Saban v. Ador , 418 P.3d 1066 ( 2018 )


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  •                                     IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    SABAN RENT-A CAR LLC, et al.,
    Plaintiffs/Appellees/Cross-Appellants,
    v.
    ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,
    Defendant/Appellant/Appellee/Cross-Appellee,
    _________________________________
    TOURISM AND SPORTS AUTHORITY,
    Defendant-in-Intervention/Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
    No. 1 CA-TX 16-0007
    FILED 3-13-2018
    Appeal from the Arizona Tax Court
    No. TX2010-001089
    The Honorable Dean M. Fink, Judge
    The Honorable Christopher T. Whitten, Judge
    AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; REMANDED
    COUNSEL
    Mandel Young, PLC, Phoenix
    By Taylor C. Young, Robert A. Mandel
    Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellees/Cross-Appellants Saban et al.
    Kickham, Hanley, PLLC, Royal Oak, MI
    By Gregory D. Hanley, pro hac vice
    Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellees/Cross-Appellants Saban et al.
    Aiken, Schenk, Hawkins & Ricciardi, PC, Phoenix
    By Shawn K. Aiken
    Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellees/Cross-Appellants Saban et al.
    Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix
    By Kimberly J. Cygan, Jerry A. Fries
    Co-Counsel for Defendant/Appellant/Appellee/Cross-Appellee ADOR
    Osborn Maledon, PA, Phoenix
    By Thomas L. Hudson, Eric M. Fraser
    Co-Counsel for Defendant/Appellant/Appellee/Cross-Appellee ADOR
    Fennemore Craig, PC, Phoenix
    By Timothy J. Berg, Theresa Dwyer, Emily Ayn Ward
    Co-Counsel for Defendant-in-Intervention/Appellant/Cross-Appellee AzSTA
    Dickinson Wright, PLLC, Phoenix
    By Scot L. Claus, Vail C. Cloar
    Co-Counsel for Defendant-in-Intervention/Appellant/Cross-Appellee AzSTA
    Lewis, Roca, Rothgerber, Christie, LLP, Phoenix
    By Robert G. Schaffer
    Counsel for amici curiae Halikowski and ADOT
    Gammage & Burnham, PLC, Phoenix
    By Michael R. King, Cameron C. Artigue, Christopher L. Hering
    Counsel for amici curiae Convention and Visitors Bureaus
    Pima County Attorney's Office, Tucson
    By Regina L. Nassen
    Counsel for amicus curiae Pima County
    Gallagher & Kennedy, PA, Phoenix
    By Michael K. Kennedy, Mark C. Dangerfield
    Counsel for amicus curiae Arizona Chamber of Commerce
    Perkins Coie, LLP, Phoenix
    By Paul F. Eckstein, Thomas D. Ryerson
    Counsel for amicus curiae City of Phoenix
    2
    SABAN, et al. v. ADOR, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    OPINION
    Judge Diane M. Johnsen delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
    Presiding Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop and Judge Maria Elena Cruz joined.
    J O H N S E N, Judge:
    ¶1           A class of car-rental companies sued to invalidate a surcharge
    enacted to build sports facilities to be owned by the Arizona Tourism and
    Sports Authority ("AzSTA"). The car-rental companies argued the
    surcharge is invalid both under Article IX, Section 14 of the Arizona
    Constitution and under the Dormant Commerce Clause implied by the
    United States Constitution. The tax court ruled the surcharge was invalid
    under the Arizona Constitution (but not under the Dormant Commerce
    Clause) and ordered a refund.
    ¶2            For reasons explained below, we reverse the tax court's order
    granting summary judgment to the car-rental companies under the Arizona
    Constitution and direct entry of judgment in favor of the Arizona
    Department of Revenue ("ADOR") and AzSTA on that claim. We affirm the
    judgment in favor of ADOR and AzSTA under the Dormant Commerce
    Clause. Because we conclude the surcharge is not invalid under either
    constitutional provision, we reverse the tax court's refund order.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    ¶3              AzSTA is a "corporate and political body" the legislature
    created in 2000. Ariz. Rev. Stat. ("A.R.S.") § 5-802 (2018).1 By statute,
    AzSTA's "boundaries" are those "of any county that has a population of
    more than two million persons," meaning (then and now) Maricopa
    County. A.R.S. § 5-802(A). The legislature directed AzSTA to build and
    operate a "[m]ultipurpose facility" — a stadium/events center — that could
    accommodate a professional football team, a college bowl game, and "other
    sporting events and entertainment, cultural, civic, meeting, trade show or
    convention events[.]" A.R.S. §§ 5-801(4) (2018) (defining "multipurpose
    facility"), -804(A) (2018), -807 (2018), -815 (2018) (powers of AzSTA). The
    legislature also granted AzSTA the power to contract to host the Super Bowl
    1      Absent material revision after the relevant date, we cite the current
    version of a statute or rule.
    3
    SABAN, et al. v. ADOR, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    and college football national championship and playoff games and to build
    Major League Baseball spring-training facilities and youth and amateur
    sports and recreational facilities. A.R.S. §§ 5-808 (2018), -809 (2018).
    ¶4             Although AzSTA may charge for use of its facilities, it cannot
    levy taxes or assessments to build those facilities. A.R.S. § 5-802(C).
    Instead, the legislature authorized Maricopa County voters to approve
    taxes to fund AzSTA's construction projects. See 
    id. Among the
    taxes the
    legislature authorized voters to impose is the one challenged here: A
    surcharge on the gross proceeds of car-rental businesses. See A.R.S. § 5-
    839(B) (2018). Maricopa County voters approved the car-rental surcharge
    authorized by § 5-839 in November 2000, just months after the legislature
    established AzSTA.2 As authorized, the surcharge is the greater of 3.25
    percent "of the gross proceeds or gross income from the business" or $2.50
    per car rental, payable by the car-rental business, not the customer. A.R.S.
    § 5-839(B)(1). If a customer rents a vehicle as a "temporary replacement" for
    another vehicle, the surcharge charged the car-rental company is a flat
    $2.50. See A.R.S. § 5-839(B)(2).3
    ¶5             In August 2009, Saban Rent-A-Car, Inc. sought a refund of
    amounts it had paid under § 5-839, claiming the surcharge violated Article
    IX, Section 14 of the Arizona Constitution and the Dormant Commerce
    Clause implied by the U.S. Constitution. After ADOR denied the refund
    and that decision was upheld on administrative review, Saban challenged
    the ruling in the tax court, seeking injunctive relief and a refund on behalf
    of a class of all similarly situated car-rental companies. The court granted
    AzSTA leave to intervene as a defendant, then certified a class of all
    2      This court already has denied two challenges to the tax. In Long v.
    Napolitano, 
    203 Ariz. 247
    , 251-53, ¶¶ 2-9 (App. 2002), we ruled that § 5-839
    did not violate provisions of the Arizona Constitution unrelated to the
    provision at issue in this case. See 
    id. at 253,
    ¶¶ 10-11. In Karbal v. ADOR,
    
    215 Ariz. 114
    , 117, ¶ 11 (App. 2007), a car-rental customer raised some of
    the same arguments made here against the surcharge, but we ruled that the
    customer lacked standing because the surcharge is imposed on the car-
    rental companies, not the customers.
