Gric v. Dcs ( 2016 )


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  •                                   IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    GILA RIVER INDIAN COMMUNITY, Appellant,
    v.
    DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, SARAH H., JEREMY H., A.D.,
    Appellees.
    No. 1 CA-JV 16-0038
    FILED 8-11-2016
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. JD528014
    The Honorable Karen L. O’Connor, Judge
    AFFIRMED
    COUNSEL
    Office of General Counsel for the Gila River Indian Community, Sacaton
    By Linus Everling, Thomas L. Murphy, Mandy Cisneros
    Co-Counsel for Appellant Gila River Indian Community
    Rothstein, Donatelli, Hughes, Dahlstrom & Schoenburg, L.L.P., Tempe
    By April E. Olson
    Co-Counsel for Appellant Gila River Indian Community
    Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson
    By Dawn R. Williams
    Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
    Scharf-Norton Center for Constitutional Litigation at the Goldwater
    Institute, Phoenix
    By James Manley, Aditya Dynar
    Counsel for Appellees S.H. and J.H.
    Office of the Legal Advocate, Phoenix
    By Tiffany Mastin
    Guardian ad Litem for Appellee A.D.
    Office of the General Counsel for the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian
    Community, Scottsdale
    By Cheryl J. Scott
    Counsel for Amici Curiae Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community,
    Cherokee Nation, and the Native American Bar Association of Arizona
    OPINION
    Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
    Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen and Judge Randall M. Howe joined.
    W I N T H R O P, Judge:
    ¶1           Following termination of the parental rights of the biological
    parents of A.D., an Indian child and eligible member of the Gila River
    Indian Community (“the Community”),1 the Community moved for an
    order transferring jurisdiction of the matter to its Children’s Court. The
    Maricopa County Juvenile Court denied the motion, and the Community
    appealed. We hold that 
    25 U.S.C. § 1911
    (b) of the Indian Child Welfare Act
    (“ICWA”),2 which the Community argues requires transfer, does not allow
    1     The Community is a federally recognized Indian tribe.
    2      ICWA is a federal statute enacted to address “the consequences to
    Indian children, Indian families, and Indian tribes of abusive child welfare
    practices that resulted in the separation of large numbers of Indian children
    from their families and tribes through adoption or foster care placement,
    usually in non-Indian homes.” Memorandum from the United States
    Department of the Interior’s Office of the Solicitor on “Implementation of
    the Child Welfare Act by Legislative Rule” (June 8, 2016) (“2016
    Memorandum”). ICWA is codified at 
    25 U.S.C. §§ 1901
     to 1963. See also
    2
    GRIC v. DCS, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    jurisdiction to be transferred after parental rights have been terminated.
    Accordingly, we affirm the denial of the motion to transfer jurisdiction.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY3
    I.     The Underlying Proceedings
    ¶2            At the time of A.D.’s birth in 2014, both she and her biological
    mother (“M.D.”) tested positive for amphetamines and opiates.4
    Approximately one week later, the Arizona Department of Child Safety
    (“DCS”) removed her from the hospital and placed her with S.H. and J.H.
    (“the foster parents”), with whom she has since remained.5
    Bureau of Indian Affairs’ Indian Child Welfare Act Proceedings: Final Rule,
    
    81 Fed. Reg. 38778
    -38876 (June 14, 2016) (eff. Dec. 12, 2016) (to be codified
    at 25 C.F.R. pt. 23) (“2016 BIA Final Rule”); Bureau of Indian Affairs’
    Guidelines for State Courts and Agencies in Indian Child Custody
    Proceedings, 
    80 Fed. Reg. 10146
    -10159 (Feb. 25, 2015) (“2015 BIA
    Guidelines”).
    3      In general, we view the facts and reasonable inferences therefrom in
    the light most favorable to affirming the juvenile court’s order. Ariz. Dep’t
    of Econ. Sec. v. Matthew L., 
    223 Ariz. 547
    , 549, ¶ 7, 
    225 P.3d 604
    , 606 (App.
    2010).
    4       M.D. is a member of the Community. At the time of A.D.’s birth,
    M.D. was not married, and the identity of A.D.’s biological father was never
    positively established. The record is unclear whether A.D. is actually
    enrolled or is simply eligible to enroll as a member of the Community. In
    either event, she qualifies as an “Indian child” for purposes of ICWA. See
    
    25 U.S.C. § 1903
    (4) (“’Indian child’ means any unmarried person who is
    under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is
    eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a
    member of an Indian tribe[.]”); see also 2016 Memorandum at 3 n.18.
