of the Warranty
Act is “to prevent warranty deception.” Milton R. Schroeder,
Private Actions under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 66 Cal. L.
Rev. 1, 9 (1978) (“Schroeder”). To further that purpose, the
Act requires conspicuous disclosure of the “terms and
conditions” of warranties “in simple and readily understood
language.” 15 U.S.C. § 2302(a). And, “[t]o enforce its
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requirements, the Act permits ‘a consumer who is damaged by the
failure of a supplier, warrantor, or service contractor to
comply with any obligation under this chapter, or under a
written warranty, implied warranty, or service contract’ to sue
warrantors for damages and other relief in any court of
competent jurisdiction.” DiCintio v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 768
N.E.2d 1121, 1123 (N.Y. 2002) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1)).
To bring a cause of action under the Warranty Act, a person must
be a consumer of a consumer product and have a written warranty,
implied warranty, or service contract, as those terms are
defined by the Warranty Act.2
¶10 The Warranty Act defines “consumer product” as “any
tangible personal property which is distributed in commerce and
which is normally used for personal, family or household
purposes.” 15 U.S.C. § 2301(1). The parties agree that the
Jeep is a consumer product. Therefore, the dispositive issue is
whether Parrot is a consumer as defined by the Act.
¶11 The Act creates three categories of consumers. Id. §
2301(3). The first category includes “a buyer . . . of any
consumer product,” other than for purposes of resale. Id. The
second encompasses “any person to whom [a consumer product] is
2
Although the Warranty Act also refers to implied warranties
and service contracts, because the issue before this Court is
whether Parrot has the right to enforce a written warranty, we
limit our analysis to written warranties.
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transferred during the duration of . . . [a] written warranty.”
Id. The third category includes “any other person who is
entitled by the terms of such warranty . . . or under applicable
State law to enforce against the warrantor . . . the obligations
of the warranty.” Id.
¶12 Each category requires a qualifying sale - a sale in
which a person buys a consumer product for purposes other than
resale. The first category necessarily involves a qualifying
sale by its own terms, requiring that a consumer be a
“buyer . . . of any consumer product.” Id. (emphasis added).
The necessity of a qualifying sale for categories two and three
consumers arises from the Warranty Act’s definition of “written
warranty.” DiCintio, 768 N.E.2d at 1124.
¶13 The Warranty Act defines “written warranty” as:
(A) any written affirmation of fact or written promise
made in connection with the sale of a consumer product
by a supplier to a buyer which relates to the nature
of the material or workmanship and affirms or promises
that such material or workmanship is defect free or
will meet a specified level of performance over a
specified period of time, or
(B) any undertaking in writing in connection with the
sale by a supplier of a consumer product to refund,
repair, replace, or take other remedial action with
respect to such product in the event that such product
fails to meet the specifications set forth in the
undertaking,
which written affirmation, promise, or undertaking
becomes part of the basis of the bargain between a
supplier and a buyer for purposes other than resale of
such product.
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15 U.S.C. § 2301(6) (emphasis added).
¶14 Subsections (A) and (B) each expressly require a sale
of a consumer product by a supplier. Id. In addition, both
subsections are modified by the qualifying phrase at the end of
15 U.S.C. § 2301(6). That qualifying phrase calls for the
underlying sale to be to a buyer “for purposes other than
resale” and for the written affirmation, promise, or undertaking
to be part of the basis of the bargain. Id.
¶15 Consequently, the existence of a written warranty, as
defined by the Warranty Act, is a requirement for both category
two and category three “consumer” status. A person cannot be a
category two consumer unless some person purchased the vehicle
for purposes other than resale and the written warranty was
“part of the basis of the bargain between a supplier and a
buyer.” Id.
¶16 Similarly, a person cannot be a category three
consumer unless a qualifying sale has occurred. The category
three definition of “consumer” has two parts. Both parts
require that a qualifying sale occur - that a person purchased
the vehicle for purposes other than resale and that the warranty
was “part of the basis of the bargain between a supplier and a
buyer.” Id.
