Hub v. maricopa/ador ( 2015 )


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  •                          NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    HUB PROPERTIES TRUST,
    a Maryland Real estate investment trust,
    Plaintiff/Appellant,
    v.
    MARICOPA COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Arizona;
    THE ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,
    an agency of the State of Arizona,
    Defendants/Appellees.
    No. 1 CA-TX 14-0005
    FILED 1-27-2015
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    TX2011-000654
    The Honorable Dean M. Fink, Judge
    AFFIRMED
    COUNSEL
    Mooney, Wright & Moore, PLLC, Mesa
    By Paul J. Mooney, Jim L. Wright
    Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant
    Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix
    By Kathleen A. Patterson
    Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Maricopa County
    Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
    By Kenneth J. Love, Jerry A. Fries
    Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Arizona Department of Revenue
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Presiding Judge Patricia A. Orozco delivered the decision of the Court, in
    which Judge Randall M. Howe and Judge Maurice Portley joined.
    O R O Z C O, Judge:
    ¶1           Hub Properties Trust (Hub) appeals the grant of summary
    judgment in favor of Maricopa County and the Arizona Department of
    Revenue (collectively the State). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2           This appeal concerns a property tax assessment for real
    property in Maricopa County identified as parcels 111-46-132, 111-46-133,
    111-46-138, 111-46-143, 111-46-146 and 111-46-148 (the Property) for tax
    year 2011. Hub purchased the Property from the City of Phoenix (the City)
    on March 4, 2011. When the City owned the Property, it was exempt from
    property taxes pursuant to Arizona Constitution Article 9 Section 2(1) and
    Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) section 42-11102.A. (West 2015).1
    ¶3            After Hub purchased the Property, the County Assessor’s
    Office determined the Property was no longer exempt municipal
    commercial property. As a result, the Property was included in the
    Assessor’s roll as taxable property and was included in the County’s tax roll
    for tax year 2011. The Maricopa County Board of Supervisors then fixed,
    levied and assessed property taxes for the Property for the County’s
    assessment and tax roll for the 2011 tax year.
    1We cite the current version of applicable statutes when no revisions
    material to this decision have since occurred.
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    HUB v. MARICOPA/ADOR
    Decision of the Court
    ¶4            Hub subsequently brought suit claiming the taxes assessed on
    the Property were illegally collected because the Property “was not subject
    to ad valorem taxation” and appealed the Property’s valuation. The parties
    filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the former claim and the tax
    court granted the State’s motion, finding the Property was no longer tax
    exempt after the City sold it to Hub. The parties subsequently settled Hub’s
    valuation claim and the tax court entered a stipulated judgment on that
    issue. Hub timely appealed the tax court’s grant of summary judgment in
    favor of the State. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, section 9 of
    the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21.A.1 and -2101.A.1 (West
    2015).
    DISCUSSION
    ¶5              We review the grant of summary judgment and questions of
    law, including the interpretation of statutes, de novo. Maycock v. Asilomar
    Dev., Inc., 
    207 Ariz. 495
    , 498, 500, ¶¶ 14, 24, 
    88 P.3d 565
    , 568, 570 (App. 2004).
    In reviewing issues of statutory construction, we look to the statute’s plain
    language to determine its meaning. Koss Corp. v. American Express Co., 
    233 Ariz. 74
    , 79, ¶ 12, 
    309 P.3d 898
    , 903 (App. 2013).
    I.     Property Tax Exemption
    ¶6             All property in Arizona is subject to taxation unless expressly
    exempt. See A.R.S. § 42-11002. Such an exemption applies to federal, state,
    county, and municipal property. Ariz. Cons. art. 9 § 2.1; A.R.S. § 42-
    11102.A. There is a general presumption against tax exemptions and laws
    creating property tax exemptions are to be strictly construed. See Verde
    Valley Sch. v. Yavapai Cnty., 
    90 Ariz. 180
    , 182, 
    367 P.2d 223
    , 225 (1961).
