Shurman v. Shurman ( 2021 )


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  •                       NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    In re the Marriage of:
    TAMBRALA G. SHURMAN, Petitioner/Appellant,
    v.
    BRUCE D. SHURMAN, Respondent/Appellee.
    No. 1 CA-CV 21-0038 FC
    FILED 9-21-2021
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County
    No. V1300DO201980285
    The Honorable Christopher L. Kottke, Judge Pro Tempore
    AFFIRMED
    COUNSEL
    Davis Miles McGuire Gardner, Tempe
    By Spencer T. Schiefer
    Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant
    Mull & Brown, PLLC, Prescott
    By John G. Mull
    Counsel for Respondent/Appellee
    SHURMAN v. SHURMAN
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Judge Maria Elena Cruz delivered the decision of the Court, in which
    Presiding Judge Cynthia J. Bailey and Judge Jennifer M. Perkins joined.
    C R U Z, Judge:
    ¶1            Tambrala G. Shurman (“Wife”) appeals from the superior
    court’s order granting Bruce D. Shurman’s (“Husband”) Arizona Rule of
    Family Law Procedure (“Rule”) 83 motion to alter or amend the judgment.
    For the following reasons, we affirm.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2            Husband and Wife moved to Arizona to co-own and operate
    a bed and breakfast business. They purchased a property that contained
    multiple rental structures, including the parties’ marital home. Husband
    and Wife took out two loans totaling $130,000 to build an additional rental
    structure on the property. Later, Husband and Wife borrowed an
    additional $150,000 to purchase a second property, which contained a
    single-family home. The three loans did not directly encumber the
    properties and were not secured by the properties. At the time of the
    divorce, the mortgage balance on the first property was about $274,000.
    ¶3            Husband and Wife did not pay themselves a salary but used
    the business income to pay their personal expenses. The parties did not
    segregate their business and personal finances and failed to maintain profit
    or loss statements, balance sheets, bookkeeping, monthly statements, or any
    other regular business records.
    ¶4            Wife petitioned for dissolution in 2019 after twenty-one years
    of marriage and two children, one of whom was a minor at the time of the
    dissolution proceedings. Both Husband and Wife sought ownership of the
    real property and bed and breakfast business. The court held an
    evidentiary hearing to determine the separate values of the parties’
    property and business.
    ¶5             Following the hearing, the superior court found that neither
    party provided evidence of the business’ value, concluding it had a value
    of zero. The court found the parties’ real property was worth $983,772.98,
    but it offset the value of the property by the amount of the mortgage and
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    SHURMAN v. SHURMAN
    Decision of the Court
    the three loans. The court awarded the business and real property to Wife
    and ordered her to pay an equalization payment to Husband of $144,483.24,
    to be paid in monthly installments of $1,000.
    ¶6           Husband filed a Rule 83 motion to alter or amend the decree.
    The court granted Husband’s motion, finding the division of property to be
    inequitable. The court ordered the parties’ business be valued, and the
    business and real property sold and divided equally.
    ¶7          Wife timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to
    Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 12-2101(A)(2).
    DISCUSSION
    ¶8            Wife argues the superior court erred in granting Husband’s
    Rule 83 motion. We review a court’s ruling on a motion to alter or amend
    for an abuse of discretion. Stock v. Stock, 
    250 Ariz. 352
    , 354, ¶ 5 (App. 2020).
    Under Rule 83, “[t]he court may on its own or on motion alter or amend all
    or some of its rulings” if “the decision, findings of fact, or judgment is not
    supported by the evidence or is contrary to law.” Rule 83(a)(1)(H). The
    superior court found the property division in the original decree was
    inconsistent with the law, the business valuation finding was contrary to
    the evidence, and the amount of the equalization payment to Husband was
    error.
    ¶9            Under A.R.S. § 25-318(A), the court must “divide the
    community, joint tenancy and other property held in common equitably,
    though not necessarily in kind.” Generally, “all marital joint property
    should be divided substantially equally unless sound reason exists to
    divide the property otherwise.” Toth v. Toth, 
    190 Ariz. 218
    , 221 (1997). The
    superior court, be it the judge originally assigned to the case or a
    subsequently-assigned judge, enjoyed the discretion to modify its orders by
    finding that the decree was inequitable and failed to divide the parties’
    property substantially equally. See Rogone v. Correia, 
    236 Ariz. 43
    , 48, ¶ 10
    (App. 2014) (holding “consideration of a Rule 60 motion by a newly
    assigned judge raises no jurisdictional concerns”); see also Peterson v.
    Speakman, 
    49 Ariz. 342
    , 348 (1937) (“The jurisdiction of the court, no matter
    by which judge it is exercised, is that of the whole court, and not of one
    judge nor division thereof.”). This finding was not error.
    ¶10           Wife, however, contends the record supported the property
    division in the original decree and that a larger equalization payment to
    Husband was unnecessary because the business had no value. Wife argues
    the business’ tax returns support this conclusion and demonstrated the bed
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    SHURMAN v. SHURMAN
    Decision of the Court
    and breakfast reported losses in its first couple years of operation, and that
    since 2017 had generated only minimal profits.