¶17 The first part states that, in addition to meeting the
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foregoing requirements, a consumer must be a person “entitled by
the terms of such warranty . . . to enforce against the
warrantor . . . the obligations of the warranty.” 15 U.S.C. §
2301(3) (emphasis added). The use of the word “such” to modify
“warranty” logically refers to the previous use of “warranty” in
the statute. The previous use of “warranty” occurs in category
two when it defines a consumer as a person to whom the product
is “transferred during the duration of . . . [a] written
warranty.” Id. Thus, the first part of the definition of a
category three consumer means any person entitled by the terms
of a written warranty to enforce the obligations of the warranty
against the warrantor. As discussed above, the term “written
warranty,” as defined in the Warranty Act, is a “written
affirmation, promise, or undertaking [that] becomes part of the
basis of the bargain between a supplier and a buyer for purposes
other than resale of such product.” Id. § 2301(6) (emphasis
added). Accordingly, to be a category three consumer under the
first part of the definition, a qualifying sale as defined by
the Warranty Act must have occurred.
¶18 The second part of category three defines a consumer
as “any other person who is entitled . . . under applicable
State law to enforce against the warrantor . . . the obligations
of the warranty.” Id. § 2301(3) (emphasis added). In this
second part, the phrase “the warranty” should not be interpreted
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in the generic sense as meaning any warranty. Such an
interpretation would be inconsistent with the statutory scheme
as a whole.
¶19 We presume that Congress uses terms consistently.
See, e.g., United Sav. Ass’n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest
Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988) (noting that statutory
interpretation is “a holistic endeavor”). Other than references
to an implied warranty,3 every other use of the term “warranty”
in 15 U.S.C. § 2301(3) is either a direct reference to “written
warranty” or a short-hand reference to “written warranty.”
Thus, a consistent reading of the second part of section
2301(3)’s definition of a category three consumer requires
interpreting “warranty” as a written warranty as defined by the
Warranty Act.
¶20 We therefore conclude that to be a category three
consumer, a written warranty as defined by the Warranty Act must
exist. Because a written warranty requires a qualifying sale,
to meet the requirements under this category there must be
evidence of such a sale.
B
¶21 Parrot claims that he is a category two or three
3
The Act defines “implied warranty” as “an implied warranty
arising under State law . . . in connection with the sale by a
supplier of a consumer product.” 15 U.S.C. § 2301(7). As noted
in footnote 2, the issue of an implied warranty is not presented
in this case.
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consumer with a written warranty governed by the Warranty Act.
He is neither because no qualifying sale – a purchase for
purposes other than resale – has occurred.
¶22 Parrot conceded at oral argument that Pitre purchased
the Jeep from DaimlerChrysler for the purpose of resale. The
only identifiable sale in the record before this Court is to the
lessor, Pitre, whose ultimate goal is to resell the vehicle.
Consequently, the only sale here was for purposes of resale.
¶23 Even though the language defining a category two
consumer
appears to reach beyond sales of consumer products to
include transactions in which a merchant leases goods
to consumers or in which the consumer is only a
bailee, such a reading is erroneous. The definition[]
of [a] written . . . warrant[y] still require[s] a
sale between a supplier and a buyer. Thus, this
portion of the definition of “consumer” must be viewed
as referring to transferees after an initial sale of
the product. There must be an initial buyer who buys
“for purposes other than resale” of the product.
Schroeder at 11 (second emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
Parrot concedes that there is no such sale here.
¶24 Thus, we hold that because the only sale in this case
was for purposes of resale, Parrot does not have a written
warranty governed by the Warranty Act.
C
¶25 Parrot relies on several recent cases to support his
claim that he is either a category two or three consumer. We do
not find these cases persuasive. For example, in Cohen v. AM
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General Corp., the court concluded that “the purpose of the
transaction . . . was not for resale, but for the lease of the
vehicle.” 264 F. Supp. 2d 616, 619 (N.D. Ill. 2003). The court
based its conclusion on the following factors: the leasing
company would not have purchased the vehicle but for the fact
that the car dealer had entered into a leasing agreement with
the plaintiff; the leasing company did not “intend[] to add the
vehicle to its inventory or advertise it for sale to other
parties”; and it profited through the lease agreement. Id. In
Peterson v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., the court concluded
that when a lessor purchased a vehicle for purposes of leasing
the vehicle instead of reselling it, the lessee came within the
purview of the Act as a category three consumer. 697 N.W.2d 61,
71-73, ¶¶ 33-37, 41-42 (Wis. 2005).
