Vega Rangel v. luevano/special Fund ( 2016 )


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  •                     NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    ELPIDIO VEGA RANGEL,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
    ARIZONA,
    Respondent,
    ERNESTO LUEVANO,
    Respondent Employer,
    SPECIAL FUND DIVISION/NO
    INSURANCE SECTION,
    Respondent Party in Interest.
    No. 1 CA-IC 16-0005
    FILED 10-18-2016
    Special Action - Industrial Commission
    ICA CLAIM NO. 20151-180082
    The Honorable Anthony Halas, Administrative Law Judge
    AWARD SET ASIDE
    COUNSEL
    Elpidio Vega Rangel, Phoenix
    Petitioner
    Industrial Commission of Arizona, Phoenix
    By Jason M. Porter
    Counsel for Respondent ICA
    Industrial Commission of Arizona, Phoenix
    By Stephen D. Ball
    Counsel for Respondent Employer/Carrier
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen delivered the decision of the Court, in
    which Judge Jon W. Thompson and Judge Edward W. Bassett joined.1
    J O H N S E N, Judge:
    ¶1           This is a special action review of an Industrial Commission of
    Arizona ("ICA") award of a non-compensable injury. Elpidio Vega Rangel
    argues the administrative law judge ("ALJ") erred by finding he failed to
    meet his burden to show that Ernesto Luevano was an employer under the
    Workers' Compensation Act. For the reasons that follow, we set aside the
    award.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    ¶2          According to the evidence before the ALJ, Rangel lived in a
    home owned by Luevano.2 The monthly rent was $525, but since 2009,
    Luevano allowed Rangel to live rent-free in exchange for services. Rangel
    1      The Honorable Edward W. Bassett, Judge of the Arizona Superior
    Court, has been authorized to sit in this matter pursuant to Article VI,
    Section 3 of the Arizona Constitution.
    2      "We will affirm a Commission decision if it is reasonably supported
    by the evidence after reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to
    sustaining the award." Lovitch v. Indus. Comm'n, 
    202 Ariz. 102
    , 105, ¶ 16
    (App. 2002).
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    VEGA RANGEL v. LEUVANO/SPECIAL FUND
    Decision of the Court
    was responsible for collecting rent from the tenants in nine other nearby
    homes owned by Luevano, making repairs to all the homes, painting and
    cleaning the homes after tenants moved out and before other tenants
    moved in, maintaining the common areas of the properties, and generally
    "keep[ing] an eye on things." Luevano supplied Rangel with a credit card
    for maintenance expenses, for which Luevano paid the bill. Although
    Rangel did not have a set work schedule, he had to be available all day,
    every day, for repairs. This arrangement continued for at least five years,
    except for a few short periods when Rangel was out of town. During those
    times, Rangel was responsible for paying his rent, although Luevano does
    not remember ever collecting any rent from Rangel.
    ¶3           One night in 2014, two tenants called Rangel to complain
    about suspicious people in the property parking lot. Rangel went to the
    parking lot to investigate, and there confronted six people. After an
    exchange of some sort, Rangel was shot three times, sustaining multiple
    injuries.
    ¶4            Rangel filed a claim for workers' compensation, which the
    Special Fund Division/No Insurance Section of the Industrial Commission
    of Arizona denied. Rangel protested the denial and requested a hearing.
    At the hearing, Luevano and the No Insurance Section asserted three
    arguments: (1) Luevano is not an employer under the Workers'
    Compensation Act because his primary occupation is not that of a landlord
    and he does not regularly employ people in the property management
    business; (2) Rangel was not an employee under the Act because his work
    was sporadic and subject to no definite terms of employment; and (3)
    Rangel's injury did not arise out of and in the course of his employment.
    ¶5            In his Decision Upon Hearing, the ALJ found Rangel failed to
    show that Luevano was an employer under the Act. The ALJ did not
    address the other two arguments Luevano and the No Insurance Section
    raised. Rangel requested review and the ALJ affirmed his decision. This
    special action timely followed.
    ¶6            This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised
    Statutes ("A.R.S.") sections 12-120.21(A)(2) (2016) and 23-951 (2016) and
    Rule 10 of the Arizona Rules of Procedure for Special Actions.3
    3     Absent material revision after the relevant date, we cite a statute's
    current version.
    3
    VEGA RANGEL v. LEUVANO/SPECIAL FUND
    Decision of the Court
    DISCUSSION
    ¶7           We defer to the ALJ's factual findings, but review de novo the
    determination of whether an employer-employee relationship existed.
    Henderson-Jones v. Indus. Comm'n, 
    233 Ariz. 188
    , 191-92, ¶ 9 (App. 2013).
    ¶8             To be entitled to benefits under the Arizona Worker's
    Compensation Act, a worker must have been "in the service of an employer
    subject to the Act at the time of the injury." 
    Id. at 192,
    ¶ 11. A claimant bears
    the burden of establishing all elements of the claim by a preponderance of
    the evidence. Special Fund Div./No Ins. Section v. Indus. Comm'n, 
    172 Ariz. 319
    , 324 (App. 1992).
    ¶9             Employers subject to the Act include "every person who
    employs any workers . . . regularly employed in the same business . . . under
    contract of hire." A.R.S. § 23-902(A) (2016). The term "regularly employed"
    includes "all employments, whether continuous throughout the year, or for
    only a portion of the year, in the usual trade, business, profession or
    occupation of an employer." 
    Id. ¶10 A
    business need not be profitable or entrepreneurial to bring
    an employer within the Act. See Greenway Baptist Church v. Indus. Comm'n,
    
    130 Ariz. 482
    , 484 (App. 1981) (church can be employer for the purposes of
    the Act). An employer who is "regularly using his [worker's] labor in a
    commercial enterprise" is subject to the Act. Griebel v. Indus. Comm'n, 
    133 Ariz. 270
    , 273-74 (App. 1982) (homeowner who paid handyman to work on
    home but who had no intent to exploit his labor by reselling home at a profit
    not an employer subject to Act).
    ¶11          The ALJ heard evidence that Luevano works full time at a
    manufacturing company, and that the homes he owns and rents out are an
    hour's drive from his own home. Luevano testified he purchased the
    houses as investment properties, although he does not always make a
    profit.
    ¶12          On the record presented, the dozen rental properties Luevano
    owns are a commercial enterprise constituting a "trade, business, profession
    or occupation" that renders him an employer for purposes of the workers'
    compensation laws. See 
    Greenway, 130 Ariz. at 484
    . The ALJ erred by
    concluding that because Luevano had a full-time job elsewhere, he was not
    also engaged in the business of property management. That Luevano's
    property management business was not his main source of income, or that
    it may not have been consistently profitable, is not dispositive. The
    properties Luevano owned and rented out constituted such a significant
    4
    VEGA RANGEL v. LEUVANO/SPECIAL FUND
    Decision of the Court
    enterprise that, as landlord, Luevano was willing to forego rent on one of
    the units in exchange for Rangel's agreement to live on-site and perform a
    variety of services with respect to the other properties. Under § 23-902(A),
    Luevano plainly was an "employer" with respect to his ownership and
    maintenance of the rental properties.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶13          For the foregoing reasons, we set aside the award.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED: AA
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1 CA-IC 16-0005

Filed Date: 10/18/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021