State v. Garcia ( 2018 )


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  •                      NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,
    v.
    EFREN ORTIZ GARCIA, Appellant.
    No. 1 CA-CR 17-0305
    No. 1 CA-CR 17-0315
    (Consolidated)
    FILED 5-15-2018
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. CR2013-103418-001 SE
    No. CR2016-134204-001 DT
    The Honorable Mark H. Brain, Judge
    AFFIRMED
    COUNSEL
    Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
    By Adele G. Ponce
    Counsel for Appellee
    Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix
    By Kevin D. Heade
    Counsel for Appellant
    STATE v. GARCIA
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop delivered the decision of the Court, in which
    Presiding Judge James B. Morse Jr. and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.
    W I N T H R O P, Judge:
    ¶1           Efren Ortiz Garcia (“Garcia”) appeals his convictions and
    sentences for misconduct involving weapons and misconduct involving
    body armor. For the following reasons, we affirm his convictions,
    probation revocation, and sentences.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1
    ¶2            On July 18, 2016, Mesa police stopped Garcia in his car.
    Garcia was wearing army fatigues, body armor, and an empty holster on
    his thigh. Garcia initially did not comply with the officers’ commands,
    putting the officers on high alert. The officers eventually detained Garcia.
    While confirming the car did not have any other occupants, the officers saw
    in open view a handgun that would fit in Garcia’s empty holster. Garcia
    was on felony probation at the time of the incident.
    ¶3             The State charged Garcia with misconduct involving
    weapons and misconduct involving body armor. At trial, Garcia called a
    witness, Lasley, to testify that he found the gun two days before the offense
    in an empty field next to his neighborhood. Lasley saw Garcia driving, and
    caught a ride with Garcia to a nearby Circle K. During the ride, the gun
    slipped out of a pocket of Lasley’s basketball shorts into Garcia’s car. Lasley
    forgot to retrieve the weapon before he left the car.
    ¶4           The jury found Garcia guilty of both charges. The court
    sentenced Garcia to concurrent, presumptive terms of ten years in prison
    for each count. The court also revoked Garcia’s probation, and sentenced
    him to six months in prison consecutive to the ten-year sentences.
    ¶5            Garcia timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to
    Article 6, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution, and Arizona Revised
    1      We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the
    verdict. State v. Payne, 
    233 Ariz. 484
    , 509, ¶ 93 (2013).
    2
    STATE v. GARCIA
    Decision of the Court
    Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections 12-120.21(A)(1) (2016), 13-4031 (2010), and 13-
    4033(A)(1) (2010).2
    ANALYSIS
    ¶6            Garcia presents two claims on appeal. First, he argues the
    trial court erred by failing to require that the jury, after a separate
    aggravation hearing, determine Garcia was on felony probation at the time
    of the offenses.      Second, Garcia argues that the State committed
    prosecutorial misconduct by vouching during its closing argument. Garcia
    failed to object to either of these alleged errors at trial, so we review for
    fundamental error. State v. Henderson, 
    210 Ariz. 561
    , 567, ¶ 19 (2005).
    I.     Separate Aggravation Hearing
    ¶7            Garcia first argues the trial court erred by not requiring the
    jury to explicitly determine, after a separate aggravation hearing, that he
    was on felony probation at the time of the offenses. After the evidence was
    presented, the trial court instructed the jury that a prohibited possessor is
    “a person who is at the time of possession serving a term of probation
    pursuant to a conviction for a felony offense.” The court released the jury
    from service after the jury reached its verdicts without conducting a
    separate hearing. In light of the jury’s verdict, inherently determining that
    Garcia was on probation at the time of the offense, the court increased the
    minimum sentence Garcia could receive to ten years in prison.
    ¶8            Facts that increase a defendant’s mandatory minimum
    sentence must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable
    doubt. Alleyne v. United States, 
    570 U.S. 99
    , 103 (2013). Arizona trial courts
    are required to sentence a defendant who commits a felony offense while
    on felony probation to no less than the presumptive term of imprisonment.
    See A.R.S. § 13-708(C) (Supp. 2017). Therefore, Garcia’s felony probation
    status is a fact that increased his minimum sentence and the court was
    required to submit that issue to the jury or find that it was inherent in the
    jury’s verdicts. State v. Flores, 
    236 Ariz. 33
    , 35, ¶ 5 (App. 2014). If the jury’s
    verdicts necessarily or implicitly included a finding that Garcia was on
    probation at the time of the offenses, there was no need to conduct a