¶26 But here, Parrot conceded that Pitre, the dealer-
lessor, had purchased the Jeep for resale. Thus, both Cohen and
Peterson, in which the purpose of the purchase of the motor
vehicle was found to be for leasing, are inapposite.
¶27 Parrot also relies heavily on opinions that have held
that interpreting the Warranty Act as not applying to leases “is
inconsistent with the purposes of the [Warranty] Act – to
protect the ultimate user of the product.” Szubski v. Mercedes-
Benz, U.S.A., L.L.C., 796 N.E.2d 81, 88, ¶ 28 (Ct. Com. Pl. Ohio
2003); see also Cohen, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 621 (holding that
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“[t]his reading . . . best serves Congress’ goal of ‘better
protecting consumers’”) (citation omitted); Mesa v. BMW of N.
Am., LLC, 904 So. 2d 450, 458 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (same).
Although this interpretation of the Act has a certain
attraction, it does not comport with the plain language of the
Act. As discussed above, a person must be a consumer as defined
under the Warranty Act, which requires that there be a
qualifying sale. See 15 U.S.C. § 2301(3), (6). In the absence
of such a sale, Parrot simply does not qualify as a consumer
under the Act.
¶28 Finally, a few courts, including our court of appeals,
have concluded that if state law permits enforcement of a
written warranty, then the Warranty Act governs that warranty
even if the written warranty does not otherwise meet the
requirements of the Warranty Act. See, e.g., Voelker v. Porsche
Cars N. Am., Inc., 353 F.3d 516, 525 (7th Cir. 2003); Parrot,
210 Ariz. at 148-49, ¶¶ 21-27, 108 P.3d at 927-28; Mesa, 904 So.
2d at 457; Dekelaita v. Nissan Motor Corp., 799 N.E.2d 367, 372
(Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
¶29 We find the reasoning of these courts flawed in two
respects. First, they rely upon an incorrect reading of 15
U.S.C. § 2301(6). Second, they rely upon the mistaken
assumption that the use of the term “the warranty” in the second
part of category three’s definition of “consumer” means that the
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Warranty Act governs any warranty enforceable under state law.
¶30 For instance, in Parrot, the court mistakenly limited
the qualifying phrase “which written affirmation, promise, or
undertaking becomes part of the basis of the bargain between a
supplier and a buyer for purposes other than resale of such
product” to subsection (B) of 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6). See 210
Ariz. at 147, ¶ 15, 108 P.3d at 926.4 Instead, as set forth in
paragraphs 13 and 14, above, the qualifying phrase applies to
both subsection (A) and (B) of § 2301(6). See also 16 C.F.R. §
700.11(b) (“A written warranty must be ‘part of the basis of the
bargain.’ This means that it must be conveyed at the time of
sale of the consumer product . . . .”).
4
Specifically, the court quoted the definition of a warranty
in the following manner:
any written affirmation of fact or written promise
made in connection with the sale of a consumer product
by a supplier to a buyer which relates to the nature
of the material or workmanship and affirms or promises
that such material or workmanship is defect free or
will meet a specified level of performance over a
specified period of time, or
any undertaking in writing in connection with the sale
by a supplier of a consumer product to refund, repair,
replace, or take other remedial action with respect to
such product in the event that such product fails to
meet the specifications set forth in the undertaking,
which written affirmation, promise, or undertaking
becomes part of the basis of the bargain between a
supplier and a buyer for purposes other than resale of
such product.
Parrot, 210 Ariz. at 147, ¶ 15, 108 P.3d at 926 (emphasis
added).
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¶31 This error led the court to conclude that, to be a
category two consumer, one need only have a “written
warranty . . . ‘made in connection with the sale’ of a consumer
product by ‘a supplier’ to ‘a buyer.’” Parrot, 210 Ariz. at
147, ¶ 15, 108 P.3d at 926 (citations omitted). Likewise, the
court’s conclusion that Parrot is a category three consumer
rests in part on its mistaken reading of 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6).
See id. at 148, ¶¶ 21-22, 108 P.3d at 927.
