Keyandia C. v. Dcs, C.C. ( 2022 )


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  •                       NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    KEYANDIA C., Appellant,
    v.
    DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, C.C., Appellees.
    No. 1 CA-JV 21-0220
    FILED 2-10-2022
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. JD34449
    The Honorable Christopher Whitten, Judge
    AFFIRMED
    COUNSEL
    Maricopa County Legal Defender’s Office, Phoenix
    By Jamie R. Heller
    Counsel for Appellant
    Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson
    By James W. Rappaport
    Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
    KEYANDIA C. v. DCS, C.C.
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Presiding Judge D. Steven Williams delivered the decision of the Court, in
    which Judge David B. Gass and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined.
    W I L L I A M S, Judge:
    ¶1           Keyandia C. (“Mother”) appeals the superior court’s order
    terminating her parental rights to her child. For the following reasons, we
    affirm.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2           This case is not the first time the Department of Child Safety
    (“DCS”) intervened in Mother’s care of her child, C.C. In 2017, the superior
    court adjudicated C.C. dependent based upon Mother’s domestic violence,
    substance abuse, and untreated mental-health issues. After Mother’s
    successful participation in services, the superior court dismissed the
    dependency and returned C.C. to her.
    ¶3            Three years later, in April 2020, Mother left C.C. in maternal
    grandmother’s care and left the state. When grandmother was unable to
    continue caring for C.C., she notified Mother who refused to take the child.
    DCS took custody of C.C. and filed a dependency petition. Mother told DCS
    she was in California but planned to leave soon and did not know where
    she would live. She did, however, provide DCS with a P.O. Box address in
    Tempe and requested visitation. DCS referred her for supervised visits, but
    the referral eventually closed because of Mother’s lack of contact. A few
    months later, the superior court adjudicated C.C. dependent.
    ¶4           In the months following C.C.’s removal, Mother moved
    frequently and maintained only sporadic contact with DCS. Without a
    physical address, DCS was unable to refer her for services. DCS referred
    Mother for drug testing, but she did not comply. DCS also tried to engage
    Mother by setting up in-person meetings, but after agreeing to them,
    Mother never appeared. DCS again referred Mother for supervised visits,
    but Mother did not participate.
    ¶5          Mother did not visit C.C. until December 2020. The two visits
    that month did not go well, and Mother still had not participated in
    substance-abuse testing or provided DCS with a physical address. Over the
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    KEYANDIA C. v. DCS, C.C.
    Decision of the Court
    next few months, Mother was incarcerated in Arizona on charges of
    disorderly conduct, assault, and trespassing. Meanwhile, the superior court
    changed the case plan to severance and adoption, and DCS moved to
    terminate Mother’s parental rights based upon abandonment and nine
    months in an out-of-home placement. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1), (B)(8)(a).
    ¶6            Mother was released from jail in March 2021, and then met
    with the case manager. As a result of that meeting, DCS referred her for
    substance-abuse testing and treatment, a psychological consultation, and
    visitation. The consulting psychologist recommended Mother participate in
    masters-level individual counseling. The DCS case manager testified
    Mother knew about the recommendation but indicated she did not need
    counseling.
    ¶7             By the termination hearing, Mother had regularly attended
    visitation after her release from jail but had completed only two drug tests
    and had not participated in any other services. The superior court
    terminated Mother’s parental rights based upon abandonment and nine
    months in an out-of-home placement. Mother timely appealed. This court
    has jurisdiction under Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and
    A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1), and -2101(A)(1).
    DISCUSSION
    ¶8            On appeal, Mother argues no reasonable evidence supports
    the superior court’s finding that DCS made diligent efforts to provide her
    with appropriate reunification services under the nine-month out-of-home
    placement ground. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(a). Because we affirm the
    termination order under the nine-month out-of-home placement ground,
    we need not address Mother’s arguments regarding abandonment. See Jesus
    M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 
    203 Ariz. 278
    , 280, ¶ 3 (App. 2002).
    ¶9             Parents’ right to custody and control of their own children,
    though fundamental, is not absolute. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec.,
    
    196 Ariz. 246
    , 248, ¶¶ 11–12 (2000). Termination of a parental relationship
    may be warranted if the state proves one statutory ground under A.R.S.
    § 8-533 by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 248–49, ¶ 12. Clear and
    convincing means the grounds for termination are highly probable or
    reasonably certain. Kent K. v. Bobby M., 
    210 Ariz. 279
    , 284–85, ¶ 25 (2005).
    The court must also find termination of the relationship to be in the child’s
    best interest by a preponderance of the evidence. 
    Id. at 285, ¶ 29
    .
    ¶10           This court “will accept the juvenile court’s findings of fact
    unless no reasonable evidence supports those findings, and [this court] will
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    KEYANDIA C. v. DCS, C.C.
    Decision of the Court
    affirm a [termination] order unless it is clearly erroneous.” Jesus M., 
    203 Ariz. at 280, ¶ 4
    . This court does not reweigh the evidence, but “look[s] only
    to determine if there is evidence to sustain the [superior] court’s ruling.”
    Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 
    207 Ariz. 43
    , 47, ¶ 8 (App. 2004).
    ¶11            Before terminating a parent’s rights under the nine-month
    out-of-home placement grounds, the superior court must find DCS made
    diligent efforts to provide the parent with appropriate reunification
    services. A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8). DCS satisfies its diligent-efforts obligation if
    it provides the parent with “the time and opportunity to participate in
    programs designed to help [the parent] become an effective parent.” See
    Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-501904, 
    180 Ariz. 348
    , 353 (App. 1994). That
    means DCS must “identify the conditions causing the child’s out-of-home
    placement, provide services that have a reasonable prospect of success to
    remedy the circumstances as they arise throughout the time-in-care period,
    maintain consistent contact with the parent, and make reasonable efforts to
    assist the parent in areas where compliance proves difficult.” Donald W. v.
    Dep’t of Child Safety, 
    247 Ariz. 9
    , 23, ¶ 50 (App. 2019).
    ¶12             Although DCS must continue to make diligent efforts “during
    the entire time the [case plan is] reunification,” see Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of
    Econ. Sec., 
    223 Ariz. 86
    , 96, ¶ 30 (App. 2009), it is not required to provide
    parents with unlimited time to “assume their responsibilities and take
    positive steps toward recovery,” Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-501568,
    
