Lillqvist v. Hon. fish/brigham ( 2017 )


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  •                      NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    ANN-CATRINE LILLQVIST, Petitioner,
    v.
    THE HONORABLE GEOFFREY FISH, Judge of the SUPERIOR COURT
    OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA, in and for the County of MARICOPA,
    Respondent Judge,
    ALEXANDER F. BRIGHAM, Real Party in Interest.
    No. 1 CA-SA 17-0270
    FILED 12-21-2017
    Petition for Special Action from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. FC 2013-006119
    The Honorable Geoffrey H. Fish, Judge
    JURISDICTION ACCEPTED IN PART AND DECLINED IN PART;
    RELIEF GRANTED IN PART
    COUNSEL
    Dickinson Wright PLLC, Phoenix
    By Leonce A. Richard, III
    Counsel for Petitioner
    The Cavanagh Law Firm, P.A., Phoenix
    By Christina S. Hamilton
    Counsel for Real Party in Interest
    LILLQVIST v. HON. FISH/BRIGHAM
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop delivered the decision of the Court, in which
    Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie and Judge Peter B. Swann joined.
    W I N T H R O P, Judge:
    ¶1             Petitioner, Ann-Catrine Lillqvist (“Wife”), filed a petition for
    special action challenging the family court’s order of contempt for her
    failure to comply with the Property Settlement Agreement (“PSA”) by not
    signing over to Alexander Brigham (“Husband”) a disputed annuity and a
    quit claim deed of the Maine residence. Wife also challenged the court’s
    award of attorneys’ fees to Husband. For the following reasons, we accept
    jurisdiction concerning the contempt finding of the annuity, but deny relief;
    accept jurisdiction concerning the contempt finding for the Maine residence
    and grant relief; and decline jurisdiction concerning the issue of attorneys’
    fees.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2            In September 2014, the parties entered a Rule 69 settlement
    agreement, evidenced by a PSA, and enlisted their former attorney to help
    allocate and move the marital assets per that agreement. The trial court
    entered a decree of dissolution of a non-covenant marriage between the
    parties’ in January 2015. In its decree, the court found: “[t]he parties’
    Property Settlement Agreement dated the 9th day of December 2014, is
    approved and incorporated herein . . . but is specifically not merged herein
    and shall survive as an independent contract between the parties. The
    parties are ordered to comply with the terms of the Property Settlement
    Agreement as the Order of this Court.”
    ¶3            The PSA provided that Husband “assign, grant, convey and
    transfer” specific, delineated property to Wife, and that Wife “assign, grant,
    convey and transfer” all “property not allocated to Wife” to Husband.
    Under Husband’s award of property, it listed the assets he was to receive,
    which included the Maine residence.
    ¶4          On May 5, 2017, Husband filed a petition for enforcement
    with the family court alleging he was entitled to the Advisor’s Edge
    2
    LILLQVIST v. HON. FISH/BRIGHAM
    Decision of the Court
    Variable Annuity (the “Annuity”)1 and Maine residence pursuant to the
    PSA. Wife moved for summary judgment, arguing the Annuity was an
    omitted asset, and thus, subject to equal division. Husband cross-moved
    for summary judgment.
    ¶5            The family court held an evidentiary hearing on August 23,
    2017. At the hearing, the parties’ former attorney and asset-manager
    throughout the proceedings, testified that a share file system was
    established for the parties’ to securely view their financial information. The
    asset-management attorney also created a PowerPoint to show how the
    assets were to be distributed. The PowerPoint “roadmap” showed a
    balance sheet, which listed the division of the tax-deferred assets: $16,834
    to Wife and $671,105 to Husband. The division of the tax-deferred assets
    and the distribution of the property was approved by both parties. Neither
    the PSA nor the roadmap, detailing the distribution of assets, specifically
    referred to the Annuity. However, the asset-management attorney testified
    at length that it was evident from the description and calculation of the
    various assets that the Annuity was included in Husband’s portion of tax-
    deferred assets.
    ¶6            As a part of the property distribution, and PSA, Wife was
    required to transfer to Husband any property she was not entitled to, which
    included the Annuity and Maine residence. Wife, however, refused to
    transfer the Annuity, and only signed over the Maine residence once the
    petition to enforce was filed. In Wife’s defense, she testified that although
    she looked at the roadmap, she did not understand what was meant by tax-
    deferred assets, and did not know it included the Annuity.
    ¶7           The family court denied the motion and counter-motion for
    summary judgment, finding genuine issues of material fact existed. The
    court then found that although the Annuity was not specifically listed in
    the PSA, it was clear from the evidence, and the language of the PSA, that
    the Annuity was a part of Husband’s property award.2 The court further
    found Wife’s testimony that she was confused about the Annuity not
    1     Both Wife and the family court refer to this asset as the
    “Transamerica Annuity.”
    2      The court found the parties clearly contemplated that Husband
    would receive the Annuity based on the share file system and the total
    amount of tax-deferred assets, of which Wife was only to be awarded
    $16,834.
    3
    LILLQVIST v. HON. FISH/BRIGHAM
    Decision of the Court
    credible, at least in part because Wife was represented by highly
    experienced attorneys.
    ¶8            The court awarded the Annuity to Husband, and found Wife
    in contempt for failing to transfer the Annuity and sign the deed to the
    Maine residence. The court awarded Husband attorneys’ fees incurred for
    Wife’s failure to perform under the PSA by failing to timely sign the Maine
    residence deed, and ordered Wife to pay a portion of Husband’s reasonable
    attorneys’ fees and costs for the evidentiary hearing.
    ¶9           On October 25, 2017, Wife filed this petition for special action,
    arguing the court erred in holding her in contempt because the court
    improperly interpreted the parties’ PSA. 3
    JURISDICTION
    ¶10           Special action jurisdiction is available when there is no other
    equally plain, speedy or adequate remedy by appeal.4 Ariz. R. Spec. Act.
    1(a). “An order holding a party in contempt for refusing to obey a court
    order is not appealable and may only be reviewed through special action.”
    BMO Harris Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Bluff, 
    229 Ariz. 511
    , 513, ¶ 5 (App. 2012);
    accord Stoddard v. Donahoe, 
    224 Ariz. 152
    , 154, ¶ 7 (App. 2010).
    ANALYSIS
    ¶11 “We review [a] civil contempt finding . . . for an abuse of discretion.”
    
