State v. Reed ( 2017 )


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  •                      NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent,
    v.
    DONELL REED, Petitioner.
    No. 1 CA-CR 16-0724 PRPC
    FILED 11-14-2017
    Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. CR2004-038162-002 SE
    The Honorable Julie Ann Mata, Judge Pro Tempore
    REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED
    COUNSEL
    Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix
    By Jeffrey R. Duvendack
    Counsel for Respondent
    Donell Reed, Kingman
    Petitioner
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Presiding Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop delivered the decision of the Court,
    in which Judge Diane M. Johnsen and Judge Maria Elena Cruz joined.
    STATE v. REED
    Decision of the Court
    W I N T H R O P, Presiding Judge:
    ¶1             Donell Reed petitions this court for review of the dismissal of
    his petition for post-conviction relief, filed pursuant to Arizona Rule of
    Criminal Procedure (“Rule”) 32. This is his first, timely, “of right” petition
    for post-conviction relief, filed after a probation violation admission and
    disposition. We have considered the petition for review and, for the reasons
    stated, grant review but deny relief.
    ¶2           Reed pled guilty in 2004 to amended Count I, attempted child
    abuse (domestic violence), a class 3 felony and dangerous crime against
    children, and amended Count II, child abuse (domestic violence), a class 2
    felony. Before proceeding to sentencing, the superior court, with Reed and
    plea counsel present, amended the plea agreement to reflect the correct
    sentencing range as to Count I, noted the original plea agreement was not
    “in the Court’s possession,” and directed the clerk’s office to make the
    changes to the original plea agreement. The court then sentenced Reed to
    seven years’ imprisonment in the Arizona Department of Corrections
    (“ADOC”) for Count II, and placed him on lifetime probation for Count I.
    Reed did not seek post-conviction relief at that time.
    ¶3           After his release from prison on Count II, Reed twice violated
    probation, but was reinstated to probation each time. A third petition to
    revoke was filed in 2015, and Reed admitted another probation violation.
    The court revoked Reed’s probation and sentenced him to eight years’
    imprisonment in ADOC.
    ¶4            Reed filed a notice of post-conviction relief, and after
    appointed counsel filed a notice of completion of review, Reed filed a pro se
    petition for post-conviction relief, requesting relief under Rule 32.1(e)
    (alleging the existence of newly discovered material facts). Reed claimed
    he discovered in April 2016 that his original plea had been amended
    without his approval to show a different and higher range of sentencing on
    Count I, he was not present when the clerk’s office made the change, and
    the State breached its agreement as originally signed and entered. The
    superior court summarily dismissed his petition.
    ¶5            Reed filed his petition for review, reiterating his claim. There
    is no factual dispute as to the amendment to the plea taking place. In
    general, we review the denial of post-conviction relief for an abuse of
    discretion. State v. Decenzo, 
    199 Ariz. 355
    , 356, ¶ 2 (App. 2001). Here, we
    find no abuse of discretion. Reed’s claim arises from an amendment to the
    plea agreement, directed in open court, while he and counsel were present.
    2
    STATE v. REED
    Decision of the Court
    At best, Reed may have a claim for technical error, which does not entitle
    him to have his plea or sentence set aside if “substantial justice has been
    done.” State v. Mendiola, 
    23 Ariz. App. 251
    , 254 (1975) (quoting Ariz. Const.
    art. 6, § 27).
    ¶6              Because Reed was present during the technical change, he
    cannot show that this was a fact “discovered after the trial” or that he
    “exercised due diligence” to be entitled to relief. See Ariz. R. Crim. P.
    32.1(e)(1), (2); State v. Bilke, 
    162 Ariz. 51
    , 52-53 (1989). The plea existed in
    the record for more than a decade. Simply because a defendant presents
    the court with evidence for the first time does not make that evidence
    “newly discovered.” State v. Mata, 
    185 Ariz. 319
    , 333 (1996) (citation
    omitted). Reed’s claim is untimely and therefore precluded. See Ariz. R.
    Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3), 32.4(a).
    ¶7             Additionally, Reed has not attached or requested transcripts
    of the original plea proceeding or other documentary evidence to show
    either that he was not advised of the correct sentencing range or that he did
    not agree to the changes. The minute entry from his change of plea hearing
    states: “The Court advises Defendant of the range of possible sentence and
    the availability of probation . . . .” The court amended the plea agreement
    to reflect the appropriate range of sentences for a class 3 felony consistent
    with Arizona Revised Statutes sections 13-3623(A)(1) (2001) and 13-
    604.01(I) (Supp. 2002). Reed could have requested the transcripts from
    these proceedings pursuant to Rule 32.4(d), but he did not do so. “Where
    matters are not included in the record on appeal, the missing portions of
    the record will be presumed to support the action of the trial court.” State
    v. Zuck, 
    134 Ariz. 509
    , 513 (1982) (citation omitted).
    ¶8            Reed has failed to meet his burden of proof to show a
    colorable claim under Rule 32.1(e), and by extension, claims under Rule
    32.1(a) for an unlawful sentence, breach of an agreement, or other due
    process violation. Under Rule 27.8, a trial court is required to determine if
    a defendant’s admission to a probation violation is voluntary. State v.
    Flowers, 
    159 Ariz. 469
    , 472 (App. 1989). After the group advisement, before
    Reed’s admission to the third probation violation, the superior court
    advised him of the range of sentence if he were to enter an admission, which
    was from five to fifteen years, consistent with the plea agreement as
    amended in 2005. The court then sentenced him to eight years’
    imprisonment in ADOC, a term less than the presumptive ten-year term.
    Reed has provided nothing to show that his original plea or subsequent
    admission and disposition was defective.
    3
    STATE v. REED
    Decision of the Court
    ¶9   Accordingly, although we grant review, we deny relief.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED: AA
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1 CA-CR 16-0724-PRPC

Filed Date: 11/14/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/14/2017