Chereka v. Gadissa ( 2015 )


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  •                      NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    KIDIST CHEREKA, Plaintiff/Appellant,
    v.
    WORKNEH GADISSA, Defendant/Appellee.
    No. 1 CA-CV 14-0624 FC
    FILED 6-11-2015
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. FC2014-004661
    The Honorable Thomas Kaipio, Judge Pro Tempore
    AFFIRMED
    COUNSEL
    Kidist Chereka, Phoenix
    Plaintiff/Appellant
    Workneh Gadissa, Phoenix
    Defendant/Appellee
    CHEREKA v. GADISSA
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Judge Donn Kessler delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding
    Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop and Judge Samuel A. Thumma joined.
    K E S S L E R, Judge:
    ¶1            Kidist Chereka (“Mother”) appeals from a judgment of the
    superior court removing her children from an order of protection issued by
    a justice court against the children’s father, Workneh Gadissa (“Father”).
    For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2            Mother and Father previously lived together and share legal
    decision making for their two children, S.W. (age 4) and K.W. (age 1).
    Mother alleged Father beat her and threw dangerous items at her. She
    further alleged Father hit S.W., severely bruising him and threw hot water
    at S.W., requiring her to take him to the hospital. Mother also alleged K.W.
    returned home from Father’s care covered in rashes, including diaper
    rashes, and had not been fed while he was with Father.
    ¶3             Mother filed a request for a protective order against Father for
    herself, S.W., and K.W. in justice court. The justice court granted Mother’s
    request, listing Mother and the two children as protected persons. The
    court then transferred the matter to the superior court, where a family court
    proceeding was pending between Mother and Father. See generally Ariz. R.
    Prot. Ord. P. 4. Father then requested a hearing to contest the protective
    order. The superior court did not consolidate the transferred case from the
    justice court and the pending family court matter.1
    ¶4            The superior court held an evidentiary hearing. In its minute
    entry from that hearing, after receiving testimony from Mother and Father
    and receiving various documentary exhibits, the court ruled that there was
    reasonable cause to believe that Father committed an act of domestic
    violence against Mother and that “significant acrimony exists between the
    parties” warranting the continuance of the order of protection, but found it
    1The other matter not before us on appeal is Maricopa County Superior
    Court FC 2013-002025.
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    CHEREKA v. GADISSA
    Decision of the Court
    was appropriate to modify the order “by removing the minor children
    from” its protection “as stated on the record.” The court accordingly filed
    an amended order of protection excluding the children.
    ¶5            Mother filed a timely notice of appeal from the superior
    court’s order. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the
    Arizona Constitution, Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections 12-
    2101(A)(1), -2101(A)(5)(b), and Rule 9(B)(2) of the Arizona Rules of
    Protective Order Procedure.
    ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
    ¶6            On appeal, Mother argues: (1) the superior court erred by
    improperly excluding witness testimony that would have proven that the
    children needed to be included in the protective order; (2) the exclusion of
    such evidence violated her right to due process; (3) the superior court
    violated her First Amendment rights by preventing her from taking the
    children to church; and (4) the court improperly adjusted the parenting time
    preventing her from attending school.
    ¶7             We review the trial court’s grant of an order of protection for
    an abuse of discretion. Savord v. Morton, 
    235 Ariz. 256
    , 259, ¶ 10, 
    330 P.3d 1013
    , 1016 (App. 2014). A court abuses its discretion when there is no
    factual support for the court’s conclusions or the court erroneously applies
    the law. Grant v. Arizona Pub. Serv. Co., 
    133 Ariz. 434
    , 455–56, 
    652 P.2d 507
    ,
    528–29 (1982). We review legal issues de novo. Department of Child Safety v.
    Beene, 
    235 Ariz. 300
    , 304, ¶ 8, 
    332 P.3d 47
    , 51 (App. 2014) (quoting Mario G.
    v. Arizona Dep't of Econ. Sec., 
    227 Ariz. 282
    , 285, ¶ 12, 
    257 P.3d 1162
    , 1165
    (App. 2011)). We view the evidence in a light most favorable to upholding
    the trial court’s decision and will not overturn the trial court unless the
    ruling “is devoid of competent evidence to support the decision.”