    3     The first $2.50 collected for each car-rental transaction goes to the
    Maricopa County stadium district; the remaining revenues go to AzSTA.
    See A.R.S. §§ 5-801(1), -839(G)(1), (2). The legislature also authorized
    Maricopa County to tax hotels at up to 1 percent of room sales to support
    AzSTA. A.R.S. § 5-840 (2018).
    4
    SABAN, et al. v. ADOR, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    businesses that paid the surcharge from September 2005 through March
    2008.
    ¶6            After discovery, the tax court ruled on cross-motions for
    summary judgment that although the surcharge did not violate the
    Dormant Commerce Clause, it was invalid under Article IX, Section 14 of
    the Arizona Constitution. The court ruled that ADOR would have to
    refund the tax to class members but could recoup the amount of the refund,
    over time, from AzSTA pursuant to A.R.S. § 42-5029(G) (2018). The court
    granted ADOR's motion for entry of judgment pursuant to Arizona Rule of
    Civil Procedure 54(b), leaving the amount of the refund to be determined.
    ¶7            We have jurisdiction of the parties' various appeals and cross-
    appeal from the Rule 54(b) judgment pursuant to Article VI, Section 9 of the
    Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(6) (2018). See Empress Beauty
    Supply, Inc. v. Price, 
    116 Ariz. 34
    , 35 (App. 1977) (Rule 54(b) appropriate
    when "the only question remaining to be resolved is the amount of
    recovery") (quotations omitted).4
    DISCUSSION
    A.     Standard of Review.
    ¶8             We review de novo the grant of a motion for summary
    judgment. See Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 
    216 Ariz. 195
    ,
    199, ¶ 15 (App. 2007). Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no
    genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to
    judgment as a matter of law." Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Although a party
    ordinarily may not appeal an order denying summary judgment, see, e.g.,
    Fleitz v. Van Westrienen, 
    114 Ariz. 246
    , 248 (App. 1977), the court of appeals
    may review the denial of a motion for summary judgment if the superior
    court denied the motion on a point of law, Strojnik v. Gen. Ins. Co. of America,
    
    201 Ariz. 430
    , 433, ¶ 11 (App. 2001).
    B.     Article IX, Section 14 of the Arizona Constitution.
    ¶9           In relevant part, Article IX, Section 14 of the Arizona
    Constitution states:
    4      Empress Beauty Supply interpreted A.R.S. § 12-2101(G), which since
    was renumbered to A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(6) without substantial change. See
    Empress Beauty 
    Supply, 116 Ariz. at 35
    ; H.B. 2645, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess.,
    Ariz. Laws 2011, Ch. 304, § 1.
    5
    SABAN, et al. v. ADOR, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    No moneys derived from fees, excises, or license taxes relating
    to registration, operation, or use of vehicles on the public
    highways or streets or to fuels or any other energy source
    used for the propulsion of vehicles on the public highways or
    streets, shall be expended for other than highway and street
    purposes . . . .
    Under this provision, revenues collected from certain "fees, excises, or license
    taxes" may be spent only for "highway and street purposes." ADOR and
    AzSTA concede the surcharge authorized by A.R.S. § 5-839 is an excise tax.
    See also Karbal v. ADOR, 
    215 Ariz. 114
    , 116, ¶¶ 9-10 (App. 2007). Therefore,
    if the surcharge is a tax "relating to registration, operation, or use of vehicles
    on the public highways or streets," it violates Section 14 because its
    proceeds are spent on sports and recreation facilities, not highways and
    streets.
    ¶10             Relying on dictionary definitions, Saban argues the phrase
    "relating to" in Section 14 broadly sweeps up any tax "having connection
    with or reference to the operation or use of vehicles on the public
    highways." To be sure, the phrase "relating to" is inherently indeterminate.
    See New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins.
    Co., 
    514 U.S. 645
    , 655 (1995) ("If 'relate to' were taken to extend to the furthest
    stretch of its indeterminacy, then for all practical purposes [its scope] would
    never run its course, for 'really, universally, relations stop nowhere.'"
    (quoting H. James, Roderick Hudson xli (New York ed., World's Classics
    1980)) (alteration in original omitted)). For that reason, as Saban conceded
    at oral argument, without some limiting principle, Section 14 would
    encompass not only the car-rental surcharge at issue here but also a broad
    range of taxes that Arizona does not now funnel to highways— including
    retail sales or business privilege taxes on car sales, tire sales, car leases and
    car repairs.
    ¶11            Nevertheless, Saban cites Landon v. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz., 
    240 Ariz. 21
    (App. 2016), for the proposition that we should look no farther than
    the dictionary in interpreting the words "relating to" in Section 14. The issue
    in Landon was whether the discharge of an injured employee fell within a
    provision of the Workers' Compensation Act concerning workers
    "terminat[ed] from employment for reasons that are unrelated to the
    industrial injury." 
    Id. at 24,
    25-26, ¶¶ 5-7, 15. We consulted dictionaries for
    the plain meaning of "related," namely "connected" to or "associated" with.
    
    Id. at 26,
    ¶ 16 (citing Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) and Webster's II
    New College Dictionary (3d ed. 2005)). But we also considered the purpose
    of the legislation and applied common principles of statutory construction,
    6
    SABAN, et al. v. ADOR, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    including the rule that "when statutory provisions relate to the same subject
    matter, they should be construed together and reconciled whenever
    possible, in such a way so as to give effect to all the statutes 
    involved." 240 Ariz. at 25
    , 26, ¶¶ 12, 17 (quotation omitted).
    ¶12              We must use these and other like principles to discern
    whether Section 14 encompasses the car-rental surcharge. See Travelers 
    Ins., 514 U.S. at 656
    ("We simply must go beyond the unhelpful text and the
    frustrating difficulty of defining its key term, and look instead to the
    objectives [of the statute]."); RSP Architects, Ltd. v. Five Star Dev. Resort
    Communities, LLC, 
    232 Ariz. 436
    , 438, ¶ 8 (App. 2013) (phrase "relating to"
    in Prompt Payment Act, A.R.S. § 32-1129(A)(1) (2018), does not encompass
    every relationship or connection with the referenced term: "Common sense
    . . . tells us there must be some bounds to the breadth of the statute."). We
    look to the "context, subject matter, effects and consequences, reason and
    spirit of the law" and try to construe it "in the context of related provisions
    and in light of its place in the statutory scheme." 
