State v. Villarreal ( 2018 )


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  •                      NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,
    v.
    ADAN G. VILLARREAL, Appellant.
    No. 1 CA-CR 16-0725
    FILED 2-15-2018
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. CR2015-117120-001
    The Honorable Christopher A. Coury, Judge
    AFFIRMED
    COUNSEL
    Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
    By Jana Zinman
    Counsel for Appellee
    Nicole Farnum, Phoenix
    Counsel for Appellant
    STATE v. VILLARREAL
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Judge Kent E. Cattani delivered the decision of the Court, in which
    Presiding Judge James P. Beene and Judge Randall M. Howe joined.
    C A T T A N I, Judge:
    ¶1           Adan Villarreal appeals from his convictions and sentences
    for possession of narcotic drugs for sale, possession of marijuana for sale,
    and possession of drug paraphernalia. Villarreal challenges in particular
    the superior court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained
    when law enforcement entered his apartment. For reasons that follow, we
    affirm.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    ¶2             The Glendale Fire Department and Glendale Police Officer
    Stepp responded to a fire at Villarreal’s apartment. After the blaze was
    extinguished, the fire captain told Officer Stepp that there was something
    in the apartment that he should see. The captain led Officer Stepp inside to
    the kitchen where the officer saw a small plastic bag of cocaine sitting next
    to a digital scale. In the front room, Officer Stepp saw a bowl containing a
    white powdery substance inside an open plastic bin. He then did a safety
    sweep of the apartment, during which he saw a small vacuum-sealed bag
    of marijuana and Villarreal’s identification card and open passport.
    ¶3            Officer Stepp recognized Villarreal from his identification and
    approached him outside the apartment. Villarreal voluntarily talked with
    officers and consented to a full search of the apartment. During the search,
    officers found a large vacuum-sealed bag of marijuana, $3,500 in cash, a
    vacuum sealing machine, and packaging material. Villarreal was arrested
    and charged with possession of narcotic drugs for sale, possession of
    marijuana for sale, and possession of drug paraphernalia.
    ¶4            A jury found Villarreal guilty as charged, and he was
    sentenced to a mitigated sentence of 4 years’ imprisonment for possession
    of narcotic drugs for sale and concurrent 3-year terms of probation for the
    other convictions. Villarreal timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction
    under Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) § 13-4033.
    2
    STATE v. VILLARREAL
    Decision of the Court
    DISCUSSION
    ¶5             Villarreal argues that the superior court erred by denying his
    motion to suppress the evidence found in his apartment. During the
    pretrial suppression hearing, Officer Stepp testified—over Villarreal’s
    objection—that he followed the fire captain into Villarreal’s apartment after
    “the captain . . . came outside and advised me that they had located
    something in the apartment that they needed to alert me to.” Villarreal
    asserts that this statement was inadmissible hearsay and should have been
    precluded. He urges that, without this evidence of the fire captain’s
    statement, Officer Stepp had no basis to enter the apartment in the first
    instance, so all resulting evidence should have been suppressed.
    ¶6            We review the superior court’s ruling on a motion to suppress
    for an abuse of discretion, but review de novo constitutional and legal
    issues. State v. Moody, 
    208 Ariz. 424
    , 445, ¶ 62 (2004). We consider only
    evidence presented at the suppression hearing and view that evidence in
    the light most favorable to upholding the superior court’s decision. State v.
    Mitchell, 
    234 Ariz. 410
    , 413, ¶ 11 (App. 2014).
    ¶7             Hearsay is “a statement that: (1) the declarant does not make
    while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in
    evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” Ariz.
    R. Evid. 801(c). An out-of-court assertion offered to prove its effect on the
    listener (rather than the truth of the matter asserted) is not hearsay. See State
    v. Romanosky, 
    162 Ariz. 217
    , 222 (1989); State v. Rivers, 
    190 Ariz. 56
    , 60 (App.
    1997).
    ¶8             Here, the officer’s testimony was offered to explain its effect
    on the listener—that is, why Officer Stepp followed the fire captain into the
    apartment—and not to prove the truth of the fire captain’s assertion that
    there was something of significance in the apartment. Thus, the statement
    was not hearsay, and the superior court did not err by declining to preclude
    it on that basis. For the same reason, Villarreal’s Confrontation Clause
    argument also fails. See State v. Tucker, 
    215 Ariz. 298
    , 315, ¶ 61 (2007)
    (“[T]estimony that is not admitted to prove its truth is not hearsay and does
    not violate the Confrontation Clause.”) (citing Crawford v. Washington, 
    541 U.S. 36
    , 59 n.9 (2004)).
    ¶9           Moreover, based on the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision in
    Mazen v. Seidel, 
    189 Ariz. 195
    (1997), Officer Stepp was authorized to enter
    the apartment even without the fire captain’s statement. In Mazen, the court
    held that when firefighters lawfully enter a structure under exigent
    3
    STATE v. VILLARREAL
    Decision of the Court
    circumstances, law enforcement may also lawfully enter that structure
    subject to the “spatial and temporal boundaries of the firefighters’ entry,
    presence, and plain-view discovery.” 
    Id. at 202.
    The court noted that “[t]he
    police could lawfully step into the shoes of the firefighters to seize what the
    firefighters could move,” and that the defendant “no longer had a
    reasonable expectation of privacy for that area . . . where one officer was
    already legally present.” 
    Id. at 199
    (quotation omitted and alteration in
    original).
    ¶10            Villarreal does not challenge the lawfulness of the firefighters’
    entry, and Officer Stepp’s contemporaneous entry with the fire captain into
    Villarreal’s kitchen and living room did not exceed the spatial and temporal
    boundaries of the firefighters’ entry or otherwise violate Villarreal’s rights.
    Accordingly, the superior court did not err by denying Villarreal’s motion
    to suppress.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶11           We affirm Villarreal’s convictions and sentences.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED: AA
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1 CA-CR 16-0725

Filed Date: 2/15/2018

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021