Justin C. v. Dcs, S.C. ( 2015 )


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  •                       NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    JUSTIN C., Appellant,
    v.
    DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, S.C., Appellees.
    No. 1 CA-JV 15-0136
    FILED 12-1-2015
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Apache County
    No. S0100JD201300001
    The Honorable Donna J. Grimsley, Judge Pro Tem
    AFFIRMED
    COUNSEL
    Law Office of Devin Brown, St. Johns
    By Devin Brown
    Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant
    Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Mesa
    By Amanda Adams
    Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
    JUSTIN C. v. DCS, S.C.
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Judge Jon W. Thompson delivered the decision of the Court, in which
    Presiding Judge Randall M. Howe and Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop joined.
    T H O M P S O N, Judge:
    ¶1           Justin C. (Justin) appeals from the juvenile court’s order
    terminating his parental rights to his daughter S.C. For the following
    reasons, we affirm.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2            S.C. was born in January 2012. Justin and S.C.’s mother, D.H.,
    were never married.1 S.C. came into the care of the Department of Child
    Safety (DCS)2 after DCS received a referral that S.C. and her seven-year-old
    half-brother had been neglected. When DCS contacted Justin and D.H. in
    January 2013, D.H. admitted to using methamphetamine and Justin
    admitted to using marijuana on a regular basis. DCS allowed S.C. to remain
    in the home with D.H. and Justin, but the next day Justin attempted to
    choke D.H. and hit her in the face while she was holding S.C. Police
    arrested Justin, who was already on probation for assault. DCS took
    custody of S.C. and placed her in a foster home along with her brother.
    ¶3            DCS filed a dependency petition and in January 2013 the
    juvenile court found that S.C. was a dependent child as to both Justin and
    D.H. The court approved a case plan of family reunification, and DCS put
    services into place. Justin’s participation in services was inconsistent, and
    in January 2014, the juvenile court approved a case plan of severance and
    adoption. DCS filed a severance motion, and the court held a contested
    severance trial over three days in the fall of 2014 and in January 2015. The
    court terminated Justin’s parental rights pursuant to Arizona Revised
    1 D.H.’s parental rights were previously terminated; she is not a party to
    this appeal.
    2The Arizona Department of Economic Security originated this action but
    was later replaced by the Department of Child Safety. See S.B. 1001, 51st
    Leg., 2d Spec. Sess. (Ariz. 2014). We refer to both entities as “DCS.”
    2
    JUSTIN C. v. DCS, S.C.
    Decision of the Court
    Statutes (A.R.S.) sections 8-533(B)(8)(a) (Supp. 2012) (nine months’ out of
    home placement) and 8-533(B)(3) (substance abuse). Justin timely
    appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 8-235 (2010), 12-
    120.21(A)(1) (2010), and -2101 (A)(1) (Supp. 2012).
    DISCUSSION
    ¶4            On appeal, Justin argues that insufficient evidence supported
    the juvenile court’s findings concerning both of the statutory grounds for
    severance (nine months’ out of home placement and substance abuse). He
    does not appeal from the juvenile court’s best interest finding.
    ¶5             “We will not disturb the juvenile court’s order severing
    parental rights unless its factual findings are clearly erroneous, that is,
    unless there is no reasonable evidence to support them.” Audra T. v. Ariz.
    Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 
    194 Ariz. 376
    , 377, ¶ 2, 
    982 P.2d 1290
    , 1291 (App. 1998)
    (citations omitted). We view the facts in the light most favorable to
    sustaining the juvenile court’s ruling. Lashonda M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec.,
    
    210 Ariz. 77
    , 82, ¶ 13, 
    107 P.3d 923
    , 928 (App. 2005). We do not reweigh the
    evidence, because “[t]he juvenile court, as the trier of fact in a termination
    proceeding, is in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the
    parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, and make appropriate findings.”
    Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 
    203 Ariz. 278
    , 280, ¶ 4, 
    53 P.3d 203
    , 205
    (App. 2002) (citation omitted). The juvenile court may terminate a parent-
    child relationship if DCS proves by clear and convincing evidence at least
    one of the statutory grounds set forth in A.R.S. § 8-533(B). Michael J. v. Ariz.
    Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 
    196 Ariz. 246
    , 249, ¶ 12, 
    995 P.2d 682
    , 685 (2000). The
    court must also find by a preponderance of the evidence that severance is
    in the child’s best interests. Kent K. v. Bobby M., 
    210 Ariz. 279
    , 284, ¶ 22, 
    110 P.3d 1013
    , 1018 (2005).