    ¶7            When a taxpayer claims a tax exemption, it must be
    specifically granted by statute. New Cornelia Coop. Mercantile Co. v. Ariz.
    State Tax Comm’n, 
    23 Ariz. App. 324
    , 327, 
    533 P.2d 84
    , 87 (App. 1975).
    Moreover, “[t]he taxpayers have the burden of establishing the right to an
    exemption from taxation.” McElhaney Cattle Co. v. Smith, 
    132 Ariz. 286
    , 291,
    
    645 P.2d 801
    , 806 (1982).
    ¶8            On appeal, Hub argues that because the City owned the
    Property “during the entire assessment period for the tax year 2011, on the
    tax lien date, and for more than two full months of the tax year at issue
    herein,” the Property was tax exempt during tax year 2011. Thus, Hub
    contends the Property was illegally taxed that year. Hub’s argument stems
    from the notion that once property is exempt, it is exempt for the entire tax
    year even if there is a change of use or ownership. Hub argues:
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    HUB v. MARICOPA/ADOR
    Decision of the Court
    [A]lthough the [ ] Property was arguably non-exempt for ten
    months out of tax year 2011-despite being tax exempt during
    the entire assessment period for tax year 2011, and on the
    statutory lien date-the Legislature has not provided for the
    prorated taxation of real property that transitions from
    government ownership to private ownership during the tax
    year. Simply put, there is no provision in the law for the
    prorated taxation of such property. Absent such a provision,
    there is no legal authority for the [State’s] actions in this case.
    ¶9            Although the City owned the property during the pertinent
    property valuation period, that is not dispositive in determining whether
    the Property was tax exempt while Hub owned it in tax year 2011. The
    statute provides that the County Assessor shall determine the Property’s
    “full cash value” on or before January 1, 2010 for the State’s 2011 tax roll.
    See A.R.S. §§ 42-13051.B.2, -11001.19(a) (West 2015). After the sale to Hub,
    the Property was no longer exempt municipal commercial property. On or
    before the first Monday in August 2011, the Maricopa County Board of
    Supervisors “fix[ed], lev[ied], and assess[ed]” property taxes for the
    Property in accordance with A.R.S. § 42-17151.A.1. (West 2015). There is no
    dispute that Hub owned the Property during the 2011 assessment period.
    ¶10            The tax court correctly noted the logical extension of Hub’s
    position that “taxable status is fixed on the valuation date” is that if the State
    had purchased the Property from a private, taxable party, the State could
    be required to pay property taxes until the next valuation period. This
    would clearly contravene the plain meaning of both Article 9, Section 2 of
    the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 42-11102.A “There shall be exempt
    from taxation all federal, state, county and municipal property.” Ariz. Cons.
    art. 9, § 2 (emphasis added). “Federal, state, county and municipal property
    is exempt from taxation[.]” A.R.S. § 42-11102.A (emphasis added).
    ¶11           Moreover, we find Hub has failed to meet its burden of
    showing it was entitled to a property tax exemption for tax year 2011 and
    cannot point to a statutory provision that explicitly grants such an
    exemption. The tax court concluded, “[t]he period of exemption . . . begins
    on the date the property enters government ownership and ends on the date
    it leaves government ownership.” We agree. Although the Property was
    tax exempt while the City owned it in 2011, the exemption was lifted when
    Hub purchased the Property in March. See City of Phoenix v. Elias, 
    64 Ariz. 95
    , 97-101, 
    166 P.2d 589
    , 590-92 (1946) (holding property was exempt until
    January 6th while the State owned it, but could be taxed upon its subsequent
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    HUB v. MARICOPA/ADOR
    Decision of the Court
    transfer to a private party). Thus, we affirm the tax court’s ruling that the
    Property was not tax exempt after the City sold it to Hub in 2011.