    ¶11           While “[t]he valuation of assets is a factual determination that
    must be based on the facts and circumstances of each case,” and the court
    “has discretion to rely on various methods of valuing a professional
    practice,” insufficient evidence supported the court’s findings in the
    original decree, because they were not based on a recognized valuation
    method. Kelsey v. Kelsey, 
    186 Ariz. 49
    , 51 (App. 1996). After hearing
    evidence at trial, the court found that “neither party presented evidence as
    to the value of the parties’ business.” The court noted the tax returns for
    the business “reflect minimum income yielded” since 2017, and
    “considered that the family is covered for health insurance through Arizona
    Health Cost Containment System.” The court concluded the “business has
    not been a high-income earning endeavor,” and with “no solid evidence[]
    upon which to assign a value to the parties’ business,” it “assigned zero
    value.”
    ¶12            The court’s finding that the business had no value
    contradicted evidence that the business generated some profits in the years
    before the community ended and provided for the parties’ personal
    expenses during the marriage. Wife testified that the parties had personal
    monthly expenses of around $7,700, which were paid with business income.
    Further, the tax records showed that the business’ income increased every
    year since it opened; this was not compelling evidence the business had no
    value when the community ended. We agree that the court’s original
    decree erroneously valued the business at zero.
    ¶13            It was also inequitable to award the business to Wife but
    assign half of the business’ debt to Husband. Wife testified that the parties
    took three loans for business purposes, and pursuant to the parties’
    “business plan.” In her brief, Wife admits the loans are “associated with
    the real estate and business.” The agreement for one loan named the
    community business as the borrower. The court offset the value of the
    parties’ real property, and Husband’s equalization payment, with the
    amount of the loans, even though that debt did not directly encumber the
    property. The court erred in reducing the value of the properties in the
    amount of this debt, and allocating half of this debt to Husband, while
    failing to credit him with any interest in the business. The evidence
    presented at trial tied the business to the parties’ real property, and because
    the parties’ business and personal finances were so commingled, the court,
    on review pursuant to Rule 83, did not err in ordering the properties and
    the business to be sold and the profits to be divided equally.
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    SHURMAN v. SHURMAN
    Decision of the Court
    ¶14            Though “equitable” division typically requires “substantially
    equal” division, the court can otherwise divide the marital property if a
    sound reason exists to do so. Toth, 
    190 Ariz. at 221
    . The court found
    “stability of housing for the parties’ children compelling, and the children
    reside primarily with” Wife. But at the time of trial, the parties’ only minor
    child was 17 years old and scheduled to graduate from high school in mid-
    2021. And in any event, “[w]hile a court may consider the parties’ children
    in deciding which party should be awarded a given piece of property, in
    doing so, the court may not impinge on either party’s property interests.”
    Dole v. Blair, 
    248 Ariz. 629
    , 633, ¶ 14 (App. 2020). The court therefore
    provided no sound reason to divide the property other than substantially
    equally.
    ¶15           Wife argues that, in the amended decree, the court erred in
    addressing the parties’ earning abilities in dividing the property, because
    “[n]othing in A.R.S. § 25-318 prompts the court to divide community
    property on the basis of the parties’ earning capacity.” However, as noted
    above, the court can divide property unequally if “sound reason exists” to
    do so. Toth, 
    190 Ariz. at 221
    . Here, the court noted the parties had
    “relatively equally” earning capacities, which did not justify either party
    being awarded the business to the exclusion of the other. Throughout the
    marriage, Wife typically had a higher income than husband. Wife claimed
    she would need to take courses, complete the licensing process in Arizona,
    and repay her retirement before she could return to work as a psychologist,
    but Wife has a master’s degree and many years’ experience, and the court
    did not err in finding she would “likely have little problem locating work
    in Arizona.” Husband testified that Wife was offered work as a consultant
    for about $50,000 per year, but she turned down the job offer. Wife argues
    the court erred in taking “judicial notice that Arizona has a vast demand for
    education professionals.” Even if taking judicial notice of this issue was
    error, the court’s conclusion, in the amended decree, that neither party’s
    earning capacity warranted an unequal division of property was supported
    by substantial evidence.
    ¶16            Finally, Wife argues it was improper for the court to alter the
    allocation of the parties’ debts because Husband did not raise this issue in
    his motion. However, under Rule 83, the court may sua sponte alter a
    judgment. See Rule 83. As Wife recognizes in her brief, the prior allocation
    of debts was dependent upon the prior division of assets, so the court did
    not err in modifying the debt allocation.
    ¶17          Ultimately, the superior court ordered the parties’ real
    property and business be sold and divided equally. The apportionment of
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    SHURMAN v. SHURMAN
    Decision of the Court
    community property in a dissolution rests within the discretion of the
    superior court, and the court did not abuse its discretion in granting
    Husband’s Rule 83 motion. See Kohler v. Kohler, 
    211 Ariz. 106
    , 107, ¶ 2 (App.
    2005).
    CONCLUSION
    ¶18           For the foregoing reasons, we affirm. Both parties request an
    award of their attorneys’ fees on appeal. We have considered the relative
    financial resources of the parties and the reasonableness of the positions
    asserted on appeal. See A.R.S. § 25-324(A). In the exercise of our discretion,
    we decline to award attorneys’ fees. We award Husband his costs on
    appeal upon compliance with ARCAP 21.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED: AA
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1 CA-CV 21-0038-FC

Filed Date: 9/21/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 9/21/2021