    Michaelson v. Garr, 
    234 Ariz. 542
    , 544, ¶ 5, 
    323 P.3d 1193
    , 1195 (App. 2014)
    (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). We review evidentiary
    rulings for misapplication of the law and abuses of discretion that result in
    unfair prejudice. Larsen v. Decker, 
    196 Ariz. 239
    , 241, ¶ 6, 
    995 P.2d 281
    , 283
    (App. 2000), amended (Feb. 22, 2000). It is the duty of the appellant to order
    the necessary transcripts. Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 11(c). When the record is
    incomplete, we assume that any missing evidence supports the trial court’s
    ruling. Bliss v. Treece, 
    134 Ariz. 516
    , 519, 
    658 P.2d 169
    , 172 (1983).
    DISCUSSION
    ¶8           Mother’s first two arguments are that the superior court erred
    in excluding a witness’s testimony. She alleges that the judge was “mad”
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    CHEREKA v. GADISSA
    Decision of the Court
    at her for “appealing his July 21, 2014 Ruling” and that excluding the
    witness denied her due process. The record indicates that another witness
    was sworn but did not testify. Even if the superior court excluded that
    witness’s testimony, Mother did not provide a transcript of the superior
    court proceeding. We presume that the evidence presented at trial
    supported the trial court’s decision to exclude the witness’s testimony and
    that the judge properly weighed the evidence in accordance with the
    relevant factors. See 
    Bliss, 134 Ariz. at 519
    , 658 P.2d at 172; Aguirre v. Robert
    Forrest, P.A., 
    186 Ariz. 393
    , 397, 
    923 P.2d 859
    , 863 (App. 1996).
    ¶9             In addition, in the absence of a transcript, we cannot find any
    due process violation. The Fourteenth Amendment’s due process
    protections entitle a party “to notice and an opportunity to be heard at a
    meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Curtis v. Richardson, 
    212 Ariz. 308
    , 312, ¶16, 
    131 P.3d 480
    , 484 (App. 2006) (citing Comeau v. Arizona
    State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 
    196 Ariz. 102
    , 106–07, ¶ 20, 
    993 P.2d 1066
    , 1070–
    71 (App. 1999)). Due process entitles a party to offer evidence and challenge
    adverse testimony. 
    Id. at ¶
    16 (citing Application of Levine, 
    97 Ariz. 88
    , 91–
    92, 
    397 P.2d 205
    , 207 (1964)). Due process also entitles parties who do not
    understand English to have the proceedings translated into their native
    language. See cf. State v. Natividad, 
    111 Ariz. 191
    , 194, 
    526 P.2d 730
    , 733
    (1974) (stating that it is “axiomatic” for a criminal defendant who does not
    speak English to have the proceedings translated into his or her native
    language so long as a request for translation is timely made). The minute
    entry from the hearing shows that Mother was present for the evidentiary
    hearing, was permitted to participate, was represented by counsel, and had
    the benefit of a court interpreter to interpret from English to the parties’
    native language. Given the lack of any transcript, we presume the court did
    not deny Mother due process of law. See 
    Larsen, 196 Ariz. at 241
    , ¶ 
    6, 995 P.2d at 283
    .
    ¶10           Mother also argues that the superior court violated her First
    Amendment rights by precluding her from taking the children to church
    and further erred in preventing her from going to school by changing
    parenting time. The amended order of protection from which Mother
    appeals does not restrict Mother’s choice of where to take her children to
    worship nor does it address parenting hours. We will only consider issues
    raised in proceedings before the superior court. See Quila v. Schafer’s Estate,
    
    7 Ariz. App. 301
    , 302, 
    438 P.2d 770
    , 771 (1968). If there are orders in the
    related family court proceeding involving these issues it is not before us,
    and the notice of appeal did not include such orders. Accordingly, we
    express no opinion on them.
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    CHEREKA v. GADISSA
    Decision of the Court
    CONCLUSION
    ¶11        For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the superior court’s
    amended protective order.
    :ama
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