Greenham v. Hope ( 2018 )


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  •                      NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    In re the Matter of:
    MELANIE BLYTHE GREENHAM,
    Petitioner/Appellant,
    v.
    JASON DOUGLAS HOPE,
    Respondent/Appellee.
    No. 1 CA-CV 17-0263 FC
    FILED 3-20-2018
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. FC2011-093940
    The Honorable Theodore Campagnolo, Judge
    AFFIRMED
    APPEARANCES
    Melanie Greenham, Mexico
    Petitioner/Appellant
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen delivered the decision of the Court, in
    which Judge Kent E. Cattani and Judge Jennifer M. Perkins joined.
    GREENHAM v. HOPE
    Decision of the Court
    J O H N S E N, Judge:
    ¶1            Melanie Blythe Greenham ("Mother") appeals the superior
    court's denial of her motion to vacate part of a child-support order. We
    affirm.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    ¶2            Mother and Jason Douglas Hope ("Father") married in 1990
    and over the course of their marriage had three children. They divorced in
    South Carolina in 2011; the dissolution decree incorporated a settlement
    agreement. At the time, Mother lived in Arizona and Father, New York.
    The settlement agreement stated that Mother would be the primary
    residential parent and Father would pay child support.
    ¶3            Mother subsequently remarried and moved to Mexico with
    the children and her new husband. In 2011, Father filed the decree in
    Maricopa County Superior Court and sought custody of the children.
    Father was awarded sole custody, and in 2012 he petitioned the Arizona
    court to modify his child support. The court allowed Father to serve his
    petition on Mother by emails sent to her email address and the email
    address of her new husband. The court then set an evidentiary hearing,
    which it later continued, over Mother's objection, to November 5, 2012.
    Mother moved for leave to appear at the hearing by telephone,
    acknowledging in her motion that the court would consider the parties'
    child support obligations at that hearing. The record does not disclose
    whether the court ruled on Mother's motion, but she failed to attend the
    hearing, without explanation. After the hearing, the court adopted Father's
    child support proposal, which eliminated Father's responsibility to pay
    child support, required Mother to pay Father child support of $124.43 per
    month beginning May 1, 2012, and required Mother to pay back child
    support of $204.00 per month for the months between November 2011 and
    April 2012.
    ¶4            On appeal, we held it was unclear "whether South Carolina
    relinquished its continuing, exclusive jurisdiction" under the Uniform
    Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act ("UCCJEA"), Arizona
    Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") sections 25-1001 to -1067 (2018).1 See Hope v.
    Hope, 1 CA-CV 13-0112, 
    2014 WL 860797
    , at *4, ¶ 23 (App. Mar. 4, 2014)
    ("2014 Decision"). We therefore instructed the superior court to vacate the
    1      Absent material revision after the relevant date, we cite the current
    version of a statute or rule.
    2
    GREENHAM v. HOPE
    Decision of the Court
    child support modification in accordance with Glover v. Glover, 
    231 Ariz. 1
    ,
    7, ¶ 22 (App. 2012), and to determine whether the court had subject-matter
    jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. 2014 Decision at *6, ¶ 34.
    ¶5            On remand, Mother and Father stipulated that the South
    Carolina child support order was properly registered with the superior
    court by July 21, 2014, and thus the Arizona court had gained subject-matter
    jurisdiction over child support. On June 9, 2015, and after conferring with
    the South Carolina court, see A.R.S. § 25-1033 (2018), the superior court
    entered an order finding that it had subject-matter jurisdiction over both
    child custody and child support and personal jurisdiction over both Mother
    and Father. The court further found that Mother had had notice and an
    opportunity to be heard on the matter of child support modification, and
    accordingly adopted the child support arrangements Father had presented
    in 2012.
    ¶6              Mother again appealed; we held that the superior court had
    subject-matter jurisdiction to enter the child support order pursuant to
    A.R.S. § 25-1311(A)(2) (2018) and that Mother had waived any objection to
