Howitt v. Wrinkle ( 2018 )


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  •                       NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    In re the Marriage of:
    SCOTT E. HOWITT, Petitioner/Appellant,
    v.
    PAMELA A. WRINKLE, Respondent/Appellee.
    No. 1 CA-CV 17-0760 FC
    FILED 10-18-2018
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. FN2012-091539
    The Honorable Theodore Campagnolo, Judge
    REVERSED AND REMANDED
    COUNSEL
    Berkshire Law Office, PLLC, Tempe
    By Keith Berkshire, Erica L. Gadberry
    Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant
    Pamela A. Wrinkle, Phoenix
    Respondent/Appellee
    HOWITT v. WRINKLE
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Judge James B. Morse Jr. delivered the decision of the Court, in which
    Presiding Judge James P. Beene and Judge Michael J. Brown joined.
    M O R S E, Judge:
    ¶1          Scott Howitt ("Husband") appeals from the family court's
    order denying his petition to modify his spousal maintenance obligation to
    Pamela Wrinkle ("Wife"). For the following reasons, we reverse and
    remand for proceedings consistent with this decision.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2             The parties were married in 1984. They were divorced in 2012
    by a consent decree, which they filled out using a form provided by the
    Maricopa County Superior Court.1 As relevant on appeal, the court ordered
    Husband to pay spousal maintenance of $1,100 per month for 15 years.2 At
    section 10 of the findings the decree provides:
    If spousal maintenance is to be awarded, the parties further
    agree:
    Spousal maintenance awarded shall be modified in
    accordance with Arizona law, OR
    X      The parties acknowledge that the circumstances of
    their futures are unknown, but each desires that this
    maintenance award, so awarded by their agreement, not be
    modified in the future for any reason. Therefore, it is at this
    time ordered that this spousal maintenance award shall NOT
    be modifiable for any reason.
    Further down the same page, though, section 4 of the orders provides:
    1      The parties were ordered to appear at an early resolution conference
    at 1:30 p.m. on August 23, 2012. The (signed) decree was entered by the
    clerk at 3:36 p.m. that same day.
    2      The parties further agreed that spousal maintenance would increase
    to $1,700 per month "upon the [sale] of the house."
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    HOWITT v. WRINKLE
    Decision of the Court
    In accordance with the parties' agreements,
    X      The spousal maintenance award shall be modifiable in
    accordance with Arizona law, OR
    The spousal maintenance award shall NOT be
    modifiable for any reason.
    ¶3           In 2017, Husband filed a petition to modify the spousal
    maintenance award, alleging changed circumstances based on a recent
    cancer diagnosis.3 See Ariz. Rev. Stat. ("A.R.S.") § 25-327(A). Wife objected,
    arguing that the spousal maintenance award was non-modifiable per the
    decree. The family court agreed with Wife and rejected the petition.
    ¶4             Husband moved for reconsideration, contending that the
    court orders in the decree specify that the maintenance award is modifiable,
    or at the very least, the decree presented a "contradiction of sorts" regarding
    modifiability that "should allow for considerable review."4 Again, Wife
    objected, asserting (among other things):
    It is my understanding that the divorce decree was never
    intended to be modifiable. I believe that [it] is stated in the
    earlier part of the document. A possible mistake was made
    later in the document that wasn't caught by anyone present at
    the time including [Husband]. I believe he is now using this
    as a reason to not honor our mutually agreed upon
    arrangement.
    The family court denied the motion, reasoning as follows:
    In order to harmonize and effectuate the Decree, Section 4
    Orders that the spousal maintenance award is either
    modifiable or non-modifiable according to the agreement of
    the parties. Section 10 of the Findings clearly shows that the
    parties agreed that the spousal maintenance award was non-
    3      The form-based petition stated: "You cannot ask for a change in
    spousal maintenance/support if you signed an agreement that says that
    spousal maintenance/support cannot be changed or modified." (Emphasis
    in original.)
    4     Ultimately, the family court considered the motion as one filed
    pursuant to Arizona Rules of Family Law Procedure 83, 84, and 85. In the
    context of this case, however, the characterization of Husband's post-ruling
    motion is a distinction without a difference.
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    HOWITT v. WRINKLE
    Decision of the Court
    modifiable. Any other interpretation would require the
    introduction of parol or extrinsic evidence to change the terms
    of the Decree.
    ¶5            Husband timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to
    A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(2).
