State v. Weber ( 2017 )


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  •                      NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,
    v.
    LANCE WEBER, Appellant.
    No. 1 CA-CR 16-0548
    FILED 12-26-2017
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. CR2015-000856-001
    The Honorable Christopher A. Coury, Judge
    AFFIRMED
    COUNSEL
    Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix
    By Adele G. Ponce
    Counsel for Appellee
    Ballecer & Segal, LLP, Phoenix
    By Natalee E. Segal
    Counsel for Appellant
    STATE v. WEBER
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Judge James B. Morse Jr. delivered the decision of the Court, in which
    Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie and Judge Peter B. Swann joined.
    M O R S E, Judge:
    ¶1             Lance Weber appeals his convictions and sentences on two
    counts of sexual assault, a class 2 felony; one count of attempted sexual
    assault, a class 3 felony; and two counts of assault, a class 1 misdemeanor.
    For reasons that follow, we affirm.
    DISCUSSION
    A.      Voir Dire Questions
    ¶2            Weber argues the prosecutor engaged in improper conduct
    during jury voir dire by asking stakeout questions. At issue are questions
    posed by the prosecutor that inquired how jurors felt about: (1) advice that
    women should not be afraid to be impolite when necessary to protect
    themselves because this advice is not always easy to follow when the
    woman knows a potential assailant; and (2) what physical injuries the jurors
    might expect to see on a rape victim. Because Weber failed to object to the
    prosecutor's questions, he has forfeited all but fundamental error review.
    State v. Henderson, 
    210 Ariz. 561
    , 568, ¶ 22 (2005). Under this standard of
    review, the defendant has the burden of proving that error occurred, that it
    was fundamental, and that he was prejudiced thereby. 
    Id. at 567,
    ¶ 20.
    ¶3             In State v. Prince, our supreme court defined impermissible
    "stakeout questions" as questions that "'ask a juror to speculate or
    precommit to how that juror might vote based on any particular facts.'" 
    226 Ariz. 516
    , 529, ¶ 35 (2011) (quoting U.S. v. Fell, 
    372 F. Supp. 2d
    . 766, 770 (D.
    Vt. 2005)). The questions here did neither. The questions simply sought to
    determine whether potential jurors could keep an open mind when
    listening to and weighing the victim's testimony. Because the inquiries did
    not "seek to precommit the juror[s] to a specific result," 
    id., they did
    not
    constitute error, let alone fundamental error. See State v. Lavers, 
    168 Ariz. 376
    , 385 (1991) (before engaging in fundamental error review, this court
    must first find that error occurred).
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    STATE v. WEBER
    Decision of the Court
    B.       Prosecutorial Vouching
    ¶4            Weber also argues the prosecutor committed prosecutorial
    misconduct by engaging in impermissible vouching while questioning a
    witness and during closing argument. It is improper for the prosecution to
    vouch for the credibility of the state's witnesses. State v. Bible, 
    175 Ariz. 549
    ,
    601 (1993). There are two forms of prosecutorial vouching: where the
    prosecutor places the prestige of the government behind its witness; and
    where the prosecutor suggests that information not presented to the jury
    supports a witness's testimony. State v. Doerr, 
    193 Ariz. 56
    , 62, ¶ 24 (1998).
    Because Weber failed to object to the alleged vouching, our review is again
    limited to fundamental error. 
    Henderson, 210 Ariz. at 568
    , ¶ 22.
    ¶5            Weber first points to testimony from a police detective that
    because the victim's bar tab matched up with the victim's statement, the
    victim was "honest about what she drank." Contrary to Weber's contention,
    the challenged testimony was not intentionally elicited by the prosecutor.
    Rather, the statement was unexpectedly volunteered by the witness,
    without objection from Weber, in response to a question asking what
    actions the detective took in investigating the case. Accordingly, there was
    no prosecutorial misconduct on the part of the prosecutor with respect to
    the challenged testimony. See Pool v. Superior Court, 
    139 Ariz. 98
    , 108–09
    (1984) (holding prosecutorial misconduct is not merely error, negligence, or
    mistake, but "intentional conduct which the prosecutor knows to be
    improper and prejudicial" (emphasis added)).
    ¶6            Second, Weber contends the prosecutor improperly offered
    his personal opinion regarding credibility during closing argument by
    arguing the victim was truthful in her testimony and that Weber, in
    contrast, was a liar.
    ¶7            Prosecutors have wide latitude in closing arguments and are
    permitted to suggest reasonable inferences from the evidence presented,
    including ultimate conclusions for the jury's consideration. 
    Bible, 175 Ariz. at 602
    . A prosecutor thus may characterize a witness as truthful if the
    argument is grounded in the evidence presented at trial. State v. Corona,
    