    personal jurisdiction by appearing in the action. See Hope v. Greenham, 1
    CA-CV 15-0548 FC and -1791 FC, 
    2016 WL 3773544
    , at *4, ¶¶ 24-27 (App.
    Jul. 12, 2016) ("2016 Decision").
    ¶7            On January 25, 2017, Mother moved the superior court to
    vacate its June 9, 2015 ruling, arguing the superior court lacked subject-
    matter jurisdiction to modify child support because Father had not properly
    served her with his April 19, 2012 petition to modify child support. The
    superior court denied the motion, and Mother timely appealed. We have
    jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution,
    and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) (2018) and -2101(A)(2) (2018). See In re
    Marriage of Dougall, 
    234 Ariz. 2
    , 5-6, ¶ 9 (App. 2013) (denial of a motion
    made pursuant to Arizona Rule of Family Law Procedure 85(C) is
    appealable under § 12-2101(A)(2)). Father filed no answering brief.
    Although we may deem his failure to constitute a confession of reversible
    error, in our discretion, we will not do so but will consider the merits of
    Mother's appeal. See Bugh v. Bugh, 
    125 Ariz. 190
    , 191 (App. 1980).
    DISCUSSION
    ¶8           Mother argues the superior court did not have jurisdiction to
    modify the child support order. Specifically, Mother claims Father failed to
    properly serve her with his April 19, 2012 petition to modify child support,
    which she contends divested the superior court of jurisdiction and rendered
    3
    GREENHAM v. HOPE
    Decision of the Court
    its subsequent ruling void. She further argues she was deprived of due
    process because she was not given proper notice that the court was going
    to consider child support modifications at the hearing on November 5, 2012.
    We review de novo the superior court's denial of a motion under Rule
    85(C)(1)(d) to vacate a void judgment. See Ezell v. Quon, 
    224 Ariz. 532
    , 536,
    ¶ 15 (App. 2010) (de novo review of denial of motion to vacate void
    judgment under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(4)); Ariz. R. Fam. L.
    Proc. 85 cmt. (Rule 85 is analog of Ariz. R. Civ. Proc. Rule 60).
    ¶9             Mother's argument that she was not properly served with the
    child-support petition amounts, at most, to a challenge to personal
    jurisdiction, not subject-matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., N. Propane Gas Co. v.
    Kipps, 
    127 Ariz. 522
    , 525 (1980) ("The due process clause of the United States
    Constitution . . . limits the power of a state to achieve personal jurisdiction
    over a defendant.") (citing Kulko v. Super. Ct., 
    436 U.S. 84
    (1978)). But
    Mother waived any challenge to personal jurisdiction by repeatedly
    appearing in court and making court filings in the child-support
    proceeding. See Shah v. Vakharwala, 1 CA-CV 17-0129 FC, ___ Ariz. ___, 
    2018 WL 358214
    at *2, ¶ 8 (App. Jan. 11, 2018). Indeed, we already have held that
    "Mother has waived any challenge to personal jurisdiction because she
    appeared in the matter and litigated it on the merits." 2014 Decision at *6,
    ¶ 30.
    ¶10           In the event that Mother means to challenge the subject-
    matter jurisdiction of the superior court, we held in the 2016 Decision at *4,
    ¶ 26, that the Maricopa County Superior Court properly acquired subject-
    matter jurisdiction when Father properly registered the South Carolina
    support order in July 2013 or July 2014. Accordingly, and because "the
    consent decree clearly designates Arizona as the minor children's home
    state and the state in which all future actions will be adjudicated," we held
    the superior court had subject-matter jurisdiction to modify the child
    support order. 
    Id. at *4,
    ¶¶ 24-27.
    ¶11          Finally, Mother contends that when the superior court ruled
    in June 2015, it failed to take into account the changes in Mother's
    circumstances since 2012. If Mother believes that she has had a substantial
    and continuing change in circumstances, she may ask the superior court to
    modify the order. See A.R.S. §§ 25-327(A) (2018), -503(E) (2018).
    4
    GREENHAM v. HOPE
    Decision of the Court
    CONCLUSION
    ¶12          For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the superior court's
    denial of Mother's motion.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED: AA
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1 CA-CV 17-0263-FC

Filed Date: 3/20/2018

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021