    5      The foster parents are non-Indians (and thus non-ICWA placement
    preference compliant, see 
    25 U.S.C. § 1915
    ) who adopted another Indian
    child in 2013. By all accounts, A.D. is bonded with her foster family. The
    family resides in Maricopa County, and not within the Community’s
    boundaries; accordingly, because A.D. has never resided or been domiciled
    within the Community’s reservation, the Community could not exercise
    3
    GRIC v. DCS, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    ¶3            On August 27, 2014, DCS filed a dependency petition on
    behalf of A.D. The Community was provided notice of the dependency
    proceedings, and on October 3, 2014, formally moved to intervene pursuant
    to 
    25 U.S.C. § 1911
    (c).6 The juvenile court granted the motion to intervene,
    and the Community continued to be involved throughout the case.
    ¶4            On February 20, 2015, the juvenile court found A.D.
    dependent. Pursuant to DCS’s request, the court ordered a case plan of
    7
    severance and adoption, and on March 4, 2015, DCS moved for termination
    of the parent-child relationship. The Community received notice of the
    motion for termination. See 
    25 U.S.C. § 1912
    .
    ¶5            On March 18, 2015, the juvenile court terminated the parental
    rights of A.D.’s biological parents. At that time, the court found the foster
    parents were an adoptive placement meeting all of A.D.’s needs. The court
    also found the foster parents had demonstrated a willingness to honor
    A.D.’s cultural heritage, including by making arrangements to ensure her
    continued exposure to the Community’s culture. The Community had not
    provided an alternative ICWA-compliant placement and agreed that good
    cause existed to deviate from the ICWA placement preferences. 8 See 25
    exclusive jurisdiction over A.D. See 
    25 U.S.C. § 1911
    (a). Nonetheless, the
    Community did not object to placement of A.D. with the foster parents; nor
    has the Community objected to A.D. remaining with them during the
    course of these proceedings.
    6       Under 
    25 U.S.C. § 1911
    (c), “[i]n any State court proceeding for the
    foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian
    child, the Indian custodian of the child and the Indian child’s tribe shall
    have a right to intervene at any point in the proceeding.”
    7     By February 2015, the foster parents had indicated they wanted to
    adopt A.D. if her biological parents’ rights were terminated. Meanwhile,
    the Community sought to find an ICWA-compliant placement, but a
    maternal aunt identified as a possible placement did not pass the necessary
    background check.
    8      The Community requested A.D. remain in her current placement
    until an ICWA-compliant placement could be identified, and thereafter, the
    Community made further unsuccessful efforts to identify a placement
    compliant with ICWA preferences.
    4
    GRIC v. DCS, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    U.S.C. § 1915(a)-(b). DCS, as the legal guardian of A.D., was granted
    authority by the juvenile court to consent to her adoption. No objection or
    notice of appeal was filed challenging termination of the biological parents’
    parental rights.
    ¶6            On June 2, 2015, the foster parents moved to intervene under
    Rule 24, Ariz. R. Civ. P., and expressed a desire to adopt A.D. At a June 5
    Report and Review hearing, the Community requested additional time to
    respond in writing to the motion to intervene, but failed to file a response,
    and the juvenile court granted the foster parents’ motion to intervene. Soon
    thereafter, the foster parents filed a petition to adopt A.D., and although
    adoption hearings were scheduled, the juvenile court granted the
    Community’s motion to stay the adoption proceedings.
    II.    The Motion to Transfer Jurisdiction
    ¶7             On August 18, 2015, the Community moved to transfer
    jurisdiction of the remaining proceedings to the Community’s Children’s
    Court pursuant to 
    25 U.S.C. § 1911
    (b).9 In its motion, the Community noted
    that the State of Arizona, through DCS, supported the motion, but the foster
    parents and A.D.’s guardian ad litem (“GAL”) objected to the motion.10 The
    GAL filed a written objection to the motion to transfer on September 11,
    2015, and, pursuant to the juvenile court’s minute entry order issued after
    the September 29 Report and Review hearing, the foster parents filed a
    response to the motion to transfer on October 13, 2015.