    separate hearing to address that issue. See State v. Gatliff, 
    209 Ariz. 362
    , 364,
    ¶ 12 (App. 2004) (finding no separate dangerousness determination
    necessary because it was inherent in the jury’s verdict).
    2      We cite the current version of all applicable statutes because no
    revisions material to this decision have occurred.
    3
    STATE v. GARCIA
    Decision of the Court
    ¶9             Here, to prove the misconduct involving weapons charge, the
    State had to prove Garcia was a prohibited possessor at the time of the
    offense. See A.R.S. § 13-3102(A)(4) (2018). Section 13-3101(A)(7)(d) (2018)
    provides that, a person who is on felony probation while possessing a
    weapon is a prohibited possessor, and as noted above, this is the only
    definition of a prohibited possessor the court provided to the jury. The jury
    found Garcia guilty, necessarily finding all elements of the charged offenses
    proved beyond a reasonable doubt. We presume jurors follow jury
    instructions, thus, the court was entitled to presume that the jurors’ verdict
    included a finding that Garcia was on felony probation at the time of the
    offense. See State v. Newell, 
    212 Ariz. 389
    , 403, ¶ 68 (2006). Accordingly,
    there was no need to submit that issue to the jury in a separate hearing.
    II.    Prosecutorial Misconduct
    ¶10            Garcia next argues that the State committed prosecutorial
    misconduct by vouching when it commented on the sufficiency of the
    evidence and the lack of credibility of Garcia’s witness. Prosecutorial
    vouching occurs when (1) “the prosecutor places the prestige of the
    government behind its witness” and when (2) “the prosecutor suggests that
    information not presented to the jury supports the witness’[] testimony.”
    State v. Blackman, 
    201 Ariz. 527
    , 542, ¶ 62 (App. 2002) (internal quotations
    and citation omitted). While counsel is prohibited from referring to matters
    not in evidence, counsel may draw reasonable inferences from evidence
    presented at trial. 
    Id. at 544, ¶ 71
    . Prosecutorial misconduct does not
    require reversal unless it permeated the trial to the extent it likely affected
    the outcome and denied the defendant his right to a fair trial. 
    Id. at 541, ¶ 59
    .
    a.     Prosecutor’s Comments Regarding Sufficiency of Evidence
    ¶11            During closing argument, Garcia pointed to the State’s failure
    to test the handgun for fingerprints and DNA. The prosecutor responded,
    “[s]o when defense is trying to say [the State] had an analyst, but then he
    didn’t do [fingerprint or DNA analysis] . . . he wasn’t instructed to do it.
    And that’s because Detective Figueroa was confident in her investigation.”
    This argument was sufficiently tethered to the evidence. Detective
    Figueroa testified, without objection, that she was confident in the
    thoroughness of her investigation. The State reasonably argued from that
    evidence that the detective did not deem it necessary to test the evidence
    for fingerprints or DNA. Cf. State, ex rel. McDougall v. Corcoran, 
    153 Ariz. 157
    , 160 (1987) (finding comments on defendant’s failure to produce
    4
    STATE v. GARCIA
    Decision of the Court
    evidence was a permissible response to defendant’s arguments about the
    sufficiency of the investigation).
    b.      Prosecutor’s Comments Regarding Witness’ Credibility
    ¶12             At trial, the prosecutor also argued that the State would
    explain why it did not “believe [Lasley’s] story at all.” And that if, “you
    [Lasley] want to tell the truth, you show up for your interviews. If you want
    to tell the truth, you don’t come to court 15 minutes before you’re supposed
    to testify and then say what happened.”
    ¶13            The credibility of witnesses is an issue for the jury to decide.
    State v. Harrison, 
    111 Ariz. 508
    , 509 (1975). Lasley testified to the facts in the
    State’s argument. The State was free to use these facts to argue Lasley was
    not a credible witness. See State v. Schrock, 
    149 Ariz. 433
    , 438-39 (1986)
    (characterizing the argument that a defendant’s statement was a lie as “a
    proper attack on defendant’s statement”).
    ¶14             The State further made the following arguments after Lasley
    testified about the gun falling out of his basketball shorts: “I’m familiar
    with, basketball shorts, they have pretty deep pockets.” While this was not
    in evidence, and therefore improper, the statement did not permeate the
    trial to the extent of affecting the outcome nor deny Garcia the right to a fair
    trial.
    ¶15         We conclude the State’s arguments, considered individually
    and cumulatively, do not amount to prosecutorial misconduct requiring
    reversal.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶16           We affirm Garcia’s convictions, probation revocation, and
    sentences.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED: AA
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1 CA-CR 17-0305

Filed Date: 5/15/2018

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021