¶32 In Dekelaita, the court concluded that the lessee was
a category three consumer because the lessee was entitled to
enforce the warranty under state law. 799 N.E.2d at 372. This
conclusion rested on the premise that “the third [category] does
not exclusively require that the warranty meet[] the Act’s
definition if in fact it is enforceable under state law.” Id.
at 374.
¶33 But Dekelaita comes to this conclusion without any
discussion of the statute or reference to “warranty” as used in
the definition of a category three consumer. See id. at 372.
Instead, the court simply assumed that a category three consumer
may obtain remedies under the Warranty Act if a warranty is
enforceable under state law. See id. But this is an incorrect
reading of the reference to warranty in the definition of a
category three consumer. Under 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6), for the Act
to apply, a purchase for purposes other than resale is required.
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Dekelaita simply does not address these requirements.
¶34 The court in Dekelaita nevertheless went on to
conclude that a written warranty, as defined by the Warranty
Act, existed in that case. See id. at 372-74. This conclusion,
however, relies upon the same mistaken reading of 15 U.S.C. §
2301(6) as was made in Parrot. See Dekelaita, 799 N.E.2d at
370.
¶35 Because the court in Dekelaita relied on this
misreading of 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6), it ignored the issue of
whether the sale was for purposes other than resale and whether
the written warranty was part of the basis of the bargain
between the supplier and the buyer.5 See 799 N.E.2d at 372-74.
Dekelaita’s holding that all that is necessary to be a category
three consumer is to have some warranty that is enforceable
under state law is based upon a mistaken premise.
¶36 In Voelker, the court depended upon the holding in
Dekelaita to conclude that because the lessee could enforce the
5
The court in Dekelaita does note that the question of
whether the car was purchased for resale was important in the
DiCintio opinion. 799 N.E.2d at 375. But it dismisses
DiCintio’s reasoning by stating “[t]he problem with that
reasoning is that most automobile purchasers buy a car with the
ultimate goal of resale . . . . Under the DiCintio court’s
reasoning, few buyers could ever enforce the Act.” Id. (citing
Cohen, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 620). Because Parrot has conceded
that the purchase by Pitre – the only purchase in the record in
this case – was for purposes of resale, we need not today decide
whether other purchasers qualify under the terms of the Act.
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warranty under state law, the lessee was a category three
consumer. 353 F.3d at 524 (citing Dekelaita, 799 N.E.2d at
372). Because we do not find Dekelaita persuasive precedent for
this proposition, we decline to follow Voelker.
¶37 We therefore hold that because Pitre purchased the
vehicle for purposes of resale, and there is no other qualifying
sale on the record before us, Parrot does not qualify as a
consumer under the Warranty Act. As a result, he cannot
maintain an action against DaimlerChrysler under the Warranty
Act.6
IV
¶38 The Warranty Act “apparently was not successful in
resolving consumer problems with chronically defective
automobiles.” Abrams, 899 F.2d at 1317. As a result, a number
of states enacted so-called lemon laws. Id.; see also Joan
Vogel, Squeezing Consumers: Lemon Laws, Consumer Warranties, and
a Proposal for Reform, 1985 Ariz. St. L.J. 589, 592 (“Due to the
inadequacy of the UCC and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, thirty
seven states have now passed lemon laws to deal with automobile
warranty disputes.”). Arizona enacted its version of a lemon
law in 1984. See 1984 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 265, § 1 (codified
as amended at A.R.S. §§ 44-1261 to -1265).
6
This does not mean Parrot has no remedies. DaimlerChrysler
acknowledged that Parrot “retains any common law” or other
possible remedies.
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¶39 The Lemon Law definition of “consumer” parallels the
definition in the Warranty Act:
“Consumer” means the purchaser, other than for
purposes of resale, of a motor vehicle, any person to
whom the motor vehicle is transferred during the
duration of an express warranty applicable to the
motor vehicle or any other person entitled by the
terms of the warranty to enforce the obligations of
the warranty.
A.R.S. § 44-1261(A)(1). An important difference between the
Lemon Law and the Warranty Act is that the Lemon Law does not
define the term “warranty.” Accordingly, the requirement that
there be a sale for purposes other than resale does not apply to
warranties under the Lemon Law. Thus, although Parrot would not
qualify as a category one consumer under the Lemon Law because
he did not purchase the Jeep, he may qualify as a category two
or three consumer under A.R.S. § 44-1261(A)(1). However, we
need not decide whether Parrot would qualify as a category two
or three consumer because of the limited remedies afforded by
the Lemon Law.