    ¶8           On December 9, 2015, and January 5, 2016, the juvenile court
    heard testimony on whether good cause existed to deny the Community’s
    9     The Community also filed a motion to change the physical custody
    of A.D. to a placement within the Community, but withdrew that motion
    on September 29, 2015, after its proposed placement “fell through.”
    10     Meanwhile, pursuant to an August 11, 2015 Report and Review
    hearing, the juvenile court issued a minute entry filed August 24 in which
    the court held in abeyance the foster parents’ “Motion to Compel, or
    alternatively, to Waive, Consent” for A.D. to be adopted, pending
    jurisdiction being established, and scheduled a Report and Review hearing
    on September 29, 2015, and evidentiary hearings on December 9, 2015, and
    January 5, 2016.
    5
    GRIC v. DCS, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    motion to transfer jurisdiction.11 See generally 
    25 U.S.C. § 1911
    (b). Both sides
    offered evidence regarding several factors, including whether the
    Community’s Children’s Court was a convenient forum, the degree to
    which A.D. had bonded with her foster family, and the possible effects of a
    potential change in placement for A.D., after which the juvenile court took
    the matter under advisement.
    III.   The Under Advisement Ruling
    ¶9            In a ruling filed January 29, 2016, the juvenile court denied the
    Community’s motion to transfer jurisdiction after concluding the GAL and
    foster parents had established good cause to deny the motion by clear and
    convincing evidence. The court based its ruling in part on the possible
    harmful effects of a potential change in placement for A.D.
    ¶10           The Community filed a timely notice of appeal. We have
    jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 8-
    235(A) (2014) and Rule 103(A) of the Arizona Rules of Procedure for the
    Juvenile Court.
    ANALYSIS
    ¶11            Noting that the 2015 BIA Guidelines provide that a potential
    change in placement is not a ground for good cause to deny a motion to
    transfer,12 the Community argues the juvenile court erred in finding good
    11   Near the completion of the January 5 hearing, the Community’s
    ICWA social worker identified for the first time an unnamed potential
    ICWA-compliant placement who was purportedly culturally related to
    A.D. That placement had no contact with A.D., however, and the
    Community does not mention that potential placement on appeal.
    12     See 2015 BIA Guidelines, 
    80 Fed. Reg. 10156
    , C.3.(c) (“In determining
    whether good cause exists, the court may not consider whether the case is
    at an advanced stage or whether transfer would result in a change in the
    placement of the child . . . .”). “Although the Guidelines are not binding,
    we nonetheless consider them when interpreting ICWA.” Gila River Indian
    Cmty. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 
    238 Ariz. 531
    , 535, ¶ 16, 
    363 P.3d 148
    , 152 (App.
    2015). Moreover, the 2016 BIA Final Rule, issued June 14, 2016, and effective
    December 12, 2016, is instructive. “The final rule prohibits a finding of good
    cause based on predictions of whether the transfer could result in a change
    in the placement of the child[.]” 2016 BIA Final Rule, 
    81 Fed. Reg. 38822
    , J.
    6
    GRIC v. DCS, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    cause to deny its motion to transfer jurisdiction to the Community’s
    Children’s Court. We need not directly address this issue, however, or the
    numerous additional arguments raised by the parties13 and amici because
    we find one threshold issue dispositive:14 Does 
    25 U.S.C. § 1911
    (b) of ICWA
    allow transfer to tribal court of state preadoptive and adoptive placement
    proceedings occurring after parental rights have terminated? We answer
    that question in the negative.