    188 Ariz. 85
    , 91 (App. 1997). Given that other evidence presented at trial
    corroborated the victim's testimony, it was not improper for the prosecutor
    to argue that the victim was truthful in her testimony. Nor did the
    prosecutor's argument that Weber was a liar amount to an expression of
    personal opinion regarding Weber's credibility because it was likewise a
    permissible argument linked to the evidence presented. See State v. Schrock,
    
    149 Ariz. 433
    , 438-39 (1986) (characterizing argument that a defendant's
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    STATE v. WEBER
    Decision of the Court
    statement was a lie as "a proper attack on defendant's statement"). The
    prosecutor merely urged the jury to draw reasonable inferences from the
    evidence regarding the credibility of the victim and Weber. Accordingly,
    the prosecutor's arguments were not improper.
    C.       Cumulative Error
    ¶8             Weber additionally argues that the prosecutor's actions of
    asking stakeout questions and engaging in vouching require reversal when
    considered cumulatively. We note that Arizona considers claims of
    cumulative error only with respect to "a claim that prosecutorial
    misconduct deprived a defendant of a fair trial." State v. Hughes, 
    193 Ariz. 72
    , 78-79, ¶ 25 (1998). Because we have found no prosecutorial misconduct,
    there is no merit to the claim of cumulative error. See State v. Bocharski, 
    218 Ariz. 476
    , 492, ¶ 75 (2008) ("Absent any finding of misconduct, there can be
    no cumulative effect of misconduct sufficient to permeate the entire
    atmosphere of the trial with unfairness.").
    D.       Victim's Statement
    ¶9            Finally, Weber contends the trial court erred in allowing a
    forensic nurse who examined the victim to testify to the victim's statement
    about the assault, arguing the statement was inadmissible hearsay. We
    review a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of hearsay evidence for
    abuse of discretion. State v. Tucker, 
    205 Ariz. 157
    , 165, ¶ 41 (2003).
    ¶10            Hearsay is generally inadmissible at trial to prove the truth of
    the matter asserted. Ariz. R. Evid. 801(c), 802. Pursuant to Rule 803(4),
    however, otherwise inadmissible hearsay may be admitted if the statement
    "(A) is made for—and is reasonably pertinent to—medical diagnosis or
    treatment; and (B) describes medical history; past or present symptoms or
    sensations; their inception; or their general cause." The rationale behind
    this hearsay exception is that medical practitioners "will seek and patients
    will give reliable information to further necessary medical treatment." State
    v. Robinson, 
    153 Ariz. 191
    , 199 (1987). Weber argues the victim's statements
    to the forensic nurse were not admissible pursuant to Rule 803(4) because
    the examination was not for medical purposes. We disagree.
    ¶11           We apply a two-part test in determining whether hearsay
    statements are "reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment: (1) was the
    declarant's apparent 'motive . . . consistent with receiving medical care;' and
    (2) was it 'reasonable for the physician to rely on the information in
    diagnosis or treatment.'" 
    Id. (quoting U.S.
    v. Iron Shell, 
    633 F.2d 77
    , 84 (8th
    Cir. 1980)). Applying this test, the trial court could reasonably find that the
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    STATE v. WEBER
    Decision of the Court
    victim's statements to the forensic nurse qualified for admission under the
    medical diagnosis or treatment exception to the rule against hearsay.
    ¶12           Although the forensic nurse swabbed the victim for DNA and
    documented her injuries during the examination for potential use in a
    future prosecution, there was also testimony that the exam was performed
    for the dual purposes of treating the victim and gathering evidence.
    Further, the nurse who performed the exam testified that as a forens