McCcd v. Hon talamante/arvizu ( 2015 )


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  •                      NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    MARICOPA COUNTY COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT, Petitioner,
    v.
    THE HONORABLE DAVID M. TALAMANTE, Judge of the SUPERIOR
    COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA, in and for the County of
    MARICOPA, Respondent Judge,
    LILLIANA ARVIZU; DONANN DRYSDALE; HEATHER EHLY and
    BRADLEY EHLY; JESSICA GOLDEN; MONICA GONZALEZ and
    DAVID AMAYA; HAYDEN JOHNSON; MARIA JONES and ERNEST
    LEE JONES, JR.; JENNIFER KOZLOWSKI; AMANDA MUELLER;
    ELIZABETH NEIL-CARACCIOLO and DAVID M. CARACCIOLO;
    KAREN NOLL; ASHLEY PHELPS PALMER and CODY PALMER; DOUG
    POLLOCK and GINA POLLOCK; TRACHELLE SANFORD and JOSEPH
    SANFORD; SUSAN SHEPHERD; CIJI SMITH and CHRISTOPHER
    SMITH; and AMANDA WEBER, Real Parties in Interest.
    No. 1 CA-SA 15-0039
    FILED 3-19-2015
    Petition for Special Action from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. CV2012-093373
    The Honorable David M. Talamante, Judge
    JURISDICTION ACCEPTED; RELIEF GRANTED
    COUNSEL
    Udall Shumway, P.L.C., Mesa
    By David R. Schwartz
    Counsel for Petitioner
    Richard G. Neuheisel, P.L.L.C., Tempe
    By Richard G. Neuheisel
    Counsel for Real Parties in Interest
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop delivered the decision of the Court, in which
    Presiding Judge Kent E. Cattani and Judge Peter B. Swann joined.
    W I N T H R O P, Judge:
    ¶1             In May 2012, a group of former students (“Plaintiffs”) and
    their spouses filed a complaint against the Maricopa County Community
    College District (“the District”), alleging numerous causes of action,
    including defamation. After Plaintiffs’ answers to interrogatories indicated
    they were relying for a portion of their defamation claim on statements
    made after they served their notice of claim and filed their complaint, the
    District filed a motion for partial summary judgment. In part, the District
    argued that any portion of the overall defamation claim based upon those
    post-complaint statements was barred for failure to serve a notice of claim
    incorporating those independent statements. The superior court granted
    much of the District’s motion, but denied the portion of the motion related
    to statements attributed to the District in May and June 2012 news reports
    and blog postings that resulted from the filing of the complaint. After the
    superior court denied the District’s motion for reconsideration and ruled
    that Plaintiffs could amend their previous notice of claim to include
    statements of the District reported in the newspapers of May and June 2012,
    the District filed a petition for special action. Because we agree with the
    District that Plaintiffs were required to serve a timely new or amended
    notice of claim for any new allegations of defamation, and the failure to do
    so was fatal to that portion of their defamation claim based on those post-
    complaint statements, we accept jurisdiction and grant relief.
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    MCCCD v. HON. TALAMANTE/ARVIZU et al.
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    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2             Plaintiffs were a group of “Block 2” (second semester) nursing
    students at Chandler-Gilbert Community College during the spring
    semester in 2011. Plaintiffs completed their final examination on May 9,
    2011, and final grades were posted on-line two days later. Nineteen Block
    2 students (including the seventeen Plaintiffs) received a failing grade and
    an academic dishonesty checkmark, making them ineligible to proceed in
    the nursing program. The students e-mailed staff members, including their
    instructors, to determine the basis for the alleged academic dishonesty, and
    were advised to follow the instructional grievance process outlined in the
    College Catalog and Student Handbook. According to the students, each
    of them attempted to follow the process outlined by the college, including
    arranging an individual conference with the lead instructor, but the
    instructor cancelled all but one of the conferences and refused to answer
    any questions, and administrators at the college suspended the published
    instructional grievance process and switched to a different process under
    the Student Code of Conduct.