    I.      Standard of Review
    ¶12            We review de novo the application and interpretation of the
    law, including statutes. Valerie M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 
    219 Ariz. 331
    ,
    334, ¶ 10, 
    198 P.3d 1203
    , 1206 (2009); Michael J., Jr. v. Michael J., Sr., 
    198 Ariz. 154
    , 156, ¶ 7, 
    7 P.3d 960
    , 962 (App. 2000). As a general rule, we look to the
    plain language of a statute because it is the best evidence of legislative
    intent. Zamora v. Reinstein, 
    185 Ariz. 272
    , 275, 
    915 P.2d 1227
    , 1230 (1996); In
    re Estate of Jung, 
    210 Ariz. 202
    , 204, ¶ 12, 
    109 P.3d 97
    , 99 (App. 2005); In re
    Adam P., 
    201 Ariz. 289
    , 291, ¶ 12, 
    34 P.3d 398
    , 400 (App. 2001). Only if the
    plain meaning of the language is not clear do we consider other factors,
    such as the context of the statute, its historical background, its effects and
    consequences, and the spirit and purpose of the law. State v. Garza
    Rodriguez, 
    164 Ariz. 107
    , 112, 
    791 P.2d 633
    , 638 (1990); Estate of Jung, 
    210 Ariz. at 204, ¶ 12
    , 
    109 P.3d at 99
    . Also, when possible, we interpret statutory
    language in a way that gives meaning to each word and clause, and avoids
    making any part of a statute superfluous, contradictory, void, or
    insignificant. See Devenir Assocs. v. City of Phoenix, 
    169 Ariz. 500
    , 503, 821
    13      At the December 9, 2015 evidentiary hearing, DCS argued that
    neither the GAL nor the foster parents had standing to object to the motion
    to transfer jurisdiction. On appeal, the Community again raises the issue,
    arguing the GAL and foster parents lack standing under 
    25 U.S.C. § 1911
    (b)
    to challenge the transfer. We disagree. The GAL advocates for A.D., who
    is a party, and the juvenile court granted the foster parents’ motion to
    intervene pursuant to Rule 24, Ariz. R. Civ. P. Accordingly, both are parties
    in this case. See Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 37(A).
    14    This court will affirm the juvenile court’s decision if correct for any
    reason. See Forszt v. Rodriguez, 
    212 Ariz. 263
    , 265, ¶ 9, 
    130 P.3d 538
    , 540
    (App. 2006); Haynes v. Syntek Fin. Corp., 
    184 Ariz. 332
    , 337, 
    909 P.2d 399
    , 404
    (App. 1995) (“[W]e will affirm the trial court’s decision if it is correct for any
    reason, even if that reason was not considered by the trial court.”).
    7
    GRIC v. DCS, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    P.2d 161, 164 (1991); Garza Rodriguez, 
    164 Ariz. at 112
    , 
    791 P.2d at 638
    ; State
    v. Johnson, 
    171 Ariz. 39
    , 42, 
    827 P.2d 1134
    , 1137 (App. 1992).
    II.    Discussion
    ¶13           For purposes of our discussion, we bear in mind that the
    progression of A.D.’s case has involved separate and distinct juvenile court
    proceedings, each with its own statutory requirements. DCS obtained
    temporary physical custody of A.D. in August 2014, see A.R.S. § 8-821
    (Supp. 2015), placed A.D. in a licensed foster home for care, see A.R.S. § 8-
    514 (Supp. 2015), and filed a dependency petition, see A.R.S. § 8-841 (2014).
    After the court found A.D. dependent, DCS moved for termination of
    parental rights pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1), (3), and (8)(b) (Supp. 2015).
    The court then terminated the rights of the biological parents, placed A.D.
    in the legal care, custody, and control of DCS, affirmed the current
    placement (the foster parents) as an adoptive placement, and ordered DCS
    to carry out a plan for permanent placement. The foster parents later filed
    a petition to adopt A.D. See A.R.S. § 8-109 (2014).15 Only then did the
    Community seek to transfer jurisdiction from the juvenile court to the
    Community’s Children’s Court pursuant to 
    25 U.S.C. § 1911
    (b).
    ¶14           Subsection (b) of 
    25 U.S.C. § 1911
     provides as follows:
    (b) Transfer of proceedings; declination by tribal court
    In any State court proceeding for the foster care placement of,
    or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child not
    domiciled or residing within the reservation of the Indian
    child’s tribe, the court, in the absence of good cause to the
    contrary, shall transfer such proceeding to the jurisdiction of
    the tribe, absent objection by either parent, upon the petition
    of either parent or the Indian custodian or the Indian child’s
    tribe: Provided, That such transfer shall be subject to
    declination by the tribal court of such tribe.
    ¶15           As the plain language of 
    25 U.S.C. § 1911
    (b) provides, “state
    court proceedings are required to be transferred to tribal jurisdiction where
    ’foster care placement’ or ‘termination of parental rights’ is the matter at
    issue.” In re A.P., 
    962 P.2d 1186
    , 1189, ¶ 19 (Mont. 1998). As the Supreme
    15     Provisions regarding dependency are found in Chapter 4, Articles 8-
    10, of Title 8 of the Arizona Revised Statutes, while provisions regarding
    termination of parental rights are found in Chapter 4, Article 5, and
    provisions regarding adoption are found in Chapter 1 of Title 8.