    RSP, 232 Ariz. at 438
    , ¶ 9;
    see 
    Landon, 240 Ariz. at 26
    , ¶ 17. And, in interpreting a voter-approved
    measure, we seek to give effect to "'the intent of the electorate that adopted
    it.'" State v. Maestas, 
    242 Ariz. 194
    , 197, ¶ 11 (App. 2017) (quoting Cave Creek
    Unified Sch. Dist. v. Ducey, 
    233 Ariz. 1
    , 6-7, ¶ 21 (2013)).
    ¶13            Applying those principles here, the broad interpretation
    Saban urges would render multiple phrases in the provision superfluous —
    a result that we must seek to avoid. See 
    RSP, 232 Ariz. at 439
    , ¶ 13. Section
    14 expressly applies not only to excise taxes "relating to registration,
    operation, or use of vehicles on the public highways or streets" but also to
    such levies on "fuels or any other energy source used for the propulsion of
    vehicles on the public highways or streets." Saban's broad construction of
    "relating to" would render the fuels provision irrelevant because fuel used
    to propel a vehicle is related to use or operation of a vehicle. The same is
    true with respect to Section 14's express reference to "registration." A
    vehicle's registration is related to its use on public streets; one may not
    legally drive a vehicle that is not registered. Because a broad interpretation
    of "relating to" deprives these other terms of any effect, the text of Section
    14 itself reveals that we should not construe "relating to" in its broadest
    possible sense.
    ¶14           Turning to the purpose of the provision, Section 14 was
    enacted in response to federal legislation that conditioned grants of federal
    highway funds on a state's assurance that revenue "from State motor
    vehicle registration fees, licenses, gasoline taxes, and other special taxes on
    motor-vehicle owners and operators of all kinds" would be used exclusively
    7
    SABAN, et al. v. ADOR, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    for highway purposes. H.R. 8781, 73rd Cong., Ch. 586, § 12, 48 Stat. 993,
    995 (1934) (enacted). In an official publicity pamphlet mailed before the
    1952 election, at which Section 14 was approved, voters were informed that
    21 states had adopted similar "anti-diversion" laws to ensure and preserve
    eligibility for federal highway funds. See State of Ariz. Initiative &
    Referendum Publicity Pamphlet, Proposed Amendment to the Constitution at 4
    (1952).5
    ¶15            Significantly, the pamphlet assured voters that passage of
    Section 14 would "entail no change in the source or expenditure of highway
    revenues." But at the time, Arizona already was collecting a statewide
    excise tax on car-rental business revenues. That tax was enacted in 1935 —
    17 years before voters enacted Section 14. See S.B. 118, 12th Leg., 1st Reg.
    Sess., Ariz. Laws 1935, Ch. 77, art. 2, § 2(f)(2) (encoded as Ariz. Code Ann.
    § 73-1303(f)(2) (1939)) (subsequently encoded as A.R.S. § 42-1314 (1959),
    H.B. 41, 24th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., Ariz. Laws 1959, Ch. 11, § 1) (repealed by
    S.B. 1038, 27th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., Ariz. Laws 1985, Ch. 298, § 11); A.R.S. §§
    42-5008 (2018), -5071 (2018); see also Alvord v. State Tax Comm'n, 
    69 Ariz. 287
    ,
    289 (1950) (recounting history of Arizona's business privilege tax on car-
    rental services). From the inception of that statewide car-rental business
    tax, and at the time Section 14 was adopted, proceeds from the tax were not
    reserved for highway uses but went instead to the state's general fund.
    Ariz. Code Ann. § 73-1303 (1939) (providing for tax for "the purpose of
    raising public money to be used in liquidating the outstanding obligations
    of the state and county governments" and "to aid in defraying the necessary
    and ordinary expenses of the state and counties"); see also Ariz. Code Ann.
    § 73-1303 (Supp. 1952) (same). The pamphlet sent to voters in 1952 did not
    mention the then-existing car-rental business tax, even while telling voters
    of other existing taxes that would fall within Section 14's scope: "[S]tate
    gasoline and diesel taxes, registration fees, unladen weight fees on common
    5      Citing Phelps v. Firebird Raceway, Inc., 
    210 Ariz. 403
    (2005), Saban
    argues we may not use the voter pamphlet in interpreting Section 14. But
    the majority in Phelps held the constitutional provision at issue there was so
    plain it required no interpretation. 
    Id. at 405,
    ¶ 10. We may rely on voter
    pamphlets to determine the electorate's intent when necessary to resolve
    ambiguity. See, e.g., Calik v. Kongable, 
    195 Ariz. 496
    , 500-01, ¶¶ 17-19 (1999);
    Laos v. Arnold, 
    141 Ariz. 46
    , 47-48 (1984). Such a pamphlet assists us in
    ascertaining an "interpretation . . . consistent with the purpose" of the
    measure "as communicated to the people of Arizona." Cave Creek Unified
    Sch. 
    Dist., 231 Ariz. at 351
    , ¶ 25.
    8
    SABAN, et al. v. ADOR, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    and contract motor carriers, and motor carrier taxes based on gross
    receipts."
    ¶16           Further, echoing the federal statute's focus on "motor-vehicle
    owners and operators," the pamphlet told voters that the purpose of the
    constitutional measure was "to INSURE THE EXPENDITURE OF ALL
    REVENUES DERIVED FROM ROAD USERS TO ROAD USES ONLY."
    Consistent with that focus on tax collections from road users, Arizona puts
    into its Highway Fund the proceeds of fees or taxes that must be paid in
    order to legally drive on public roads — motor carrier taxes, vehicle
    registration and in lieu fees and driver's license fees.6
    ¶17             By contrast, as respects the surcharge at issue here, the
    relationship between the business of renting vehicles and the "operation, or use
    of vehicles on the public highways or streets" (emphasis added) is attenuated
    in at least two ways. First, the surcharge is not imposed on the road user
    (the driver-customer), but instead is imposed on the car-rental business,
    regardless of its own usage of vehicles on public highways or streets (and
    regardless of whether it chooses to pass along the surcharge to its
    customers). Second, the taxable event that triggers the surcharge is the
    rental of a vehicle, not its operation or use. While most every car-rental
    transaction will result in the customer using the car on public highways or
    streets, the surcharge is imposed regardless of whether, how much or how
    often the customer drives the car.
    ¶18           Ohio appellate courts have issued three decisions addressing
    a nearly identical constitutional provision. See generally State v. Curry, 
    97 Ariz. 191
    , 194-95 (1965) (consulting decisions interpreting similar statutory
    6       According to information provided by amicus Arizona Department
    of Transportation, the revenue sources of the Arizona Highway Fund for
    each year since 2000 have been "Motor Vehicle Fuel Tax Revenues," "Motor
    Vehicle Registration Fee Revenues," "Motor Carrier Tax Revenues," "Motor
    Vehicle Operators' License Fees and Misc. Fees and Revenues," and "Motor
    Vehicle License (In Lieu) Tax Revenues." See Sources of Revenues Deposited
    in the Arizona Highway User Revenue Fund and Arizona Highway Fund, Fiscal
    Year     2000    Through    Fiscal   Year    2016    (July   13,    2016),
    https://www.azdot.gov/docs/default-source/businesslibraries/hurf-
    annual-disclosure-file-2016.pdf?sfvrsn=10.
