Delicious v. Bbva ( 2016 )


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  •                       NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    DELICIOUS DELIVERIES PHOENIX, INC. dba DELICIOUS
    DELIVERIES, an Arizona corporation, Plaintiff/Appellant,
    v.
    BBVA COMPASS INSURANCE AGENCY, INC. dba COMPASS
    INSURANCE AGENCY PHOENIX, a foreign corporation,
    Defendant/Appellee.
    No. 1 CA-CV 14-0585
    FILED 2-16-2016
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. CV2011-021795
    The Honorable Mark H. Brain, Judge
    AFFIRMED
    COUNSEL
    Jaburg Wilk, Phoenix
    By Thomas S. Moring
    Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant
    The Hassett Law Firm, P.L.C., Phoenix
    By Myles P. Hassett, Julie K. Moen, Jamie A. Glasser
    Counsel for Defendant/Appellee
    DELICIOUS v. BBVA
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Judge Peter B. Swann delivered the decision of the court, in which
    Presiding Judge Kenton D. Jones and Judge Samuel A. Thumma joined.
    S W A N N, Judge:
    ¶1            An insured asserted a negligence claim against an insurance
    agent based on the agent’s conduct in reporting and following up on
    claims that the insurer ultimately denied. We affirm the superior court’s
    grant of summary judgment in the agent’s favor. The insured failed to
    produce facts sufficient to generate a triable issue regarding whether the
    agent owed and breached a duty of care.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2            BBVA Compass Insurance Agency, Inc. (“Compass”), a
    licensed insurance producer under A.R.S. § 20-282, assisted Delicious
    Deliveries Phoenix, Inc. (“Delicious”) in obtaining an insurance policy
    from Auto-Owners Insurance Company (“Auto-Owners”). Compass
    thereafter submitted two property-loss claims to Auto-Owners on
    Delicious’s behalf -- one related to an alleged equipment breakdown and
    one related to an alleged employee theft. Using preprinted forms,
    Compass provided brief descriptions of the claims (specifically, “Insd
    phone equipment was [out] for over 3 weeks and had significant loss as
    well as business interruption” and “insd employee [as named] – stole
    from the insd. employee dishonesty claim”), and identified available
    coverages and limits.
    ¶3           During the claims investigation, Compass, in response to a
    complaint by Delicious, asked Auto-Owners and the assigned
    independent adjuster for a status report on the equipment-breakdown
    claim.    Both Auto-Owners and the adjuster responded that the
    investigation was ongoing and that additional documentation was
    needed. Compass replied that it had lost Delicious as a client because of
    the claim, that Compass and Delicious were both unhappy, and that
    Compass wished to discuss the employee-theft claim with Auto-Owners.
    Later, Compass contacted Auto-Owners twice more; on at least one of
    these occasions, Compass again requested a status report.
    2
    DELICIOUS v. BBVA
    Decision of the Court
    ¶4             Auto-Owners ultimately denied both claims. Delicious then
    brought an action against Auto-Owners for breach of contract and the
    implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and against Compass for
    negligence.     The complaint alleged that Compass had violated a
    professional standard of care by failing to procure proper coverage, by
    failing to explain the policy, and by failing to “respond or assist” Delicious
    with its claims. Delicious later clarified that the cause of action against
    Compass was limited to “[t]he actions and inactions of [Compass] in
    evaluating available coverage and reporting the claim[s] to [Auto-
    Owners]” and Compass’s conduct when it “inserted itself into the process
    of adjusting the claim[s].” With respect to the claims-reporting theory,
    Delicious asserted that Compass was negligent in its “review of the policy
    language and determination of what information to put in the Notice[s] of
    Loss,” and there was “a potential problem with the timing and reporting
    in [the] claim[s].” With respect to the claims-advocacy theory, Delicious
    asserted that Compass failed to “d[o] anything to assist its customer”
    when it “inserted itself into the process of adjusting the claim,” and
    generally failed to “do a good job of it.”
    ¶5            Compass moved for summary judgment, arguing that
    Delicious could not prove professional negligence because it had not
    disclosed an expert witness. Delicious responded that an expert was not
    required because its claim was for traditional negligence, not professional
    negligence. Apart from general statements of dissatisfaction, however,
    Delicious provided no specific explanation of the manner in which
    Compass was negligent in reporting the claims. With respect to
    Compass’s conduct during the claims-investigation period, Delicious cited
    an Auto-Owners employee’s deposition testimony that insurance agents
    “[a]bsolutely” can advocate for their clients, and that such efforts may
    affect an insurer’s coverage determination “if [the] insurance agent has
    additional information that . . . may change a coverage position.”
    ¶6            After holding oral argument, the superior court entered
    summary judgment in favor of Compass. Auto-Owners later prevailed on
    the bad faith claims after a jury trial. Delicious’s appeal is limited to the
    summary-judgment ruling on the negligence claims against Compass.
    DISCUSSION
    ¶7            We review the grant of summary judgment de novo,
    viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most
    favorable to the non-moving party. Andrews v. Blake, 
    205 Ariz. 236
    , 240,
    ¶ 12 (2003). We will affirm if summary judgment is correct on any
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    DELICIOUS v. BBVA
    Decision of the Court
    ground. Rowland v. Great States Ins. Co., 
    199 Ariz. 577
    , 581, ¶ 6 (App.
    2001).
    ¶8              Summary judgment is warranted when “there is no genuine
    dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to
    judgment as a matter of law.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A defendant is
    entitled to summary judgment “if the facts produced in support of the
    [plaintiff’s] claim . . . have so little probative value, given the quantum of
    evidence required, that reasonable people could not agree with the
    conclusion advanced by the proponent of the claim.” Orme Sch. v. Reeves,
    
