Clark v. Clark ( 2016 )


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  •                      NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    In re the Marriage of:
    LINDA JEAN HARNISH CLARK, Petitioner/Appellee,
    v.
    EDWARD WAYNE CLARK, Respondent/Appellant.
    No. 1 CA-CV 14-0370 FC
    FILED 4-5-2016
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. FC2011-090967
    The Honorable Timothy J. Ryan, Judge
    AFFIRMED
    COUNSEL
    Bishop Law Office, PC, Phoenix and Tempe
    By Daniel P. Beeks, William D. Bishop
    Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee
    Edward Wayne Clark, Mesa
    Respondent/Appellant
    CLARK v. CLARK
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Presiding Judge Peter B. Swann delivered the decision of the court, in
    which Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop and Judge Donn Kessler joined.
    S W A N N, Judge:
    ¶1            Edward Wayne Clark (“Husband”) appeals from the
    superior court’s post-decree ruling awarding attorney’s fees and costs to
    Linda Jean Harnish Clark (“Wife”) under A.R.S. § 25-324(A). The superior
    court found that the award was warranted based on a disparity in the
    parties’ financial resources and on unreasonable positions that Husband
    had taken in the litigation. The record is sufficient to support the court’s
    findings. We therefore affirm.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2            Husband and Wife divorced after a lengthy marriage. In
    2013, the superior court awarded approximately $109,000 in attorney’s
    fees and costs to Wife, finding that “Husband has substantially greater
    financial resources compared to Wife” and “has taken patently
    unreasonable positions, driving up the cost of litigation, particularly in the
    post-trial proceedings.” Husband appealed, and we ultimately affirmed
    the award in Clark v. Clark, 1 CA-CV 13-0252 FC, 
    2015 WL 2448844
    , at *8,
    ¶¶ 32-33 (Ariz. App. April 30, 2015) (mem. decision).
    ¶3            While the appeal was pending, Husband filed a petition to
    modify child support. The superior court deemed the petition premature
    because the issue of Husband’s income was on appeal.
    ¶4            Husband then moved for relief from judgment regarding the
    division of real property. At oral argument on that motion, the superior
    court denied Husband’s oral request for reconsideration of the petition to
    modify child support. The court denied Husband’s motion for relief from
    judgment (a ruling that we later affirmed in Clark v. Clark, 1 CA-CV 14-
    0293 FC, 
    2015 WL 2381297
     (Ariz. App. May 12, 2015) (mem. decision)),
    and permitted Wife to file an application for attorney’s fees and costs.
    ¶5           Wife applied under A.R.S. § 25-324 for $52,522.49 in
    attorney’s fees and costs incurred since the initial fee award. Over
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    CLARK v. CLARK
    Decision of the Court
    Husband’s objection, the court entered judgment in Wife’s favor for the
    full amount she requested, finding:
    Husband has taken, and continues to take, unreasonable
    positions during the course of this post-decree litigation.
    The Court further finds that Husband has been less than
    candid with the Court. The Court further finds that
    Husband’s pattern and practice of litigation is done with the
    intent to escalate litigation costs for [Wife]. The Court
    further finds that the work expended by counsel to be
    reasonably calculated to provide thorough competent
    representation. The Court further finds the hourly rate to be
    reasonable. The Court further finds that the judgment
    entered below is related to issues of support, and therefore
    subject to the contempt authority of the Court.
    ¶6            Husband filed a motion to amend the judgment, requesting
    that the court make specific findings under A.R.S. § 25-324(A). Wife filed
    proposed findings, which Husband opposed. The court adopted Wife’s
    proposed findings in their entirety and denied Husband’s motion for
    amendment as moot. Husband appeals.
    DISCUSSION
    ¶7            We review an award of attorney’s fees under A.R.S. § 25–324
    for an abuse of discretion. Rinegar v. Rinegar, 
    231 Ariz. 85
    , 90, ¶ 22 (App.
    2012). We view the record in the light most favorable to upholding the
    award, and will affirm if any reasonable evidence in the record supports
    the superior court’s decision. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 
    152 Ariz. 317
    , 323 (1987).
    We must accept the superior court’s factual findings unless they are
    clearly erroneous or unsupported by any credible evidence. See Imperial
    Litho/Graphics v. M.J. Enters., 
    152 Ariz. 68
    , 72 (App. 1986).