    9
    SABAN, et al. v. ADOR, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    language in other states).7 In the first case, Ohio Trucking Ass'n v. Charles,
    
    983 N.E.2d 1262
    (Ohio 2012), the state supreme court considered whether
    its anti-diversion constitutional provision applied to fees assessed on
    certified abstracts of motor vehicle records. The court rejected a strict plain-
    language approach to "relating to":
    At an extreme level, at the furthest stretch of its
    indeterminacy, there is no doubt that fees for certified
    abstracts are related to the registration of vehicles on public
    highways. We are not convinced that this extreme view of
    "relating to" is logical; we know that it is not compelled by the
    language of [the constitutional provision] or the objectives of
    the amendment.
    
    Id. at 1267,
    ¶ 15 (quotation omitted). The court concluded that certified
    abstract fees were not sufficiently related to "registration, operation, or use"
    of vehicles because the abstract fees were "not necessary to the general
    motoring public" and "not triggered by the registration, operation, or use of
    a vehicle on the public highways." 
    Id. at 1267,
    ¶ 16 (emphasis added).
    ¶19           In another case decided a day later, the same court held that
    a business tax on gross receipts from the sale of motor-vehicle fuel fell
    within the scope of the constitutional provision. Beaver Excavating Co. v.
    Testa, 
    983 N.E.2d 1317
    , 1319-20, ¶ 1 (Ohio 2012). The tax at issue there, like
    the AzSTA surcharge, was a privilege tax paid by businesses, not a tax paid
    directly by motorists. After considering the words "relating to" "according
    to [their] plain and ordinary meaning given in the context of political
    discussions and arguments, in order to carry out the intention and
    objectives of the people," 
    id. at 1325,
    ¶ 30 (quotation omitted), the court
    concluded that the "text and history" of the provision showed it was
    intended to apply "broadly" to business privilege taxes "derived from the
    sales of motor-vehicle fuel" — not solely to transactional taxes imposed
    directly on fuel sales, 
    id. at 1325-27,
    ¶¶ 30, 33-36.
    ¶20           Although Beaver Excavating supports Saban's position that the
    anti-diversion measure may encompass a business privilege tax, the case
    7       The Ohio Constitution provides that "[n]o moneys derived from fees,
    excises, or license taxes relating to registration, operation, or use of vehicles
    on public highways, or to fuels used for propelling such vehicles, shall be
    expended for other than" highway and related purposes. Ohio Const. art.
    XII, § 5a.
    10
    SABAN, et al. v. ADOR, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    says little about the meaning of "relating to the registration, operation, or
    use of motor vehicles." The tax at issue there was imposed on fuel, which
    Ohio and Arizona's anti-diversion provisions both explicitly mention in a
    separate clause without any words of limitation. Further, whether framed
    as a business tax or a sales tax, a tax on motor-vehicle fuel directly relates
    to the operation or use of a motor vehicle.
    ¶21           The third Ohio case, Fowler v. Ohio Dep't of Pub. Safety, ___
    N.E.3d ___, No. 16AP-867, 
    2017 WL 3263761
    at *6, ¶ 21 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug.
    1, 2017), considered a "financial responsibility reinstatement fee" imposed
    on motorists ticketed for driving without insurance. The court concluded
    the fee was not "related to" vehicle registration, operation or use because it
    was not required of all motorists as a prerequisite to driving, see 
    id. at *5-*6,
    ¶¶ 18-19, and because it was not "trigger[ed]" by registration, operation or
    use of a vehicle but rather by a lack of insurance, 
    id. at *6,
    ¶ 19. The court
    acknowledged an undeniable relationship between the fee and motor
    vehicle registration, but found that relationship was "too attenuated" to fall
    within the scope of the Ohio provision. See 
    id. ¶22 Under
    the reasoning of these cases, an anti-diversion
    provision applying to fees or taxes "relating to . . . operation[] or use" of
    vehicles on public highways and streets only encompasses fees and taxes
    generally imposed on all who operate or use vehicles on public highways
    and streets, meaning fees or taxes that are a prerequisite to legally operating
    or using a vehicle on a public thoroughfare or that are triggered by
    operation or use of a vehicle on a public thoroughfare.8
    ¶23           These general principles are reflected in the categories of taxes
    the publicity pamphlet told Arizona voters would be subject to Section 14,
    and those that voters reasonably understood would not. All of the non-fuel
    revenue sources the pamphlet stated would be encompassed by the
    constitutional provision — "registration fees, unladen weight fees on
    8       Other out-of-state cases the parties cite are less helpful because the
    anti-diversion provisions in those cases do not use the phrase "relate to" or
    "relating to." See Thrifty Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 
    833 P.2d 852
    , 856 (Colo. App. 1992) (provision applied to "proceeds from the
    imposition of any license, registration fee, or other charge with respect to
    the operation of any motor vehicle upon any public highway in this state")
    (alteration omitted); Wittenberg v. Mutton, 
    280 P.2d 359
    , 362 (Or. 1955)
    (provision applied to "proceeds from any tax or excise levied on the
    ownership, operation or use of motor vehicles").
    11
    SABAN, et al. v. ADOR, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    common and contract motor carriers, and motor carrier taxes based on
    gross receipts" — are prerequisites to the legal operation or use of a vehicle
    on a public highway or are triggered by such operation or use of a vehicle.
    See 
    16 supra
    . The surcharge authorized by A.R.S. § 5-839 lacks any such
    nexus to operation or use of a vehicle. Setting aside the fact that the
    surcharge is imposed on car-rental businesses, not on car-rental customers,
    it goes without saying that one need not rent a vehicle to legally operate or
    use that vehicle on an Arizona street; moreover, the surcharge is not
    triggered by operation or use of a vehicle, but rather by a rental transaction.
    Consistent with that conclusion, as stated, we infer that when voters
    enacted Section 14 in 1952 knowing that Arizona already imposed a
    statewide car-rental tax, they understood that Section 14 would not
    constrain the state's use of the proceeds of that existing revenue source.9
    ¶24           Our analysis also is informed by the principle that "statutes
    must be given a sensible construction which will avoid absurd results."
    Sherman v. City of Tempe, 
    202 Ariz. 339
    , 343, ¶ 18 (2002) (citing Sch. Dist. No.
