State v. Lopez ( 2015 )


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  •                      NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent,
    v.
    EVERADO LOPEZ, JR., Petitioner.
    No. 1 CA-CR 13-0867 PRPC
    FILED 5-21-2015
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. CR2003-014080-008 DT
    The Honorable M. Scott McCoy, Judge
    REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED
    COUNSEL
    Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix
    By Diane M. Meloche
    Counsel for Respondent
    Everado Lopez, Jr., Kingman
    Petitioner
    STATE v. LOPEZ
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Presiding Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop delivered the decision of the Court,
    in which Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Donn Kessler joined.
    W I N T H R O P, Presiding Judge:
    ¶1           Petitioner, Everado Lopez, Jr. (“Lopez”), petitions for review
    of the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief filed pursuant to
    Rule 32, Ariz. R. Crim. P. After considering the petition for review, we
    grant review and deny relief for the reasons stated below.
    ¶2           A jury convicted Lopez of the use of wire or electronic
    communication in a drug-related transaction and conspiracy to commit
    transportation of dangerous drugs for sale. The trial court sentenced Lopez
    to an aggregate term of fifteen years’ imprisonment, and we affirmed his
    convictions and sentences on direct appeal. State v. Lopez, 1 CA-CR 04-0534
    (Ariz. App. Nov. 17, 2005) (mem. decision). Lopez now seeks review of the
    summary dismissal of his third successive petition for post-conviction
    relief. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal
    Procedure 32.9(c).
    ¶3            Lopez argues his trial counsel was ineffective when he
    allegedly gave Lopez erroneous advice during plea negotiations. We deny
    relief. Lopez could have raised this issue in his prior post-conviction relief
    proceedings. Any claim a defendant raised or could have raised in an
    earlier post-conviction relief proceeding is precluded. See Ariz. R. Crim. P.
    32.2(a). None of the exceptions under Rule 32.2(b) apply here.
    ¶4            Lopez argues that Missouri v. Frye, ___ U.S. ___, 
    132 S. Ct. 1399
    (2012), and Lafler v. Cooper, ___ U.S. ___, 
    132 S. Ct. 1376
    (2012), constitute
    significant changes in the law that allow him to present an untimely claim
    of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(g), 32.2(b)
    (recognizing that preclusion does not apply to claims for relief based on a
    significant change in the law). In both cases, the Supreme Court held a
    defendant has a right to effective assistance of counsel during the plea
    bargain process. Frye, ___ U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 1407-08; Lafler, ___ U.S.
    at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 1384. Frye and Lafler, however, are not significant
    changes in the law as applied in Arizona. Arizona has long recognized that
    the right to effective assistance of counsel extends to the plea bargain
    2
    STATE v. LOPEZ
    Decision of the Court
    process. State v. Donald, 
    198 Ariz. 406
    , 413, ¶¶ 14-17, 
    10 P.3d 1193
    , 1200
    (App. 2000).1
    ¶5             Lopez may, however, be able to seek habeas corpus relief in
    federal court based on ineffective assistance of trial counsel if he can first
    show either he had no counsel in his first post-conviction relief proceeding
    or counsel in his first post-conviction relief proceeding was ineffective. See
    Martinez v. Ryan, __ U.S. __, 
    132 S. Ct. 1309
    , 1320 (2012). Martinez, however,
    does not require a state court to consider all untimely claims of ineffective
    assistance of counsel raised in post-conviction proceedings.
    ¶6            For the above reasons, we grant review and deny relief.
    :ama
    1      Further, in both Frye and Lafler, the Supreme Court acknowledged it
    was merely applying the existing law as defined in 1984 in Strickland v.
    Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 687 (1984). See Frye, ___ U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at
    1409; Lafler, ___ U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 1384. In 1985, the Supreme Court
    held that the law announced in Strickland applied “to ineffective-assistance
    claims arising out of the plea process.” Hill v. Lockhart, 
    474 U.S. 52
    , 57 (1985).
    3