    ¶3           In June 2011, fifteen of the students served a notice of claim
    on the District and others. The students were ultimately advised
    (approximately three months after the grades came out) that they had
    received the failing grades because they had allegedly collaborated, and
    therefore cheated, on a five-point on-line quiz in April 2011, a few weeks
    before the final examination. The students claimed they believed the
    assignment allowed for group collaboration, and some of the students
    denied collaborating at all. After hearings in September and October 2011,
    a Student Conduct Board found the students “more likely than not” shared
    answers or collaborated and thus committed academic dishonesty, and a
    Student Conduct Appellate Board upheld the findings. The students
    served a supplemental notice of claim (adding the other two Plaintiffs) in
    November 2011. Meanwhile, Plaintiffs complained to the state’s nursing
    board, which in March 2012 issued a letter of concern about the school’s
    classroom and grievance practices and its curriculum. The college
    eventually held instructional grievance meetings with the students in
    February and March 2012. On March 9, 2012, Plaintiffs served a second
    amended notice of claim, and on March 23, 2012, they served a
    supplemental notice of claim, which included an allegation of ongoing and
    continuing wrongdoing against Plaintiffs. In April 2012, the college’s
    President mailed out Final Determination letters, denying the students’
    appeals.
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    MCCCD v. HON. TALAMANTE/ARVIZU et al.
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    ¶4             On May 10, 2012, Plaintiffs filed their complaint, alleging
    numerous causes of action, including defamation, and naming the District
    and others as defendants.1 Soon thereafter, in May and June 2012, several
    news organizations reported about the filing of the complaint, and named
    and quoted several of the students, who gave interviews to news reporters.
    College officials refused to discuss the details of the lawsuit, although a
    spokesman for the District issued the following written statement: “The
    district believes the claim has no merit whatsoever, and we will defend the
    lawsuit vigorously.” Blog postings (some purportedly by District
    personnel) followed the news stories. Plaintiffs filed a First Amended
    Complaint on June 5, 2012, and, in response to the court’s order of a more
    definite complaint, filed Second and Third Amended Complaints in March
    and May 2013. None of the amended complaints specifically incorporated
    statements attributed to the District in the news reports and blog postings
    that occurred after the initial complaint. Answers by Plaintiffs to non-
    uniform interrogatories in late June 2014, however, indicated for the first
    time that Plaintiffs were relying in part on the May and June 2012 news
    reports and blog postings for their claim of defamation.
    ¶5            On August 26, 2014, the District filed a motion for partial
    summary judgment, seeking the dismissal of several independent
    defamation claims. As to the claim of defamation based on the May and
    June 2012 news reports and blog postings, the District argued that claim
    was barred based on the statute of limitations, failure to serve a notice of
    claim, and a lack of actual defamation. Plaintiffs responded in part that any
    time limits should be equitably tolled (ostensibly under the theory that
    there was no evidence the internal grievance procedures had ended),2 and
    the defamations were continuing in nature. Although the superior court
    granted most of the District’s summary judgment motion, it denied the
    motion with regard to statements attributed to the District in the May and
    June 2012 news reports and blog postings. The District filed a motion for
    1     Plaintiffs also sued seven District employees. The superior court
    dismissed with prejudice the claims against the individual defendants on
    May 17, 2013.
    2      The record indicates there were two applicable administrative
    appeal processes pursued by Plaintiffs: (1) the Student Conduct Code
    appellate process, which concluded when the Student Conduct Appellate
    Board issued its “final and binding” decision in February 2012, and (2) the
    Instructional Grievance Process, which, as Plaintiffs have acknowledged,
    terminated with the college president’s Final Determination letters in April
    2012.
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    MCCCD v. HON. TALAMANTE/ARVIZU et al.
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    reconsideration directed at Plaintiffs’ failure to serve a notice of claim
    regarding the 2012 news reports and blog postings. The court denied the
    motion for reconsideration, and ruled that it would allow Plaintiffs to
    amend their notice of claim “to include the statement of the district reported
    in the newspapers of May and June 2012.”
    ANALYSIS
    I.     Jurisdiction
    ¶6              Although this court rarely accepts special action jurisdiction
    to review the denial of a motion for summary judgment, see, e.g., Piner v.