    3 of Maricopa County v. Dailey, 
    106 Ariz. 124
    , 127 (1970)). Acknowledging
    that Section 14's reach is not limitless, Saban asserts we should construe the
    provision so that it "reach[es] no further than A.R.S. § 5-839." That
    contention disregards the duty of a court that is interpreting a legal
    provision to strive to discern and apply sound principles of general
    applicability in accordance with the intent of those who enacted the
    provision. Saban offers no principled rule of textual interpretation that
    would invalidate the surcharge here without invalidating many other
    vehicle-related taxes that Arizona never has earmarked for highway
    purposes — including taxes on motor vehicle sales and leases, auto repairs,
    sales of automobile-related equipment and parts, and everything else that
    might be said to be "related to" use of motor vehicles. Voters approved
    Section 14 more than 60 years ago. We cannot ignore that so far as we know,
    9      Saban argues § 5-839(C) echoes the language of Section 14 in that it
    authorizes a surcharge on the business of renting "motor vehicles . . . that
    are designed to operate on the streets and highways of this state." Surely
    the lawmakers who enacted the statute did not intend the surcharge to fall
    within Section 14 – its purpose is to fund AzSTA facilities, not to benefit the
    Highway Fund. That being said, and accepting that the car-rental
    surcharge applies only to the renting of vehicles to be used on public
    thoroughfares, as stated above, the surcharge is imposed not on the user of
    those public thoroughfares but on the business that rents a vehicle to the
    user. Nor is it a tax that one must pay to legally operate a vehicle on a public
    thoroughfare or that is triggered by operation of a vehicle on a public
    thoroughfare.
    12
    SABAN, et al. v. ADOR, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    at no time since then have they, the legislature or the executive branch
    seriously suggested that the provision might be or should be interpreted to
    sweep so broadly.
    ¶25           In sum, contrary to Saban's contention, Section 14's text,
    context and history teach that the voters did not intend it to encompass
    every tax or fee in any way "relating to" vehicles. Instead, we conclude
    Section 14 applies to a tax or fee that is a prerequisite to, or triggered by, the
    legal operation or use of a vehicle on a public thoroughfare. By that
    reasoning, we hold it does not apply to the surcharge enacted pursuant to
    A.R.S. § 5-839.
    C.     The Dormant Commerce Clause.
    1.     General principles.
    ¶26             Saban cross-appeals the superior court's rejection of its
    challenge to the surcharge under the Dormant Commerce Clause implied
    by the United States Constitution. The Commerce Clause grants Congress
    the power to "regulate Commerce . . . among the several States." Art. I, § 8,
    cl. 3. "[T]he Commerce Clause . . . reflected a central concern of the Framers
    that[,] . . . in order to succeed, the new Union would have to avoid the
    tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued relations
    among the Colonies and later among the States under the Articles of
    Confederation." Hughes v. Oklahoma, 
    441 U.S. 322
    , 325 (1979). Accordingly,
    "[a]lthough the Clause is framed as a positive grant of power to Congress,
    [the U.S. Supreme Court has] 'consistently held this language to contain a
    further, negative command, known as the dormant Commerce Clause,
    prohibiting certain state taxation even when Congress has failed to legislate
    on the subject.'" Comptroller of Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne, ___ U.S. ___,
    ___, 
    135 S. Ct. 1787
    , 1794 (2015) (quoting Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson
    Lines, Inc., 
    514 U.S. 175
    , 179 (1995)). The concern of the Dormant Commerce
    Clause is with "economic protectionism[,] that is, regulatory measures
    designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state
    competitors." Dep't of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 
    553 U.S. 328
    , 337-38 (2008)
    (quotation omitted). Here, Saban argues the surcharge violates the clause
    because it targets non-Arizona residents who rent vehicles when they visit
    the state.
    ¶27           A threshold question under the Dormant Commerce Clause
    is whether the activity alleged to be unconstitutionally burdened is part of
    interstate commerce. Interstate commerce includes the provision of goods
    or services aimed primarily at out-of-state visitors. See Heart of Atlanta
    13
    SABAN, et al. v. ADOR, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    Motel, Inc. v. United States, 
    379 U.S. 241
    , 256 (1964) ("transportation of
    passengers in interstate commerce"); Exec. Town & Country Servs., Inc. v. City
    of Atlanta, 
    789 F.2d 1523
    , 1525-26 (11th Cir. 1986) (limousine business
    primarily used by airport patrons); Op. of Justices to the House of
    Representatives, 
    702 N.E.2d 8
    , 12 (Mass. 1998) (car-rental business). Saban
    submitted evidence on summary judgment that a significant majority of the
    customers of class members Avis, Hertz and Budget — 87%, 72.3% and
    80%, respectively — are out-of-state residents. It does not matter, for
    purposes of the Dormant Commerce Clause, that the surcharge is not
    imposed directly on travelers from out of state, but rather is paid by
    businesses whose revenues derive from transactions with those travelers.
    See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, Me., 
    520 U.S. 564
    ,
    580 (1997) ("no analytic difference" when "the discriminatory burden is
    imposed on the out-of-state customer indirectly by means of a tax on the
    entity transacting business with the non-[resident] customer"); Heart of
    
    Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 258
    ("[I]f it is interstate commerce that feels the pinch, it
    does not matter how local the operation which applies the squeeze.")
    (citation omitted). Accordingly, the car-rental business in Arizona is part
    of interstate commerce.
    ¶28             That being said, the Dormant Commerce Clause is not
    violated whenever a state taxes a service primarily used by non-residents.
    "It was not the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged in
    interstate commerce from their just share of state tax burden even though it
    increases the cost of doing . . . business." Western Live Stock v. Bureau of
    Revenue, 
    303 U.S. 250
    , 254 (1938). Thus, "interstate commerce may be made
    to pay its way." Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 
    430 U.S. 274
    , 281 (1977).
    A tax is not invalid if it "is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus
    with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against
    interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the
    State." 
    Id. at 279.
    ¶29           As framed on appeal, the only question under Complete Auto
    is whether A.R.S. § 5-839 impermissibly discriminates against interstate
    commerce. See Complete 
    Auto, 430 U.S. at 279
    . In this context,
    "'discrimination' simply means differential treatment of in-state and out-of-
    state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter."
    Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality of State of Or., 
    511 U.S. 93
    , 99
    (1994). In that inquiry, "a fundamental element . . . [is] the principle that
    'any notion of discrimination assumes a comparison of substantially similar
    entities.'" 
    Davis, 553 U.S. at 342-43
    (quoting United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v.
    Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 
    550 U.S. 330
    , 342 (2007) (quoting
    Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 
    519 U.S. 278
    , 298 (1997))). Thus, a law is
    14
    SABAN, et al. v. ADOR, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    discriminatory if it "impose[s] disparate treatment on similarly situated in-
    state and out-of-state interests." 
    Tracy, 519 U.S. at 298
    , n.12. Discriminatory
    laws are almost always per se invalid; they may survive a constitutional
    challenge only if they serve a legitimate local interest other than economic
    protectionism and there is no reasonable nondiscriminatory alternative. See
    Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, Wis., 
    340 U.S. 349
    , 354 (1951).10
    2.     Facial discrimination.
    ¶30            Saban first argues the surcharge violates the Dormant
    Commerce Clause because it discriminates on its face against interstate
    commerce. "State laws discriminating against interstate commerce on their
    face are virtually per se invalid." Camps 
    Newfound, 520 U.S. at 575
    (quoting
    Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 
    516 U.S. 325
    , 331 (1996)) (internal quotation
    omitted). But there is no discrimination evident on the face of the surcharge
    or its statutory authority, A.R.S. § 5-802: The tax is imposed on all car-rental
    business revenues generated in Maricopa County, whether or not they are
    derived from transactions with customers who live in Arizona.