¶40 The Lemon Law’s remedies for the failure of a
manufacturer “or its authorized dealers” to correct or repair
“any defect or condition which substantially impairs the
use . . . of the motor vehicle,” are replacing the vehicle “or
accept[ing] return of the motor vehicle from the consumer and
refund[ing] to the consumer the full purchase price, including
all collateral charges, less a reasonable allowance for the
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consumer’s use of the vehicle.” A.R.S. § 44-1263(A).
¶41 Both remedies assume that the consumer has the right
to transfer title to the vehicle back to the manufacturer. Only
the owner of the vehicle or holder of title can transfer title.
See A.R.S. § 28-2058 (2004). This record, however, establishes
that Pitre is the owner and title holder; at oral argument
Parrot conceded that he did not have title in the vehicle. A
person who neither owns a vehicle nor has title to it cannot
return the vehicle to the manufacturer, nor is he entitled to
have the defective vehicle replaced by another. Therefore,
under the Lemon Law, Parrot has no remedy.
¶42 That the statute’s remedies are inapplicable to
lessees is implicit in A.R.S. § 44-1263(A), which provides
express protection of a “lienholder,” requiring that “[t]he
manufacturer shall make refunds to the consumer and lienholder,
if any, as their interests appear,” without providing protection
for lessors.
¶43 Our conclusion is bolstered by a 1992 amendment to the
section of Arizona’s version of the Uniform Commercial Code7
pertaining to leases. See 1992 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 226, § 4
(codified as amended at A.R.S. §§ 47-2A101 to -2A532 (2005)).
In the section governing revocation of acceptance of a lease,
lessors and lessees may agree to be bound by the Lemon Law and
7
A.R.S. §§ 47-1101 to -10102 (2005).
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not by the Uniform Commercial Code:
The lessee and lessor may, by a conspicuous writing
contained in the lease or elsewhere, provide that the
provisions of this section will not apply to a new
motor vehicle which is otherwise subject to the
provisions of title 44, chapter 9, article 5 [the
Lemon Law]. . . . When the parties have so agreed,
then for the purposes of title 44, chapter 9, article
5, the lessee shall be deemed the consumer of the
motor vehicle, with the lessor having all the rights
of a lienholder in such motor vehicle.
A.R.S. § 47-2A517(F). Subsection F recognizes that although
leases may be “otherwise subject” to the Lemon Law, the remedies
provided in section 44-1263(A) are, as a practical matter,
simply not available to the lessee. As the latter part of
subsection F makes clear, for such remedies to be available, the
lessee and lessor have to be made the functional equivalents of
a consumer and a lienholder. There is no “conspicuous writing”
evidencing such an agreement in this case.
¶44 Furthermore, a proponent of the amendment noted that
“unlike a buyer, a lessee normally does not have the right to
sell or otherwise alienate title to the leased goods, an
important reason why it may often be inappropriate to allow the
lessee the remedies available under the lemon law.” State Bar
of Ariz., Corp., Banking and Commercial Loan Section, Comm. on
U.C.C. Article 2A, Report of the Comm. on Article 2A (Oct. 1,
1991) (on file with Ariz. Legislative Council) (related to H.B.
2421, Fortieth Legislature, Second Regular Sess.) Accordingly,
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unless the lessor and lessee have expressly provided in writing
to permit the lessee “to ‘sell’ the vehicle back to the
manufacturer or other responsible party or to exercise other
remedies under the lemon law,” a lessee has no remedy under the
Lemon Law. Because Parrot and Pitre did not expressly provide
for such a contingency, Parrot’s claim under the Lemon Law
fails.
V
¶45 For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the decision of
the court of appeals and affirm the summary judgment entered by
the superior court.
__________________________________
Michael D. Ryan, Justice
CONCURRING:
_________________________________________
Ruth V. McGregor, Chief Justice
_________________________________________
Rebecca White Berch, Vice Chief Justice
_________________________________________
Andrew D. Hurwitz, Justice
_________________________________________
W. Scott Bales, Justice
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