    Superior Court, 
    192 Ariz. 182
    , 184, ¶ 8, 
    962 P.2d 909
    , 911 (1998), we accept
    jurisdiction in this case because the matter is one of public significance
    affecting a political subdivision of the state and involves an issue of law that
    is likely to arise again. See Deer Valley Unified Sch. Dist. No. 97 v. Houser, 
    214 Ariz. 293
    , 295, ¶ 5, 
    152 P.3d 490
    , 492 (2007); Vo v. Superior Court, 
    172 Ariz. 195
    , 198, 
    836 P.2d 408
    , 411 (App. 1992); Ariz. Rev. Stat. (“A.R.S.”) § 12-
    120.21(A)(4).3 Moreover, if the District is forced to conduct further
    discovery, go to trial, and appeal an erroneous ruling, the purpose of the
    notice of claims statute will be subverted. See generally Flood Control Dist. of
    Maricopa Cnty. v. Gaines, 
    202 Ariz. 248
    , 250, ¶ 2, 
    43 P.3d 196
    , 198 (App. 2002);
    Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 1(a).
    II.    The Merits
    ¶7            The District argues the superior court committed legal error
    and failed to uphold the purpose of the notice of claims statute by allowing
    Plaintiffs to amend their pre-lawsuit notice(s) of claim to assert new,
    separate claims for defamation. According to the District, “[t]here is no
    dispute that the Students did not ever file a notice of claim with the District,
    as required by A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A), asserting such independent claim[s]
    for defamation and offering to settle it for a specific sum.” We agree with
    the District that the portion of Plaintiffs’ defamation claim based on
    statements made in the May and June 2012 news reports and blog postings
    is barred due to Plaintiffs’ failure to file a timely new or amended notice of
    claim incorporating those statements.
    ¶8            Before a public entity can be properly sued for damages, a
    notice of claim that complies in all respects with A.R.S. § 12-821.01 must
    3      We cite the current version of the statutes throughout this opinion
    because no changes material to our decision have occurred since the events
    giving rise to the complaint.
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    MCCCD v. HON. TALAMANTE/ARVIZU et al.
    Decision of the Court
    first be served. Under § 12-821.01(A), persons with a claim against a public
    entity or public employee must file that claim with a person authorized to
    accept service within 180 days after the cause of action accrues. The claim
    must “contain facts sufficient to permit the public entity or public employee
    to understand the basis on which liability is claimed,” and provide “a
    specific amount for which the claim can be settled and the facts supporting
    that amount.” A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A); see also Backus v. State, 
    220 Ariz. 101
    ,
    106-07, ¶ 23, 
    203 P.3d 499
    , 504-05 (2009) (holding the claimant is required to
    supply those facts the claimant deems adequate to permit the public entity
    to evaluate the claim); Deer 
    Valley, 214 Ariz. at 296
    , ¶ 
    9, 152 P.3d at 493
    (requiring that a claimant “include a particular and certain amount of
    money that, if agreed to by the government entity, will settle the claim”).
    ¶9             The requirements set forth in A.R.S. § 12-821.01 exist to “allow
    the public entity to investigate and assess liability, . . . permit the possibility
    of settlement prior to litigation, and . . . assist the public entity in financial
    planning and budgeting.” 
    Backus, 220 Ariz. at 104
    , ¶ 
    10, 203 P.3d at 502
    (quoting Deer 
    Valley, 214 Ariz. at 295
    , ¶ 
    6, 152 P.3d at 492
    ); accord Falcon ex
    rel. Sandoval v. Maricopa Cnty., 
    213 Ariz. 525
    , 527, ¶ 9, 
    144 P.3d 1254
    , 1256
    (2006) (quoting Martineau v. Maricopa Cnty., 
    207 Ariz. 332
    , 335-36, ¶ 19, 
    86 P.3d 912
    , 915-16 (App. 2004)); Yollin v. City of Glendale, 
    219 Ariz. 24
    , 28-29,
    ¶ 11, 
    191 P.3d 1040
    , 1044-45 (App. 2008).
    ¶10            Failure to comply with the statute is not excused by a
    defendant’s actual notice or substantial compliance by a claimant. 