    A. Nine Months’ Out of Home Placement
    ¶6            Under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(a), the juvenile court may
    terminate a parent-child relationship if DCS “made a diligent effort to
    provide appropriate reunification services,” the child was in an out-of-
    home placement for nine months or longer, and the parent substantially
    neglected or willfully refused to remedy the circumstances that caused the
    child to remain out of the home. DCS “is not required to provide every
    conceivable service or to ensure that a parent participates in each service it
    offers.” Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JS-501904, 
    180 Ariz. 348
    , 353, 
    884 P.2d 234
    , 239 (App. 1994). DCS fulfills its statutory mandate to diligently
    provide appropriate reunification services when it “provide[s] [a parent]
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    JUSTIN C. v. DCS, S.C.
    Decision of the Court
    with the time and opportunity to participate in programs designed to help
    [the parent] become an effective parent.” 
    Id.
     “To ‘substantially [neglect] or
    willfully [refuse] to remedy a circumstance,’ a parent must be aware that
    [DCS] alleges that the circumstance exists and is one that, if it continues to
    exist at severance, may result in the termination of [the parent’s] parental
    rights.” Marina P. v. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 
    214 Ariz. 326
    , 332, ¶ 35, 
    152 P.3d 1209
    , 1215 (App. 2007) (citation omitted).
    ¶7            At the time DCS filed its severance motion in February 2014
    S.C. had been in an out-of-home placement for approximately thirteen
    months, and by the last day of trial she had been in care for approximately
    two years. During the dependency, DCS requested that Justin participate
    in substance abuse assessment and treatment services, random drug
    testing, parenting classes, parent-aide services, and visitation. From the
    outset of the dependency, DCS also informed Justin he would need to
    “demonstrate an ability to parent . . . without violence in the home and an
    ability to provide the basic needs of [S.C.] such as shelter, food and
    clothing.”
    ¶8             Justin completed the substance abuse assessment in January
    2013. The intake worker who completed the assessment recommended that
    Justin begin an intensive outpatient substance abuse treatment, that he
    participate in domestic violence classes, and that he attend parenting
    classes. Justin began attending the intensive outpatient sessions, but his
    attendance was “very inconsistent” until 2014. He missed nearly half of the
    sessions he was expected to attend in 2013. His attendance improved in
    2014, although he missed several sessions. Justin’s substance abuse
    counselor, W.G., testified that even after Justin’s attendance improved, he
    continued to deny that he had a substance abuse problem and was there
    “just to get [S.C.] back.” By the last day of trial, Justin had completed the
    outpatient treatment program, but still needed to complete an aftercare
    program.
    ¶9            Justin tested positive for opiates in February, March, May,
    October and December 2013. In May 2013 he tested positive for
    methamphetamine and twice tested positive for marijuana. He tested
    positive for marijuana in November 2013, and as a result of that positive
    test and because he was found to possess alcohol, he served a total of
    fourteen days in jail in January and February 2014 for violating his
    4
    JUSTIN C. v. DCS, S.C.
    Decision of the Court
    probation. He tested positive for opiates twice and methamphetamine once
    in January 2014.3 In May and September 2014 he tested positive for opiates.
    ¶10            Justin’s probation officer, A.O., testified that Justin had been
    on intensive probation since July 2013, after he assaulted D.H. As part of
    his probation, Justin was required to participate in both intensive outpatient
    substance abuse counseling and domestic violence counseling. A.O.
    testified that Justin was closed out of domestic violence treatment in 2013,
    attended four domestic violence sessions in 2014, and missed one session.
    A.O. explained that, as of the date of her testimony in September 2014,
    Justin had not successfully completed domestic violence treatment because
    he still had about thirteen of twenty-six sessions to complete. However, on
    the last day of trial four months later, Justin testified that he had completed
    twenty-five sessions and would complete his last session within a week.
    ¶11           Justin completed a psychological evaluation with Dr. Shane
    Hunt, a licensed psychologist, in December 2013. Dr. Hunt diagnosed
    Justin with antisocial personality disorder, ADHD, intermittent explosive
    disorder, alcohol abuse in early partial remission, cannabis use in early
    partial remission, and amphetamine abuse in early partial remission. Dr.
    Hunt opined that Justin had a limited ability to make appropriate decisions
    that would be in a child’s best interest, let alone his own best interest:
    I’m very concerned in regards to [Justin] not
    having the emotional regulation to be able to
    take care of his own needs and keep himself out
    of . . . trouble . . . much less putting children in
    his care. You know, it’s the hostility and the
    anger, the poor temperament, the difficulties in
    . . . making what I would call responsible
    3 By January 2014, the DCS case manager had spoken with Justin and
    advised him that DCS had not been provided with a prescription for opiates
    (hydrocodone or oxycodone) although he had been testing positive for both
    of those drugs. Justin did not provide a prescription for opiates until
    August 2014, when he provided his probation officer with a prescription
    for hydrocodone. Subsequently, Justin’s treating physician stopped
    prescribing Justin opiates after the probation department informed the
    doctor about Justin’s history of substance abuse. Justin’s substance abuse
    counselor, W.G., testified that continued use of opiates, even with a
    prescription, presented a potential problem due to a high potential for
    cross-addiction.
