Wilda M. v. Dcs ( 2017 )


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  •                       NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    WILDA M., Appellant,
    v.
    DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, G.M., T.M., Appellees.
    No. 1 CA-JV 16-0524
    FILED 7-25-2017
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. JD528951
    The Honorable Timothy J. Ryan, Judge
    AFFIRMED
    COUNSEL
    Law Office of H Clark Jones LLC, Mesa
    By Clark Jones
    Counsel for Appellant
    Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Mesa
    By Amanda L. Adams
    Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
    WILDA M. v. DCS, et al.
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Presiding Judge Jon W. Thompson delivered the decision of the Court, in
    which Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Randall M. Howe joined.
    T H O M P S O N, Judge:
    ¶1           Wilda M. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order
    severing her parental rights to G.M. and T.M. For the reasons that follow,
    we affirm.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2            Mother is the biological parent of the subject children, who
    were born in August 2010 and March 2015.1 The Department of Child
    Safety (DCS) became involved in their parent-child relationship after DCS
    received a report in March 2015 that T.M. had been born substance exposed
    to marijuana. Mother tested negative for illicit substances at the hospital
    after T.M.’s birth, but admitted to sporadic use of marijuana during her
    pregnancy. She denied using other drugs. Due to mother’s willingness to
    participate in in-home services that DCS would provide, mother was
    discharged for the hospital with T.M. after a DCS case manager consented
    to her doing so.
    ¶3            Over the subsequent few weeks, however, mother failed to
    keep in contact with DCS, and DCS was unable to locate mother. DCS
    ultimately learned that mother had been arrested on April 13, 2015, after a
    domestic violence dispute with her roommate. Mother was released the
    next day, and left the residence she shared with her roommate. She left G.M.
    with her roommate, and reportedly “bounc[ed] around from house to
    house” with T.M. DCS intervened and took temporary custody of both
    children and placed them in the same licensed foster home. DCS also filed
    a petition in which it alleged the children were dependent due to mother’s
    neglect, based on substance-abuse, domestic violence (not involving the
    children), and mental illness.
    ¶4          The juvenile court found the children dependent in July 2015
    and approved a case plan of family reunification. Mother agreed with DCS
    1     The children’s alleged fathers are not parties of this appeal.
    2
    WILDA M. v. DCS, et al.
    Decision of the Court
    to participate in court-ordered services, including substance-abuse services,
    random drug testing, a psychological evaluation, parent-aide services, and
    supervised visits with the children. She also agreed to “self-refer” for anger
    management and domestic-violence classes. Mother participated in the
    DCS services, and had supervised visits with her children twice each week.
    However, mother failed to consistently submit to drug testing, and
    submitted diluted urine samples. Mother eventually completed an out-
    patient substance-abuse program in October 2015, however, she
    subsequently tested positive for alcohol consumption.
    ¶5             Because mother had continued a romantic relationship with a
    convicted felon while on probation for a prior aggravated DUI conviction,
    her probation was revoked. She was then sentenced to serve 2.5 years of
    incarceration. Mother expected to be released from prison in May 2017, but
    her maximum end date is December 2017. DCS did not facilitate in-person
    prison visits between mother and her children, but she had telephonic visits
    with them.
    ¶6            The superior court granted DCS’s request to change the case
    plan to severance and adoption and DCS moved to sever mother’s parental
    rights on the length-of-felony-sentence ground in March 2016. See Arizona
    Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) section 8-533(B)(4). At the contested severance
    hearing in October 2016, the DCS case manager testified that after mother’s
    release, mother would not likely be reunited with the children for another
    year because mother would need to reestablish a relationship with the
    children, demonstrate stability, and complete anger management and
    substance-abuse treatment.2 The case manager also testified that the
    children’s placement was willing to adopt them.
    ¶7            In December 2016, the court issued an order severing
    mother’s parental rights. The court found that the state had met its burden
    in proving the statutory ground, and that termination of mother’s parental
    rights was in the children’s best interests. Mother timely appealed to this
    court. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A) (2014), 12-
    120.21(A)(1) (2016), and -2101(A)(1) (2016).
    2      Notably, the record shows that during her incarceration mother had
    participated in various services, including over ten months of “Confronting
    Addictive Behaviors,” Women in Recovery, twenty hours of DUI
    programming through Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD), and auto
    tech and graphic arts classes.
    3
    WILDA M. v. DCS, et al.
    Decision of the Court
    DISCUSSION
    ¶8            The sole issue on appeal is whether the juvenile court erred in
    finding that the termination of mother’s parental rights was in the
    children’s best interests. Mother does not challenge the juvenile court’s
    finding of the requisite statutory ground.
    ¶9            As relevant here, mother argues that DCS failed to meet the
    evidentiary standard to establish that the children would accrue an
    affirmative benefit from the termination of mother’s parental rights, or be
    harmed by continuing the parent-child relationship. The evidence in the
    record from the juvenile court indicates otherwise.
    ¶10            The best interest inquiry “must include a finding as to how
    the child would benefit from a severance [of the parent-child relationship]
    or be harmed by the continuation of the relationship.” Maricopa Cty. Juv.
    Action No. JS-500274, 
    167 Ariz. 1
    , 5, 
    804 P.2d 730
    , 734 (1990). In evaluating
    whether severance is in a child’s best interest, the juvenile court is required
    to conduct the inquiry considering “the totality of the circumstances.”
    Dominque M. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 
    240 Ariz. 96
    , 99, ¶ 12, 
    376 P.3d 699
    , 702
    (App. 2016). Therefore, even where a bond exists between a parent and her
    child—as mother argues exists in this matter, that bond is not dispositive in
    the best interest analysis. See 
    id. at 98,
    12, 376 P.3d at 701
    .
    ¶11             This court has also held that a finding that severance is in a
    child’s best interest may be accomplished by a showing, by preponderance
    of the evidence, that a child is adoptable3 and the current placement is
    meeting the child’s needs. See Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 
    207 Ariz. 43
    , 50, ¶ 19, 
    83 P.3d 43
    , 50 (App. 2004).
    ¶12          As noted above, at the time of the severance hearing in
    October 2016, mother was expected to be away from G.M. and T.M. for
    approximately another year, after being incarcerated since November 2015.
    Considering that, according to DCS, mother would need additional time to
    demonstrate her ability to provide stability and care for her children and to
    complete her rehabilitative services, any reunification between mother and
    the children would, at best, be prolonged. During that time, the children
    3      See Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JS-501904, 
    180 Ariz. 348
    , 352, 
    884 P.2d 234
    , 238 (App. 1994) (“[DCS] need not show that it has a specific
    adoption plan before terminating a parent’s rights; [DCS] must show that
    the children are adoptable.”).
    4
    WILDA M. v. DCS, et al.
    Decision of the Court
    could be left in limbo, for an uncertain period, in the state’s custody. Under
    these circumstances, DCS’s testimony that the children’s placement had
    been meeting their needs and was willing to adopt the children, was more
    than sufficient to support the court’s finding that termination of mother’s
    parental rights was in the children’s best interests.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶13          Accordingly, we affirm the juvenile court’s order terminating
    mother’s parental rights to both children.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED: AA
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1 CA-JV 16-0524

Filed Date: 7/25/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021