    166 Ariz. 301
    , 309 (1990).
    ¶9             To establish a negligence claim, a plaintiff must show: “(1) a
    duty requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard of care; (2) a
    breach by the defendant of that standard; (3) a causal connection between
    the defendant’s conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual damages.”
    Gipson v. Kasey, 
    214 Ariz. 141
    , 143, ¶ 9 (2007). Compass contends that, in
    view of its status as a licensed insurance producer, Delicious was required
    to comply with A.R.S. § 12-2602(A) and to prove its claim by expert
    testimony. Delicious contends that the facts it produced were sufficient.
    ¶10           We need not decide whether an expert was required because
    even assuming that Delicious’s claim was susceptible of proof by evidence
    other than expert testimony, Delicious failed to produce facts sufficient to
    generate a triable issue of material fact with respect to the question of
    whether Compass breached a duty of care. In response to the motion for
    summary judgment, Delicious provided no facts in support of its theory
    that Compass was negligent with respect to the manner in which it
    reported the claims. Further, Delicious provided no facts in support of its
    theory that Compass’s efforts during the claims investigation (which, as
    Delicious conceded at oral argument on appeal, Compass had no duty to
    undertake) fell below a duty of care. The deposition testimony on which
    Delicious relied established that an insurance agent may serve as a
    conduit for the factual information on which an insurer bases its coverage
    decisions. But Delicious did not allege that Compass failed to relay
    factual information to Auto-Owners; Delicious’s theory was instead that
    Compass should have acted as a more aggressive advocate.
    ¶11          Delicious argues that facts surrounding the conduct of
    Compass in relaying information to the insurer and advocating for
    coverage go only to the question of breach of duty, not existence of the
    duty. With that proposition, we agree. But Delicious provided no
    evidence -- expert or otherwise -- that a reasonable insurance agent in
    Compass’s position should have and would have acted differently with
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    DELICIOUS v. BBVA
    Decision of the Court
    respect to claims advocacy. If the record before the trial court on
    summary judgment in this case were deemed sufficient to generate a
    triable issue of fact, then no such claim could ever fail on summary
    judgment. It is not sufficient merely to point to the fact that coverage was
    denied to support an inference that an agent breached a duty -- a plaintiff
    must identify evidence that shows what the agent should have done or
    not done. A general assertion that the agent should have tried harder is
    not evidence of negligence.
    ¶12          Expert testimony identifying precise failings by Compass
    would no doubt have been helpful to Delicious. But no such evidence
    appears in this record. Moreover, even assuming that it may be possible
    in some cases to demonstrate with non-expert testimony that a licensed
    agent breached a duty of care, no such evidence appears in this record.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶13         For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the superior court’s
    entry of summary judgment for Compass.
    :ama
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1 CA-CV 14-0585

Filed Date: 2/16/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021