    DISCUSSION
    ¶6           We review de novo questions of law, including those
    involving interpretation of a decree or statute. Cohen v. Frey, 
    215 Ariz. 62
    ,
    66, ¶ 10 (App. 2007); In re Marriage of Waldren, 
    217 Ariz. 173
    , 175, ¶ 6 (2007).
    ¶7            As Husband points out, a spousal maintenance award is
    presumed to be modifiable (upon a showing of changed circumstances that
    are substantial and continuing) unless the parties specifically agree
    otherwise. A.R.S. §§ 25-319(C), -327(A); Schroeder v. Schroeder, 
    161 Ariz. 316
    ,
    323 (1989); Waldren, 217 Ariz. at 175, ¶ 9. At issue here is whether the decree
    evinces such an agreement. See Waldren, 217 Ariz. at 175, ¶ 9 (discussing
    A.R.S. §§ 25-319(C) and -317(G)). The decree—which delineates the spousal
    maintenance award as both modifiable and non-modifiable—is ambiguous.
    See Cohen, 215 Ariz. at 66, ¶ 11 (a decree is ambiguous if it "can reasonably
    be construed to have more than one meaning") (quoting In re Estate of
    Lamparella, 
    210 Ariz. 246
    , 250,    ¶ 21 (App. 2005)); see also In re Marriage of
    Johnson & Gravino, 
    231 Ariz. 228
    , 233, ¶¶ 16-17 (App. 2012). We agree with
    Husband that this ambiguity cannot be resolved without (impermissibly)
    considering extrinsic evidence of intent. Cf. In re Marriage of Zale, 
    193 Ariz. 246
    , 249-50, ¶¶ 10-15 (1999) (noting that it was error to consider parol
    evidence to resolve a dispute about the duration of an award of spousal
    maintenance).
    ¶8             Attempting to "harmonize" the conflicting sections, the family
    court held that section 10 of the findings took precedence over section 4 of
    the order because "Section 10 of the Findings clearly shows that the parties
    agreed and that the spousal maintenance award was non-modifiable."
    However, the opposite could also be said—that section 4 of the order
    "clearly shows" that the parties agreed that the spousal maintenance award
    was to be modifiable. The two sections are diametrically opposed and cannot
    be read in harmony with one another. A court may not assign a meaning
    to one provision that would render another meaningless. See Cohen, 215
    Ariz. at 66, ¶ 12. We cannot say, looking within the four corners of the
    Decree, which section controls, or, said differently, which "X" is in the
    "right" place.
    4
    HOWITT v. WRINKLE
    Decision of the Court
    ¶9            It appears that there was a clerical error in the drafting of the
    document. Before a court can determine whether the maintenance award
    is modifiable or non-modifiable, this error must first be corrected. A family
    court can correct a clerical error—i.e., "to show what the court actually
    decided but did not correctly represent in the written judgment"—at any
    time. Egan-Ryan Mech. Co. v. Cardon Meadows Dev. Corp., 
    169 Ariz. 161
    , 166
    (App. 1990) (interpreting Ariz. R. Civ. P. 60(a)); Ariz. R. Fam. L. P. 85(A). In
    correcting a clerical error, the family court should look outside the decree
    to other documents in the record. Vincent v. Shanovich, 
    243 Ariz. 269
    , 271,
    ¶ 8 (2017). We therefore remand to the family court to correct the apparent
    clerical error in the decree. If the court determines that the award is
    modifiable, it should consider the merits of Husband's petition to modify.
    To be clear, the party seeking modification bears the burden of proving
    changed circumstances by comparison with the circumstances existing at
    dissolution, Scott v. Scott, 
    121 Ariz. 492
    , 494 (1979); Richards v. Richards, 
    137 Ariz. 225
    , 226 (App. 1983), and the question whether circumstances have
    changed lies with the family court, Schroeder, 
    161 Ariz. at 323
    .
    ¶10            That said, we note that Wife referred to the issue of arrearages
    below and in her answering brief. Spousal maintenance payments that
    accrued before Husband filed his petition to modify were vested when due
    and are not subject to modification. See In re Marriage of Priessman, 
    228 Ariz. 336
    , 340, ¶ 13 (App. 2011) (discussing § 25-327(A)). A spousal maintenance
    obligation may be enforced by a contempt proceeding. Danielson v. Evans,
    
    201 Ariz. 401
    , 411, ¶ 37 (App. 2001); see generally Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 92.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶11          For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand for
    proceedings consistent with this decision. In our discretion, we deny
    Husband's request for attorneys' fees on appeal. See A.R.S. § 25-324(A). We
    award costs to Husband upon compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil
    Appellate Procedure 21.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED: AA
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