    ¶31             Saban argues, however, that the surcharge falls within what
    it calls a category of "facial discrimination-by-proxy" decisions by the
    Supreme Court that, according to Saban, "involve[] regulations that, while
    not drawn explicitly along state lines, contained language that either
    plainly was intended to serve as a neutral proxy for that demarcation or
    that impelled the Supreme Court to scrutinize the design or predictable
    effect of the tax scheme." But the two cases Saban cites both involve explicit
    facial discrimination. In the first, Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 
    468 U.S. 263
    (1984), the Court struck down a Hawaii tax on liquor sales. The text of the
    statute plainly discriminated along state lines: It specifically exempted
    "[o]kolehao manufactured in the State" and "fruit wine manufactured in the
    State from products grown in the State." Matter of Bacchus Imports, Ltd., 
    656 P.2d 724
    , 726, n.1 (Haw. 1982), rev'd sub nom. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias,
    
    468 U.S. 263
    (1984) (quoting Haw. Rev. Stat. § 244-4 (6), (7)) (emphasis
    added); see also Bacchus 
    Imports, 468 U.S. at 265
    . In the second case, Camps
    Newfound, the Court struck down a Maine tax exemption that excluded
    10     Per se discrimination is the only issue here. ADOR and AzSTA do
    not contend the surcharge can survive if it is per se discriminatory; Saban
    does not contend the surcharge is invalid under any lesser standard. See
    Oregon Waste 
    Sys., 511 U.S. at 99
    ("nondiscriminatory regulations that have
    only incidental effects on interstate commerce are valid unless 'the burden
    imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative
    local benefits'") (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 
    397 U.S. 137
    , 142 (1970)).
    15
    SABAN, et al. v. ADOR, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    charitable institutions "conducted or operated principally for the benefit of
    persons who are not residents of 
    Maine." 520 U.S. at 568
    (emphasis added).
    Neither case supports Saban's argument for "facial discrimination-by-
    proxy."
    3.     Discriminatory effect.
    ¶32           Even when no discrimination is evident on the face of a state
    provision, it may violate the Dormant Commerce Clause if its effects
    discriminate against non-residents.      "The commerce clause forbids
    discrimination, whether forthright or ingenious. In each case it is our duty
    to determine whether the statute under attack, whatever its name may be,
    will in its practical operation work discrimination against interstate
    commerce." W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 
    512 U.S. 186
    , 201-02 (1994)
    (quoting Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 
    311 U.S. 454
    , 455-56 (1940)). Saban argues
    the surcharge is discriminatory because it falls disproportionately on out-
    of-state residents, who make up the majority of car-rental customers in
    Arizona.
    ¶33            Because three-quarters or more of the customers of the
    plaintiff class are non-Arizona residents, it is undeniable that, to the extent
    class members pass along the surcharge to their customers, non-residents
    bear the main burden of the surcharge. The Supreme Court, however, has
    expressly rejected the notion "that a state tax must be considered
    discriminatory for purposes of the Commerce Clause if the tax burden is
    borne primarily by out-of-state consumers." Commonwealth Edison Co. v.
    Mont., 
    453 U.S. 609
    , 618-19 (1981). The issue is whether non-residents bear
    a greater burden than similarly situated residents. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics
    Corp. of Am., 
    481 U.S. 69
    , 88 (1987); see also, e.g., Commonwealth 
    Edison, 453 U.S. at 617-18
    (Montana coal tax imposed on all customers at same rate was
    permissible even though 90% of revenues were collected from non-resident
    customers); Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 
    373 U.S. 64
    , 70 (1963)
    ("[E]qual treatment for in-state and out-of-state taxpayers similarly situated
    is the condition precedent for a valid use tax on goods imported from out-
    of-state."). Under this analysis, the surcharge does not discriminate in its
    effect on non-residents: It is imposed at the same rates on all car-rental
    revenues, whether those revenues are generated from transactions with
    residents or transactions with non-residents.11
    11     Saban contends the lower rate the surcharge imposes on revenues
    from temporary-replacement rentals (i.e., cars rented on a short-term basis
    16
    SABAN, et al. v. ADOR, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    ¶34             Saban argues the surcharge here is not unlike the tax struck
    down for its discriminatory effect in W. Lynn Creamery, 
    512 U.S. 186
    . But
    the tax at issue there -- a facially neutral tax imposed even-handedly on
    both in-state and out-of-state milk producers -- burdened out-of-state
    interests in a predictably disproportionate way because it was coupled with
    a subsidy that effectively refunded the tax to in-state milk producers, but
    not to out-of-state milk producers. 
    Id. at 199,
    n.16. Here, no subsidy or
    other like measure reimburses an Arizona resident (or Arizona car-rental
    company) for the surcharge when a resident rents a car — a distinction that
    renders W. Lynn Creamery inapposite.
    ¶35            By Saban's reasoning, all taxes on goods and services used
    primarily by out-of-state residents would be suspect. But courts routinely
    uphold "tourism" taxes; as long as such taxes do not distinguish between
    in-state and out-of-state residents, it is irrelevant whether the overall
    burden of the tax falls mostly on visitors to the state. See, e.g., Youngblood v.
    State, 
    388 S.E.2d 671
    , 672, 673 (Ga. 1990) (hotel tax used to help finance
    domed stadium; law "imposes an equal tax on residents of the state as well
    as nonresidents"); Geja's Cafe v. Metro. Pier & Exposition Auth., 
    606 N.E.2d 1212
    , 1214, 1219-20 (Ill. 1992) (restaurant tax); Second St. Properties, Inc. v.
    Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, 
    445 S.W.2d 709
    , 711, 716 (Ky. 1969) (hotel tax
    to fund tourist and convention commissions); Hunter v. Warren County Bd.
    of Supervisors, 
    800 N.Y.S.2d 231
    , 233, 235 (App. Div. 2005) (tax on hotel room
    revenues); Travelocity.com LP v. Wyo. Dep't of Revenue, 
    329 P.3d 131
    , 151, ¶¶
    91-94 (Wyo. 2014) (same). By the same token, the lower rate charged on
    revenues from temporary-replacement rentals, which does not distinguish
    between residents and non-residents, is similar to residency-neutral
    exceptions in other tourism taxes that have been upheld. See, e.g., Paustian
    v. Pa. Convention Ctr. Auth., 
    3 Pa. D. & C.4th 16
    , 17, 20, 28-31 (Com. Pl. 1988),
    aff'd sub nom. Paustian v. Pa. Convention Ctr. Auth., 
    561 A.2d 1337
    (1989)
    (hotel tax exempted those renting a room for 30 days or more; "the
    classification is rational and those within the class are treated equally").
