Nayeri v. Mohave County ( 2022 )


Menu:
  •                         NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    MAJID NAYERI, et al., Plaintiffs/Appellees, 1
    v.
    MOHAVE COUNTY, et al., Defendants/Appellants.
    No. 1 CA-TX 21-0001
    1 CA-TX 21-0002
    (Consolidated)
    FILED 2-3-2022
    Appeal from the Arizona Tax Court
    No. TX2016-000893
    The Honorable Danielle J. Viola, Judge
    AFFIRMED
    COUNSEL
    Brentwood Law Group, PLLC, Tempe
    By Stephen Brower
    Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee Majid Nayeri
    Al Arpad, Esq., Phoenix
    By Alexander R. Arpad
    Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee Bita Abidian
    1On the court’s own motion, it is ordered amending the caption in this
    appeal as reflected in this decision. The above referenced caption shall be
    used on all further documents filed in this appeal.
    Mohave County Attorney’s Office, Kingman
    By Jeffrey B. Haws, Matthew J. Smith
    Counsel for Defendants/Appellants
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Presiding Judge Cynthia J. Bailey delivered the decision of the Court, in
    which Judge Peter B. Swann and Judge D. Steven Williams joined.
    B A I L E Y, Judge:
    ¶1            Mohave County and Mohave County Treasurer Cindy Landa
    Cox (collectively, “the County”) appeal the tax court’s award of attorneys’
    fees to Majid Nayeri and Bita Abidian (collectively, “Taxpayers”). 2 For the
    following reasons, we affirm.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2            This case began when Mohave Valley River Enterprises
    (“MVRE”) and Taxpayers sued the County to enjoin the sale of delinquent
    tax liens, arguing the sale was untimely. The same attorney represented
    both plaintiffs. After the tax court granted summary judgment for the
    County, MVRE and Taxpayers appealed.
    ¶3            While the appeal was pending, MVRE settled its claims with
    the County and agreed to pay its own attorneys’ fees and costs. Taxpayers
    pursued the appeal. We vacated and remanded. See Nayeri v. Mohave Cnty.,
    
    247 Ariz. 490
    , 492, ¶ 1 (App. 2019).
    ¶4            On remand, the parties agreed the tax court need only decide
    whether to grant Taxpayers a tax abatement and whether to award
    Taxpayers attorneys’ fees. The court denied the request for abatement and
    awarded Taxpayers $110,390.00 in attorneys’ fees under Arizona Revised
    Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 12-348(B)(3). The County timely appealed.
    2      Although Taxpayers filed a notice of cross-appeal, Taxpayers
    abandoned the cross-appeal and did not file a cross-appeal brief. The
    parties agreed the only issue in this appeal is attorneys’ fees.
    2
    NAYERI, et al. v. MOHAVE COUNTY, et al.
    Decision of the Court
    ¶5             We have jurisdiction over the County’s appeal under Article
    6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and
    12-2101(A)(1).
    DISCUSSION
    ¶6           The County argues the tax court abused its discretion in
    awarding attorneys’ fees to Taxpayers for work done on behalf of MVRE
    and for work on the unsuccessful tax abatement claim.
    ¶7            A court may award attorneys’ fees under A.R.S. § 12-348(B)(3)
    to the prevailing party in an action against a county challenging “[t]he
    regularity of sales of property for delinquent taxes.” Once a party
    requesting fees has met the minimum requirements, the opposing party has
    the burden to show the requested fees are unreasonable. See State ex rel.
    Corbin v. Tocco, 
    173 Ariz. 587
    , 594-96 (App. 1992) (affirming an award of
    attorneys’ fees where the opposing party conducted no discovery and
    presented no evidence challenging the relevance of any entry).
    ¶8            We review an award of attorneys’ fees for an abuse of
    discretion. Democratic Party of Pima Cnty. v. Ford, 
    228 Ariz. 545
    , 547, ¶ 6
    (App. 2012). We will not disturb the judgment if there is any reasonable
    basis for it. Associated Indem. Corp. v. Warner, 
    143 Ariz. 567
    , 570-71 (1985)
    (citation omitted). “[T]he question is not whether the judges of this court
    would have made an original like ruling, but whether a judicial mind, in
    view of the law and circumstances, could have made the ruling without
    exceeding the bounds of reason.” 
    Id. at 571
     (quoting Davis v. Davis, 
    78 Ariz. 174
    , 179 (1954) (Windes, J., specially concurring)).
    ¶9            Taxpayers filed a detailed request for attorneys’ fees and costs
    that totaled $117,445.00 and a declaration from counsel stating the fees
    corresponded to work for “Plaintiffs Majid Nayeri and Bita Abidian.” After
    the County specifically objected to four entries including a report on
    bankruptcy repercussions, drafts of a mediation memo, and a report to
    Nayeri, Taxpayers removed the four entries—as well as one other—and
    reduced its fee request to $114,640.00.
    ¶10           At oral argument, the County argued that Taxpayers’ fee
    request did not distinguish between work done for MVRE and Taxpayers,
    and that the amount requested was excessive. Taxpayers’ counsel argued
    that he had removed all entries relating solely to work performed for
    MVRE, and that the remaining work was necessary, regardless of MVRE’s
    involvement. Taxpayers’ counsel also argued that Taxpayers and MVRE
    signed a fee agreement to be jointly and severally liable for attorneys’ fees
    3
    NAYERI, et al. v. MOHAVE COUNTY, et al.
    Decision of the Court
    and costs, and that the collateral source rule precluded the County from
    arguing that some fees were paid by other sources. The tax court took the
    matter under advisement. After it held a post-argument status conference
    with the parties, the court awarded Taxpayers $110,390.00 in attorneys’
    fees, noting that the amount excluded “vague” entries and entries
    associated with Taxpayers’ unsuccessful effort to obtain an abatement.
    ¶11            On appeal, the County raises the same arguments: that the tax
    court awarded attorneys’ fees for work done solely on behalf of MVRE and
    for work on the unsuccessful abatement request. The County does not
    support this contention with specific problematic entries or evidence that
    Taxpayers’ counsel was paid by two sources for the same work. Although
    Taxpayers’ final fee application included a $150 entry for analyzing the
    MVRE settlement agreement, work that clearly did not benefit Taxpayers,
    the tax court reduced the fee request by more than $4,000. The County did
    not meet its burden to show the awarded fees were unreasonable. See Tocco,
    
    173 Ariz. at 594-96
    .
    ¶12           The County also argues the tax court abused its discretion in
    awarding approximately $85,000 in attorneys’ fees for work performed
    between January 2017 and December 2018, a period when counsel
    represented both Taxpayers and MVRE, contending the fee request was
    unreasonable per se. We disagree. By awarding attorneys’ fees for work
    performed during that period, the tax court implicitly accepted Taxpayers’
    argument that the work was necessary regardless of MVRE’s involvement
    in the case. We see no abuse of discretion in this conclusion.
    ¶13          Taxpayers request attorneys’ fees on appeal under A.R.S. § 12-
    348(A)(1) and (B)(3). Subsection (A)(1), which authorizes fees in a civil
    action brought by the county, is inapplicable because Taxpayers filed this
    action. In our discretion, we award Taxpayers attorneys’ fees and taxable
    costs under A.R.S. § 12-348(B)(3), in an amount to be determined upon
    compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 21.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶14          For the reasons stated above, we affirm.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED: AA
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1 CA-TX 21-0001

Filed Date: 2/3/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 2/3/2022