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    JUSTIN C. v. DCS, S.C.
    Decision of the Court
    choices are all concerns that I would have in
    regards to [Justin’s] minimal and adequate
    parenting. And I think it directly impacts that
    and it limits his ability to . . . make appropriate
    decisions that would be in his children’s best
    interest, or even in his own best interest.
    Dr. Hunt opined that there was a “high possibility” of abuse or neglect for
    a child placed in Justin’s care. He further testified that Justin would need
    to demonstrate a year of sobriety before S.C. could be returned to his care.
    ¶12          S.S., the parent aide assigned to supervise Justin’s visits with
    S.C. and provide him with hands-on parenting lessons, testified that during
    visits Justin failed to consistently demonstrate hands-on parenting
    techniques during the visits, and relied on his parents to meet S.C.’s basic
    needs.
    ¶13             DCS case manager C.C. testified that Justin had failed to make
    the necessary behavioral changes to have S.C. returned to his care. She
    testified that Justin’s substance abuse problem was unresolved and agreed
    with Dr. Hunt’s opinion that Justin needed to demonstrate a year of
    sobriety before S.C. could be returned to his care. She testified that Justin
    would need to completely finish an entire substance abuse treatment
    program. C.C. noted that Justin had only been employed for a few weeks
    in October or November 2014 and that he had failed to obtain appropriate
    housing. C.C. testified that without a job and appropriate housing Justin
    was unable to meet S.C.’s basic needs.
    ¶14          Based on all of the evidence, the trial court concluded that S.C.
    had been cared for in an out of home placement for more than nine months
    and Justin substantially neglected or willfully refused to remedy the
    circumstances causing S.C. to remain in care. The court found:
    [F]ather substantially refused or willfully
    neglected to engage in substance abuse until the
    child had been in care 17 months and still has
    not completed services or exhibited the
    behavioral skills necessary for the child to be
    safely returned. Father had not completed
    domestic violence classes as of January 16, 2015,
    although [he] was close to completion. Father
    did not engage in parenting classes, so the
    parent aid fashioned individual classes for him
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    JUSTIN C. v. DCS, S.C.
    Decision of the Court
    during visits and transport, but no certificate of
    completion was received. Father continued to
    exhibit the detrimental behaviors noted in the
    psychological evaluation, even at the time of the
    trial. He has not engaged in counseling services
    to address his mental health issues.           He
    continues to blame others. He does not take any
    responsibility for his own actions that caused
    the child to be in car[e]. He continues to rely on
    his parents to provide food for his child.
    Father’s late efforts at engaging in services are
    not sufficient to demonstrate to the court that he
    has met the behavioral changes necessary for
    the child to be safely returned to him.
    The evidence was sufficient to support the severance order under A.R.S. §
    8-533(8)(a). While Justin made some efforts to comply with the caseplan,
    those efforts were “too little, too late.” See Maricopa Cty Juv. Action No. JS-
    501568, 
    177 Ariz. 571
    , 577, 
    869 P.2d 1224
    , 1230 (App. 1994). Although Justin
    argues that the juvenile court improperly discounted his good faith efforts
    and focused just on the first nine months that S.C. was in care, the record
    instead shows that the juvenile court looked at Justin’s efforts from the
    outset of the dependency and up until the last day of trial. As noted by the
    trial court, the only program that Justin actually completed during the
    entire dependency was one portion of the drug treatment program. He
    failed to demonstrate a year of sobriety and did not demonstrate that he
    could meet S.C.’s basic needs.
    B. Reunification Services
    ¶15           Justin further argues that DCS failed to make diligent efforts
    to provide appropriate reunification services. Reasonable evidence
    supports the juvenile court’s finding that DCS made diligent efforts to
    provide reunification services, however. DCS gave Justin “the time and
    opportunity” to participate in services designed to help him parent,
    including a psychological evaluation, outpatient drug treatment, urinalysis
    testing, and parent aid services. Although Justin complains that DCS failed
    to provide him with employment assistance, housing assistance, and
    transportation assistance4, DCS is not required to provide a parent with
    4Justin’s mother testified that he received gas cards from Catholic Services
    so he could attend his domestic violence classes.
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    JUSTIN C. v. DCS, S.C.
    Decision of the Court
    every conceivable service. See Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JS-501904, 
    180 Ariz. 348
    , 353, 
    884 P.2d 234
    , 239 (App. 1994).
    ¶16          Because we affirm the court’s order granting severance on the
    basis of nine months in an out-of-home placement, we need not address
    Justin’s argument concerning A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3).
    CONCLUSION
    ¶17          For the foregoing reasons, the juvenile court’s severance order
    is affirmed.
    :ama
    8