    ¶36          In the end, although the car-rental surcharge falls mostly on
    revenues generated by transactions with non-Arizonans, that is true only
    because non-Arizonans rent most of the cars. Saban has provided no
    evidence that the surcharge has an impermissible discriminatory effect.
    to replace damaged or stolen cars) discriminates against non-residents, who
    are less likely to rent replacement vehicles and more likely to rent vehicles
    for vacations or other visits to Arizona.
    17
    SABAN, et al. v. ADOR, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    4.     Discriminatory purpose.
    ¶37            Saban also argues the surcharge is invalid because it
    purposefully discriminates against interstate commerce. Citing Bacchus
    Imports, Saban contends that a discriminatory purpose, by itself, may
    invalidate a law. 
    See 468 U.S. at 270
    ("Examination of the State's purpose in
    this case is sufficient to demonstrate the State's lack of entitlement to a more
    flexible approach permitting inquiry into the balance between local benefits
    and the burden on interstate commerce."). As further support, Saban cites
    Amerada Hess Corp. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, N.J. Dep't of Treasury, 
    490 U.S. 66
    , 75-76 (1989), in which the Court said of Bacchus Imports that
    "because the exemption [in that case] was motivated by an intent to confer
    a benefit upon local industry not granted to out-of-state industry, the
    exemption was invalid."
    ¶38           Notwithstanding the dictum in Amerada Hess, however, the tax
    invalidated in Bacchus Imports expressly discriminated on its face in favor
    of liquor produced in the state. See 
    31 supra
    . And Saban cites no case in
    which the Supreme Court has invalidated any measure on Dormant
    Commerce Clause grounds solely based on discriminatory intent.
    Nevertheless, some circuit courts of appeals have concluded that
    discriminatory purpose alone may be a sufficient ground on which to
    invalidate a measure under the Dormant Commerce Clause. See, e.g., S.D.
    Farm Bureau, Inc. v. Hazeltine, 
    340 F.3d 583
    , 594, 597 (8th Cir. 2003) (striking
    down voter-approved measure when "pro-con" statement sent to voters
    before the election was "brimming with protectionist rhetoric"); Waste
    Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 
    252 F.3d 316
    , 337, 338, 340 (4th Cir. 2001)
    (bill's sponsor stated it addressed "large volume of out of state waste"
    coming into Virginia, and governor declared the state "has no intention of
    becoming the nation's dumping grounds"); SDDS, Inc. v. S.D., 
    47 F.3d 263
    ,
    268, 272 (8th Cir. 1995) (ballot materials stated that "South Dakota is not the
    nation's dumping grounds"); Alliance for Clean Coal v. Miller, 
    44 F.3d 591
    , 595
    (7th Cir. 1995) (statute's stated purpose was "the need to maintain and
    preserve as a valuable State resource the mining of coal in Illinois").
    ¶39           If discriminatory purpose may be enough by itself to
    invalidate a state tax under the Dormant Commerce Clause, the question is
    the nature and amount of the evidence required to prove such purpose,
    issues as to which the Supreme Court has not laid out clear guidance. See
    18
    SABAN, et al. v. ADOR, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    
    Hazeltine, 340 F.3d at 596
    .12 In examining the evidentiary basis for the
    "purpose" of a measure challenged on equal-protection grounds, however,
    the Court has noted that: (1) it will assume that a law's stated purpose is its
    actual purpose; (2) the proper inquiry is into the law's "principal purposes";
    and (3) it "will not invalidate a state statute . . . merely because some
    legislators sought to obtain votes for the measure on the basis of its
    beneficial side effects on state industry." Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery
    Co., 
    449 U.S. 456
    463, n.7, 471, n.15 (1981) (law whose actual purpose is
    permissible is not invalid merely because some legislators defended it with
    protectionist rhetoric).
    ¶40            At issue in Clover Leaf Creamery was a state law that banned
    the sale of milk in certain plastic containers. 
    Id. at 458.
    Although
    proponents argued the measure was aimed at promoting conservation, the
    challengers contended the real purpose of the law was to promote local
    "dairy and pulpwood industries," 
    id. at 460,
    a contention supported by a
    statement by the law's chief legislative proponent chiding a colleague for
    letting "the guys in the alligator shoes from New York and Chicago come
    here and tell you how to run your business," Brief for Respondents,
    Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 
    449 U.S. 456
    (1981), 
    1980 WL 339367
    at *30 (cited in Clover Leaf 
    Creamery, 449 U.S. at 463
    , n.7). Another legislator
    supporting the bill said:
    I don't think there is anything the matter with supporting the
    timber industry which is our third largest employer in the
    state. I think in fact that is one of our responsibilities to keep
    a healthy economy in the state rather than importing
    petrochemicals and importing plastic bottles from Chicago or
    wherever they are manufactured certainly the natural
    resources aren't from here.
    
    Id. at 30-31.
    12      "[T]he Supreme Court 'never has articulated clear criteria for
    deciding when proof of a discriminatory purpose and/or effect is sufficient
    for a state or local law to be discriminatory. Indeed, the cases in this area
    seem quite inconsistent.'" Puppies 'N Love v. Phoenix, 
    116 F. Supp. 3d 971
    ,
    987 (D. Ariz. 2015) (quoting E. Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law, Principles
    and Policies 444-45 (4th ed. 2011)), superseded by statute, A.R.S. §§ 44-1799.10
    to -1799.11 (2018), as recognized and vacated by Puppies 'N Love v. Phoenix, No.
    CV-14-00073-PHX-DGC, 
    2017 WL 4679258
    , at *6 (D. Ariz. Oct. 18, 2017).
    19
    SABAN, et al. v. ADOR, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    ¶41           The Supreme Court acknowledged these statements, but
    nonetheless refused to invalidate the law based on an improper
    protectionist purpose.    The Court remarked that the lawmakers'
    protectionist statements were "easily understood, in context, as economic
    defense of an Act genuinely proposed for environmental reasons," Clover
    Leaf 
    Creamery, 449 U.S. at 463
    , n.7, and concluded that "the principal
    purposes of the [law] were to promote conservation and ease solid waste
    disposal problems." 
    Id. ¶42 As
    noted, the Arizona legislature enacted A.R.S. § 5-839 in
    2000. According to the evidence offered on summary judgment and in the
    public record, the measure was proposed by a gubernatorial task force
    based on a report titled, "Arizona Tourism Retention and Promotion."