    Falcon, 213 Ariz. at 527
    , ¶ 
    10, 144 P.3d at 1256
    ; Harris v. Cochise Health Sys., 
    215 Ariz. 344
    , 351, ¶ 25, 
    160 P.3d 223
    , 230 (App. 2007). Although a notice of claim
    may be amended or supplemented, the amended or supplemental notice
    must be served within 180 days when the facts are known to the claimant.4
    See Turner v. City of Flagstaff, 
    226 Ariz. 341
    , 344, ¶ 15, 
    247 P.3d 1011
    , 1014
    (App. 2011), abrogated on other grounds as recognized by Fields v. Oates, 
    230 Ariz. 411
    , 415, ¶ 16, 
    286 P.3d 160
    , 164 (App. 2012).
    ¶11          With regard to defamation, each alleged defamatory
    statement by a defendant constitutes a separate publication giving rise to a
    separate cause of action. State v. Superior Court, 
    186 Ariz. 294
    , 299, 
    921 P.2d 697
    , 702 (App. 1996) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 577A(1) & cmt.
    a (1977)). Also, there is effectively no continuous cause of action for
    4      Nothing in the record indicates Plaintiffs’ defamation claim is subject
    to mandatory administrative review; accordingly, the tolling provisions of
    A.R.S. § 12-821.01(C) do not apply. See Kosman v. State, 
    199 Ariz. 184
    , 186,
    ¶¶ 7-9, 
    16 P.3d 211
    , 213 (App. 2000).
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    MCCCD v. HON. TALAMANTE/ARVIZU et al.
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    defamation recognized under Arizona law. See Larue v. Brown, 
    235 Ariz. 440
    , 445, ¶ 23, 
    333 P.3d 767
    , 772 (App. 2014) (applying the “single
    publication rule” and noting that, “in the case of Internet publications, the
    statute of limitations begins to run when the allegedly defamatory material
    is first made available to the public by posting it on a website”).
    ¶12           Consequently, each statement attributed to the District in the
    May and June 2012 news reports and blog postings gave rise to an
    independent defamation claim, and the failure of Plaintiffs to file a separate
    notice of claim within 180 days of those statements is fatal to Plaintiffs’
    defamation claim as related to those statements.5 Further, unless the
    District and/or its agents have continued to reply to the blog posts or in
    some way substantially modified the allegedly defamatory comments
    within the past 180 days, Plaintiffs may not now file a notice of claim related
    to the posts and subsequent comments. See 
    Larue, 235 Ariz. at 446
    , ¶¶ 27-
    
    30, 333 P.3d at 773
    .
    ¶13           If Plaintiffs wished to sue the District for alleged defamatory
    statements made in May and June 2012, they had to first serve a notice of
    claim and state a specific sum for which the District could settle that claim.
    They did not do so. Nothing prevented Plaintiffs from serving a timely new
    or amended notice of claim after their complaint in 2012 and then either
    filing a new complaint or seeking to amend their current complaint if the
    District denied their claim. Allowing Plaintiffs to amend their pre-lawsuit
    notice(s) of claim years after filing their complaint prevents the District
    from assessing that claim before the lawsuit and allows Plaintiffs to
    circumvent the purpose of the notice of claim statute. Accordingly, that
    portion of Plaintiffs’ defamation claim related to the May and June 2012
    news reports and blog postings must be summarily dismissed.
    5      Plaintiffs do not contend they were unaware of the news reports or
    blog postings. Moreover, they have clearly been aware of the notice of
    claim statute from the outset of their case, as evidenced by the notice of
    claim, amended notice of claim, and two supplemental notices of claim they
    served, and nothing in the record indicates the District waived the notice
    requirement or led Plaintiffs to believe otherwise. Thus, equitable tolling
    cannot be applied in this case. See 
    Kosman, 199 Ariz. at 186-87
    , ¶¶ 
    10-11, 16 P.3d at 213-14
    .
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    MCCCD v. HON. TALAMANTE/ARVIZU et al.
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    CONCLUSION
    ¶14           We accept jurisdiction and grant relief. The superior court is
    directed to grant the District’s motion for partial summary judgment with
    respect to that portion of Plaintiffs’ claim of defamation related to the May
    and June 2012 news reports and blog postings.
    :ama
    8