Offerman v. Granada ( 2017 )


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  •                                IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    DOUGLAS OFFERMAN, Plaintiff/Appellee,
    v.
    GRANADA LLC, Defendant/Appellant.
    No. 1 CA-CV 16-0407
    FILED 11-14-2017
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. CV2014-015038
    The Honorable Karen A. Mullins, Judge
    The Honorable Katherine M. Cooper, Judge
    REVERSED AND REMANDED
    COUNSEL
    Law Office of Lawrence K. Lynde, PLLC, Phoenix
    By Lawrence K. Lynde
    Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee
    Manning & Kass, Ellrod, Ramirez, Trester, LLP, Phoenix
    By Richard V. Mack
    Counsel for Defendant/Appellant
    OPINION
    Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
    Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen and Judge Jennifer B. Campbell joined.
    OFFERMAN v. GRANADA
    Opinion of the Court
    B R O W N, Judge:
    ¶1           Granada, LLC ("Granada") appeals the superior court's
    judgment in favor of Douglas Offerman ordering specific performance of
    an alleged option to purchase a home owned by Granada. Because the
    option was not sufficiently definite to support specific performance, we
    reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this decision.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    ¶2            Offerman leased a home from Granada from August 2012
    through August 2014. Granada's principal Gilbert Houseaux, a licensed
    real estate agent, acted as the agent for both Offerman and Granada in the
    transaction. Before the lease began, Offerman expressed an interest in
    purchasing the property, but Granada declined to sell at that time. The
    parties, however, added the following language to their lease agreement,
    which Houseaux drafted:
    At the completion of the 24 month lease, the Tenant has the
    option to purchase [the] property . . . for a sales price to be
    determined at that time by an independent appraiser
    acceptable to both Tenant and Landlord. (Terms and
    Conditions to be stipulated by both parties at such time).
    If the Tenant chooses to exercise his right to purchase this
    property at the end of the 2 year lease agreement, he shall be
    credited $200.00 of each $1900.00 of monthly rent paid
    towards purchase.
    The acceptable condition of the property when Tenant takes
    occupancy will be considered the condition Tenant agrees to
    accept at time of closing. All inspections and contingencies to
    be performed and satisfied prior to initial move-in. Property
    to be sold AS-IS.
    ¶3            As the end of the lease term neared, believing this language
    gave him an option to purchase the property, Offerman told Houseaux he
    intended to exercise the option and asked Granada to name an independent
    appraiser. Receiving no response from Houseaux, Offerman retained an
    appraiser who valued the property at $240,000 and shared the appraisal
    with Granada. Granada did not name an appraiser or obtain an additional
    appraisal. Instead, Granada sent Offerman a draft purchase contract with
    a proposed $350,000 sale price, which Offerman rejected. Granada later
    notified Offerman it would not renew the lease, but Offerman remained in
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    OFFERMAN v. GRANADA
    Opinion of the Court
    the house, paying the monthly rent of $1,900 for several months after the
    original lease term ended.
    ¶4             Offerman sued Granada for breach of contract, alleging
    Granada had failed to agree on an independent appraiser, refused to
    respond to Offerman's efforts to exercise the option by proposing a "grossly
    inflated" cash purchase price, and served him with an eviction notice rather
    than engaging in the purchase process. Offerman asked the court to (1)
    order Granada to "specifically perform pursuant to the terms of the
    purchase option"; (2) set the purchase price at $240,000; (3) compel Granada
    to open escrow at a title company of Offerman's choosing and to "cooperate
    in the purchase process, the establishment and completion of escrow and
    the closing"; and (4) order all of the $1,900 payments Offerman made after
    September 1, 2014, be applied toward the purchase price.
    ¶5            After a bench trial, the superior court found that Offerman
    was entitled to specific performance of the option. The court then held an
    evidentiary hearing "on all issues" relating to the form of judgment.
    Following that hearing, the court entered judgment ordering Granada to
    sell the property to Offerman for $240,000. The court also, inter alia, named
    a title agency to hold escrow, determined the date for close of escrow,
    divided the various transaction fees between the parties, and ordered
    Granada to arrange for a property inspection. The court further directed
    the title agency to use the judgment "as the escrow instructions" and
    ordered Granada to "convey clear and unencumbered fee simple title to the
    Property to [Offerman] at close of escrow."
    ¶6             Granada moved for a new trial, arguing the option could not
    be specifically performed because it lacked numerous material terms. The
    superior court denied Granada's motion, awarded Offerman attorney’s fees
    and costs, and entered final judgment. Granada timely appealed.
    DISCUSSION
    ¶7          Granada argues the superior court erred in ordering specific
    performance because the option did not contain sufficiently definite terms.1
    Offerman counters that his timely exercise of the option created an
    1      Granada also contends the option is unenforceable under the statute
    of frauds; however, because we hold the option is too indefinite to be
    specifically performed, we do not address whether it comports with the
    statute of frauds.