    According to the report, although the task force's original mission was to
    study how to pay for a new stadium to house the Arizona Cardinals and to
    maintain the Fiesta Bowl's "status as a 'Top-Tier' bowl," after considering
    "additional threats to the State's tourism tax base," the task force broadened
    its mission "to include the protection and promotion of Arizona's tourism
    industry and Cactus League[,] and directed that any capital finance plan to
    build a stadium also include resources to promote tourism retention." The
    report asserted that a new stadium would generate $800 million annually
    and that Arizona would not be allowed to host another Super Bowl without
    a new stadium. The report also stated that $200 million in annual revenues
    generated by the Cactus League were at risk because other warm-weather
    cities were offering new spring-training facilities to lure Major League
    Baseball teams away from Arizona. Pursuant to the Governor's reported
    directive "that the funding package minimize the impact on the average
    Arizona resident," the task force estimated that under the legislation it
    proposed, 85-90% of the car-rental and hotel assessments would be paid by
    visitors to Arizona.
    ¶43            At the sole legislative committee hearing on the bill that
    authorized AzSTA and its funding sources, members of the Governor's task
    force spoke on behalf of the measure, as did representatives of the Arizona
    Cardinals, the Fiesta Bowl and the Cactus League. The committee also
    heard words of support from the Arizona Office of Tourism, the Valley
    Hotel & Resort Association and from a representative of Enterprise Leasing,
    a car-rental company that has opted out of the present class action.
    ¶44            At the urging of a lawmaker who cited a desire to minimize
    the bill's "impact to residents," a House committee amended the proposed
    legislation to explicitly exempt vehicle rentals to Arizonans. See S.B. 1220,
    44th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess., Committee on Program Authorization Review, Minutes
    20
    SABAN, et al. v. ADOR, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    of Meeting (March 9, 2000) page E-11 (considering S.B. 1220). Other
    committee members opposed the exemption out of concern for its
    constitutionality; one warned that "certain nonresidents cannot be
    targeted." 
    Id. at E-12.
    Ultimately, the resident exemption was stricken from
    the bill before it became law.
    ¶45             Notwithstanding Saban's arguments to the contrary, the
    statements recited above are even less probative of a discriminatory
    purpose than the comments at issue in Clover Leaf Creamery. The statements
    in that case were made in support of the challenged law; the comments by
    the Arizona lawmakers concerned an amendment — an exemption for
    Arizona residents — that the legislature ultimately rejected. We cannot
    conclude a statute that is neither discriminatory on its face nor in its effect
    is rendered unconstitutional simply because lawmakers considered and
    dismissed a protectionist amendment at some point in the legislative
    process. Nor is it proper to impute protectionist intent to legislators who
    correctly inform their peers of the constitutional limits to their power. See
    also generally Julian Cyril Zebot, Awakening A Sleeping Dog: An Examination
    of the Confusion in Ascertaining Purposeful Discrimination Against Interstate
    Commerce, 
    86 Minn. L
    . Rev. 1063, 1086 (2002) (invalidating statute based on
    purported discriminatory purpose when other legitimate purposes may
    exist "is a direct affront to state sovereignty, for it fails to respect legitimate
    state policymaking.").
    ¶46            Saban also cites as evidence of discriminatory intent a single
    sentence in the pamphlet sent to Maricopa County voters before the election
    on the surcharge. In the middle of the second page of the 22-page pamphlet,
    voters were told that "the surcharge on car rentals targets visitors to the
    State (and includes an exemption for 'replacement vehicles' for vehicles
    undergoing repair or similarly unavailable on a temporary basis)." We
    often look to election materials to discern the purpose of a voter-approved
    law. See 
    14 supra
    . But the language Saban cites is only one sentence in a
    lengthy document that broadly describes the purposes of the surcharge --
    to promote tourism; to build a "multipurpose facility" for professional
    football, college bowl games and other events, including college basketball
    tournament games and trade shows and concerts; to build and renovate
    Cactus League facilities; and to develop youth and amateur sports and
    recreational facilities. Guided by the Supreme Court's demonstrated
    reluctance to strike down a law based on isolated statements evidencing
    protectionist motives, we are not persuaded that the statement Saban cites
    proves discriminatory intent sufficient to invalidate the surcharge.
    21
    SABAN, et al. v. ADOR, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    ¶47           In addition, Saban points to the Governor's task force report
    and comments by task force and AzSTA members to the effect that the
    surcharge was created so that visitors to Arizona would pay most of the
    cost of the new AzSTA-owned facilities. Assuming for purposes of
    argument that these non-legislative statements may bear on the issue, they
    merely highlight that the facilities to be built with the surcharge were
    intended to spur tourism and its resulting positive effects on the Arizona
    economy. As noted, proponents of AzSTA and the surcharge argued that
    the new facilities would attract visitors to the state, who would spend large
    amounts not only on rental cars but on hotels, food and beverage and other
    recreational activities. Saban cites no authority for the notion that the
    Dormant Commerce Clause is offended by a tax on tourism activities when
    the proceeds of the tax are used to build facilities to attract tourists.13
    Because the car-rental surcharge funds construction of facilities that benefit
    non-residents who visit Arizona to attend events at those facilities, we are
    not persuaded that the comments Saban cites are anything other than
    legitimate discussion about whether services those non-residents purchase
    should be taxed to fund those facilities.
    ¶48            In sum, A.R.S. § 5-839 and the resulting car-rental surcharge
    are not discriminatory on their face; nor do they cause any discriminatory
    effects on interstate commerce. Finally, assuming arguendo that a state tax
    that is non-discriminatory on its face and in its effect may be invalid solely
    based on a discriminatory purpose, Saban has not demonstrated that the
    challenged surcharge has a discriminatory purpose that violates the
    Dormant Commerce Clause.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶49          We conclude that the car-rental surcharge authorized under
    A.R.S. § 5-839 is not invalid under Article IX, Section 14 of the Arizona
    13      Nor does Saban argue that the surcharge is unconstitutional because
    it is not fairly related to the promotion of tourism. See Complete 
    Auto, 430 U.S. at 279
    . Saban repeatedly asserts that the surcharge was designed to
    pay for a new stadium for the Arizona Cardinals, suggesting that the
    proceeds of the surcharge have been spent primarily for the benefit of local
    sports fans. It offered no evidence, however, to support the proposition
    that (even apart from the multiplier effect of tourism dollars on the state's
    economy) the facilities built by the surcharge benefit local sports fans more
    than the out-of-state fans of professional and college football and Major
    League Baseball, concert-goers, trade-show visitors and others who use
    those facilities when they visit Arizona.
    22
    SABAN, et al. v. ADOR, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    Constitution, and reverse the tax court's ruling on summary judgment to
    the contrary, including its award of attorney's fees and costs. We affirm the
    superior court's ruling that the surcharge is not unconstitutional under the
    Dormant Commerce Clause. Accordingly, we vacate the superior court's
    refund order, direct entry of judgment in favor of ADOR and AzSTA and
    remand for any further required proceedings consistent with this decision.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED: AA
    23
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1 CA-TX 16-0007

Citation Numbers: 418 P.3d 1066

Filed Date: 3/13/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/13/2018

Authorities (38)

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