    II.    Double Taxation
    ¶12           Hub contends that it was subject to double taxation because
    the City could have been required to pay government property lease excise
    taxes (GPLET) while it owned the Property in 2011 pursuant to A.R.S. § 42-
    6203.G (West 2015). “Double taxation occurs when the same property or
    person is taxed twice for the same purpose or for the same taxing period by
    the same taxing authority[.]” Lake Havasu City v. Mohave Cnty., 
    138 Ariz. 552
    , 562, 
    675 P.2d 1371
    , 1381 (App. 1983) (internal citations and quotations
    omitted).
    ¶13           Under A.R.S. § 42-6203.G:
    Prime lessees of government property improvements who
    become taxable or whose taxable status terminates during the
    calendar year in which the taxes are due, including prime
    lessees subject to exemption or abatement under §§ 42-6208
    and 42-6209, shall pay tax for that calendar year on a pro rata
    basis.
    Hub admits that no GPLET were imposed during the 2011 tax year.
    Instead, Hub’s double taxation argument stems from the possibility that the
    State could have assessed GPLET for the 2011 tax year.
    ¶14            We find three reasons why such a tax would not constitute
    double taxation when imposed with property taxes. First, GPLET would
    not be imposed on the same party. Hub is not a “prime lessee” because it
    did not enter into a lease directly with a government lessor; it purchased
    the Property from the City. See A.R.S. § 42-6201.4 (West 2015). Second, the
    taxes are not assessed for the same purpose. GPLET are assessed on prime
    lessees “for the use or occupancy of each government lessor’s government
    property improvement” while ad valorem taxes are assessed on the property
    itself based on its full cash value. A.R.S. § 42-6202.A; see supra ¶ 9. Third,
    the taxes are levied by different taxing authorities. “Government lessors”
    levy GPLET. A.R.S. § 42-6202.A. By contrast, the property taxes Hub paid
    were levied by the County Assessor. See A.R.S. § 42-17151.A. Thus, we
    affirm the tax court’s ruling that “[t]here is plainly no double taxation here.”
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    HUB v. MARICOPA/ADOR
    Decision of the Court
    III.   Due Process
    ¶15           Unlike Hub’s illegal taxation claim, the parties voluntarily
    settled Hub’s property valuation claim and the tax court entered a
    stipulated judgment. However, Hub argues its due process rights were
    violated because:
    The County’s actions in assessing property taxes against the .
    . . Property for tax year 2011 gave no . . . notice to [Hub] . . .
    and provided it no opportunity to appeal the proposed
    valuation to either the Assessor or to the State Board of
    Equalization prior to having to remit the tax.
    Hub mischaracterizes the requirements of due process. “If it is property
    that is being taxed, due process requires that the property owner be advised
    of the tax, and that it have the opportunity to be heard with respect to its
    assessment.” Seafirst Corp. v. Ariz. Dep’t. of Revenue, 
    172 Ariz. 54
    , 59, 
    833 P.2d 725
    , 730 (Tax Ct. 1992).
    ¶16           Hub undoubtedly had notice of the Property’s valuation and
    had a right to appeal the valuation pursuant to A.R.S. § 42-16205.01.A.1
    (West 2015), which permits a new property owner to appeal a property’s
    valuation to a court if the former owner of the property did not have a
    pending appeal or receive a final judgment or dismissal regarding the
    property valuation. Moreover, Hub exercised its due process rights by
    filing its complaint in the tax court; Hub’s second claim for relief was a
    “Valuation Appeal.”
    ¶17          Hub exercised its right to be heard in the tax court, and we
    find no authority supporting Hub’s argument that due process requires the
    Assessor or the State Board of Equalization to hear valuation appeals and
    Hub has not cited to any such authority. Thus, we find no due process
    violation and affirm the tax court’s ruling on this issue.
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    HUB v. MARICOPA/ADOR
    Decision of the Court
    CONCLUSION
    ¶18        We affirm the tax court’s grant of the State’s motion for
    summary judgment.
    :ama
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