    8
    GRIC v. DCS, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    Court noted in Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 
    490 U.S. 30
    ,
    36 (1989):
    At the heart of the ICWA are its provisions concerning
    jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings. Section
    1911 lays out a dual jurisdictional scheme. Section 1911(a)
    establishes exclusive jurisdiction in the tribal courts for
    proceedings concerning an Indian child “who resides or is
    domiciled within the reservation of such tribe,” as well as for
    wards of tribal courts regardless of domicile. Section 1911(b),
    on the other hand, creates concurrent but presumptively
    tribal jurisdiction in the case of children not domiciled on the
    reservation: on petition of either parent or the tribe, state-
    court proceedings for foster care placement or termination of
    parental rights are to be transferred to the tribal court, except
    in cases of “good cause,” objection by either parent, or
    declination of jurisdiction by the tribal court.
    (Footnote omitted; emphasis added.)
    ¶16           Under ICWA, a “child custody proceeding” includes foster
    care placement, termination of parental rights proceedings, preadoptive
    placement, and adoptive placement of an Indian child. 
    25 U.S.C. § 1903
    (1).
    Each of these four terms is specifically defined within the statute, and these
    federal definitions of child custody proceedings generally are consistent
    with state court proceedings involving an Indian child, though they may be
    labeled differently under state law. See In re Guardianship of Ashley Elizabeth
    R., 
    863 P.2d 451
    , 453 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993) (determining that a state
    guardianship petition fits the ICWA definition of a foster care placement).
    ¶17          ICWA defines the term “foster care placement” as “any action
    removing an Indian child from its parent or Indian custodian for temporary
    placement in a foster home or institution or the home of a guardian or
    conservator where the parent or Indian custodian cannot have the child
    returned upon demand, but where parental rights have not been terminated.”
    
    25 U.S.C. § 1903
    (1)(i) (emphasis added). ICWA further defines the term
    “termination of parental rights” as “any action resulting in the termination
    of the parent-child relationship.” 
    25 U.S.C. § 1903
    (1)(ii). Accordingly,
    under § 1911(b), ICWA provides only for transfer of state juvenile court
    proceedings before termination of parental rights, and not for post-
    9
    GRIC v. DCS, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    termination preadoptive and adoptive placements.16 See In re A.P., 
    962 P.2d at 1189, ¶ 20
    .
    ¶18            In this case, neither A.D.’s biological parents nor the
    Community sought to transfer the proceedings from the juvenile court to
    the Community’s Children’s Court before termination of parental rights.17
    By the time the Community moved to transfer, A.D.’s case had progressed
    to the point where the biological parents’ rights had been terminated and
    legal custody had been permanently placed with DCS, the juvenile court
    had found the foster parents were an adoptive placement, and the court had
    authorized DCS to facilitate permanent placement of A.D. through
    adoption. Further, an adoption petition had been filed. By not moving to
    transfer jurisdiction before termination of the biological parents’ rights, the
    Community effectively waived its right to seek transfer of jurisdiction
    under 
    25 U.S.C. § 1911
    (b).
    ¶19            Although no court in Arizona has previously addressed this
    issue, our conclusion is supported by the decisions of other state courts
    interpreting ICWA and the plain language of 
    25 U.S.C. § 1911
    (b). Courts
    examining this question have concluded that the transfer provision of 
    25 U.S.C. § 1911
    (b) only applies to foster care placement proceedings and
    termination of parental rights proceedings, and does not apply to
    proceedings following the termination of parental rights. See In re A.P., 
    962 P.2d at 1191, ¶ 28
    ; In re Welfare of the Child of R.S. & L.S., 
    805 N.W.2d 44
    , 50-
    51 (Minn. 2011); In re J.B., 
    900 P.2d 1014
    , 1016 (Okla. Civ. App. 1995),
    overruled by In re M.S. & K.S., 
    237 P.3d 161
    , 167, ¶ 19 (Okla. 2010); see also
    Thompson v. Fairfax Cty. Dep’t of Family Servs., 
    747 S.E.2d 838
    , 853 (Va. Ct.