    ¶8            A.R.S. § 25-324(A) provides that the court may award
    reasonable attorney’s fees “after considering the financial resources of
    both parties and the reasonableness of the positions each party has taken
    throughout the proceedings.” Fees may be awarded based on either the
    disparity of the parties’ financial resources or the reasonableness of their
    positions. Magee v. Magee, 
    206 Ariz. 589
    , 591 n.1, ¶ 8 (App. 2004).
    Husband contends that fees were not warranted on either ground. We
    hold that the record supports the court’s findings with respect to both
    grounds.
    3
    CLARK v. CLARK
    Decision of the Court
    I. FINANCIAL DISPARITY
    ¶9            Disparity in income may support an attorney’s fees award
    even if the party against whom fees are sought has taken reasonable
    positions in the litigation. In re Marriage of Pownall, 
    197 Ariz. 577
    , 583, ¶ 29
    (App. 2000). When considering parties’ financial resources for purposes
    of A.R.S. § 25-324(A), “the court is obligated to consider factors such as the
    degree of the resource disparity between the parties, the ratio of the fees
    owed to the assets and/or income of each party, and other similar
    matters.” Magee, 
    206 Ariz. at 592, ¶ 17
    . The “relative financial disparity
    between the parties is the benchmark for eligibility.” 
    Id. at 593, ¶ 18
    . The
    court determines the weight to attribute to each of the factors. In re
    Marriage of Williams, 
    219 Ariz. 546
    , 550, ¶ 15 (App. 2008).
    ¶10           Here, the superior court stated that it had considered the
    financial resources of each party, and found that “Husband has
    substantially greater financial resources, earnings, and earning potential
    compared to Wife.” The court further found that Husband had not paid
    Wife any funds ordered by previous judgments (excepting child support
    and spousal maintenance) and that Wife had been “forced to spend the
    amounts she received for spousal maintenance to pay her attorneys
    during the post-trial proceedings, which has also caused Wife to incur
    significant credit card debt. Husband’s refusal to pay these amounts to
    Wife has compounded the disparity in financial resources between the
    parties.” The court noted that it would have awarded Wife all of her
    requested fees based on income disparity even if Husband had acted
    reasonably.
    ¶11           Husband’s own contemporaneous child support worksheet
    showed that Husband’s monthly income was $11,189 and Wife’s monthly
    income was $4,291. Even after adjusting both incomes to reflect the $3,000
    per month spousal maintenance paid to Wife, Husband’s monthly income
    was still greater than Wife’s. In the abstract, we would not necessarily
    uphold an award of fees of this magnitude based solely on an income
    disparity in this range. But because the court found that Wife’s spousal
    maintenance award was going directly to pay her attorneys to redress
    Husband’s non-payment of court-ordered judgments, including the
    substantial initial fee award, we hold that the record supports the court’s
    ruling.
    II. REASONABLENESS OF POSITIONS
    ¶12           A.R.S. “§ 25-324(A) requires that the propriety of a litigant’s
    legal position be evaluated by an objective standard of reasonableness.”
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    CLARK v. CLARK
    Decision of the Court
    Williams, 219 Ariz. at 548, ¶ 10.       The abuse of discretion standard
    acknowledges the superior court’s opportunity to observe whether the
    parties’ positions were reasonable. See Graville v. Dodge, 
    195 Ariz. 119
    , 131,
    ¶ 56 (App. 1999).
    ¶13          The superior court found that Wife had not taken any
    unreasonable positions, but that Husband had taken unreasonable post-
    decree positions and that his “pattern and practice of litigation is done
    with the intent to escalate litigation costs for Wife.” The superior court
    then found twenty specific post-decree positions taken by Husband that
    were unreasonable. The court noted that it would have awarded Wife all
    of her requested fees based on Husband’s unreasonable positions even if
    there had been no financial disparity.
    ¶14           The record supports the court’s findings. The superior court
    was in the best position to observe the reasonableness of the parties’
    conduct throughout the litigation, and we cannot say the court abused its
    discretion by concluding that Husband acted unreasonably and that Wife
    did not.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶15          For the foregoing reasons, we affirm. In exercise of our
    discretion, we deny Wife’s request for attorney’s fees on appeal. We
    award Wife costs on appeal upon her compliance with ARCAP 21.
    :ama
    5