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    OFFERMAN v. GRANADA
    Opinion of the Court
    enforceable contract.2 The court's interpretation of an agreement presents
    a question of law that we review de novo. United Cal. Bank v. Prudential Ins.
    Co. of Am., 
    140 Ariz. 238
    , 257 (App. 1983).
    ¶8             Specific performance is an equitable remedy. Shreeve v. Greer,
    
    65 Ariz. 35
    , 39 (1946). A court may properly order "specific performance of
    an agreement for the sale of land if the agreement is in writing, signed by
    the parties to be charged, . . . and is definite in its terms." Daley v. Earven,
    
    131 Ariz. 182
    , 185 (App. 1981). But a court may not order specific
    performance if the parties did not agree on one or more "important,
    essential or material terms." Id.; see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts
    ("Restatement") § 362 (1981) ("Specific performance or an injunction will not
    be granted unless the terms of the contract are sufficiently certain to provide
    a basis for an appropriate order."); T.D. Dennis Builder, Inc. v. Goff, 
    101 Ariz. 211
    , 213 (1966) (stating that essential terms include "identification of the
    parties, a description of the subject matter of the contract, the purchase price
    and the time and conditions of payment").
    ¶9             An option does not require "completeness in every detail."
    
    Daley, 131 Ariz. at 185
    . Nevertheless, "[t]he necessity for clearly defined
    terms is even more critical when an option is concerned." Christmas v.
    Turkin, 
    148 Ariz. 602
    , 603 (App. 1986). "The more terms the parties leave
    open, the less likely it is that they have intended to conclude a binding
    agreement." Restatement § 33 cmt. c. In some circumstances, terms may be
    "certain enough to provide the basis for the calculation of damages but not
    certain enough to permit the court to frame an order of specific performance
    . . . and to determine whether the resulting performance is in accord with
    what has been ordered." Restatement § 362 cmt. a; see also Restatement § 33
    cmt. b (explaining that "greater definiteness may be required for an order
    of specific performance than for an award of damages"). Accordingly, the
    narrow issue we decide is whether the superior court properly ordered
    specific performance as a remedy for Offerman's breach of contract claim.
    ¶10          Offerman argues specific performance was proper under
    Restatement § 87(2), which states that "[a]n offer which the offeror should
    reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a substantial character
    on the part of the offeree before acceptance and which does induce such
    2      Offerman also suggests that Houseaux breached his fiduciary duty
    and that Granada breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair
    dealing. Offerman, however, did not name Houseaux as a defendant, nor
    did he allege a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
    against Granada. Thus, we do not address those assertions on appeal.
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    OFFERMAN v. GRANADA
    Opinion of the Court
    action or forbearance is binding as an option contract to the extent necessary
    to avoid injustice." But Offerman cites no authority suggesting that action
    or forbearance based on an option whose terms are not definite, even if that
    action or forbearance is substantial, entitles a party to specific performance.
    See Restatement § 87 cmt. e (explaining that "[f]ull-scale enforcement of the
    offered contract is not necessarily appropriate" in cases falling within the
    scope of Restatement § 87(2)).
    ¶11            Offerman also contends, under Holaway v. Realty Assoc., 
    90 Ariz. 289
    (1961), that his option with Granada could be specifically
    performed because it established a clear method for determining a purchase
    price. Holaway involved an action for cancellation of an option contract in
    which the plaintiff asserted the option was void because it lacked a legal
    description of the property at 
    issue. 90 Ariz. at 290
    . Our supreme court
    affirmed the superior court's order rejecting the plaintiff's claim, concluding
    the contract "furnished ample means to identify the particular real property
    intended to be charged." 
    Id. at 292.
    The court explained that although the
    option failed to describe the parcels of land subject to the option, the parties
    "understood and agreed" that the descriptions were to be determined by a
    plat prepared by the defendants' agent. 
    Id. ¶12 Holaway
    does not help Offerman's position. First, nothing
    indicates that the remedy of specific performance was at issue in that case.
    Second, the agreed-upon mechanism for establishing a legal description in
    Holaway is significantly different from this case. Although Offerman and
    Granada agreed on a mechanism to establish price by selecting an
    "independent appraiser," the selected appraiser had to be "acceptable to
    both Tenant and Landlord." The parties failed to provide an alternative
    method for selecting an appraiser for the impasse that ultimately occurred.3
    Third, the parties did not establish a means to determine the many other
    remaining undefined terms. For example, the option is silent as to the
    timing of payment or closing, terms of payment (earnest money, down
    payment, financing, and allocation of closing costs), condition of title upon
    conveyance, method of conveyance, and whether escrow would be handled
    by a title agency. Unlike in Holaway, the option did not specify a method
    3     Because it was not addressed by the parties on appeal, we do not
    decide whether the superior court could properly enter an order for specific
    performance (or an injunction) compelling Granada to engage in the
    agreed-upon process of selecting an independent appraiser to determine
    purchase price. See generally Restatement § 357 (explaining when specific
    performance is an available remedy).