    App. 2013) (“ICWA allows tribes to seek the transfer to a tribal court in two
    kinds of proceedings: ‘foster care placement’ and ‘termination of parental
    rights.’”); Nebraska v. Elise M. (In re Zylena R.), 
    825 N.W.2d 173
    , 182 (Neb.
    2012) (“[W]e conclude that ICWA . . . contemplate[s] four different types of
    child custody proceedings, two of which must be transferred from a state
    16      Further, ICWA defines the term “preadoptive placement” as “the
    temporary placement of an Indian child in a foster home or institution after
    the termination of parental rights, but prior to or in lieu of adoptive
    placement,” and defines “adoptive placement” as “the permanent
    placement of an Indian child for adoption, including any action resulting in
    a final decree of adoption.” 
    25 U.S.C. § 1903
    (1)(iii-iv) (emphasis added).
    17     We also note the Community did not object to the proceedings
    taking place in juvenile court or to the placement orders, and did not appeal
    the court’s order terminating parental rights.
    10
    GRIC v. DCS, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    court to a tribal court upon proper motion in the absence of good cause to
    the contrary. . . . The State’s argument that a foster care placement
    proceeding and a termination of parental rights proceeding are a single
    ‘proceeding’ . . . is inconsistent with the plain language of ICWA . . . .”); but
    see In re M.S. & K.S., 237 P.3d at 166, ¶ 14 (holding that 
    25 U.S.C. § 1911
    (b)
    does not preclude tribal court jurisdiction when transfer is requested after
    parental rights are terminated). The 2016 BIA Final Rule is also instructive
    and supports our view. See 2016 BIA Final Rule, 
    81 Fed. Reg. 38822
    , J(1),
    Response to Comment (“Like the statute, the final rule addresses transfer
    of foster-care-placement and termination-of-parental-rights proceedings.
    See FR § 23.115; 25 U.S.C. 1911(b).”); 38823, (J)(1), Response to Comment
    (“The final rule clarifies in the definitions that, as relevant here, a
    ‘proceeding’ is a foster-care-placement or termination-of-parental rights
    proceeding.”).
    ¶20            As the Minnesota Supreme Court explained in In re Welfare of
    the Child of R.S. & L.S.:
    We are persuaded that Congress did not intend to permit the
    transfer of adoptive and preadoptive placement proceedings
    to tribal courts. We cannot assume that, having specifically
    used a term in section 1911(a)—“child custody proceeding”—
    that includes preadoptive and adoptive proceedings, Congress
    was simply careless in using terms in section 1911(b)—“foster
    care placement” and “termination of parental rights”—that
    exclude preadoptive and adoptive placement proceedings. See
    Russello v. United States, 
    464 U.S. 16
    , 23, 
    104 S.Ct. 296
    , 
    78 L.Ed.2d 17
     (1983) (“We refrain from concluding here that the
    differing language in the two subsections has the same
    meaning in each. We would not presume to ascribe this
    difference to a simple mistake in draftsmanship.”).
    Rather, we are bound by the plain language of the statute.
    Under the plain language of 
    25 U.S.C. § 1911
    (b), tribal courts
    have presumptive jurisdiction over two types of child custody
    proceedings—foster care placement and termination of
    parental rights—involving Indian children who do not reside
    and are not domiciled on their tribe’s reservation. But, again
    under the plain language of 
    25 U.S.C. § 1911
    (b), Congress has
    not granted tribal courts jurisdiction over preadoptive and
    adoptive placement proceedings involving Indian children
    who do not reside and are not domiciled on their tribe’s
    reservation. Where a statute is clearly limited to specifically
    11
    GRIC v. DCS, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    enumerated subjects, we do not extend its application to other
    subjects by process of construction. Martinco v. Hastings, 
    265 Minn. 490
    , 495, 
    122 N.W.2d 631
    , 637 (1963).
    The [Minnesota] court of appeals concluded that because
    section 1911(b) neither expressly requires nor expressly
    prohibits transfer of other types of child custody
    proceedings—preadoptive         and    adoptive     placement
    proceedings—the statute was ambiguous. 793 N.W.2d at 757.