    Stoddard, 224 Ariz. at 154
    , ¶ 9 (citing Munari v. Hotham, 
    217 Ariz. 599
    , 605,
    ¶ 25 (App. 2008)). “We do not reweigh the evidence and we accept the
    factual findings made by the superior court unless clearly erroneous.” 
    Id. at 154-55
    (citing Imperial Litho/Graphics v. M.J. Enters., 
    152 Ariz. 68
    , 72 (App.
    1986)).
    3     Wife also argues the court cannot hold her in contempt for violating
    the PSA because the PSA is not a court order. Wife’s argument is not
    supported by the evidence. The court’s decree of dissolution specifically
    ordered the parties to comply with the PSA “as the Order of this Court.”
    4      We decline jurisdiction of Wife’s argument that the family court
    improperly awarded Husband’s attorneys’ fees because this argument is
    best brought as an appeal, not a special action. Regardless, Wife’s request
    is premature. Husband submitted his request for attorneys’ fees, and as of
    the time of his special action response, is awaiting a decision from the court.
    4
    LILLQVIST v. HON. FISH/BRIGHAM
    Decision of the Court
    I.     Annuity
    ¶12            At the evidentiary hearing, the asset-management attorney
    testified that both parties had access to a share file system. This system
    allowed the parties to view all assets subject to distribution. The parties
    further received a PowerPoint roadmap, which included calculations for
    the tax-deferred assets, detailing how the assets would be allocated and
    distributed. Although the Annuity was not specifically mentioned in the
    PSA or roadmap, the family court found it was readily discoverable
    through the share file system, and could be further identified by looking at
    the amounts under tax-deferred assets. Wife confirmed she received the
    roadmap, and only after her approval were the assets distributed. Wife
    now argues she was unaware of the Annuity or its allocation during the
    distribution process. The family court, however, was in the best position to
    determine the quality of the evidence and the parties’ credibility on this
    issue, and we see no abuse of the court’s discretion in this regard.
    ¶13          Although the court could have simply ordered Wife to
    comply with the PSA after finding the PSA awarded the Annuity to
    Husband, it did not do so, and its finding is supported by reasonable
    evidence. We cannot say, on this record, that the court abused its discretion
    in holding Wife in civil contempt. 5
    II.    Maine Residence
    ¶14         Wife argues she cannot be found in contempt regarding the
    Maine residence because she signed over the residence to Husband. We
    agree.
    ¶15           The “purpose of finding a person in civil contempt is to coerce
    that person to do or refrain from doing some act.” Korman v. Strick, 
    133 Ariz. 471
    , 474 (1982). Thus, “a civil contemnor is always purged of the civil
    contempt and coercive force when he or she complies with the court’s
    order.” 
    Id. Although Wife
    did not sign over the Maine residence until the
    5       The court does not specify whether it found Wife in civil or criminal
    contempt. We assume, however, that Wife was found in civil contempt. See
    Ong Hing v. Thurston, 
    101 Ariz. 92
    , 98 (1966) (“criminal contempt is the
    commission of a disrespectful act directed at the court itself which obstructs
    justice [and] civil contempt is the disobeyance of a court order directing an
    act for the benefit or advantage of the opposing party” (citing Van Dyke v.
    Superior Court of Gila Cty., 
    24 Ariz. 508
    , 524 (1922))).
    5
    LILLQVIST v. HON. FISH/BRIGHAM
    Decision of the Court
    petition to enforce was filed, she did sign it at some point before the hearing.
    Accordingly, Wife could not be found in contempt because she had already
    complied with the court’s order. Thus, the court abused its discretion in
    finding Wife in contempt for failing to sign over the Maine residence before
    the hearing.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶16           For the foregoing reasons, we accept jurisdiction concerning
    the contempt finding of the annuity, but deny relief; accept jurisdiction
    concerning the contempt finding for the Maine residence and grant relief;
    and decline jurisdiction concerning the issue of attorneys’ fees.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED: AA
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1 CA-SA 17-0270

Filed Date: 12/21/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/21/2017