    177 Ariz. 571
    , 577 (App. 1994). Nor is it required to “provide every
    conceivable service” or to ensure that the parent participates in the services
    offered. Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-501904, 
    180 Ariz. at 353
    . And it
    need not undertake futile reunification efforts. Mary Ellen C. v. Ariz. Dep’t
    of Econ. Sec., 
    193 Ariz. 185
    , 192, ¶ 34 (App. 1999).
    ¶13            As an initial matter, DCS argues Mother waived her claim by
    not raising it before the termination hearing. Because Mother challenged
    DCS’s efforts to provide services during the termination hearing, we
    decline to apply waiver here. See Marianne N. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 
    243 Ariz. 53
    , 56 (2017) (waiver is discretionary); cf. Shawanee S. v. Ariz. Dep’t of
    Econ. Sec., 
    234 Ariz. 174
    , 179, ¶¶ 17–18 (App. 2014) (applying waiver when
    parent failed to raise service issues during review hearings or at the time of
    the termination trial).
    ¶14          Turning to the merits, Mother first contends DCS failed to
    take affirmative steps to locate her or assist her with housing. Mother,
    however, was neither missing nor unaware of the dependency. The DCS
    case manager contacted her immediately, and she returned his call just days
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    KEYANDIA C. v. DCS, C.C.
    Decision of the Court
    after DCS took custody of C.C. During that call, the case manager provided
    Mother with his contact information.
    ¶15            Once Mother had that information and knew C.C. was in
    foster care, she moved frequently, failed to keep in regular contact with the
    case manager, and never provided DCS with a physical address so it could
    refer her for services. Additionally, despite her frequent moves, as noted
    supra ¶ 4, the case manager set up in-person meetings with Mother, but
    Mother did not show up.
    ¶16          Mother knew she needed to establish stable housing. Yet, the
    record shows she took little initiative to remedy her instability and never
    indicated to DCS that she needed housing assistance, prompting the case
    manager to “assume,” based upon his conversations with her, that she
    moved frequently by choice. Indeed, Mother testified that for the first half
    of the dependency, she “was out of town,” because “random people and
    random guys would just talk to me and try to take me out of town,” and
    she thought they would help her find a job.
    ¶17          Mother next argues DCS waited almost a year to refer her for
    substance-abuse testing and treatment. The record shows, however, that
    Mother’s repeated moves and failure to remain in consistent contact with
    DCS hindered the case manager’s ability to refer her for substance-abuse
    services. When Mother was referred for substance-abuse services, she
    resisted the initial treatment assessment, indicating she did not have
    substance-abuse issues. Mother did not begin to engage in the case until
    December 2020, when she had two visits with C.C.
    ¶18           Mother asserts that DCS should have referred her for
    substance-abuse services at that time. But, according to the case manager,
    Mother did not tell him that she was living in Arizona, nor did she provide
    him with her address so he could refer her for those services. Regardless,
    Mother was incarcerated over the next few months, hindering her ability to
    participate in DCS’s referrals during that time. When Mother finally
    provided her location to DCS in March 2021, the case manager immediately
    referred her for substance-abuse services. She, however, only drug tested
    twice and never completed a substance-abuse assessment.
    ¶19             Mother next contends the case manager ignored her requests
    for a hair follicle drug test. The case manager testified that Mother indicated
    she did not want to complete a hair test, so to accommodate her, he set up
    urinalysis testing. Although Mother disputes this testimony, the resolution
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    KEYANDIA C. v. DCS, C.C.
    Decision of the Court
    of conflicting evidence “is uniquely the province of the [superior] court” to
    weigh and decide as the trier of fact. Jesus M., 
    203 Ariz. at 282, ¶ 12
    .
    ¶20            Finally, Mother argues DCS failed to provide her with
    mental-health services, such as a psychological evaluation and individual
    counseling, and should have completed a psychological consultation
    sooner. However, DCS agreed to refer Mother for mental-health services
    after she demonstrated thirty days’ sobriety. The case manager testified that
    this requirement was needed to ensure an accurate psychological
    evaluation. Regardless, Mother did not provide her location to him so he
    could refer her for services until March 2021. Then, she participated in only
    a few urinalysis tests, and when DCS tried to implement individual
    counseling, she indicated she did not need it. Mother’s refusal to engage in
    the case for the first ten months ultimately caused the delays she points to
    on appeal.
    ¶21           On this record, reasonable evidence supports the superior
    court’s finding that DCS made diligent efforts to provide Mother with
    appropriate reunification services and that Mother failed to remedy the
    circumstances the caused C.C. to be in an out-of-home placement.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶22          For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED: AA
    6