State v. Benally ( 2018 )


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  •                      NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,
    v.
    DEAN BENALLY, Appellant.
    No. 1 CA-CR 17-0658
    FILED 6-28-2018
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Coconino County
    No. CR S0300CR78008342
    The Honorable Mark R. Moran, Judge Pro Tempore
    AFFIRMED
    COUNSEL
    Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
    By Michael O’Toole
    Counsel for Appellee
    Dean Benally, Phoenix
    Appellant
    STATE v. BENALLY
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Presiding Judge Kenton D. Jones delivered the decision of the Court, in
    which Judge Michael J. Brown and Judge Jon W. Thompson joined.
    J O N E S, Judge:
    ¶1            Dean Benally appeals from the trial court’s decision denying
    his application to set aside his felony conviction and restore his civil rights.
    For the following reasons, we affirm.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2            In 1978, Benally pleaded guilty to one count of first-degree
    burglary, a felony. The trial court suspended the sentence and placed him
    on probation for thirteen months. In 1979, the court revoked Benally’s
    probation and sentenced him to one year in prison. Between 1983 and 2016,
    Benally was convicted of eleven more felonies.
    ¶3              In July 2017, while incarcerated for a separate felony
    conviction, Benally applied to set aside the 1978 conviction and restore his
    civil rights, including the right to possess a firearm. The State opposed the
    application, noting Benally’s more recent felony convictions. The trial court
    denied his application.
    ¶4             In September 2017, Benally again moved to set aside his 1978
    conviction and restore his civil rights. The State opposed the request, citing
    Benally’s criminal history and current incarceration. The court again
    denied the request. Benally timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction
    pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 13-4033(A)(3).1 See State v.
    Hall, 
    234 Ariz. 374
    , 375, ¶ 2 (App. 2014) (citing A.R.S. § 13-4033 in support
    of the appellate court’s jurisdictional authority to review a trial court’s
    denial of a request to set aside a felony conviction); cf. State v. Sanchez, 
    209 Ariz. 66
    , 68 n.2, ¶ 4 (App. 2004) (finding the denial of a defendant’s request
    to expunge his record was “an order made after judgment that affect[ed]
    his substantial rights”).
    1     Absent material changes from the relevant date, we cite a statute’s
    current version.
    2
    STATE v. BENALLY
    Decision of the Court
    DISCUSSION
    I.     Restoration of Civil Rights
    ¶5             We review a trial court’s decision denying a request to restore
    civil rights for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Nixon, 
    242 Ariz. 242
    , 244,
    ¶ 10 (App. 2017) (citing A.R.S. § 13-908). Benally argues his civil rights
    should be restored pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-912, which states:
    Any person who has not previously been convicted of any
    other felony shall automatically be restored any civil rights
    that were lost or suspended by the conviction if the person
    both:
    1.     Completes a term of probation or receives an absolute
    discharge from imprisonment.
    2.     Pays any fine or restitution imposed.
    As the State notes, Benally’s civil rights were automatically restored in 1980
    after he was discharged from prison for his 1978 felony conviction, but were
    suspended again when he was subsequently convicted of another felony.
    Because his rights were suspended for another felony, Benally cannot now
    request they be restored based upon his absolute discharge from the 1978
    conviction. Benally must wait two years until after his absolute discharge
    from his most recent felony conviction to apply to have his civil rights
    restored. See A.R.S. § 13-906(A), (B). Accordingly, we affirm the denial of
    his request to restore his civil rights.
    II.    Application to Set Aside Conviction
    ¶6              We review a trial court’s decision denying a request to set
    aside a conviction for an abuse of discretion. Hall, 234 Ariz. at 375, ¶ 3
    (citing State v. Bernini, 
    233 Ariz. 170
    , 172, ¶ 8 (App. 2013)). Benally does not
    allege, nor is there any evidence in the record indicating, that the court
    based its decision upon improper factors. Accordingly, we find the court
    acted within its discretion to deny Benally’s motion to set aside the
    conviction. See State v. Key, 
    128 Ariz. 419
    , 421 (App. 1981) (holding the
    decision to grant or deny a request to set aside a conviction is always
    discretionary).
    ¶7            Benally also briefly suggests the trial court’s decision
    constituted a “cruel and unusual punishment” and violated the Privileges
    and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. To the extent
    3
    STATE v. BENALLY
    Decision of the Court
    Benally raises any of these as issues on appeal, we find he has waived them
    by failing to develop sufficient arguments. See State v. Bolton, 
    182 Ariz. 290
    ,
    298 (1995) (“Failure to argue a claim on appeal constitutes waiver of that
    claim.”) (citations omitted).
    ¶8             Finally, Benally argues his conviction should be set aside and
    his rights restored because there are “no records of the matter,” presumably
    referring to the 1978 conviction. The record does not support this
    argument; all relevant documents, including the minute entries for his
    change of plea, sentencing, and revocation of probation are included within
    the record on appeal.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶9            The trial court’s order is affirmed.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED: AA
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1 CA-CR 17-0658

Filed Date: 6/28/2018

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 6/28/2018