    We disagree. “[S]ilence in a statute regarding a particular
    topic does not render the statute unclear or ambiguous unless
    the statute is susceptible of more than one reasonable
    interpretation.” Premier Bank v. Becker Dev., LLC, 
    785 N.W.2d 753
    , 760 (Minn. 2010). Moreover, we do not read the differing
    language in the two subsections as congressional “silence.”
    Rather, we read the differing language as drawing an express
    distinction between foster care and termination of parental
    rights proceedings on the one hand, and preadoptive and
    adoptive placement proceedings on the other.
    The differing language in the two subsections cannot be read
    in isolation from the other provisions of ICWA. See State v.
    Gaiovnik, 
    794 N.W.2d 643
    , 647 (Minn. 2011) (“When
    interpreting statutes, we do not examine different provisions
    in isolation.”)[.] We construe statutes “as a whole” and “in
    the light of their context.” See Christensen v. Hennepin Transp.
    Co., Inc., 
    215 Minn. 394
    , 409, 
    10 N.W.2d 406
    , 415 (1943). As
    discussed above, Congress distinguished among the four
    types of child custody proceedings—foster care placement,
    termination of parental rights, preadoptive placement, and
    adoptive placement—throughout ICWA. For example, it
    required the “testimony of qualified expert witnesses” in
    foster care placement and termination of parental rights
    proceedings, but not in preadoptive and adoptive placement
    proceedings. 
    25 U.S.C. § 1912
    (e), (f). It allowed for the
    invalidation of foster care placement and termination of
    parental rights for violation of certain procedural provisions
    of ICWA, but did not permit the invalidation of preadoptive
    or adoptive placements. 
    25 U.S.C. § 1914
    . It gave the child’s
    tribe the right to notice and intervention in foster care and
    termination proceedings, but not adoption proceedings. See
    
    25 U.S.C. §§ 1911
    (b), 1912(a). These distinctions support our
    conclusion that in 
    25 U.S.C. § 1911
    (b), Congress intended to
    12
    GRIC v. DCS, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    limit the types of child custody proceedings that can be
    transferred to tribal courts to foster care placement and
    termination of parental rights.
    805 N.W.2d at 50-52 (rejecting any suggestion that 
    25 U.S.C. § 1911
    (b) is
    ambiguous).
    ¶21            In this case, the Community filed its motion to transfer
    jurisdiction from the juvenile court to the Community’s Children’s Court
    after the termination, and at a time when there were no foster care
    placement or active termination of parental rights proceedings before the
    court. The Community’s motion relied solely on 
    25 U.S.C. § 1911
    (b) as
    authority for its claim of presumptive jurisdiction. Under the plain
    language of ICWA, however, the Community was precluded from relying
    on § 1911(b) to assume jurisdiction through a motion to transfer the
    proceedings.18 The juvenile court therefore did not err in denying the
    Community’s motion to transfer jurisdiction.
    18     Because the Community sought transfer of jurisdiction only under
    the authority of 
    25 U.S.C. § 1911
    (b), we do not analyze or address the
    propriety of such a motion under any other authority. See In re Welfare of
    the Child of R.S. & L.S., 805 N.W.2d at 57 (Dietzen, J., concurring) (“The
    court’s consideration of those issues is dictum and not binding on the
    court.”). See also 2016 BIA Final Rule, 
    81 Fed. Reg. 38822
    , J(1), Response to
    Comment (“Parties may request transfer of preadoptive and adoptive
    placement proceedings, but the standards for addressing such motions are
    not dictated by ICWA or these regulations. Tribes possess inherent
    jurisdiction over domestic relations, including the welfare of child citizens
    of the Tribe, even beyond that authority confirmed in ICWA. . . . Thus, it
    may be appropriate to transfer preadoptive and adoptive proceedings
    involving children residing outside of a reservation to Tribal jurisdiction in
    particular circumstances.” (citations omitted)); 
    25 U.S.C. § 1902
     (providing
    a Congressional declaration of policy stating that ICWA establishes
    “minimum Federal standards for the removal of Indian children from their
    families and the placement of such children in foster or adoptive homes
    which will reflect the unique values of Indian culture”).
    13
    GRIC v. DCS, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    CONCLUSION
    ¶22            The juvenile court’s order denying the Community’s motion
    to transfer jurisdiction pursuant to 
    25 U.S.C. § 1911
    (b) is affirmed.
    :AA
    14