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    OFFERMAN v. GRANADA
    Opinion of the Court
    for determining these terms; instead, the option expressly deferred
    negotiating the "Terms and Conditions" to the end of the lease term.
    ¶13           The present case is more akin to the facts and analysis in
    Christmas. In that case, a landlord granted the tenant an option to purchase
    the leased premises for a set price during the first two years of the lease
    term and agreed to credit a portion of the tenant's rent payments toward
    the down 
    payment. 148 Ariz. at 602-03
    . The parties also agreed that "[t]he
    remaining terms of the option to purchase shall be negotiated between
    Tenant and Owner and memorialized in writing not later than March 1,
    1985." 
    Id. We held
    that the quoted language precluded specific
    performance because, based on the plain language of the lease, the
    purported option "was clearly an agreement to make an agreement." 
    Id. at 603.
    We distinguished cases where "the parties have purported to agree on
    a contractual provision and have done so in a vague and indefinite
    manner," which are inappropriate for specific performance, from "cases in
    which [the parties] have remained silent as to a material term" where "the
    reasonable conclusion is that [the parties] understood the law would imply
    the omitted term." 
    Id. at 603-04
    (quoting Kidd v. Early, 
    222 S.E.2d 392
    , 403
    (N.C. 1976)).
    ¶14             Here, as in Christmas, the parties did not expect that the law
    would imply the several remaining essential terms; their agreement
    specified they would determine those terms at "the completion of the 24
    month lease." Further, at trial, Offerman confirmed that when he signed
    the lease, he intended to negotiate the option's additional terms and
    conditions at a later time, stating he anticipated an additional written
    purchase contract would be required to effectuate the sale of the property.
    Thus, given the absence of essential terms in the option language agreed to
    by the parties, an order of specific performance was not a proper remedy.
    See The Power P.E.O., Inc. v. Employees Ins. of Wausau, 
    201 Ariz. 559
    , 563, ¶ 22
    (App. 2002) (stating specific performance is unavailable if the contract
    "leave[s] any material or essential term for future negotiation"); see also
    Restatement § 362 cmt. b ("If specific performance or an injunction is to be
    granted, it is important that the terms of the contract are sufficiently certain
    to enable the order to be drafted with precision because of the availability
    of the contempt power for disobedience.").
    ¶15          Indeed, to fashion the order of specific performance, the
    superior court held a separate evidentiary hearing to determine not only
    the purchase price but numerous other "Terms and Conditions," including
    naming a title agency to hold escrow and determining how to divide the
    various transaction fees, such as taxes, insurance, home warranty, lot
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    OFFERMAN v. GRANADA
    Opinion of the Court
    survey, homeowners' association, home inspection, termite inspection, lien
    release, and escrow fees. The court also directed the title agency to use the
    judgment "as escrow instructions," and ordered Granada to "convey clear
    and unencumbered fee simple title" to Offerman at close of escrow (on or
    before April 29, 2016). Of particular concern, some of the terms the court
    added are directly contrary to those specified in the parties' written
    agreement, including (1) directing Granada to arrange for a property
    inspection and provide disclosure statements and (2) permitting Offerman
    to cancel the contract if estimated repairs exceeded $5,000, even though the
    option stated the property would be sold in "AS-IS" condition as of the date
    Offerman took occupancy.
    ¶16           On a claim for specific performance, it is not within the
    superior court's authority to flesh out an option agreement that lacks
    certainty. See Savoca Masonry Co., Inc. v. Homes & Son Const. Co., Inc., 
    112 Ariz. 392
    , 395 (1975) ("[T]he court's role is not that of contract maker. While
    custom, usage and implications can be used to prove a contract's existence,
    they cannot be the basis for providing numerous essential elements of an
    agreement."); see also Cypert v. Holmes, 
    81 Ariz. 64
    , 66 (1956) (finding, in the
    context of an incomplete agreement, that "no court will . . . make an
    agreement for the parties respecting those matters that have been left
    unsettled"). Therefore, we hold that the superior court erred in ordering
    specific performance of the option, but offer no opinion as to whether
    Offerman may yet pursue other remedies arising from his breach of
    contract claim. See Restatement § 362 cmt. a (recognizing that contract
    terms may be "certain enough to provide the basis for the calculation of
    damages but not certain enough to permit the court to frame an order of
    specific performance").
    ¶17           Based on our reversal of the superior court's judgment
    ordering specific performance, we vacate the court's award of attorney's
    fees and costs. On remand, the court shall consider the parties' requests for
    fees and costs, including reasonable attorney's fees incurred in this appeal,
    based on the ultimate outcome of the case. We award costs incurred on
    appeal to Granada upon compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate
    Procedure 21.
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    OFFERMAN v. GRANADA
    Opinion of the Court
    CONCLUSION
    ¶18            Based on the foregoing, we reverse the superior court's order
    directing specific performance of the option. We vacate the court's award
    of attorney's fees and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
    opinion.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED: AA
    8