Ornstein v. Bank of America ( 2017 )


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  •                       NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    IAN NEAL ORNSTEIN, Plaintiff/Appellant,
    v.
    BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., et al., Defendants/Appellees.
    No. 1 CA-CV 16-0220
    FILED 4-20-2017
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. CV2015-052615
    The Honorable Robert C. Houser, Jr., Judge (Retired)
    AFFIRMED
    COUNSEL
    Ian Neal Ornstein, Tucson
    Plaintiff/Appellant
    Bryan Cave LLP, Phoenix
    By Sean K. McElenney, Gregory B. Iannelli
    Counsel for Defendant/Appellee, Bank of America, N.A.
    ORNSTEIN v. BANK OF AMERICA et al.
    Decision of the Court
    Quarles & Brady LLP, Phoenix
    By Scott A. Klundt, Sarah R. Anchors
    Counsel for Defendants/Appellees, Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. and Bank of
    New York Mellon
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Judge Margaret H. Downie delivered the decision of the Court, in which
    Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen and Judge James P. Beene joined.
    D O W N I E, Judge:
    ¶1            Ian Neal Ornstein appeals the dismissal of his complaint
    against Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (“SPS”), Bank of New York Mellon
    (“BONY”), and Bank of America, N.A. (“BOA”). For the following
    reasons, we affirm.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1
    ¶2             In 2006, Ornstein obtained a loan from Soma Financial,
    which was evidenced by a promissory note secured by a deed of trust on
    residential property in Tucson (“the Property”). The loan was assigned to
    BOA. BOA later declared the loan in default and transferred its servicing
    rights to SPS.
    ¶3             A trustee’s sale was scheduled for April 7, 2015. The notice
    of sale listed BONY as the beneficiary of the deed of trust. On April 3,
    Ornstein filed an action in Pima County Superior Court seeking to enjoin
    the trustee’s sale. The superior court denied Ornstein’s request, and the
    Property was sold to BONY on April 7 pursuant to a trustee’s deed.
    1       We assume the truth of the well-pleaded factual allegations in the
    complaint. Cullen v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 
    218 Ariz. 417
    , 419, ¶ 7 (2008). In
    reviewing the superior court’s dismissal order, we may consider public
    records and documents central to the complaint. Strategic Dev. & Constr.,
    Inc. v. 7th & Roosevelt Partners, LLC, 
    224 Ariz. 60
    , 64, ¶¶ 13–14 (App. 2010).
    2
    ORNSTEIN v. BANK OF AMERICA et al.
    Decision of the Court
    ¶4            Ornstein filed a complaint against SPS, BONY, and BOA
    (collectively, “Defendants”) for wrongful foreclosure, declaratory
    judgment, and injunctive relief. Defendants moved to dismiss pursuant to
    Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing Ornstein’s claims were
    barred because he did not obtain an order enjoining the trustee’s sale. See
    Ariz. Rev. Stat. (“A.R.S.”) § 33-811(C). After briefing and oral argument,
    the superior court granted Defendants’ motion and later entered a final
    judgment. Ornstein timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to
    A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).2
    DISCUSSION
    ¶5            We review a dismissal order under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo.
    Coleman v. City of Mesa, 
    230 Ariz. 352
    , 355, ¶ 7 (2012). Section 33-811(C)
    provides, in pertinent part:
    The trustor, its successors or assigns, and all persons to
    whom the trustee mails a notice of a sale under a trust deed
    pursuant to § 33-809 shall waive all defenses and objections
    to the sale not raised in an action that results in the issuance
    of a court order granting relief pursuant to rule 65, Arizona
    rules of civil procedure, entered before 5:00 p.m. mountain
    standard time on the last business day before the scheduled
    date of the sale.
    Under this statute, a trustor who does not obtain injunctive relief before a
    trustee’s sale occurs waives “pre-sale defenses or objections” to the sale,
    BT Capital, LLC v. TD Serv. Co. of Ariz., 
    229 Ariz. 299
    , 301, ¶ 11 (2012), as
    well as “claims that are dependent on the sale.” Morgan AZ Fin., L.L.C. v.
    Gotses, 
    235 Ariz. 21
    , 23–24, ¶ 7 (App. 2014). A trustee’s sale, however,
    does not “deprive the trustor of the ability to pursue claims or defenses
    that are independent of the sale.” Morgan, 235 Ariz. at 24, ¶ 8; Sitton v.
    Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., 
    233 Ariz. 215
    , 218, ¶ 13 (App. 2013).
    2   Ornstein’s opening brief does not comply with Arizona Rule of Civil
    Appellate Procedure 13(a)(7). Unless a brief is “totally deficient,”
    however, we prefer to decide a case on its merits. Adams v. Valley Nat’l
    Bank of Ariz., 
    139 Ariz. 340
    , 342 (App. 1984). We address Ornstein’s
    arguments as we understand them, but treat issues that are unsupported
    by adequate explanation, citations to the record, or legal authority as
    waived. See In re Aubuchon, 
    233 Ariz. 62
    , 64–65, ¶ 6 (2013).
    3
    ORNSTEIN v. BANK OF AMERICA et al.
    Decision of the Court
    ¶6             Count one of Ornstein’s complaint, entitled “Wrongful
    Foreclosure/Rescission/Injunctive Relief,” asserted defenses and
    objections to the trustee’s sale that are clearly barred by A.R.S. § 33-811(C).
    Count two sought a declaratory judgment regarding the “true holder of
    the obligation,” “the correct Trustee and Beneficiary,” the validity of
    various trustee sale notices, pre-sale loan modification rights, Defendants’
    standing to foreclose, and Ornstein’s default status. These claims are
    premised on the notion that the trustee’s sale was invalid; as such, they
    are barred by § 33-811(C). Finally, count three of the complaint sought to
    enjoin Defendants from evicting Ornstein or recording documents based
    on the trustee’s sale. As a collateral attack on the trustee’s sale, the
    requested relief is barred by § 33-811(C).
    ¶7            For the first time on appeal, Ornstein raises several
    additional claims neither alleged in his complaint nor asserted in the
    superior court, including lack of notice and expiration of the statute of
    limitations. “We do not consider arguments raised for the first time on
    appeal except under exceptional circumstances.” In re MH 2008-002659,
    
    224 Ariz. 25
    , 27, ¶ 9 (App. 2010). Ornstein has identified no exceptional
    circumstances that warrant consideration of his new arguments.3
    CONCLUSION
    ¶8            We affirm the judgment of the superior court. SPS and
    BONY request an award of attorneys’ fees incurred on appeal pursuant to
    the deed of trust and A.R.S. § 12-341.01. We grant their request based on
    the deed of trust and will award a reasonable sum of fees, as well as
    taxable costs, upon compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate
    3      Moreover, § 33-811(C)’s waiver provision applies to trustors who
    receive notice of a sale in time to seek an injunction, see Madison v. Groseth,
    
    230 Ariz. 8
    , 12–13, ¶¶ 11–12 (App. 2012), which clearly occurred here.
    4
    ORNSTEIN v. BANK OF AMERICA et al.
    Decision of the Court
    Procedure 21. We also award BOA its taxable costs on appeal, contingent
    on compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 21.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED: AA
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1 CA-CV 16-0220

Filed Date: 4/20/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021